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In July 1995, there was a massacre in Srebrenica in Bosnia. The international community, 
which had sent troops with a UN mandate to the conflict zone could not prevent atrocities 
from emerging. At the time, I was a Parliamentarian at the beginning of my second mandate 
and a mother to one-and-a-half-year-old daughter whose behavior had become abnormal. 
Amidst the confusion of not knowing what was happening to my child, at least one idea 
became clear in my mind. If I ever had an opportunity to influence the resources, equipment 
and mandate sufficient for ensuring peaceful circumstances for the civilians, this was it. As 
an active member of the Human Rights Group of Parliament and later as a member of the 
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, I had plenty of opportunities to emphasize peace-
building and peacekeeping ensuring the rights of the civilians in conflict and post-conflict 
areas. I tried my best in this regard.
Questions of peace and war have interested me since my childhood. Therefore, having 
decided to end my parliamentary career I had the idea of studying conflicts and crisis 
management. Because of the importance of military actions in crisis management, I decided 
to apply for the right to produce an academic dissertation on the same theme at the National 
Defence University. In this process, the roles of Professor Jarmo Toiskallio and Rector, 
General Major Pertti Salminen were of the utmost importance. I want to thank them for 
their encouragement and freedom from prejudice. In January 2007, I was the first civilian 
approved as a doctoral student at the National Defence University.
Supervisors of my work, Professor Juha Mäkinen and Professor Emeritus Reijo E. Heinonen, 
and my additional supervisor, Dr., Auli Keskinen, receive my warm thanks due to their 
active work in supporting my dissertation process. I owe special thanks to Lieutenant 
Colonel, Dr. Rainer Peltoniemi who encouraged me to start to study crisis management 
and has commented on an early version of my dissertation manuscript. I would also like 
to thank Ms. Elina Rusanen, who worked as my research assistant in 2008 and transcribed 
the interviews of my research. I also own my gratitude to the pre-examiners of this thesis, 
Professor Franz Kernic and Dr. Osmo Kuusi for their constructive comments. With regard 
to the challenges of the English language, I would also like to thank Mr. Jussi Rosti and 
Mr. James Morrison (Aakkosto Oy.), Mr. Arif Khan, and Mr. David Schlaefer for their 
comments on the text. Ms. Heidi Paananen and Captain Juha Tuominen also receive my 
warm thanks for their help when finalizing the thesis into the form of a book.
I have had several opportunities to receive ideas from persons involved with human rights, 
crisis management and research. In particular I would like to thank Dr. Tarja Cronberg, 
Mr. Pekka Haavisto, M. -P., Dr. Jarno Limnéll, Ms. Pauliina Parhiala, Professor Anna-Maija 
Pirttilä-Backman, and Professor Helena Ranta for their time and valuable thoughts.
My former colleagues in Parliament, namely Mr. Aulis Ranta-Muotio and Mr. Matti Väistö, 
deserve my thanks because they encouraged me to attain the highest academic degree in 
the form of a doctoral dissertation during a conversation before a late parliamentary vote in 
November 2005. At the time, I do not think they thought that their encouragement would 
be so influential. 
7I am grateful to my friends Jaana Lahti, Leena Linkola, Leena Savela-Syväjärvi, Pauliina 
Ståhlberg, Sirpa Vahtera, and Miina Weckroth for their support on this project. I would 
also like to thank human rights activists with whom I have worked since the 1990s for their 
inspiration. My colleagues from KIOS also receive my special thanks.
I would like to thank the following foundations for their economic support for my 
research: Suomalaisen strategisen tutkimuksen ja seurannan tukisäätiö, Maanpuolustuksen 
kannatussäätiö and Suomen Marsalkka Mannerheimin Sotatieteellinen rahasto. At the 
Parliamentary Library, I had an opportunity to work in the cabinet for researchers, for 
which I am grateful. Staff of the Parliamentary Library and the National Defence University 
helped find relevant literature and they deserve my thanks as well. The Department of 
Leadership and Military Pedagogy and its staff provided me with expertise and resources for 
my research. In particular, I would like to thank them for enabling the work of my research 
assistant during and after the interview phase of my study.
Last but not least I want to thank my husband Tero Taponen and my daughters Alli and 
Taru Taponen for their support during my research process. They, along with my mother 
Liisa Anttila and brother Tero Anttila, have given me great inspiration at different times in 
my life. Thank you!
The writing process is over. We will see later whether it has any impact on the ways armed 
conflict are handled or prevented.
 
Vantaa, 
May 2012
Ulla Anttila
81.  Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, researchers have been interested in how contemporary armed 
conflicts have changed. For example, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the massacre in 
Srebrenica in 1995 raised awareness of the fact that the end of the Cold War did not serve 
to end armed conflicts. Most armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been low 
intensity in nature where civilians are targeted as part of the tactics of the warriors and at 
least one party in the conflict consists of one or several insurgent groups. Such a conflict 
may have its roots in the regional colonial history, and the lack of democracy and welfare 
may be linked to the regional violent development. Parties in conflict may define the causes 
of conflict in different terms and their mutual perceptions may be controversial, which 
complicates peace-building.
This study focuses on crisis management. The areas of particular interests are new conflicts 
and how they influence the development of crisis management, and even how the field 
experiences of expatriate personnel affect their identities and learning. The study also 
focuses on cooperation and personnel as well as on organizations and individuals’ challenges 
for learning in crisis management. The intersection of individual and collective activities 
is interesting in crisis management and the framework of the present research is human 
security. In the study of crisis management, I intend to find ways to support sustainable 
peace. 
Studies that focus on crisis management personnel and their competences and learning 
can provide information that promotes human security. The present research analyzes the 
changes in armed conflicts and crisis management, as well as the competences and learning 
required to respond to the challenges of contemporary warfare from a human security 
perspective. From a social sciences perspective, all these branches of research are rich in terms 
of definitions and alternative interpretations, which means that this type of multidisciplinary 
research requires theoretical clarifications in several fields.
Understanding crisis management work at the grass-roots level in conflict areas is a key 
question for developing related organizations and practices. Research on human security 
in conflict areas may help to improve peace-building and crisis management practices. 
However, research in peace processes is not interest-free. Studies on peace operations have 
been criticized for being instrumental, for seeking answers to simplified questions and for 
being uncritical regarding the background of the operations and the assumptions related to 
it (see Bellamy 2004). Human security and local people’s needs should be a major topic in 
the education and training of personnel in peace operations. 
Human security challenges the analysis of security and crisis management. Long-term 
reduction of violence requires crisis management personnel to be able to cooperate with 
local inhabitants in order to enable the development of local communities. Local ownership 
in peace-building facilitates sustainable peace processes. Further analysis of local ownership 
is needed in order to develop more successful peace-building methods. The human security 
discourse has shown that security conceptions that focus merely on national security are 
insufficient.
9In this research, the analysis of armed conflicts and crisis management focuses on the era 
since the Cold War. The implications of the recent development are scrutinized in relation 
to their future prospects. The theoretical background to this dissertation will rely on the 
analysis of new conflicts, crisis management and human reality in it, as well as on major 
learning processes in crisis management. 
This research is multidisciplinary in nature. Chapter 2 introduces the various scientific 
perspectives and also introduces and evaluates the research questions (RQs) and methods. 
Some methodological triangulation is conducted. The research procedure and the 
methodological questions including the interview and futures studies choices are also 
discussed in detail. Chapters 3 to 6 analyze the theoretical background of the research. 
Due to the multidisciplinary nature of the research, several theoretical perspectives as 
well as more practical findings related to conflicts and peace building will be introduced 
briefly and reflected towards the research questions in these chapters. Chapter 3 introduces 
new conflicts and evaluates potential explanations of contemporary warfare. Due to the 
multitude of theories, the introduction to each of them is relatively short. Chapter 4 analyzes 
the recent evolution and potential future development of crisis management. In this study, 
crisis management is assessed in the context of new conflicts. Crisis management has not 
been created to respond to warfare between major powers. Chapter 4 deals briefly with the 
history of Kosovo as an example of a new conflict and because all the crisis management 
personnel interviewed for the empirical part of this research had some work experience from 
Kosovo. Theoretically and practically relevant findings related to crisis management may 
be needed for the future development of crisis management; therefore chapter 4 included 
both types of information. Chapters 3 and 4 provide background information regarding 
the core competences in crisis management that are defined in chapter 5. The theoretical 
framework necessary for analyzing human factors in the development of crisis management 
is introduced in chapters 5 and 6 the latter of which is focused on learning. Learning takes 
place when adopting the core competences and reflecting on how to develop at one’s duties. 
The framework of organizational learning will be introduced as well. 
Chapter 7 consists of analysis of the results of the Delphi panel process, and chapter 8 covers 
the results of the crisis management personnel interviews. Chapter 9 compares the results of 
the two empirical parts and discusses the implications and various meanings of the results. 
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2.  Research questions, research procedure, 
 and methodology
This research is based on pluralist epistemology. It relies on the idea of using various types 
of knowledge considered as suitable information sources (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti 
2006, 13). Integrating disparate values, epistemologies and knowledge has been considered 
as a way of dealing with complexity (Miller et al. 2008). Similarly, the ability to use different 
methodologies and theories is an advantage for futures studies (Inayatullah 2010). As 
mentioned in chapter 1, perspectives from several fields of research are applied to this study 
and the empirical part consists of two kinds of material.
Pluralist epistemology does not require theoretical triangulation. Using different methods on 
the same theme or object of study means methodological triangulation (Cohen et al. 2007, 
142). The present research used both the Delphi panel process and qualitative interviews. 
The empirical parts of this research partly focus on the same themes, which means that the 
analysis is partial methodological triangulation. 
Primarily, this study underlines the importance of a multidisciplinary approach to the 
broad research themes. Secondly, the study is anchored to military pedagogy1 and to a larger 
framework of behavioral and social sciences and military studies. A military-pedagogical 
framework works out holistic and critical views of soldiers and officers as learning, growing 
and acting human beings who interact with their environments (Toiskallio 2000a). 
The present research studies the work of soldiers in crisis management in a holistic and 
multidisciplinary manner, which is consistent with the nature of military pedagogy. Military 
studies cannot be isolated into military contexts only. It is necessary to study the military so 
that other actors in crisis areas, including local inhabitants and civilian crisis management 
personnel are also under scrutiny. 
Although the military-pedagogical literature has recognized recent and on-going changes in 
warfare, efforts to enlarge the scientific conceptualizations based on empirical studies have 
been rare in this field. Due to the strategic focus on crisis management, military-pedagogical 
research based on the empirical data is needed in the future in order to develop military 
education, training, and organizations. A similar kind of research related to civilian crisis 
management and peace-building is also required.
Thirdly, because of my scientific background in social psychology, I wanted to extend my 
study into this direction. Comprehensive views on crisis management cannot rely only on 
military studies, due to the civilian nature of crisis management. In peace-building, besides 
peacekeepers the local and expatriate civilian actors are of extreme importance. Military 
systems are also dependent on civilian systems.
Fourthly, this thesis is grounded on futures research. My work has a future orientation 
on requirements for crisis management structures, training and personnel in terms of 
facilitating peace-building. In order to understand these phenomena, it is necessary to have 
a conception of the potential evolution of futures crises and conflicts. 
1 According to Toiskallio (2000a, 7) military pedagogy (MPED) is known as a scientific discipline in Continental and Nordic 
Europe. 
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2.1  Research questions
There is a shortage of theoretical contributions in the research on peace operations (Aksu 
2003; Bellamy 2004). In Finland, the limited number of studies have focused on crisis 
management personnel, and which means there is a need for more knowledge about their 
thinking. However, their considerations are important for a comprehensive understanding 
of crisis management, especially when the crisis management institutions are developed. 
Meanwhile, more information on the thinking and perceptions of the crisis management 
personnel would be required in order to better understand the challenges that are part of 
everyday life of the personnel. The views of personnel’s views affect the implementation of 
crisis management and, therefore, human security. 
To understand the futures trends, it is necessary to comprehend the contemporary 
development that influences the future. Results of this type of research may facilitate conflict 
prevention. Crisis management evolves in relation to contemporary conflict development 
and crises leading to international operations. In order to develop crisis management, some 
assessment of futures conflicts is needed. This development work requires learning, so it is 
one of the main focuses of this research.
The main research question (RQ) in this study is:
 
 What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?
This main RQ is both theoretical and practical. The theoretical linkage between learning 
and crisis management is weak, so it is important to try to connect these concepts. The 
practical dimension of this RQ is connected with the need to develop crisis management 
practices. The framework of evolving crisis management in this research is human security 
which emphasizes the human rights of every individual. The main RQ is divided into the 
following three RQs:
1. What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management 
organizations and personnel? 
This RQ is linked to the change in armed conflicts.
2. How do field experiences affect the personnel’s identities and self-concepts?
The individual level of this RQ is crucial for understanding employees working for crisis 
management as individuals.
3. How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be developed when 
the human security approach is taken into account?
This RQ is mostly practical in its character because the framework of crisis management has 
not been broadly conceptualized. 
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2.2  Main concepts in the research
This section briefly defines the main concepts of this study which are in detail in chapters 
3–6. New conflicts consist of armed conflicts and wars that mostly take place in developing 
countries and involve non-state actors (see section 3.2). Tactics in new conflict differ from 
conventional warfare. This type of warfare is known from the history of warfare, but it has 
become the most typical type of armed conflict since the end of the Cold War. 
The concept of human security was launched in the UNDP’s Human Development Report 
in 1994. The core issue in human security is that the individuals’ rights for security are 
regarded as the first topic on the security agenda. Security policy has traditionally focused on 
the security of the states. The human security concept is based on the idea of the universal 
human rights. It can be seen as a normative concept that is connected with an obligation 
to promote human rights. It is different from the state-based security thinking, although 
these views are considered complementary. Regarding human security, there are two basic 
definitions of the concept; a broad definition and a narrow definition. According to the 
broad definition, all kinds of threats against human beings should be analyzed. According 
to the narrow definition, however, human security exists in relation to violent threats. 
(Nuruzzaman 2006; see also Human Security Report 2005.) Both perspectives are needed, 
but this thesis relies on the narrow definition due to its empirical focus. Human security 
issues are introduced in section 3.3. 
Crisis management consists of a wide range of efforts to deal with an armed conflict or a 
humanitarian catastrophe and stabilize the situation to enable peace (see chapter 4). It is 
divided into civilian and military crisis management. Military crisis management focuses 
on stabilizing conflict. Peace-building is a wider concept than crisis management that refers 
to the use of crisis management means and the long-term peace process, that may require 
reconstruction and reformation of post-conflict society. Crisis management and peace-
building issues will be introduced in chapter 4.
Peacekeepers refer to personnel working in military crisis management. In the Finnish context, 
both reservists and professional soldiers serve in these capacities. Civilian crisis management 
personnel work for civilian crisis management and have different professional backgrounds. 
Challenges to the personnel will be introduced in chapter 5.
Competences signify both individual skills and collective abilities. Their development requires 
learning processes (see section 5.3). Self-concept answers the question: who am I? (see section 
5.2.3.) Identity is a wider concept that consists of an individual’s self-concept and its social 
meaning to oneself. It can be conceptualized both in individual and collective terms (see 
section 5.2). Learning refers to different processes when adapting new knowledge and skills, 
which induces cognitive transformation at the individual level. It is studied in different 
research branches, but the present research has focused on changes due to learning. Learning 
may also be seen as a process that promotes organizational change and development (see 
chapter 6).
13
2.3  Research procedure
This research consists of a literature analysis and two empirical parts. The literature analysis 
is multidisciplinary because it is necessary to analyze issues related to new conflicts, evolution 
of crisis management and various human factors that influence crisis management and the 
personnel involved with it. Each chapter in the literature analysis is intended to facilitate the 
analysis of the research questions in a progressive manner. The analysis starts from the end of 
the Cold War and focuses mostly on the latest development in conflicts and crisis management. 
Two empirical phases make it to answer the research questions that were first introduced earlier 
in this chapter. These empirical parts are, firstly, the interviews of three professional groups 
that have work experience from Kosovo, and, secondly, the futures panel process in regard to 
the future of crisis management and special skills required from crisis management personnel. 
1. The first empirical phase of the research consists of the analysis of crisis management relying 
on futures studies, with particular focus on education, personnel and organizations in crisis 
management. The level of analysis in this part of the study is mostly organizational and 
institutional. Both special experts of crisis management (15 in total) and the interviewees 
representing crisis management personnel (27 in total) were interviewed for the first round 
of this part of the study. The interviewees of the second part of the study were asked to 
participate in the panel process regarding the future of crisis management, but the crisis 
management personnel interviewees did not attend the second round of the panel.
The method of the panel process is the Argument Delphi technique as described by Osmo 
Kuusi (1999). Historically, the Delphi technique has been criticized because of its narrow 
perspective on expertise (Linturi 2007, 106). Therefore, in order to avoid a restricted choice 
of experts, individuals with practical field experience in crisis management and experts with 
more traditional expertise are included in the first round of the panel process. The knowledge 
of people having practical experience from crisis management is especially valuable when 
the requirements for future crisis management personnel and education are analyzed. The 
challenges of the current development in crisis management are taken into account.
2. The second empirical phase of the research will consist of qualitative interviews. Between 
February and June in 2008, I interviewed: nine officers of the permanent staff in the Finnish 
Defence Forces who have experience with peacekeeping, 10 peacekeepers recruited from 
the reserves (five women and five men), and – eight people who had worked in one or 
several civilian crisis management operations (five women and three men). This part of the 
study focuses mostly on the personal and individual level of crisis management; that is, the 
personal experiences and views of the personnel. However, some of the questions regarding 
education, training and feedback systems are related to the organizational and institutional 
level of the analysis. In this research, soldiers serving in military crisis management are 
systematically called peacekeepers, not crisis management soldiers, although I prefer 
to use the term military crisis management rather than peacekeeping when referring to 
contemporary military operations of this type. A typical feature of Finnish peacekeeping has 
been the high proportion of reservists. Therefore, it was adequate to interview both reservists 
and professional officers who have peacekeeping experience.
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All the interviewees had experience with crisis management in Kosovo. Each interviewee was 
interviewed once. The interviewees had worked in Kosovo in either 2006 or 2007. At the 
time the interviews took place, every interviewee had worked in Kosovo at least for several 
months and either continued to work there or had returned home. The longest period 
between the end of the duties in the operation and the interview was less than a year and a 
half. In most cases, the interviews occurred within a year of the interviewee’s return. Due to 
the limits of human memory and the continuous changes in Kosovo, it would not have been 
reasonable to interview people who had worked in Kosovo much earlier. The civilian crisis 
management has become stronger in Kosovo due to the reinforcement of the EU mission 
in Kosovo since 2008. The recent development of the region has been peaceful and the 
prospects for Kosovo are positive. 
Immediately before the interview phase Finland had had a relatively large presentation in 
military and civilian crisis management both in Kosovo and Afghanistan.2 The conflicts in 
Kosovo and Afghanistan can therefore be regarded as “new conflicts”. In order to compare 
the interviews, it was reasonable to interview personnel who had experience from the same 
region. Because of the higher risks of the operation in Afghanistan, one could argue that 
studying personnel who have worked in Kosovo could describe some features typical of 
peace missions, regardless of their risk level. Due to the different nature of the missions in 
Kosovo and Afghanistan, I decided to concentrate on the personnel who have experience 
from Kosovo. If I had interviewed personnel from both missions, it would have been difficult 
to evaluate the impact of the operation in relation to personal differences. 
Because gender issues affect collaboration with local civilians, it was preferable that at least 
some of the interviewees would be women. Because the proportion of female professional 
officers in Finland is small, I attempted to balance the gender proportion in the sample of 
the peacekeeper interviewees recruited from the reserves. According to Kousa’s (2008) study, 
only 2.3 percent (N=14) of the responding Finnish peacekeepers were women3. 
The interview procedure was checked after the first interview, which was considered as a 
pre-interview. The positive outcome of the first interview meant that it was included in the 
data that was analyzed for this study. The interview questions of the civilian and military 
crisis management personnel were partially differentiated according to the varying roles 
of different actors in the region. Because of the lack of the studies of the realities of these 
people working in the field, I have emphasized understanding their thinking and ways of 
interpreting the surrounding realities. I decided to study individuals in order to understand 
their thinking in depth. This part of my empirical research is connected with the individual 
level of analysis. 
From an ethical perspective, this study should not be problematic. The interviewees remained 
anonymous during the study process. The dual roles of the interviewees when expressing 
personal experiences and when participating in a Delphi process made it necessary for the 
interviewees to remain anonymous, even during the Delphi process. 
2 Another alternative would have been to interview personnel who had worked in Afghanistan. Finland’s involvement in Afgha-
nistan has been relatively strong since 2002. However, because of the security situation, plenty of expatriate civilians employed 
in Afghanistan require the protection of the international ISAF troops and the civilian crisis management often relies of the mi-
litary activities. The NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan is risky for the peacekeepers and the risks have increased since 
the beginning of the operation (Salonius-Pasternak 2009). Therefore, ISAF is a riskier operation for peacekeepers than KFOR. 
3 Military service in Finland is based on a male conscript system (see Suomalainen Sotilas , 2009) and is voluntary for women.
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Two empirical phases of the research can be categorized according to their potential 
relevance when responding to the four research questions. The results of the interviews of 
the crisis management personnel potentially provide answers to all four research questions. 
Additionally, the results of the Delphi panel process provide answers to all of the research 
questions, except RQ2.
With regard to both the interview material and the Argument Delphi process, the future 
prospects of crisis management are analyzed by taking into account the educational issues 
and the cooperation of civilian and military actors and issues related to local ownership. The 
analysis of the crisis management and peace-building and the related education and training 
emphasizes the systemic level of developing crisis management and the methods of futures 
research. The opinions and perceptions of both military and civilian personnel in crisis 
management are relevant when emphasizing “people-centered” views on human security 
and crisis management. The interviews with crisis management personnel concentrated 
on the individual level, although they also built a bridge from the individual level to the 
systemic level which is based on the futures studies. Institutional and individual levels of 
crisis management are intertwined. Comprehension of both levels enables the development 
of crisis management as a system and, consequently, of the activities of individuals. 
Table 1.  Main focus of the chapters in relation to the research questions
The chapters focus on responding to the research questions consistently with Table 1. The 
main focus of each chapter is on responding to the research questions in accordance with 
Table 1. Chapters from 3 to 6 are based on theoretical analysis as well as on the description of 
the development of conflicts and crisis management, which are important themes regarding 
the research questions as well.
2.4  Methods and methodological choices
2.4.1  Futures research
A research community seldom becomes unanimous regarding the quality of knowledge 
about the future (Kuusi 1999, 5). Futures thinking is not neutral because it depends on 
subjective choices from the research problems, hypotheses and goals of a study (Godet 2001, 
13). From a scientific perspective, futures research is multidisciplinary and it aims to create 
comprehensive alternative futures scenarios that take diverse alternative parts of reality into 
Chapter   Research questions (RQ) 
Chapter 3  RQ:s 1 and 3 
Chapter 4  Main RQ and RQ 3 
Chapter 5   All RQ:s 
Chapter 6  All RQ:s 
Chapter 7  Main RQ and RQ:s 1 and 3 
Chapter 8  All RQ:s 
Chapter 9  All RQ:s 
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account. Futures paths are often comprised of arguments – or chains of arguments. For 
futures research, it is relevant to imagine and identify the actions required in order for 
the desirable, possible, probable or avoidable alternatives to come true. (Kamppinen et al. 
2003, 25–30; Keskinen 1999, 61.) The aim of the research is often to create the most 
desirable alternatives for the future (Aaltonen & Wilenius 2002). Futures research is not a 
value-free science because it aims at both the true and the good (Bell 1997b, 319). It has 
not attained the phase justifying the values that underlie the images of preferable futures 
(Bell 2009, 43). Because the objectives of this field of study are both the true and the 
good, one should be aware of the mixed subjectivity and objectivity of futures studies, in 
which the human values are used as parameters. The epistemology of futures research is 
based on the understanding that futures data, information and knowledge are provided for 
strategic decision-making based on studying the concurrent understanding of phenomena 
and assessing their conditional alternative development paths. (Keskinen 1999.) 
I believe that truth-seeking and argumentative futures research clearly provides a better basis 
for futures thinking and futures images creation than argumentation without any assessment 
that relies on futures studies as background information. In this research, the agenda that 
focuses on preferable futures relies on the concepts of human security and sustainable 
development. Although these objectives may be attained by means that are assessed in partly 
controversial terms, depending on the evaluator, at least it is more suitable to make these 
assumptions explicit.
The conception of knowledge in the futures research is broader than in scientific thinking 
in general, but this does not make futures thinking unscientific (Malaska 1993, 7). Bell 
(1997a, 235) concluded that “although futurist methodological procedures are reasonably 
well developed, no generally agreed upon theory of knowledge for futures studies yet exists.” 
The ontology of futures research is systemic. The limit of the systemic ontology is that the 
reality is conceptualized as a system and parts of reality – which are not seen as part of any 
system – extend beyond this kind of analysis. (Kamppinen & Malaska 2003.)
2.4.2  Delphi method
The Delphi technique was chosen as the method with which to assess the future of crisis 
management. The Delphi technique is one of the most frequently used methods to gather 
argumentation of several experts in order to assess the possibilities in the future development 
of the phenomenon under study (Kuusi 2003, 205). Originally, the Delphi method was 
used to induce a consensus between different opinions among experts in a group after a 
series of questionnaires following each other (ibid., 207).The Delphi method was invented 
specifically to assess the future in the United States in 1953 (Bell 1997a, 261). In the Delphi 
method the experts argue anonymously and, in a way, the researcher filters the information 
from the experts’ arguments. The research process evolves in rounds based on the responses 
of the experts in the panel. The qualitative interviews have been used as background material 
to the first round of the futures panel work and the crisis management personnel were 
interviewed in accordance with the first round Delphi Panel process. In this way, the Delphi 
method could be combined with the analysis of the results of the qualitative interviews. In 
the second round, the experts could comment on the others’ arguments made during the 
17
first round. The idea of combining various types of expertise in a futures panel guarantees 
various types of expertise in the process.
The Delphi method has been criticized methodologically (Kuusi 1999, 73–74), but the 
criticism has ignored the basic point of the Delphi technique: namely, the main idea of a 
Delphi study is to find relevant arguments regarding futures developments. The Delphi 
method is not best at identifying accurate judgments concerning future events, but at 
revealing valid and substantial arguments for the judgments. However, what really happens 
in the future is typically not based only on valid arguments. (Ibid. 77–85.) Apart from 
criticizing the loose way in which the Delphi techniques has been used, Sackman (1975) 
criticized the method due to its inherent conformity pressures, its reliance upon what is 
little more than educated guesswork, and the absence of a formalized scientific basis for the 
legitimization of the outcomes that resulted from the use of the method. (Rescher 1998, 
96.) However, Rescher (1998) presumed that the Delphi technique remains an alternative 
in the futures assessment because there are often no better methodological alternatives that 
rely on a theory-based framework. 
Nowadays, the Delphi technique is mostly used in order to obtain justified arguments about 
the futures development, rather than to obtain a consensus among the experts (Kuusi 2003, 
210–211). The use of this method is justified, especially if certain development is only 
starting and the panel process facilitates an understanding of the weak signals that co-exist 
with this development and provide information about the potential futures development. A 
successful Delphi study more closely resembles a tool for futures making than a prediction. 
(Kuusi 1993, 138–139.)
As it was originally developed, three key characteristics of Delphi are anonymity, iteration, 
and feedback. Anonymous participants consisting mostly of experts are approached by 
mail or computer. Iteration means that there are several rounds the first of which can be 
an inventory in which participants are asked about events to be forecast or parameters to 
be estimated. In subsequent rounds, participants are asked to give quantitative estimates. 
The number of rounds is either fixed or determined to fulfill consensus criteria. Feedback 
signifies that the first round’s results are clustered and sent back to all participants. Before 
the second and later rounds, the results of the entire group are fed back in a statistical format 
to all the participants. In the second and subsequent rounds, the participants are asked for 
arguments for their deviating opinions. Before the third and subsequent estimation rounds, 
these arguments are sent back with statistical results. (Woudenberg 1991, 133, ref. Kuusi 
1999, 71.)
There are different applications of the Delphi method. According to Kuusi (1999, 35–36), 
the three types of experts regarding futures are scientists, decision-makers, and synthesizers. 
Regarding technology development, the scientists are aware of scientific invariance as well 
as the limits of knowledge of non-experts, the decision-makers are aware of the practical 
facts regarding development work and the synthesizers are masters of the relevance (ibid. 
35–36). Thus, based on the elaboration of Osmo Kuusi (1999), the present study applied 
the Argument Delphi method.4 
4 The participants of the panel process in this research remain anonymous although Kuusi (1999, 128) states that the panelists 
are usually informed about the other panel process within an Argument Delphi process. However, Kuusi (1999, 231; 2003) 
recommends the anonymity of the panelists.
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The aim of the Delphi process is to find out the challenges in the future of crisis management. 
In particular, the analysis is focused on the future paths necessary for developing education 
and training and solving personnel questions in crisis management. Because the qualitative 
interviews of the crisis management personnel are more focused on the personal relevance 
of experiences from crisis management, this part of the study focuses more on the structural 
factors that are relevant for human capacities in crisis management. In the Argument Delphi 
method, the first round of the expert panel is usually arranged through an interview process. 
In this phase, it is necessary to find arguments about which the experts clearly disagree. 
During the second round or iteration, the experts comment anonymously on the arguments 
and the reasons given by the experts. The third round is usually where the experts meet and 
assess the results, but this discussion does not affect the results. During the process, it is 
important to obtain the valuable arguments under consideration and to find - new essential 
questions to the theme. All of this is enabled by the anonymity of the experts during the first 
and second iterations. Anonymity is crucial during the argumentation phases of a study. The 
optimal number of experts in this process is between 15 and 50. (See Kuusi 2003, 213–218.)
In a successful Delphi process, the panel creates a vision that is relevant from several 
perspectives and in several categories. Its ability to produce a lot of information is also 
valuable. Through a panel process, it is possible to obtain information that would not 
be produced in other ways. (Linturi 2007, 111.) The major distinction between a survey 
method and a Delphi method is related to the basic samples of the study. Because a Delphi 
panel consists of experts, the limited number of experts usually prevents any sampling from 
being used. A significant phase in using a Delphi method is the second round of the research, 
in which the feedback opinions of the experts are sought. The anonymity of the experts may 
enable expression of opinions that they would not express if they had to commit to them 
publicly.
Questions regarding crisis management in the future may be sensitive in that an official 
opinion or guideline restricting “official views” on the subject may limit how openly an 
individual expresses his or her opinions. However, even weak signals related to such issues 
should be found and interpreted. Therefore, the Delphi method, which provides anonymity 
to the respondents, probably strengthens the validity of the results in the panel work.
One of the relevant questions is whether to look especially after the so-called weak 
signals in the research process. According to Mannermaa (2004, 117) weak signals are 
methodologically challenging because they are often not repeated. They sometimes become 
visible or understandable due to their differentiation. Weak signals only live for a while. 
Analysis of weak signals is open to errors – but they can also be a source of innovations. 
Experts do not automatically identify weak signals: their expertise may be too narrow to 
observe simultaneous processes outside their field. Listening to experts does not necessarily 
reveal or help identify weak signals. (Ibid. 117–122.) 
Weak signals can be interpreted as tacit knowledge, neither of them is explicit in its nature. 
Tacit knowledge is a substantial concept for learning at work and other forms of learning 
outside classroom situations (Paloniemi 2008). In relation to learning, tacit knowledge is 
discussed in chapter 6 of this dissertation. The Delphi panel processes and other techniques 
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of futures research have been seen as a way of eliciting experts’ tacit knowledge and making 
it explicit (Eerola & Miles 2011, 273).
It is necessary to ask what weak signals in crisis management could be and how they could 
be studied. The interviews with crisis management personnel and the Delphi panel process 
are attempts to make tacit knowledge and weak signals in crisis management more tangible 
or visible. However, the relationship between tacit knowledge and weak signal has not 
generally been considered close because tacit knowledge has been studied in pedagogy and 
organizational studies and weak signals have been studied in futures studies.
The Delphi method has been used in Finnish military studies on several occasions. Rainer 
Peltoniemi (2007) interviewed military experts to identify the core competence areas of 
the Finnish Defence system and how they would change if Finland became a member of 
NATO.5 The strong support of the experts covered the hypothesis that Finnish capabilities 
of receiving military resources, as well as the ability to maintain defence capabilities, would 
increase and Finland would take care of the control and surveillance of its territorial integrity. 
However, the experts did not believe that any of the core ability functions of the Finnish 
National Defence Forces would completely disappear because of NATO membership. 
(Ibid.) Another example is Vesa Valtonen’s (2010) use of the Delphi method to study the 
cooperation between various military and civilian officials from an operative and tactical 
perspective. Methodological triangulation was applied when comparing the results of 
action research with those of the Delphi method. Trust was found as a basic factor for good 
cooperation between civilian and military actors (ibid.). In general, the need for futures 
studies and futures orientation is obvious in military and security-oriented studies because 
the development of the military sector depends on various changing factors related to the 
threats and security development in the future. Various scenarios are made in order to find 
out probable or risky trends in the future (e.g. Ministry of Defence 2007). Results from the 
Millennium Project regarding the future of armed conflicts are discussed in detail in section 
3.6.
2.4.3  Qualitative interviews
Since the 1980s the discourse about the use of quantitative and qualitative research methods 
has been vivid in social sciences. Research methods are crucial for the validity and reliability 
of a study (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2004, 59). Alasuutari (1995) described the qualitative 
research as solving a riddle. In the analysis of qualitative data, the question always concerns 
the concept of the meaning. According to Mäkelä (1992, 43), describing the research object 
is always a theoretical task. 
There are some differences between qualitative and quantitative methods in relation to 
knowledge. However, the use of qualitative and quantitative methods may be combined. In 
qualitative research, a researcher has a responsibility to identify various decisions related to 
the research process (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2004, 69). With regard to qualitative interviews, 
the interpretation depends on the researcher (Alasuutari 2001, 160). Qualitative methods 
5 Anonymity as part of the Delphi technique has advantages and disadvantages. Outsiders may have difficulty estimating the 
competence of the experts. On the other hand, the anonymity may facilitate the expressive ability of the experts because they 
do not feel dependent on their background organizations. (Peltoniemi 2007, 214.)
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rely more on post-modernism and more relativistic views about science than quantitative 
methods. Qualitative research has acknowledged the existence of contextual factors affecting 
the results.(Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2006, 16–21.) In the present study, qualitative methods 
were chosen to ensure flexibility in the interviews and to facilitate gathering new type of 
information about crisis management.
An interview is a method of gathering information and is one of the most common methods 
in human and social sciences. It is a flexible method and it can be applied to different 
purposes and used in various circumstances. Interaction is a major feature of a process 
such as an interview. Free and profound discussions may reveal things that could not be 
found with other types of research methods. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2006, 11.) In practice, 
the flexibility of an interview process allows the research questions to be repeated and the 
interviewer to ensure that the questions have been understood correctly (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 
2004, 75). Although the interpretations of the interviewees regarding the research question 
may vary, it is essential that there is a minimum level of common understanding among the 
interviewees to ensure the credibility of the interviews.
An interview situation involves interaction and conversation between the interviewers and 
the interviewees. Consequently, the interactive nature of the interview should be taken 
into consideration during the planning, analysis and reporting of any study. (Tiittula & 
Ruusuvuori 2005, 13.) Both the interviewer and the interviewee have specific roles and the 
interviewer gives the interview process direction (Ruusuvuori & Tiittula 2005, 22).
In qualitative research, the analysis often begins during the interview. A researcher may 
reach conclusions based on the research material or the theoretical framework of the study. 
The techniques of analysis are multiform. There are only a limited number of standardized 
techniques of analysis and there are a number of ways in which the interviews can be 
classified. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2006, 136–137). In any empirical research, the material is 
handled in order to condense the information before it is analyzed. In the categorization 
and analysis, different rules are applied and logical reasoning is required for the analysis. 
(Ehrnrooth 1992, 37–38.) In a qualitative study, observations are studied as clues from an 
explicit perspective, which is called a theoretical framework (Alasuutari 1995, 69). 
In qualitative research, it is necessary to base the analysis on the material especially when 
basic information on the essence of a phenomenon is required (Eskola & Suoranta 2000, 
19). The material may be analyzed in a classifying or interpretative manner. Classifications 
mean relatively direct interpretations of the material, while interpretations require contextual 
factors to be taken into account (Vesala & Rantanen 2007, 11–13). In the present study, the 
lack of information about the essence of crisis management from a field perspective meant, 
it was important to keep the analysis techniques open prior to the analysis.
Structured interviews are generally based on an interview form (Metsämuuronen 2001, 
41). It is assumed that all the interviewees understand the questions in the same manner. 
In unstructured interviews, the questions are open to new modifications. The interviewer 
deepens the information by asking further questions in order to get the interviewee to 
reconstruct their experiences in relation to the object under scrutiny. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 
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2006, 44–46.) Half-structured interviews which fall somewhere between structured and 
unstructured interviews may be referred to as focused interviews. As a method, it is closer 
to unstructured interviews, although the theme of the interview is precise. In focused 
interviews, the position of the hypotheses is problematic: whether hypotheses can be made 
or not depends on the subject of the study. Pre-interviews make it possible to specify the 
interview procedure. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2006.) The nature of the interviews is fully 
comprehended only during the interview process and the significance of interaction should 
be taken into consideration in their interpretations. Half-structured or thematic interviews 
are considered to be a reasonable method if intimate issues are discussed in the interviews or 
if the themes being studied are not well known. (Metsämuuronen 2001, 42–43.)
This study used the focused interviews interview method which is used as a method of studying 
the thinking of crisis management personnel. The interviews were relatively structured 
which left opportunities to ask detailed questions about the themes that were of particular 
interest for a particular interviewee. The interviews in the present study can be described as 
highly structured focused interviews, which means that the analysis of the material is open 
for both classifying and interpretative methods. Focused interviews allow a certain amount 
of variation between the individual interview processes and, they are also comparable. A 
restricted amount of knowledge about crisis management personnel’s views regarding what 
their experiences mean to them also makes the descriptive nature of the interview material 
relevant. The interview procedure was intended to allow the free expression of thoughts on 
behalf of the interviewees, which may allow them to talk about phenomena that might not 
become articulated when responding to a questionnaire. 
The aim of the qualitative interviews is not to find information by describing the average 
situation of crisis management personnel. The interviewees represent a non-randomized 
sample of Finnish crisis management personnel. Even one deviant informant will oblige 
the researcher to reinterpret the theory that would get support from the interviews of the 
majority of the informants (Alasuutari 1995). Therefore, the interviews will be interpreted 
as authentic expressions of the interviewees although they may be impacted by situational 
factors. The interviews are narratives that emerge as a result of social interaction and they 
may help interpret some phenomena that would otherwise remain invisible. 
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3.  New conflicts and human security
The aim of this chapter is to respond to RQs 1 and 3 which:
RQ 1: What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management 
organizations and personnel?
RQ 3: How can crisis management practices, organizations and education be developed 
when the human security approach is taken into account?
In order to answer to these RQs, it is necessary to study recent developments in armed 
conflict and their impact on crisis management. The recent history of armed conflict will 
be handled in section 3.1. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will discuss the concepts of new conflict, 
human security and responsibility to protect, while sections 3.4 and 3.5 analyze studies 
related to the causes of warfare will be analyzed in. In order to understand how to construct 
peace, it is important to understand how the causes of contemporary warfare are explained. 
The causal explanations of warfare may have an impact on how crisis management and 
peace-building would be developed. The focus of this research is on new conflicts signifying 
warfare in which non-state actors are involved, not in wars purely between states. In peace-
building and crisis management, it would be important to be able to break the link from 
peace back to warfare and ensure peace processes. A bridge between new conflicts and crisis 
management is built at the end of this chapter. This could be helpful for comprehending 
what features in new conflicts are critical for a peace process and crisis management and 
peace-building as part of it. The focus is peace-oriented: armed conflicts and conflict cycles 
are not inevitable.
The literature analysis does not rely on a single school within military, international relations, 
or peace or conflict studies. Sections 3.4–3.5 discuss the theme of explanatory factors of 
armed conflict. Motives for various actors to start or continue warfare may not always be 
explicit, likewise when there are motivating factors to continue warfare. Explanations of 
contemporary warfare in the forms of new conflicts vary consistently with their theoretical 
background. Figure 1 categorizes the various factors explaining new conflicts.
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Figure 1.  Types of explanatory factors behind new conflicts
Understanding the causes of warfare makes it easier to comprehend how to stop conflict 
circles. According to Allardt (1976, 38) the three main dimensions of welfare are: “having,” 
which is related to the standard of living; “loving,” which is related to the community 
relations; and “being,” which signifies self-expression. Causes of warfare and armed 
conflict can be divided into these categories; this categorization mostly expresses a lack of 
welfare, which makes the society more prone to armed conflict. Allardt’s (1976) typology 
has similarities to Abraham Maslow’s theory on basic needs. It represents the results of the 
welfare studies from the 1970’s (Allardt 2004). In peace and conflict studies, some theories 
that explain causes of armed conflicts have used Maslow’s categorization of basic needs as 
a basis (see T. Väyrynen 2010). Maslow’s categorization is hierarchical: physiological needs 
are located on the base of the structure and self-actualization on the top (Maslow 1998, 
xx)6. Ecological and economic factors that create the risks of armed conflict relate to the 
standard of living (“having”) – and at least partly to basic things in an individual’s life like 
income, housing and nutrition. Religion, ethnicity, identity and political rights belong to 
community relations (“loving”) – and to self-expression (”being”). Conceptually, however, 
identity issues and political rights are described in more individual terms than ethnicity 
which is a more collective phenomenon and is therefore closer to the “loving” dimension of 
well-being. These factors are intertwined in different ways in conflicts. 
Explanatory factors of new conflicts are inter-related and manifold. Ethnic and religious 
factors may be connected with politics (this is discussed in detail in section 3.4). They 
consist of identity-based factors. The other types of factors may also have some political 
dimensions. Politics may have quite different meanings than the classical Clausewitzian 
6 Hierarchical order of an individual’s needs from the basis to the top is as follows: physiological needs, safety, social needs, 
esteem, and self-actualisation (Maslow 1998, xx).
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ones, which refer to war as a different means for politics to occur when other relevant means 
have already been used (see Clausewitz 1968). Each conflict has its unique background and 
history and provokes questions about how it could have been prevented. The objective of the 
present study is not to create a model for explaining new conflicts. However, it is crucial to 
understand their complexity in order to prevent them and to develop crisis management and 
peace-building. Through a multitude of perspectives, it is difficult to see any single “grand 
theory” that explains new conflicts. Before analyzing the explanatory factors of warfare, the 
next section will examine the challenges to humanitarian work. 
3.1  Recent development in armed conflicts
The end of the Cold War was a watershed in conflicts and conflict literature. Since 1990, 
only four wars have taken place between nations (Gulf War (1990–1991), US-Afghanistan 
(2001–2003), Anglo-American invasion of Iraq (2003), and the Russian invasion of South 
Ossetia, Georgia (2008)) (Lebow 2010). Between 1990 and 2002, 58 different armed 
conflicts were registered in 46 regions, with only three of those conflicts occurring between 
states (Rekkedal 2006, 555). Since the 1970s, there has been a sharp decline in international 
wars due to the demise of colonialism and the end of the Cold War. However, the picture is 
not as positive with regard to civil wars (Human Security Report 2005). 
The militarized and state-centric view on security has been challenged since the Cold War, 
which has led to a broadening of security agendas from issues of national defence to broader 
questions (Coticchia & Ferrari 2009, 239). In contemporary international relations, 
identifying causes of “war” has been problematic (Holsti 1991, 272). The Cold War was 
not warless because there were many revolutionary and guerrilla wars in which millions 
of people died during that period (Malkki et al. 2008, 191). Many conflicts since 1945 
have initiated by new and weak states (Holsti 1996). In a way, there is a continuum from 
the colonial conflicts of the Cold War period to today’s conflicts with non-state actors. 
Since 1945, the problem of war has mostly consisted of state maintenance and state failures 
(ibid.). It would be a simplification to limit wars to the use of force of two distinct national 
armies causing at least 1,000 casualties (Holsti 1991 272–273).
Different schools in international relations and military studies, as well as in peace and conflict 
studies have diverse explanations for contemporary warfare. Despite their limitations, it is 
possible that different theories can partly explain conflicts and their root-causes. According 
to Holsti (1991, 2), there is no answer to the ancient question of “why war occurs” – and the 
causes of war remain obscure although they have become slightly clearer.
Regarding warfare, at least four lines of development have taken place since the Cold War. 
Firstly, high technology in warfare has been acknowledged. Secondly, instead of the risks of 
larger wars between countries, smaller regional or internal conflicts with non-state actors 
have been emphasized. Thirdly, almost real-time information sharing about on-going 
conflicts has raised awareness about crises. Finally, terrorism and the US war on terror have 
increased the visibility of non-state actors in warfare. (Malkki et al. 2008, 208.)
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Raimo Väyrynen (2006b) made reference to Rapoport’s (1968) distinction between political 
and cataclysmic models of war. The former one refers to the Clausewitzian model, in 
which war is seen as a rational military instrument used by governments for political goals 
(Rapoport 1968, 13). In the latter version, wars are caused by historical and structural forces 
that are seen as being mostly beyond human control and therefore prone to escalation. 
Cataclysmic and eschatological theories of warfare consist of a wide set of views that are 
not as clearly articulated as Clausewitz’s theory (ibid., 31). Väyrynen (2006b, 1) found this 
distinction to be an essential one because human instrumentality matters in the political 
model, but the cataclysmic view says that laws of society and culture modify the hostilities. 
Tarja Väyrynen (2010) argued that explanatory causes of conflict have been a major part 
of peace and conflict studies. In this field of studies, explanations are based on the basic 
needs theory, the theory of structural violence, the theory of relative misery and cultural 
explanations (T. Väyrynen 2010, 254–255 and 260).
A central question regarding the conflicts that have occurred since the end of the Cold War 
is the extent to which they are the result of conscious political efforts and the extent to which 
they can be explained in cataclysmic terms. A lack of knowledge about contemporary warfare 
only partly explains why the media often describes new conflicts in cataclysmic terms. These 
conflicts just “happen” as a result of ethnic or religious hostilities. The political part of the 
warfare may be complicated and political motives may be “camouflaged” under a new cover 
in order to get support. According to a Clausewitzian approach, war is not deviant behavior 
but a political instrument (Holsti 1991, 13). From a human security perspective, however, 
avoiding warfare is one part of the strategy to advance human security, which means that 
the measures taken in conflict prevention are important. Finding causes of warfare would 
be relevant for promoting conflict prevention and would be necessary in order to be able to 
answer to the question: “Why war?”
 
Soon after the end of the Cold War, Holsti (1991, 323) predicted that the future agenda 
of international relations would be full of “civil wars, wars of secession and the breakdown 
of multi-community states - all with the possibility of foreign intervention.” Although civil 
wars were foreseen, the international community has not been sufficiently able to provide 
political means to deal with new forms of warfare. The humanitarian catastrophes which 
took place in the wars of the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990s reminded the international 
community about the vulnerability of the civilians in failed or fragile states. Jonathan Glover 
(2001, 136) describes the events leading to the massacre of 7000 Bosnians, mostly men, as 
follows:
  “In 1993 the UN declared six ‘safe areas’, but the troops of UNPROFOR (the 
United Nations Protection Force) were allowed to use their weapons only to protect 
themselves, not to protect the Bosnians. The Serbian forces bombarded the ‘safe areas’ 
and captured two of them in 1995, at Srebrenica and Zepa. … General Morillon led 
a convoy of vehicles with food, medicine and a few soldiers into Srebrenica, which 
the Serbs were shelling and were about to capture. … After Morillon left, the Serb 
forces renewed the shelling and killed many people, including children in a school 
playground. …
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  The Serbian forces under General Mladíc captured Srebrenica. They held the 
women and children of the town in pens. The men were taken for ‘questioning’ and 
killed. The Dutch UN troops who saw this had no authority to stop it and could 
only urge the victims not to panic.”
The actions of the UN in Srebrenica in 1995 were insufficient to protect the civilians. The 
international press followed the atrocities that took place in Srebrenica closely. The inaction 
of the international community in several recent crises has made the protection of civilians 
one of the major goals in the on-going development of peace processes. When explaining 
the UN failure in Rwanda, less attention has been paid to the complexity of structures and 
mechanisms of the UN that contributed to the failure (Piiparinen 2010, 76). Therefore, the 
responses of the international community should not be analyzed without paying attention 
to the structural impediments that may make the actual responses more difficult.
Since the warfare in the Balkans in the 1990s, the international community has taken several 
steps forward on the path to prevent genocides and other kinds of armed conflicts. Today’s 
conflicts raise international awareness but show in practice that stronger international 
mechanisms and involvement are required to solve on-going wars7. By 2008, the death toll 
in the conflict in Darfur was assessed at 450,000 (Beardsley 2009). Since the Cold War, the 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been the most devastating in terms of 
its outcome of 5.4 million deaths, only about six percent of which are direct battle deaths. 
Although this conflict has been of a large-scale, the international community’s focus on it 
has been modest. (Hawkins 2008.)
Terrorism and counterterrorism have become important parts of the international agenda 
since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) changed conflict analysis. The 
evolution of conflicts in Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003 is a consequence of 
counter-terrorist strategies of US-led coalitions defending guerrilla groups. The number of 
civilian casualties in these conflicts has gained attention in the media and attracted criticism.8
There has been a rise in the number of conflicts involving a mix of state-based and non-state 
actors, which usually function in extensive trans-national conflict networks (Lindberg & 
Melvin 2007, 55–78). The central role of the non-state actors is one of the major changes in 
new conflicts compared to conventional wars. Mary Kaldor (1999/2001) and Francois Thual 
(1995) both emphasized the role of identity-based factors in the new conflicts. Enemies are 
classified according to their differing identities from the combating groups’ perspective. 
These varying identities may be based on religion or ethnicity, and the conflict increases the 
tendency to exaggerate identity as a separating factor. On the other hand, without neglecting 
ethnicity-based and similar kinds of factors, poverty has been regarded as a key factor that 
both maintains and leads to conflict cycles (e.g. Collier 2007).
Contemporary regional and local military developments have the potential to be of global 
significance (Evans 2004, 28–29). Today’s conflicts largely occur within society rather than 
7 In 2006, Africa, Asia and the Middle East were the principal geographical locations of armed conflicts. In particular, Afg-
hanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia and Sudan commanded a lot of international attention. The publicity that armed conflicts 
attract is not in direct relation to the devastation which they have caused. 
8 According to Amnesty International (2011) 2,428 civilians were killed in Afghanistan as a result of the conflict and the major-
ity died due to the violence of the Taleban and other anti-government forces in 2010. 
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between bordered states, in relatively remote places, and are generally only of regional 
relevance (Cheeseman 2004, 222). On the other hand, a conflict that is local in character 
may extend over borders and have regional implications. While risks of armed conflicts 
between the great powers have been declining since the end of the Cold War, the probability 
of aggression by marginalized states and failing states remain as true security risks (Ryan 
2004, 108–109). It is necessary to enlarge the study of warfare to include the interaction 
between interstate, sub-state and trans-state conflict, and the diffusion of contemporary 
military capabilities (Evans 2004, 34). However, asymmetry has been an inherent part of 
warfare across history (MacFarling 2004, 139). 
3.2  Concept of new conflict
Due to the changes in armed conflicts, several scholars have worked on a new paradigm 
in conflict literature which has been called the new-wars paradigm (Malesevic 2010). For 
example, Mary Kaldor (1999/2001) referred to these new kinds of conflicts as new wars 
but I would prefer to describe these low-intensity conflicts with non-state actors – as new 
conflicts. New conflicts consist of armed conflicts that have taken place since the end of 
the Cold War; these conflicts involve non-state actors and, potentially, state-actors as well. 
Civilians are typically victims of warfare and factors related to identity issues and ethnic and 
religious factors are also often involved. Various types of warfare may be regarded as part 
of violence, which is a much broader concept. Wars between states, colonial wars, and new 
conflicts are types of warfare. Because violence is a broad concept, it includes phenomena 
such as like terrorism, organized crime, violent acts of crime, and domestic violence.
New conflicts involve irregular warfare, which can be divided into five main types: coup 
d’état, terrorism, revolution, insurgency, and civil war (Kiras 2008, 232). New conflicts are 
typically civil wars but may also involve states. Asymmetry is often typical to these conflicts 
because state actors and non-state actors may use different tactics in warfare. One of the 
most typical features of contemporary armed conflicts is complexity, which also extends to 
achieve peace (Egnell 2009).
Battlefield mortality is often low in new conflicts, at least compared to conventional warfare 
in major wars. Because the concept of war would require 1,000 battlefield deaths annually 
and new conflicts do not always exceed that number of casualties, the concept of a new 
conflict is in accordance with the conflict literature. In new conflicts, civilians are targeted as 
part of tactics, and at least a large number of combatants are non-state actors. 
Wars are armed conflicts that exceed 1,000 battlefield deaths annually. Consequently, the 
same conflict may be considered as a war some years and as an armed conflict in others. 
Salonius-Pasternak and Visuri (2006, 8) defined a crisis as an aggravated conflict. Although 
their conceptualization differs slightly from the definition of a conflict based on mortality, 
I prefer to use the concept of a new conflict to describe the type of current warfare that is 
mostly combined with low battlefield mortality.
Armed conflicts generated by non-state armed groups will remain a major cause of violence 
and instability in many regions of the world for the foreseeable future. Ethnic, tribal, clan, 
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religious, and communal groups operate based on traditional ways of war, often adapting 
them to the settings in which they are fighting. Armed non-state groups mobilize rapidly 
for war and adapt their traditional tactics to fight modern foes. The fighting units of these 
armed groups are almost always small, decentralized, and unconventional. (Shultz & Dew 
2006, 259–270.) Armed non-state groups typically have a high degree of decentralization, 
control over the local population, and the availability of funds, as well as the role played by 
civilians in their support structures (Springer 2006, 61).
The changes in contemporary warfare have been described as a paradigm shift that started 
with the emergence of nuclear weapons in 1945. The end of the Cold War made the paradigm 
shift visible. The old paradigm was one of interstate industrial war and the new one is that of 
war amongst people. (Smith 2006.) According to Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970), paradigmatic 
changes in science have meant a fundamental revolution in terms of understanding 
knowledge and the concept of paradigm has also been applied to other contexts. The basic 
scientific concepts may change radically within a paradigmatic shift. A paradigmatic shift 
in a conflict context means that contemporary warfare mostly consists of a quality that is 
not usually found in conventional warfare or in major wars. Because our understanding of 
warfare is based on the old paradigm, it is difficult to understand the new paradigm, which 
is grounded on “a continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and conflict, regardless 
of whether a state is facing a state or a non-state actor” (Smith 2006, 16–17). War amongst 
people conceptually refers to civilians as victims of warfare, as well as to warfare that media 
transfers to ordinary people. (ibid.)
In today’s warfare, the tactical level is the most important. The political and military 
institutions have been developed in the previous industrial model based on the old paradigm 
of warfare, but it is now necessary to learn new ways of applying the use of force that are 
appropriate for the current model of warfare (ibid., 16–26). All of the changes in conflicts 
have not taken place suddenly, however. The Second World War was the last large scale 
conflict in which states were combating actors. According to the Human Security Report of 
2005, the most devastating wars (that is, those causing over a half of the battlefield casualties 
during the period between 1946 and 2002) were: the civil war in China, the Korean war, the 
Vietnam war, the war between Iran and Iraq, and the wars in Afghanistan. The USA-linked 
coalition’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 are 
examples of conventional wars that have taken place recently between states.
Each year, armed conflicts directly cause approximately 100,000 deaths, most of which are 
caused by the use of small arms. (UNDP 2005, 12). In the 1990s, 95 percent of the conflicts 
were internal conflicts, not interstate conflicts (Human Security Report 2005, 18.) The 
apparent decline in war may be seen in a wider context, because in the developed world at 
least, there has been a move away from the acceptance of intentional killing (Mueller 2006, 
65). A war is usually defined as a high-intensity conflict in which the mortality rate rises over 
1,000 casualties annually. A conflict, on the other hand, has between 25 and 999 annual 
casualties. According to the tradition applied in Uppsala genocides and similar kinds of acts 
of one-sided mass destruction are excluded from the statistics regarding conflict mortality. 
(Human Security Report 2005.)
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The World Health Organization (WHO) is the only international actor to have published 
information on mortality rates of wars. WHO’s mortality estimates are higher than other 
estimates which could be the result on a broader definition of war mortality. The WHO 
statistics may have included deaths other than those caused directly in warfare. (Ibid., 
30.) The 1990s saw conflicts that involved brutal violence against civilians. Although the 
battlefield mortality rate decreased in the 1990s, the visibility of human rights violations in 
new conflicts was especially high in the mass media (ibid.). However, one-sided massacres 
and genocides are not included in the Human Security Report’s criteria for war. 
Leitenberg (2006) has criticized the Human Security Report and some other analyses that 
exclude one-sided massacres and indirect deaths caused by warfare from the mortality rates. 
Limited analysis of warfare mortality can lead to the devastation of new conflicts being 
under-estimated. On the other hand, mortality rates in warfare are often far from exact 
(Human Security Report 2005; Vesa 2010)9. Typologies vary regarding the definition of 
war and conflict and the continuum of intensity of conflict has been emphasized without 
excluding genocides from the analysis (see Chirot 1991, 3–7). Direct conflict mortality is 
lower in today’s conflicts than in conventional wars, although brutalities do take place in 
new conflicts. (Ibid., 29–30). The Human Security Report of 2005 states that the decrease of 
conflict mortality has been caused by the end of the Cold War and colonial wars. Knowledge 
about direct conflict mortality is limited and it is even more difficult to estimate indirect 
conflict mortality.10 In 2010, 14 armed conflicts exceeded 1,000-casualty threshold for a war 
(Millennium Project 2011a).
Armed conflict causes social development to deteriorate in war-torn communities and 
societies in many ways. The recruitment of child soldiers is a growing problem. The 
situation of girls recruited as child soldiers is especially difficult because they become 
victims of various kinds of abuse. (ILO 2006, 42–43.) Militarization and the recruitment 
of internally displaced persons and refugees can endanger peace processes (Nahm 2006). In 
many conflicts, the combatants consist of relatively heterogeneous groups. Modern armed 
conflicts are typically socio-international because they are not purely a social or international 
type of conflict (Romeva i Rueda 2003, 37). The unclear and unstable state between war 
and peace aggravates the position of civilians in conflict areas.
As victims of armed conflicts, women may face gender-specific threats. Acknowledgement of 
rape victims has been reported in some conflict areas (Lindsey 2005, 113). Rape has been a 
tool of ethnic cleansing in conflicts such as Bosnia and Rwanda (ibid., 118). These examples 
show how seriously women’s rights can be violated in armed conflicts. As civilians, women 
have suffered in armed conflicts throughout history. Women’s organizations started to pay 
attention to women’s position and sexual violence in armed conflicts at the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th century (Mäki 2007). Although sexual violence in 
warfare has occurred for centuries, the phenomenon was rarely studied in academic research 
before the 1990s (ibid.). The position of male civilians should not be ignored either. The 
concept of “civilians” is gendered, which may cause differentiation of the treatment of 
9 In the Vietnam War, 58,000 American soldiers died, but the estimation of Vietnamese casualties vary from one million to two 
million. Deaths that were caused by the war but occurred after it are not included in conflict mortality rates. Higher mortality 
due to diseases is not included in warfare mortality estimates either. (Vesa 2010.)
10 The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is one example of one-sided large-scale violence which is probably considered as a war in 
the eyes of majority of people though it is not officially defined as a war due of the criteria utilized in Uppsala. 
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women and men in armed conflict (Carpenter 2006). The discourse on civilians defines 
women in terms of vulnerability and innocence, but men are not typically described in a 
similar way. Belligerents are somewhat less likely to kill women and children than they are 
to kill unarmed adult men. (Ibid.)
 
The progress from peace to war and back to peace after the stabilization has traditionally 
been visualized as a continuum. Today, the situation is not so clear in many conflicts. The 
stabilization phase often fails, which means that the development can be regarded more like 
a vicious circle than a continuum leading from warfare to peace. Conflict that ends due 
to crisis management and peace building often fails to remain peaceful but instead leads 
to instability and back to conflict. Approximately half of all contemporary civil wars are 
outcomes of post-conflict societies relapsing back to warfare (Collier 2007, 177). Most of 
the conflicts in the 1990s were crises of a continuous character: by the end of the decade 65 
percent of the ongoing conflicts had lasted at least five years (Grasa 2003, 17). Many peace 
processes are unsuccessful and lead to re-newed violence (Newman & Richmond 2006, 
1). Within 5 years of cease-fire, 44 percent of countries affected by conflict return to war 
(Glenn & Gordon 2007). Preferable development would mean a continuum from conflict 
via peace-building to peace. Of course, the ideal solution would be to prevent conflicts from 
emerging in the first place. The human and economic costs of warfare are huge which means 
that the international community should work hard in order to develop policies for conflict 
prevention. The peace process of Aceh is an example that shows that conflict cycles are not 
inevitable.
Since the end of Cold War there has been a lot of debate regarding changes to warfare. 
Unlike conventional wars, new conflicts have several typical features: they involve non-
governmental fighters; the conflict takes place within a country rather than between two or 
several states; civilians are likely to be victims of the conflict; the conflict is likely to take place 
in a non-democratic and poor country; fights over natural resources may hinder the peace 
process; warfare and more peaceful phases may follow each other; identity-based factors are 
the basis of the distinction according to which some people or groups are seen as enemies; 
and although the annual number of battlefield casualties is under 1,000, indirect devastation, 
cruelty by fighters and one-sided violence including massacres may be remarkable. In the 
new-wars paradigm, a lot of attention has also been paid to the external financing of warfare 
and that traditional divisions within conflicts; the blurring of traditional divisions within 
conflicts; and the deployment of different kinds of combatants including criminal gangs and 
private armies (Malesevic 2010, 312).
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3.3  Human security and responsibility to protect
“Human security is about the security of individuals and communities rather than 
security of states, and it combines both human rights and human development.” 
     – Mary Kaldor (2007, 183)
The human security concept was launched to a wider audience by the UN Development 
Report in 1994. Human security is a universal concern, its components are interdependent, 
and early prevention is a major part of guaranteeing human security, which, as a concept 
is people-centered (UNDP 1994, 22–23). Human security means safety from chronic 
threats as well as protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in daily life (ibid. 23). 
Human security has become one of the key ideas upon which the UN and EU have been 
developing their security policies. It is relevant in conflict analysis because armed conflicts 
have a devastating impact on human rights (see Fagan 2010, 50–51).
The idea of human security has altered security thinking which has focused on nation-
state-based security. However, it has remained a controversial idea. There are two basic 
interpretations of the concept. According to a broad, inclusive view, human security requires 
the attenuation of a wide range of threats to wellbeing of individuals and communities. A 
narrow view on human security would limit it to the attenuation of the threat of physical 
violence. (Henk 2007.) As mentioned in chapter 1, the present study has used human 
security in the narrow sense, meaning freedom from violence. This conceptual constraint is 
used for practical reasons because, in the empirical parts of the research, the wider concepts 
would be too broad. In many other circumstances, the use of the broader definition of 
human security is justified (see Coticchia & Ferrari 2009).
Although the human security discussion involves the “development first” and the “security 
first” schools, these two positions are not mutually exclusive (MacFarlane & Khong 2006, 
201). The co-existence of both dimensions is important for peace processes and development. 
According to Kaldor (2007, 196), it is impossible to separate security and development and 
distinctions between foreign and domestic policy are breaking down. On the other hand, 
human security has also been defined as a precondition for human development (Martin & 
Owen 2010, 222).
The human security paradigm in security studies and international relations in the early 
1990s signified a paradigm shift in security thinking (Nuruzzaman 2006; Kaldor 2007). 
Although the human security paradigm received attention, it was not completely new 
because it shares the realist concerns for the status quo and its positivistic problem-solving 
approach. The most essential factor strengthening its popularity was the changed role of 
threats at the end of Cold War. (Nuruzzaman 2006, 299–300.) Warfare related to human 
rights principles did not emerge only with the human security paradigm conceptually, 
human security fortifies the primary position of the protection of the civilians at war and 
in crisis management and other means by which the international community intervenes in 
armed conflict. New conflicts that followed the Cold War made the need to protect human 
rights even more visible. The human security approach pays more attention to “bottom-up” 
and “people-centered” perspectives (Ewan 2007). Therefore, it has implications on research 
objectives and methods as well.
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Human security does not contradict or replace national security (Thakur 2006, 90). 
National security remains in use in some contexts, but in some others, the framework of 
human security is more suitable (ibid.). The roles of national or state security and human 
security have been widely discussed and the concepts of national and human security have 
even been regarded as controversial. In practice, however, this is not the case. Natalia Florea 
Hudson (2010) argued that state structures are needed to ensure human security including 
women’s rights for living in freedom from violence. Therefore, functioning state security is a 
condition for human security. National security should strengthen human security.
The concept of human security is based on human rights. National security does not have 
such a direct connection with human rights, although it is linked to them if states accept 
the international obligations adopted by the UN and other organizations that focus on 
human rights standards. Human rights violations that contradict the rules of war should 
be condemned, even though they are results of the activities of armed forces that have 
support from the national government. War crimes have been condemned as a result of 
international humanitarian law. Crimes against humanity are the violations of absolute 
moral requirements concerning group-based torture or murder of the innocent (May 2007, 
71). Humane treatment is a cornerstone in the Hague and Geneva Conventions regulating 
warfare (ibid. 90).
The human rights culture in international politics, which started to emerge after 1945, has 
been criticized as an outcome of the Western culture and values. The establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) is a positive signal of strengthening human rights at the 
international level. (Boucher 2009, 371–376.) The ICC may have a significant role for post-
war justice in resolving war crimes. Although human rights in general are open to debate, 
David Boucher (2009, 310) argued that “there are certain rights so fundamental that social 
relations as we know them would be inconceivable without such rights.” An international 
debate on the content of basic human rights will certainly continue and this debate will 
also have an impact on the debate on human security. In order to achieve accurate human 
rights policies, fact-based information on human rights is required (Landman 2009). This 
perspective is relevant for human security policies as well, although it can often be challenging 
to get reliable information about the human rights situation from a conflict area.
Human security represents similar kinds of values and thinking as the responsibility 
to protect which means that the international community should be able to protect the 
civilians if the local or regional state actors are not able to guarantee their safety. A high-level 
commission, “The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” based 
on a Canadian initiative, published a report entitled “Responsibility to protect” (2001). 
The principle of the responsibility to protect was adopted in the World Summit Outcome 
in the UN in 2005 and by the Security Council (resolution 1674) in 2006. This principle 
states that every member country of the UN accepts its responsibility to protect its own 
population from genocides, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing 
(Seppä 2008; Bellamy 2009). 
Human rights violations are an indicator that a conflict might take place, and therefore, 
the observance of human rights is part of the strategy to avoid civil war (Miall 2007, 117). 
Although the responsibility to protect is potentially a vital innovation for promoting human 
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rights, powerful countries may consider that they are actually responsible to protect when 
their own interests are involved in a crisis (Dove 2009). The responsibility to protect should 
primarily signify the responsibility to prevent, which means that the policies should focus 
on preventing armed conflict from emerging (Bellamy 2009, 52). The emergence of the 
responsibility to protect is a watershed in world politics although it has not yet significantly 
impacted the willingness of the governments to contribute resources to prevent mass 
atrocities (Bellamy 2011, 196–199).
Conflict-related arguments are often politically sensitive. Even humanitarian ideas may 
be criticized for the legitimizing objectives other than humanitarian ones. The level of 
devastation of a conflict, such as genocide, may cause a dispute within the international 
community and even among the scholar who specialize in these issues. Nevertheless, people 
suffering from any armed conflict should have the right for protection. It is necessary to 
provide human security in a systematic way and the rights of the individuals living under 
threat in conflict or post-conflict areas need to be acknowledged. 
Strengthening human security may be seen as an ethical principle that has implications 
on practical policies related to conflicts. It is important that various humanitarian, peace-
building, and crisis management operations take aspects of human security seriously. 
Protection of civilians and the ability to cooperate with them should be of importance in 
humanitarian, crisis management and peace-building missions. Providing human security 
requires comprehension of on-going or past conflicts. Human security must be analyzed 
in its cultural, historical or political contexts. Individual differences in the demand of 
protection should be taken into account and particularly vulnerable groups, like children, 
should receive special attention.
3.4  Cultural, religious, and political dimensions 
 of conflicts
Culture consists of various meanings linked to attitudes condensing into patterns of thought 
and behavioral institutions. It is largely transversal to societies although it is affected by 
transmitting, modifying and maintaining phenomena. Therefore, it must be understood 
that individuals learn to live in a culture within a socialization process (Todisco 2009, 189–
190). The role of culture has been analyzed in order to explain new conflicts. Cultural 
issues can have an impact on individuals and groups as well as on international relations. 
Consequently, they are also linked to globalization which revives local cultural identities 
(Giddens 1999, 13). Culture affects inter-group conflicts in two ways. Firstly, it separates 
people into an in-group and an out-group. Secondly, it shapes an individual’s perception of 
conflict and the ways that individual can respond to it. (Worchel 2005.) Cultural impacts 
extend to religious, ethnic, and political issues related to identities. 
Cultural, religious and identity issues related to violent conflicts can be essential at both 
the local and national levels. Another issue is whether these issues can explain conflicts. An 
assessment of the factors that influence violent conflict may be culturally dependent which 
means that an actor’s cultural background has an impact on his or her estimations of causalities 
in conflict or warfare. In international relations, cultural differences may be linked to various 
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roles in the power structures. Research on international relations has mostly underestimated 
the role of the religion, and the major scholars of international relations theory have been 
Westerners (Fox & Sandler 2004, 163). An individual’s religious interpretations have an 
impact on how that person assesses different symbols including whether they are restricted 
to a narrow meaning or can be interpreted as part of a more common cultural heritage 
(Heinonen 2000, 135–142). 
3.4.1  Civilizations: cooperation or combat
According to Todisco (2009, 195) civilization means “the set of professed ideas, adopted 
customs, traditions and characteristics at a given time, belonging to people in a particular 
society, together with the development of an individual’s physical, intellectual and moral 
faculties, towards a continuous progress.” Conceptually, therefore, the term civilization 
refers to progress (ibid.). The term has been used more widely in international relations due 
to Samuel Huntington’s argumentation.
Huntington’s views on the differences between the civilizations for explaining violent 
outbursts have been debated since the 1990s. According to Huntington (2003), cultures 
and cultural identities have modified the world since the Cold War to a point of uniformity, 
disintegration, and conflict. Huntington (2003) described the on on-going changes as 
follows. For the first time in history, global politics is multi-polar and multicultural. The 
power balance between different cultures is shifting; and the relative power of the West is 
decreasing. The new world order, based on cultures, is being brought forth, with: similar 
kinds of cultures cooperating. The universalistic goals of the West have more often led it to 
conflict with other cultures, especially with China and Islam. The existence of the West is 
grounded on the idea that the USA acknowledges its Western identity and that westerners 
accept that their culture is not a universal one and they are unified in order to reform 
and preserve it from the challenge of the non-Western societies. It is possible to avoid a 
global war if the world leaders accept the multicultural nature of world politics and start to 
cooperate in order to preserve it. (Ibid . 21–22.) 
Huntington (2003, 26–31) divided the world map after the 1990’s into nine regions: 
Western, Latin American, African, Islamist, Chinese, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and 
Japanese. In this new world, local politics is a politics of ethnicity and global politics is a 
politics of cultures. There is no colonial power: instead of fights for independence, there are 
struggles between liberated countries. Conflicts between rich and poor countries are less 
likely. At the beginning of 1993, there were 48 ethnic conflicts, slightly fewer than half of 
which took place between groups coming from different cultures. (Ibid.) 
Empirical studies on Huntington’s hypotheses have been made in conflict analysis and the 
results have mostly been negative towards his theory. However, a recent analysis on post-
Cold War interstate conflicts found some empirical support on Huntington’s theory has been 
found (Charron 2010). In a way, Huntington’s (2003) view on “the clash of the civilizations” 
is partially justified by the conflict between the Islamist al-Qaeda and the Western Christian 
countries. However, not all the conflicts since the end of the Cold War have taken place over 
the cultural borders defined by Huntington. Although Huntington’s thesis of the clash of 
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the civilizations fits fairly well when al-Qaeda and Western countries are studied, his claims 
seem to be too categorical to fully explain new conflicts that have taken place since the 
end of the Cold War. Cultural and religious factors often exist in the background of new 
conflicts, but it would appear to be impossible to build a theory of new conflicts based on 
culture and religion. 
 
Huntington’s views were criticized by Amartya Sen (2006), who argued that potential cultural 
controversies cannot be described as controversies between entire cultures because there 
are differences between individuals from the cultural areas that Huntington introduced. 
Conflicts between religious views may take place between different symbolic levels, which 
means that there are controversies between the levels of abstractness with regard to the 
interpretations (see Heinonen 2002, 90–93). Therefore, there are various interpretations 
of a religion within the same cultural sphere. This aspect could explain diversity within 
cultures in regard to the impact that religions have on conflicts. According to Bottici and 
Challand (2010, 135), “the myth of the clash between Islam and the West has become one 
of the most powerful myths of our time”. Francois Thual (1995) also criticized Huntington 
for simplifying the reality and neglecting the identity concept as well as the geopolitical 
background of several crises. 
Historically, there have been more conflicts within the large “civilizations” in Huntington’s 
map than between them (Nye 2003, 244). Although Huntington has been criticized, the 
political role of the religions has already been previously rising (Heinonen 2004a, 75). 
Different forms of fundamentalism may restrict the interpretation of the religion and this 
simplification may cause religion to become a politically indoctrinating ideology (Heinonen 
2004b, 51–52).
In assessing the relationship between the West and Islam, the West has considered Islam 
as a threat only for a short time. In modern times this feature emerged only after the oil 
crisis in 1973 and after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979s. (Männistö 2003, 132.) 
The view of Islam in Western countries is two-fold. On one hand, it is a religion of peace 
– as many Muslims believe it to be – on the other hand the violent interpretation of Islam 
by the extremists has attracted a lot of attention in the Western mass media. (Hämeen-
Anttila 2003, 110.) Western views of Islam and non-Western cultural phenomena have been 
criticized for being one-sided (e.g. Sen 2006; Said 1978/2003).
Edward Said (1978/2003) described Orientalism as an academic and ideological principle 
that affects the Western thought and representations of the Orient in ways that are not 
scientifically justifiable. It uses stereotypes to perceive cultural differences and consists of a 
system of representations that are part of Western consciousness. Thus, the influence of a 
culture on an individual is not determined because individual differences and civilizations 
are interrelated and interdependent. (Ibid.) Therefore, cultural determinism exaggerates the 
meaning of a culture for individuals. Huntington’s views have been criticized as an outcome 
of Orientalism. Huntington’s (2003) views are often criticized to the extent that his own 
criticism of Western-centered policies is forgotten.
Intercultural relations can evolve in four types of categories: assimilation, homogenization, 
communicative segmentation, and separateness. Assimilation refers to the full attainment 
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of globalization of the dominant culture. Homogenization signifies a new form of society 
emerging by somehow including all the parts of the original cultures. In communicative 
segmentation, every specific culture expresses itself by becoming part of global 
interdependencies that have already been defined in the international system. Separateness 
means a refusal to have dialogue or mix with other cultures. (Todisco 2009, 213–214.) 
Although the typology tends to refers to the development within a society, it may also be 
applied to international relations. National cultures are not prone to changes, which means 
that even cultural tendencies for cooperation or avoiding it may be stable (see Hofstede 
2001, 34).
Intercultural relations are very around the world and in various times in history and change 
continually. Cultural relations extend across the cultural borders that Huntington has 
presented and there is a variation of interpretations within a cultural sphere of its meanings. 
For example, there are many forms of Islam within Islamist networks (see Linjakumpu 
2009, 31). Cooperation may overcome combat or clashes. These types of development also 
depend on international and local politics. Therefore, no determinism should take place 
in relation to cultural clashes. In Todisco’s (2009) typology, separateness refers to potential 
cultural clashes, not the other alternatives included in his categorization. Although the rise 
of Islamic terrorism may partly justify Huntington’s argumentation, it does not represent the 
entire community of Islamic religion nor the other borderlines between the cultural regions 
that Huntington introduced.
Cultural cooperation is a potential future alternative to cultural clashes. Huntington’s (2003) 
views have been criticized, because cultures are not actors, but individuals are, and because 
civilizational borders are misleading (Melasuo 2009; Bottici & Challand 2010, 136). From 
this perspective, clashes of civilization are not logically possible, although cultural cooperation 
is. However, disputes related to cultural domains may exist between the representatives of 
different cultures, which means they may be perceived as cultural clashes. The distinction 
between cultural borders and their meanings to an individual comprise a complex reality. 
For example, Islam has become more political (Linjakumpu 2009, 19). A person’s cultural 
background has an impact on how he or she interprets of various phenomena. In today’s 
globalizing world which is based on networks, different cultural interpretations may have 
far-reaching consequences (see Castells 2009). 
Information about violent conflict is mostly transferred to people by the mass media. “War 
amongst the people”, as Rupert Smith (2006) described contemporary warfare, referred 
to how ordinary people perceive news when they watch the TV or follow the news on the 
Internet. Therefore, cultural perceptions and misperceptions are sensitive to the processes 
through which warfare or violence is described in mass media. Misperceptions on behalf 
of Americans related to the reasons behind the invasion of Iraq in 2003 have been widely 
described (e.g. Castells 2009). Misperception of facts may also lead to cultural misperceptions 
or strengthen them.
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3.4.2  Conflicts based on identity, ethnicity, and religion
Identity becomes a major feature for a group if it feels threatened. Identity-based conflicts 
are grounded on an existential fear. They are conflicts of survival – not only materially, 
but especially from a cultural and psychological perspective. Although such conflicts have 
existed, something new is included in their internal and external intensity. There are a 
large number of the identity-based conflicts. (Thual 1995.) Processes related to identity 
and social categorization are discussed in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 in the context of crisis 
management personnel, but, it is also important to remember these concepts in the context 
of conflict. Understanding the dynamics of majority and minority may help understand the 
background of a conflict. Uncertain majorities emphasize national feelings and discriminate 
against minorities to defend their position, while some minorities emphasize valuable parts 
of their difference (Liebkind 1996, 200). Identity differences are complex because their 
influence varies and they do not necessarily cause conflicts. 
Ethnicity does not automatically lead to conflict (Nye 2003, 151) and ethnic identities 
do not inherently conflict. Individuals are not naturally in conflict simply because of their 
different characteristics. Broadly defined, competition for power, wealth, or status may 
provide the basis for conflict (Deng 2000, 142). Ethnic conflicts often take place when 
established mechanisms for negotiation break down. After this collapse, the inability of 
governments to mediate leads to conflicts, and armed conflict or war may commence when a 
former administration ceases to exist or loses its legitimacy because of external intervention. 
(Nye 2003, 151.) Colonial background may also reinforce ethnic tensions.11
There are three types of ethnic conflict: (1) Conflict (no war, occasional violence), (2) no 
serious conflict despite a high level of awareness about differences, and (3) past conflict 
followed by reconciliation. (Chirot 2001, 3–7). Ethnic conflicts are also divided into two 
subgroups. In the first, the ethnic groups are equal; and in the second, one ethnic group is 
subordinated to the other one. In the latter subgroup, it is more likely that an element of 
inequality is included. (Horowitz 2000, 15–22.) Ethnic and cultural conflict is more likely 
if social changes accompanied by modernization and globalization, challenge identities (Nye 
2003, 244). Ethnicity may be mirrored towards other ethnic groups or cultural influences 
coming from outside. In an ethnic conflict, it may be crucial to acknowledge the position 
of a group (Lahikainen 2000, 82). Ethnic and religious identities may explain differences in 
perception and interpretation of reality. “Racialization” of a conflict from outside may make 
reconciliation difficult (Mamdani 2009, 7). An ethnic distinction that has been of historical 
importance may have a long-lasting impact on the future of a region. On the other hand, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, ethnic explanations of the genocide in Rwanda have been 
criticized for neglecting its historical roots (Piiparinen 2010). Ethnic conflicts are complex 
and similarities between them are limited. Thus, the unique features of ethnic conflicts must 
be taken into account in strategies to resolve them. (Wimmer 2004.)
The significance of religion in international affairs has been increasing recently and religion 
has been the motivation for several terrorist attacks have been motivated by it (Micklethwait 
& Wooldridge 2009, 299). Religion may be connected with violence and ethnic distinctions 
11 Belgian colonialism strengthened ethnic distinction and, after 50 years, led to the genocide in Rwanda (Mamdani 2009, 
277). Although this genocide  has often been regarded as an ethnic conflict, it was more complex than simply an outcome of 
ethnic violence, and  its socio-historical background has mostly been underestimated (Piiparinen 2010).
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and is an option for groups that feel excluded (Heinonen 2004a, 80). Feelings of oppression 
may lead to the emergence of “a culture of violence” (Juergensmeyer 2006, 12–13). The 
feelings of exclusion may explain the power of religion in conflict processes. Although 
religious ideas do not necessarily provoke conflicts, they are important factors in many 
conflict processes because the conditions that lead to armed conflict often have some relation 
to social and political identities (Juergensmeyer 2008, 253). Religions are also interpreted as 
a source of legitimacy regarding various actions (Fox & Sandler 2004, 163). The meaning of 
the religion depends on the interpretation of religious symbols and inter-religious dialogue 
require a common understanding of these symbols. (Heinonen 2002).
Identity-based and ethno-political and religious explanations can partly be used to understand 
new conflicts and provide tools with which to build peace and confidence. Confidence 
building and other efforts showing that warfare is not inevitable can be part of the peace 
process. Culturally affected perceptions of other cultures or ethnic groups do not necessarily 
determine individuals’ representations or they are not evident of their nature. Ethnicity, 
religion and identities have political dimensions in today’s world. Historical feelings and 
past events may be used to manipulate communities and individuals (Linjakumpu 2009, 
85). Although ethnic or religious distinctions may prevail in peaceful societies, manipulation 
based on ethnic, religious and identity-based issues is typical of many modern conflicts. 
Ethnic conflicts should not be simplified and a complexity framework weaves together 
ethnic conflicts together with their structural background. 
3.4.3  Terrorism
The word “terrorism” comes from the Latin word “terrere” which means to scare or to frighten. 
It was first used for a political purpose during the French Revolution. (Malkki et al. 2007, 
25.) Terrorist acts have historically been motivated by a diverse set of phenomena. Terrorism 
may be part of tactics in warfare, while terrorist acts may also take place in countries not at 
war. It is often linked to the sphere of cultural controversies (see Linjakumpu 2009). Events 
such as 9/11 and terrorist acts as part of contemporary warfare have meant that terrorism 
also exists as part of new conflicts. According to Malkki et al. (2007, 32) terrorism is the use 
of threat of violence for the purpose of causing terror and fear in order to obtain political 
influence. The idea of civilian targeting or soft targets is often regarded as the analytical core 
of terrorism (Kivimäki 2003a, 2).
Terrorism can be distinguished from conventional warfare and other types of violence due 
to its psychological nature, which is based on creating fear. Political purposes are part of 
terrorism. Terrorism may be seen as a weapon or a tactic that is utilized by both state and 
non-state actors. (Horgan 2005, 11–22.) Socially, terrorism is dependent on mass media, 
which makes a wider audience aware of terrorist acts (Rantapelkonen 2006, 97). The diverse 
social meanings and consequences of terrorism should not be neglected. Terrorism may lead 
to a spiral of revenge and function as both a consequence and a cause of differences between 
the communities it affects (Eckert 2008, 21). Terrorism has even been seen as a result of the 
myth of the clash of the civilizations, which has become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Bottici & 
Challand 2010, 111).
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Terrorists do not respect the rules of war (May 2007, 303). Terrorism is a tactic, but its 
strategic role may vary (Gurr 2006, 85; Sheffer 2006, 128). It is part of the tactics of 
many insurgent groups and international terrorism linked to al-Qaeda has received a lot of 
attention after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. While it is possible to make a distinction between 
conventional war, guerrilla war, and terrorism, terrorist attacks may be part of both guerrilla 
warfare and conventional warfare (Malkki et al. 2007, 35-38). There have been four eras 
or waves of terrorism (ibid.), the latest of which is characterized by religion or by religious 
fanaticism. There has been a change from terrorism having concrete material objectives to 
terrorism supporting spiritual goals (Heinonen 2004a, 78). 
Since the 1980s most terrorism has been Islamic in origin, although most of the recent 
terrorist acts in Europe have not been of this kind (Fox & Sandler 2004, 165; Limnéll 
2011). Al-Qaeda and a new generation of terrorists have combined traditional features of 
terrorism with new ones, including the abilities to utilize new information technology and 
media (Rekkedal 2006, 558; Heisbourg 2003, 43–47).
Terrorism has existed in different religions (Juergensmeyer 2003). A religion makes a conflict 
more absolute and demonizes its enemy. For religious terrorists, religion provides justification 
for violent acts. In this era, religious terrorism is one of the responses to secularism in a 
globalizing context (ibid.). Terrorism is found more often in developing societies than in 
extremely poor or rich societies (Gurr 2006, 86). Some explanations have been made in the 
context of so-called relative deprivation. The deepening distinction between real and weak 
actors in globalization may lead to an environment that is more susceptible to terrorism 
(Gotchev 2006, 105). Fundamentalist terrorism evolves in circumstances of economic and 
political grievances and a lack of public goods may lead to tolerance of terrorism (Kivimäki 
& Laakso 2003). Terrorists need communities and networks that support them on a practical 
and moral basis (Juergensmeyer 2003, 11). 
As a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, the UN adopted resolutions and policies supporting the 
cooperation of the international community to prevent terrorism (Fox & Sandler 2005, 
165). Before 9/11, only some terrorist attacks were seen as requiring a military response. The 
United States adopted a strategy that was active and based on the idea of pre-emptive action 
in the war on terror, while the European view of the military use of force has been more 
conservative. (Raitasalo 2005, 153–154.) After 9/11 the Western defence communities 
were convinced of a vision that focused on the “global war on terror” (Lonsdale 2008, 55-
56). In late 2001, the US and its allies started a military operation against Afghanistan in 
order to break the cooperation of the terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden and the country’s 
Taliban administration. Failure in peace-building has led to a worsening security situation 
in Afghanistan (Dobbins 2008). 
In the security strategies of the EU (2003) and the USA (2002 and 2006), terrorism and 
failed states are seen as the most relevant threats for the Western countries. The “war on 
terrorism” launched by the Americans divided opinions around the world. Since 2009, the 
Obama administration has used other terms to describe policies of counterterrorism. It has 
replaced Operation Iraqi Freedom with Operation New Dawn and has focused on advising, 
assisting, and training Iraqi security forces and increased military, diplomatic, and civilian 
efforts in Afghanistan (Salonius-Pasternak 2011a). Efficient counterterrorism requires an 
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exact focus, influencing the direct causes of terrorism, and halting radicalization: there is 
minimal evidence that the use of force would lead to a decline in terrorism (Richardson 
2006, 9; Eckert 2008, 21; Malkki et al 2007). Counterterrorism should be worldwide 
and efficient when focusing on an international actor like al-Qaeda, and large-scale UN 
initiatives in this field are important (Harmon 2008, 186–187).
The next phase of al-Qaeda may be a re-localization of the network, which may lead to the 
fading of the global Islamist jihad. The network may have a strong social impact on Muslim 
communities, even without terrorist acts. (Linjakumpu 2009, 99–100.) In late 2010 and 
early 2011, several demonstration movements – some of which aimed for democratization – 
were active in the Arab world. These movements may have several impacts on al-Qaeda. In 
the long run, they appear to have favored a process of democratization and peaceful changes, 
although, if civil wars begin due to them, al-Qaeda may exploit such conflicts. (Byman 
2011; McCants 2011.) The death of al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin Laden, in 2011 may have 
an impact on both terrorist acts and international efforts in crisis management. Because a 
majority of Americans oppose the current military operation in Afghanistan and because 
the original reason for the military operation begun in 2001 was to neutralize al-Qaeda and 
capture Osama Bin Laden, the probability of withdrawing more troops from Afghanistan is 
increasing (Salonius-Pasternak 2011b).
According to recent statistics, 95 percent of all terrorist events cause risks which are close 
to the human risks of moderate or serious car accidents. An analysis of 40 years of terrorist 
attacks shows that 25,000 terrorist attacks have led to about 34,000 deaths and 82,000 non-
fatal injuries. These statistics would change dramatically, if a terrorist attack would occur 
using a nuclear weapon or other effective means of mass destruction. (Smil 2008.) The face 
of terrorism may also change rapidly. In July 2011, a Norwegian man killed 77 people in a 
terrorist act that was not foreseen as part of Norway’s national risk assessments. 
3.4.4  Politics, power relations and limits of cultural explanations
Power relations within a country affect the probability of armed conflict. The risk of violence 
increases if a majority of people are marginalized. There is a similar affect if political elites 
are afraid of losing their power in elections due to the lack of mobility within society from 
one sector to another. For such parties, losing political power would mean losing their 
ability to influence. In many African countries, the transformation from conflict to peace 
will take time because it is difficult to rapidly change structures of societies. Therefore, 
power relations within society have an impact on the potential conflict development of any 
country. (Gounden 2011.)
In the next 10–15 years, globalization will be a major trend that will influence global 
development in diverse ways (Shapiro 2008; Mannermaa 2008). The effect that globalization 
has on cultural identities and awareness, as well as on potential conflict development, is 
manifold. Conservatism may rise as a response to globalization, while understanding of 
other cultures may be facilitated by new contacts between representatives of different 
cultures. Global policies or the lack thereof regulating globalization will certainly have 
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an impact on cultural contacts as well. Existing conflicts are interpreted in diverse ways 
globally. Different cultural orientations and power relations in international politics affect 
how the international community reacts to potential and actual violent conflicts. How the 
Western countries adapt to the development in which their power decreases and new major 
powers will emerge will be crucial. Today’s world is strongly affected by globalization and 
the rise of network society which enables the evolution of information, making trust an 
important source of power (Castells 2009, 16). Cultural globalization is neither a single great 
promise nor a single great threat but it is a continuation of modernization and potentially a 
challenge to pluralism (Berger 2002, 16). Globalization enables networking via the internet, 
for example, and therefore dialogue between people with different cultural backgrounds, 
although the potential for more conflict-prone future remains open as well. 
Regarding hegemony, there is no consensus among the theoreticians regarding how power 
shifts induce conflict-prone situations, but many of them do agree that a world war is not 
inevitable because of history (Jacoby 2008, 178). The United States may compete with 
India and China and potentially with Europe. The structural differences that affect the US 
and the EU will probably make their cooperation more difficult in the future. (Haftendorn 
2008, 156.) The growth of China and India has raised interest in their futures policies. 
Historically, the relationship between China and India has been uneasy and this situation 
continued today, having both positive and negative future prospects (Malik 2009, 207–
208). According to Robert Shapiro (2008), in 2020 the USA will be the only remaining 
military superpower, although globalization favors the rise of China on the global scale. 
Understanding Western influence is a complex process and Western power and influence is 
steadily being de-legitimized (Mahbutani 2008). Questions related to potential political and 
cultural disputes are not limited to the gap between the West and the non-West. Changing 
global power structures may influence stability and the regulatory international systems.
There are linkages between discourses on the great powers and cultural borders. Globalization 
and the development of hegemonies can be analyzed in the context of cooperation or 
clashes of civilizations (Huntington 2003). The re-emergence of autocratic regimes and 
reinforcement of Islamic radicalism have been predicted (see Kagan 2008, 105). Today’s 
world is economically multi-polar and a diffusion of power will evolve when the information 
revolution progresses (Nye 2003, 256). Globalization will probably continue in the coming 
decades while failed states pose a risk for global security (Ghani & Lockhart 2008, 14). It is 
in the interest of all countries to reduce risks of armed conflicts and insecurity in failed states. 
In the decades to come, various international actors may find common views regarding 
how to strengthen international cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management. 
Without real communication, “cultural lenses” and interests related to power may make 
international politics and peace processes difficult. Cooperation in resolving existing or 
potential contradictions is needed to ensure peaceful development.
Ethnic and religious issues are also used as tools to justify violence. Violent ethnic outbursts 
after a peaceful history cannot be explained only in ethnic terms. Ethnic or religious 
groupings and identities may have a profound influence on the members’ perceptions and 
interpretations of modern realities. When ethnic and religious dimensions are present in 
conflict and international politics, the communicative issues related to peace processes may 
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be extremely sensitive. Consciousness about various interests and “cultural lenses” facilitates 
peace processes. The option of a broader collective identity, identification to humanity 
instead of single groups of people may be constructive when dealing with global threats 
(Lahikainen 2000, 84).
3.5  Economic, social, and ecological factors explaining 
 new conflicts
“War no longer appears as a simple breakdown but as 
a self-sustaining rational economic system.”
  - Kumi Naidoo (2010, 136).
The quantitative research literature and comparative literature on violent conflict support 
the idea that political and economic variables are important for the structural prevention 
of conflict (Miall 2007, 120). In recent years, much attention has been paid to the 
interconnectedness of stability and development (Metsola 2008). There are more conflicts 
in poor countries than rich ones and in non-democratic regimes more than in democracies. 
Between 1997 and 2001 two percent of internal wars took place in the most developed 
countries, 30 percent in countries of mid-level development and 56 percent in the least 
developed countries. (Smith 2005, 10–14.) According to the democratic peace literature, 
democracies do not fight wars with each other (Fox and Sandler 2004). Societal and 
structural levels of conflict analysis remain part of the explanation of warfare, although 
identity-based features are seen as essential factors in new conflicts. 
Although the concept of failed states is imprecise, their characteristics can be identified 
as the inability or unwillingness to protect the citizens of a state from violence. Another 
feature of failed states is ”their tendency to regard themselves as beyond the domestic or 
international law” and therefore able to carry out aggression. (Chomsky 2006, 1–2.) A failed 
state can only guarantee the functions of the state in an imperfect manner (Väyrynen 2003, 
37). Although the phenomenon of failed states has been discussed at great length, it remains 
misunderstood. The factors explaining the weakness of these states are similar: corruption, 
elites monopolizing power, an absence of the rule of law, and severe ethnic or religious 
divisions. However, the responses to these similar kinds of problems are not necessarily the 
same because failed states are very diverse. It can be difficult to modify actions to enable 
long-term solutions for stabilization of failed states. (Foreign Policy 2007.)
The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy constructed a Failed States Index based on 12 social, 
economic, and military indicators. The index covers almost the whole world, ranking 177 
states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict and societal deterioration. 
The countries heading the 2009 index were Somalia, Zimbabwe, and Sudan; in 2011, the 
top three were Somalia, Chad, and Sudan. There were eight Sub-Saharan states among 
the 10 most vulnerable both in 2007 and 2011, and seven in 2009. (Foreign Policy 2007; 
Foreign Policy 2009; Foreign Policy 2011.) Many of the contemporary global crises have 
arisen from the 40 to 60 countries that can be termed failed states. Although these crises have 
been largely ignored, it is essential that the international community pay greater attention 
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to them because they cause larger-scale risks to security. (Ghani & Lockhart 2008, 23; 
Ruohomäki 2008, 13–14.)
Corruption and criminality erode the credibility of failed states, and the common people 
in these countries do not believe that they can influence the development of their home 
countries (Ghani & Lockhart 2008, 24). According to Thoms and Ron (2007), violations 
of civil and political rights are more obviously identifiable as conflict triggers than abuses 
of economic and social rights. However, although democracy has a positive impact on 
promoting peace, efforts to achieve democracy may lead to conflict. (Ibid. 702–705). 
Constructing functioning state structures and governance is a key to getting out of conflict 
cycles and violent development in fragile states (see Ghani & Lockhart 2008). This 
argumentation relies on the meaning of trust at various levels: it is essential for citizens 
as well as for the international community or the global economy. At best, functioning 
state structures promote human rights and decrease ethnic hostilities by providing equality 
standards (ibid.). Therefore, failed states can be regarded as one of the causes of violence. 
A lack of interest in peace-building may be caused by the economics of warfare, that is, the 
peace could reduce the income of an insurgent group. Because the aim of the fighters is not 
to gain political support from local inhabitants, they may fight without paying attention 
to the needs of local people. (Renner 2002.) The World Bank conducted a research project 
to study civil wars, based on the assumption that it was assessing civil wars as development 
problems. This approach was justifiable because civil wars mostly take place in poor countries 
and can retard economic development regionally. (Collier & Sambanis 2005.) The project’s 
researchers found a set of statistically significant correlates of civil war. Based on statistical 
data the Collier-Hoffler model (henceforth CH model) presumes that civil war is not caused 
by political and social grievance, but that fuelled by grievance, the opportunities to organize 
and finance a rebellion determine whether a civil war takes place. The model identifies the 
features that make rebellion financially profitable. (Ibid.) In many instances, rebellion is of 
ethnic nature, although factors such as oil can increase risk of violence (Bannon & Collier 
2003, 5–6). Natural resources can be related to armed conflict in three ways: they can be 
a cause or a means of conflict or a potential resource for economic recovery (Wennmann 
2011, 74).
At a general level, there is a negative association between economic development and 
the onset of civil war (Sambanis 2005, 304). However, the CH model is less effective at 
theoretically proposing exactly what kind of mechanisms explain these correlations (ibid.). 
The poorest countries of the world, most of which are situated in Africa and Central Asia, 
evolve in development traps that have been difficult break. In order to respond to the 
challenge of conflict cycles and insufficient development conditions, comprehensive actions 
should be taken to tackle a multitude of problems. These policies include long-term poverty 
reduction. (Collier 2007.) 
Human security could progress within the wider developmental agenda, although it has 
some conceptual restrictions in terms of determining conditions for preferable actions 
(Niemelä 2008, 126–127, 86). Economic rewards may motivate some warring party to 
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spoil a peace process (Newman 2006, 147). External actors may support insurgent groups 
and, in so doing, fuel armed conflict (see Salehyan 2009).
Most of the wars between states have not concentrated on natural resources (Väyrynen 
2003, 40). Oil and water are the resources tha most typically cause full-scale combat 
between armies of established nation-states. Certain other resources are sufficiently valuable 
to provoke conflict within states, usually between already existing ethnic and political 
factions. Internal warfare over gold, diamonds, valuable minerals, and old-growth timber 
and similar kinds of resources has become part of this political epoch. Such conflicts are 
typically interwoven with long-standing ethnic, political, and regional antagonisms. (Klare 
2002, 190.) Natural resources have prolonged several armed conflicts (Väyrynen 2003, 42). 
Resource wars of the post-Cold War era are not random or disconnected events. The wars of 
the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods and 
resource wars will become the most distinctive feature of the global security environment 
(Klare 2002, 213). In order to avoid this, it is important to establish a global system of 
resource conservation and collaboration (ibid. 226).
 
Climate change may not be the most probable source of violence, but competition for oil 
and gas has already been a factor in armed conflicts (Miall 2007). Ignoring climate change 
and its energy-political implications may lead to stronger contradictions in energy-political 
interests and even to potential conflict (ibid. 167). In the era of climate change, energy 
scarcity in particular may lead to security risks (Giddens 2009, 203). The developing and 
the poorest countries will be the most affected by climate change (Brown 2008, 31; Global 
Humanitarian Forum 2009, 66). Climate change involves a systemic challenge to security 
policy that requires a coordinated, long-term, and preventive approach to security. The 
necessary policies can be based on a soft security agenda and conflict prevention approach 
to develop capabilities required in a climate-changed world. Cooperation is needed for a 
transformation to a global low-carbon economy. (Mabey 2008, 58–65.)
In many countries, population displacement redraws the ethnic map (Brown 2008, 33). 
Twenty years from now, the number of climate displaced people may be three times as large 
it is today (Global Humanitarian Forum 2009, 49). At least some level of migration linked 
to climate change will take place but the strength of the phenomenon will depend on the 
policy of the international community (Brown 2008, 41). Environmental problems cause 
migration but more information about the processes affecting environmental migration 
is clearly needed in order to avoid exaggerating the meaning of environmental factors 
(Hugo 2008, 48). Although migration flows do not necessarily signify risks of conflict, it 
is important to remember the potential complexity of the explanatory factors of conflict. 
Human impacts of climate change may lead to social tensions that cause instabilities leading 
to risks of violence or armed conflict (Global Humanitarian Forum 2009, 54). In terms of 
conflict prevention, there is a need to integrate climate change issues into holistic instability 
and conflict analysis (Mabey 2008, 107). 
In many regions, localized water stress will be a probable source of conflict both in rural and 
urban areas. An essential part of conflict prevention is managing various solutions for higher 
variability in water flows due to climate change. Access to fertile land will be a major cause 
of climate-driven conflict and this question will be connected with complex issues of land 
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tenure, privatization and traditional management regimes. Many of the problems related 
to responding to the security challenges of climate change are connected with the broader 
difficulties in driving effective preventive action to tackle threats. (Mabey 2008, 84.)
In an analysis of the onset of civil war, Jeffrey Dixon (2009) sought to find explanatory factors 
for civil wars by analyzing 46 quantitative studies. Due to the quantitative measurement, 
the scope of explanatory factors is limited, although both conflicts and variables in the 
studies under scrutiny are not similar. Most of the variables are related to the issues handled 
in this section. (Ibid.) The following table describes Dixon’s most confident and consistent 
findings.
Table 2.  Consensus determinants of civil war based on high confidence in a sample of 
quantitative studies (Dixon 2009, 720)
Table 2 shows that population, oil exports, and regime instability increase the probability 
of civil wars, while prosperity, growth, and a growing number of peace years decrease the 
probability. Extreme democracy and extreme autocracy decrease the risk of civil war while 
anocracy increases it. The picture is far less clear regarding many other quantitative factors, 
such as when assessing ethnic and religious relations. Increasing the reliability of these 
studies, as well as taking a more qualitative stance on these issues, may help find more 
credible methods for studying explanatory factors in the civil wars.(Ibid.) However, not 
all of the factors affecting violent conflict are easily quantifiable. Contemporary warfare is 
a complex outcome of different factors (Naidoo 2010, 136). The days of ”grand theories” 
of armed conflict may be over, and perhaps the main focus should be on the processes 
that raise the probabilities of violent conflict. However, the Human Security Report 2005 
concluded that, in the long run, warfare diminishes if economic growth, good governance, 
and democratization prevail.
3.6  Development of weapons and arms trade and 
 prospects for futures warfare
Throughout history, the development of technology has enabled greater destruction in 
warfare (Keegan 1994; Wright 2010). In the context of new conflicts, the technological 
development of weaponry is a controversial question. High technology may be used in new 
conflicts but not necessarily as applications of sophisticated military technology. Computers 
and cell phones often facilitate the work of belligerents but weapons in use represent 
conventional technology. Even in Rwanda 1994, belligerents mostly used knives as weapons 
Variables  Direction 
Population  Positive 
Oil exports  Positive 
Prosperity  Negative 
Growth  Negative 
Peace years  Negative 
Democracy  Curvilinear (inverted U) 
Regime instability  Positive 
 
46
instead of firearms. So, in new conflicts a mixture of weapons will probably be utilized which 
also has implications for crisis management.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western countries led by the United States have 
tried to solve the classic problems of warfare by developing technology. The 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, issued a warning on the limits of technology (Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen 2007, 
17–18.) Development work on defence materials is going to accelerate in the near future. 
Cooperability of defence materials is essential in the future because the actors involved 
represent diverse states and organizations. The price of defence materials is estimated to 
double every seven years and maintenance expenditure is related to the price of the materials 
at the time of purchase. New defence technology consists mostly of high technology. 
(Defence Command 2004, 9–11). 
Military units relying on high technology are less dependent on human soldiers because 
human beings will be the weakest link of the machinery. Warfare is led and conducted 
by a small number of people. (Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen 2007, 20.) In theory, civilian 
casualties in warfare can be kept to the absolute minimum due to the development of 
weapons. In warfare conducted by high-tech countries this technological optimum can be 
reached. (Wirtz 2003, 35).
 
A stronger connection of information and information technology with the armed 
forces has changed how people affect warfare and how the wars are fought (Huhtinen & 
Rantapelkonen 2007, 20). Post-modern war is grounded on high-tech aerospace power, 
limitation of casualties and exit strategies. The latest strategic analyses have taken the 
fragmentation of warfare into account. (Evans 2004, 30–33.) High information technology 
has become one of the indicators of military strength. (Raitasalo 2008b, 58.) The criteria of 
functional armed forces have changed since the 1990s and now consist of net-centric leading 
and weapon systems abilities and the usefulness of the systems outside their own regions 
(Malkki et al. 2008, 208–209). The latter feature is of extreme importance in military crisis 
management.
Technological development of weapons in developed countries has an impact on conflict 
development. According to the Small Arms Survey 2006, global military production is 
rising due to the military modernization. The arsenals of modernizing countries will contain 
a large number of surplus small arms and light weapons (ibid. 26). The arms trade is difficult 
to measure, particularly when assessing the trade of small arms (Smith 2009, 143). The 
easy access to conventional arms may render armed violence more serious (Muggah & 
Krause 2009). The flows of older models of small arms and light weapons from developed 
to developing countries could potentially raise risks of violence. Therefore, international 
arms control is essential with regard to future armed conflicts. The surplus arms of the rich 
countries from the Cold War era have accelerated wars in the Third World, which means 
that the arms transfers to the poor countries play a major role in the continuation of warfare 
(Cronberg 2003, 50; Keegan 2000, 180). Somehow, it is a paradox that the value of the 
arms trade only represents 0.5 percent of all global trade but the average civil war costs 
approximately 40 billion euros annually, in addition to its uncountable human costs (Stohl 
& Grillot 2009, 185).
47
New equipment in warfare often leads to changes in tactical and organizational principles. 
Technological changes in warfare are usually adopted more quickly than tactical and 
organizational ones. (Ibid., 208–214.) In countries like Finland, new military and civilian 
technology should be adopted while developing military crisis management. Military crisis 
management organizations are developed to envisage various military threats in conflict and 
post-conflict areas. However, the future development of crisis management cannot depend 
only on questions related to military technology. From a military perspective, technological 
development concerns new conflicts. High technology is going to have an impact on military 
crisis management in the future. For military purposes, higher technology may ensure better 
protection of troops in military crisis management. In trust building, however, technological 
development of weapons is of limited importance. 
The Western intention of carrying out a military revolution through new technology is nearest 
to the new formulation of renewed warfare (Raitasalo & Sipilä 2004). However, most high-
tech scenarios have however, mostly focused on the armed forces of the developed countries, 
although the belligerents in new conflicts may be armed with much less sophisticated 
technology which can cause broad devastation. Military forces relying on high technology 
can be resisted with new methods: namely by relocating the battlefield within the civil 
society (Raitasalo 2008b, 55). The so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) is changing 
warfare, making it more complex, increasing defence budgets, and challenging the skills of 
military personnel (Smith 2004, 184). The realities in warfare have been changing and now 
the conventional high-tech Western militaries must be able to face the world of failed states 
consisting of ethnic paramilitaries and regimes having ballistic missiles and poison gas, as 
well as radical groups favoring mass-casualty terrorism. In the future, the merging of modes 
of armed conflict will probably mean warfare in which national, trans-state and sub-state 
forces may coalesce or confront each other. (Evans 2004.)
As theorists in futures research have stated, today’s thinking affects how we see the 
alternatives for the future. Therefore, today’s theories on armed conflict may have an impact 
on tomorrow’s conflicts. As Bottici and Challand (2010, 136) noted, global political theory 
can help create alternative world views. Similarly, research on armed conflicts may assist in 
understanding the complexity of conflicts and the ways of enabling conflict resolution. The 
evolution of new conflicts will also depend on the international community’s willingness to 
develop diplomatic means of preventing and ceasing warfare. However, a slight increase in 
civil wars and armed conflicts has been predicted in developing countries, mainly in Africa, 
until 2030 (Lintonen 2007, 118). Some scholars in international affairs, such as Heikki 
Patomäki (2007, 15–16) see a future that is more prone to major conflict development than 
others, such as Raimo Väyrynen (2006a, 305).
One of the global challenges of the Millennium Project founded in 1996, is ”peace and 
conflict” (Millennium Project 2011b). Due to several factors, including the evolution of the 
UN and regional organizations, a more peaceful world is becoming increasingly probable. 
However, terrorism and nuclear attacks will remain as threats in the future and a large 
number of armed conflicts will probably be asymmetrical, including the activities of non-
state actors. (Millennium Project 2009, 10–5 – 10–13.) A central part of the conflict picture 
in the future will probably resemble the new conflicts introduced in section 3.2. However, 
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factors such as adequate policies for tackling climate change may reduce conflict risks (Glenn 
et al. 2010, 66–68).
There have been three recent contradictory trends in warfare: a decline in the overall 
frequency of war, an increase in its lethality and a growth of anti-war sentiment (Lebow 
2010, 141). According to Mueller (2006), only two types of war will remain – with few 
exceptions. The most common are unconventional civil wars, which mostly take place in the 
poorest countries. Although they have been termed as “new wars” or a ”clash of civilizations”, 
they are mostly carried out by criminals, bandits, and thugs. The other remaining type of 
war could be referred to as ”policing wars” which are characterized by militarized efforts by 
developed countries. (Ibid., 73–74.) Future warfare is assessed as being tied to the power 
inequalities between the South and the North based on the revolution in military affairs. 
Thus, the dominant coalition of the industrial democracies may unilaterally take action 
against Third World states that are considered “rogue” states. (Ayoob 2000, 166.) This view 
has similarities with Mueller’s (2006) statement about “policing wars”: therefore, apart from 
the intentions regarding the protection of the civilians, power politics may be of importance 
when explaining the possible conflicts between rich and poor countries. Wars in Iraq 
(2003) and Georgia (2008) may be included in Mueller’s category of policing wars and they 
represent conventional warfare in their character. Both of Mueller’s categories may represent 
new conflicts. The intensity of conflicts may vary and ”mixed” types of warfare may take 
place simultaneously, although the risks of conventional war have reduced in comparison to 
the Cold War era. 
3.7  Conclusions
This chapter has analyzed various factors explaining new conflicts. New conflicts, as defined 
earlier in this chapter, are complex. Their explanation should take historical, social, political, 
international, ethnic and economic, and even ecological factors into consideration. The 
various schools explaining armed conflicts have no consensus regarding the explanation 
of conflicts (Forsberg 2010). The widest unanimity regards the fact that there are multiple 
causes of conflict (ibid.). Even with regard to internal conflicts, there is no wide consensus 
on explanatory factors, although some of them have been found in quantitative research 
(R. Väyrynen 2010, 41; Dixon 2009). Lack of welfare is not a sufficient explanation of new 
conflicts although it may exist in their background. In the aftermath of the conflicts in the 
1990s, ethnicity was a popular explanation of conflicts because many armed conflicts had a 
distinction between warring parties consistently with ethnic groups. However, the conclusions 
from explaining armed conflicts in ethnic terms have been accused of methodological 
individualism (see Piiparinen 2010). On the other hand, Huntington’s theses on clashes 
of civilizations have gained support regarding interstate conflicts (see Charron 2010). In a 
broad sense, identity based factors have been important in armed conflicts although their 
role as explanatory factors should be assessed with caution. At least they may fuel a conflict 
as a result of provocation. They may become instruments in a political game that are prone 
to conflict development: for example, religion may be interpreted as legitimizing violence. 
Although economic factors (included in “having,” according to Allardt’s (1976) typology) 
have certain roles behind the conflict, the justification of violence may be interpreted in the 
context of religion, ethnicity or identity (factors related to “loving” and “being” in accordance 
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with Allardt (1976)). Religion has historically been underestimated in international relations 
theories. As a conclusion, identity-based factors have an impact on armed conflicts but 
these factors should be analyzed in regard to the other ones. Economic factors may partly 
explain conflicts but religious, ethnic or identity-based factors may be used as justification 
for warfare or violent acts. Explanatory factors for new conflicts are intertwined.
Earlier in this chapter, I introduced “new conflict” as a description for most contemporary 
armed conflicts. New conflicts are learning challenges due to their complexity. These types 
of learning challenges for both crisis management organizations and personnel are part of 
the answer to the main RQ and RQ1.
Table 3.  Learning challenges to crisis management organizations and personnel posed 
by new conflicts and development goals related to them
    
In Table 3, learning challenges are categorized to address to RQ1 and development goals 
to RQ3.With these research questions in mind, Table 3 shows what kinds of development 
goals can be derived from the learning challenges. The challenges refer to RQ1 and the 
development goals to RQ3. These development goals concern the competences required for 
crisis management both at the levels of the organizations as well as of the individuals working 
in crisis management duties. Although the development goal of complexity management 
is described in similar terms at both levels, it signifies different things to personnel and 
organizations. In this context, the complexity consists of different intertwined background 
factors related to history, culture, religion and society as well as to the economic factors 
explaining why armed conflict emerged. 
Although new conflicts are demanding learning environments for crisis management 
personnel there is variation in the degree of violence that occurs in different conflict areas. 
With regard to human security, in connection with RQ3, it is relevant to remember that 
peace-building and crisis management aim to stabilize peace processes, which should ensure 
protection for civilians. Changes in armed conflict have been evaluated as having an impact 
on military theory, which has traditionally relied on military force but should instead rely 
on civil-military relations (Egnell 2009). For example, learning and cultural understanding 
should be part of the tactics in today’s peace operations (ibid.).A comprehensive approach 
to warfare and crisis management may help create broad strategies for ensuring human 
Entity  Challenge  Development goals 
Organization  complexity  complexity management 
  multiculturalism cultural knowledge 
  ensuring security negotiation capacity 
    military capability 
    human security 
 
Personnel  complexity  complexity management 
    problem solving 
  multiculturalism cultural understanding 
  ensuring security negotiation skills 
    combat skills 
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security. From the perspective of human security, cultural, identity and religious issues 
related to conflict may be especially challenging because they are prone to misinterpretations 
that may cause a conflict cycle to continue. The handling of these issues may be culturally 
and politically sensitive in a peace process, both for the parties in the conflict as well as for 
international mediators and other actors trying to promote peace. Local interpretations of 
warfare may maintain a culture of violence that impedes peace-building. Identity-based 
factors could be used as tools for political provocation and making public opinion or 
opinions of a specific group to accept the use of violence. 
Because of the complex and devastating nature of new conflicts, it is important to develop 
a new “human security” type of approach towards them. An important issue regarding the 
work of military and civilian actors in crisis management is the institutional adaptation in 
the changes of crises and the ability to react to them in functional manners. The questions 
related to the recent evolution of conflicts are essential when analyzing the experiences of 
crisis management personnel and the changes required in crisis management organizations 
and education practices in the future. Understanding the multitude of explanatory factors 
may help understand how peace processes might be facilitated to break vicious circles of 
continuous conflicts. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the implications of new conflicts on the international crisis management 
and peace-building. Violent conflicts and their development in the near future will influence 
crisis management challenges as well as the requirements for peace-building personnel. After 
warfare, peace-building in terms of establishing well-functioning state structures is necessary 
for the society recovering from armed conflict. Challenges in peace-building processes 
represent opportunities for learning both in war-torn societies as well as in international 
institutions. The individual level of the personnel employed in crisis management and 
peace-building should not be neglected either. Conflict development is a factor that impacts 
the answering of the RQs of this research and consequently: from the perspective of human 
security, crisis management and peace-building practices should evolve in order to respond 
to the needs of local populations in conflict and post-conflict areas.
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4.  Crisis management and peace-building 
The aim of this chapter is to respond to the main RQ and to RQ 3:
Main RQ: What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management? 
RQ3: How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be developed 
when the human security approach is taken into account?
 
In order to respond to these RQs, it is necessary to understand contemporary challenges in 
crisis management. This chapter will review the recent history of contemporary actors in 
crisis management and peace-building and analyze efforts by the international community 
to prevent armed conflicts and to work in post-conflict areas to ensure stability mostly at the 
institutional level. Apart from answering RQ3, this chapter focuses on the conceptual and 
developmental analysis of crisis management and peace-building. The conflict of Kosovo 
and the crisis management and peace-building mission since 1999 will be analyzed as an 
example of a new conflict and a crisis management mission because the crisis management 
personnel interviewed for this study have worked for this mission. 
The ways in which we understand contemporary conflicts impact the ways in which we try 
to resolve them (T. Väyrynen 2010). In order to ensure security development, it is crucial 
to strengthen our peace-building and crisis management capability. A peace agreement is 
a basis for stability, but it does not guarantee sustainable peace. Peace-building has been 
traditionally based on a peace agreement signed by the parties of the conflict. Today even this 
is not guaranteed. As chapter 3 showed, peace-building and crisis management efforts take 
place in complex environments because the causes of armed conflict usually are manifold 
and complex. 
There are no “ready-made” or “one-size-fits-all solutions” for peace: instead, peace processes 
should focus on the essential issues and rely on legitimate presentation, justice, confidence 
building and commitment of the parties (Ahtisaari 2009, 47–49). Contemporary peace 
processes are not regarded solely as outcomes of high-level peace agreements but rather 
as multi-level processes, which means that they should involve top, midrange, and 
grassroots leaders in peace process (Talvitie 2011; Sandole 2010 44–49). Until recently, 
the international community has largely ignored the role of civil society in peace-building 
(Theros 2010, 152). Warfare destroys social ties, which means that war-torn society tends to 
remain divided for a long time (Naidoo 2010, 147). Comprehension of the involved parties’ 
different cultural conceptions is required in conflict resolution (T. Väyrynen 2010, 261). 
Therefore, efforts to ensure human security are part of long-term peace-building, which 
requires an understanding of local cultures and people’s needs. 
Crisis management is part of peace-building. The objective of any third-party intervention 
is to move from war to peace – which is the theme of this chapter – although military 
intervention as part of counter-terrorism may raise questions about the factual peace-
orientation of crisis management. The external actors can only build capacities that increase 
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the likelihood of peace (Naidoo 2010, 140). Therefore, it is worth trying to identify how 
peace operations become successful.
How do conceptualizations affect thinking and deeds in crisis management and peace-
building? Does a terminology make a difference regarding crisis management and peace-
building? Both terms should be used in the processes that aim at long-lasting peace. Peace-
building is oriented more towards prevention and broad peace-strengthening processes while 
crisis management refers more to efforts to end warfare. Having said that, crisis management 
may function as prevention if it prevents the aggravation of violence.
A serious problem concerning peace operations, peace-building and crisis management is 
the lack of conceptualizations and theory-based studies. Peace operations have mostly been 
studied in the context of problem-solving theories and have been under-theorized. Most of 
the theoretical work on peace operations has been made in order to make such operations 
more efficient. These perspectives can be accused of non-reflexivity, which means that the 
basic assumptions of the peace operations are taken for granted. Critical theories that focus 
on peace processes are an alternative perspective that may broaden the scope of analysis. 
Therefore, in the framework of human security, critical theories are better at describing the 
realities of a peace process and even the views of the local population. (Bellamy 2004.) The 
lack of theorizations partly explains why the terminology in peace operations is so diverse. 
4.1 Conceptual and historical development and challenges
4.1.1  Peace-building and conflict prevention
Peace-building aims to reform society, including its social institutions (Franke & Warnecke 
2009). It is a widely used concept that refers to a similar kind of process as state-building or 
nation-building. Peace-building aims for a peace process by attaining trust and sustainable 
peace. In a new post-conflict situation, the need for humanitarian aid is usually the most 
topical issue with the need for military crisis management: civilian crisis management 
methods are increasingly being used (Koskela 2008, 7). 
With regard to security contexts, the motive for peace-building is derived from human 
security in a conflict zone. Nevertheless, peace-building is also needed to strengthen the 
national security of any country recovering from armed conflict. In a globalized world a 
remote conflict may also threaten the security of Western countries. Therefore, Western 
countries may have interests to finance peace-building efforts in developing countries due to 
their interest to strengthen their national security.
The effectiveness of peace-building depends on its strategic adequacy and available resources. 
Unity in warring factions to promote peace, local capacities in the country, and the level 
of efforts on behalf of the international community to support peace are needed to acquire 
durable peace. (Doyle & Sambanis 2006 , 334–5.) There is a clear need in peace-building to 
understand how the international community could help the recovery of failed states (Ghani 
& Lockhart 2008, 27).
 
53
Most of the contexts in this study have used the term peace-building instead of similar 
kinds of terms. In American terminology nation-building means approximately the same 
as state-building – the European term that means constructing political institutions, or 
promoting economic development (Fukuyama 2006b, 3). Nation-building, state-building, 
or peace-building can be divided into four components: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
post-conflict reconstruction, and long-term economic and political development. Not all 
the components are always included in the process. (See Fukuyama 2006a, 232–3).
Security functions predominate in the early phases of peace-building: after the stabilization, 
the focus is on the civilian dimension (Fukuyama 2006a, 233). The need for peace 
enforcement varies. Regarding new conflicts, the dismantling and deactivation of armed 
groups is demanding and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes 
are always complicated (Springer 2006, 62–63). DDR processes should be linked to long-
term structural, social, environmental, and developmental frameworks of conflict areas 
(Springer 2006, 293; Porto et al. 2007, 2). Military crisis management is essential for the 
security development of a post-conflict area and civilian crisis management is crucial for 
founding reliable institutions and ensuring trustworthy governance.
Peace processes need trust. Peace agreements generally induce political reforms such as 
political inclusion and demobilization, but previously warring factions generally do not 
trust each other enough to enable promised concessions even after an accord has been signed 
(Bekoe 2008, 12). Political changes take place because a transition from war to peace leads 
to profound changes in relations between a country’s military and political groups (Pouligny 
2006, 57). The legitimacy of peacekeepers is built up during the mission, and the legitimacy 
of any intervention is never secure, which means it is important to understand the local 
people’s interpretation of the idea of the mission (ibid, 180). In a post-conflict situation, 
humanitarian aid is needed initially: the need for military crisis management is larger and 
the role of military crisis management decreases while the role of civilian crisis management 
increases. After peace-building, the society needs to stand on its own feet. (Koskela 2008, 7.) 
Reconstruction and development can be controversial concepts. Reconstruction means 
returning society back to something like the historical status quo, whereas development 
requires the creation of new economic or political institutions that should be self-sustaining 
after the departure of the international community. Unfortunately, extensive international 
reconstruction can actually impede long-term development and international involvement 
can breed dependence and weaken local institutions. The reconstruction phase strongly 
affects the target country’s prospects for institutional development (Fukuyama 2006a). 
Success in peace-building requires a multidimensional strategy and mechanisms to integrate 
the work of various agencies. The integration mechanisms should ensure the unity of efforts 
during the planning and execution of the operation. Peace-building operations are not purely 
or predominantly military operations. (Flournoy 2006, 88.) In post-conflict societies, there 
is an urgent need to arrange governance that enables reasonable coordination of various 
agencies. If the DDR process successfully leads to stabilization, the role of military crisis 
management will be reduced.
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Accountability requires paying attention to the ways in which peace-building is organized. 
It is important to establish governmental structures that are accountable to the citizens. 
The role of NGOs and contractors should not impede the link of accountability between 
the state and the citizen. (Ghani & Lockhart 2008.) The work of various international 
actors should be coordinated in order to ensure the effectiveness of peace-building, and 
environmental aspects must be integrated into peace-building processes (UNEP 2009). 
Humanitarian aid always affects conflict areas (Anderson 1999), and similarly, civilian and 
military crisis management has an impact on conflict or post-conflict areas. Awareness of 
this impact may help assessments of whether activities from outside strengthen civil society’s 
ability to remove itself from vicious conflict circles or whether these activities reinforce the 
social structures that maintain the conflict. 
When Finnish concepts are compared with Fukuyama’s (2006a) terminology, military 
crisis management can be seen as peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Civilian crisis 
management supports post-conflict reconstruction and development work: reconstruction 
and development aspects may both be part of development cooperation. The distinctions 
between these terms are not always clear and it can be difficult to determine the exact 
difference between civilian crisis management and development aid (Liesinen 2007). The 
effects of crisis management should be analyzed as carefully as the effects of humanitarian 
or development aid. 
It is important to learn lessons from previous and on-going operations for developing post-
conflict reconstruction in the future (Fukuyama 2006a, 244). For the people living in a 
crisis area, the end of the conflict rarely means the end of security problems, and these 
problems are often related to the difficulties in reintegrating former combatants and creating 
or reforming police forces (Pouligny 2006, 257). The broader information and transparency 
that peacekeeping operations provide could strengthen a peace process because the lack of 
information can cause in the continuation of hostilities (Lindley 2007). Most inter-group 
conflicts have an identifiable social-psychological component (Hewstone & Cairns 2001, 
336). It is essential that the peace-building is based on a reasonable strategy that aims at 
reducing hostility from a social-psychological point of view. 
The liberal peace framework is dominant in most of peace-building policy documentations. 
This framework seeks to provide equilibrium between an empowerment of the individual 
and the institutions of governance guiding the behavior of the individual. It is based on 
democracy, free markets, development and the rule of law. The objective of the liberal 
peace framework is to establish a self-sustaining peace under liberal governance and social, 
economic, and political models that function in accordance with liberal models and 
to remove both overt and structural violence. It is questionable whether this framework 
provides social and economic support for a population that mostly lives in poverty. (Miall 
2007, 82–99)
An inclusive framework is necessary for the involvement of all groups within the state, even 
the potentially marginalized ones (Deng 2000, 144). Civil society in a conflict area may be 
divided because some parts of it may support the peace process and some others may oppose 
it (Naidoo 2010, 134). In peace processes, local involvement and ownership should ensure 
that peace is sustainable. Therefore, local conditions and cultural issues should be taken into 
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account in resource preferences and distribution and institution building. In a post-conflict 
area, it is important to get the local population involved in the process of fulfilling the 
objectives of transitional justice (Kerr & Mobekk 2007, 180). Local ownership is needed in 
all institution building, although there is no one-and-only model for appropriate institutions 
in a post-conflict area. However, peace-building that focuses on democratic administrative 
structures and collaboration with civil society are processes that must support each other.
The criteria for legitimacy of governance vary, both culturally and in relation to different 
political opinions. It is important to understand several sources of legitimacies in conflict 
areas. These issues require interactive negotiations, and external actors can support them by 
facilitating systematic and peaceful interaction to resolve potential problems. These actors 
should identify pre-existing local capacities before constructing new ones. In peace-building, 
flexibility on the part of both the local inhabitants and the international community facilitates 
the identification of good practices. (Wiuff Moe 2010.) Resolving political problems locally 
by people themselves seems to be an emerging trend in peace-building. A emerging trend 
in peace-building is to have the local people to resolve the local political problems. The 
following factors may facilitate the creation of long-lasting peace: fortifying local ownership, 
minimizing the unintended effects of peace operations, contextualized procedures enabling 
the engagement of civil society, understanding and analyzing the short- and long-term 
influences of a mission including the distinction between empowerment of local people and 
attaining timely results, and understanding the role of the regional actors in a peace process 
(Werther-Pietsch & Roithner 2011).
 
The responsibility to prevent is the most essential single dimension in the principle of the 
responsibility to protect. Conflict prevention consists of early warning systems, preventive 
diplomacy, ending the impunity of war criminals, and preventive peace operations. 
(Bellamy 2009.) It requires efforts to promote development, democracy, good governance 
and human rights. For conflict prevention, the communities must have the capacity to 
change peaceably and to regulate their conflicts peacefully. For this purpose, people and 
groups need ways to reconcile their conflicting interests. Apart from different interests, the 
groups also have common interests. The main way to balance these competing interests is to 
establish communities that adopt rules, norms, relationships, laws, procedures, habits and 
institutions that regulate concurring interests. (Miall 2007, 120–168.) 
If peace-building and crisis management can help stop a conflict cycle, they also function as 
a form of conflict prevention. It is necessary to develop methods of conflict prevention which 
are most effective before hostilities begin (Worchel 2005, 752–753). Early warning systems 
for potential conflicts are part of conflict prevention. Unfortunately, the early warning system 
for the prevention of armed conflicts has only evolved only modestly (Conflict and Fragility 
2009). Because the information required for well-functioning early warning appears to exist 
within the UN system, effective use of this information would improve conflict prevention 
(Zenko & Friedman 2011).
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4.1.2  Crisis management as a concept and its recent development
Crisis management means actions that are intended to avoid aggravating of crisis and to 
prevent war (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006; Rantapelkonen 2000) and it extends from 
prevention to recovery and reconstruction (Martin & Kaldor 2010, 5). International crisis 
management has been described as international cooperation and primarily includes actions 
taken with the UN authorization and without UN Security Council authorization, military 
action potentially assessed as a crime against peace (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006; Haas 
2008). Crisis management encompasses all phases of crisis and conflict, including conflict 
prevention, acting in armed conflict and post-conflict stabilization. Crisis management, 
which may require all levels of violence from peaceful cooperation to high-intensity battle is 
used as a broad formulation of actions (Wedin 2005, 11–13). Successful crisis management 
may function as a base for reconstruction (Laakso 2003, 283). The term conflict management 
is used in a similar way as crisis management in some sources (see Piiparinen 2010 ). 
Crisis management efforts may be motivated in similar kinds of ways in peace-building with 
regard to the contexts of human and national security (see section 4.1.1). The incentives for 
crisis management activities are often based on a mixture of human and national security 
argumentation. For example, Finland justifies its involvement in crisis management with 
national security and international responsibility argumentation (see Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2009). Human security motives focus on preventing violence in a conflict zone. 
National security argumentation depends on the idea of removing a threat to the countries 
that send troops to a military crisis management operation. Financial support from the UN 
may also strengthen the motivation of some countries to contribute to an operation.
In Finland, the concept of crisis management has been used broadly. The EU has developed a 
comprehensive approach to crisis management, referring to its military and civilian sides and 
the need to develop them in a coherent and flexible manner. To one person, comprehensive 
crisis management may mean a joint civilian and military mission, while to someone else it 
may mean improved cooperation of civilian and military actors.
 
Crisis management consists of civilian and military crisis management. Civilian crisis 
management signifies the civilian field of crisis management, including the establishment of 
governmental structures that enable trust-building in a society. Military crisis management 
refers to the military activities of crisis management that are often described as peacekeeping. 
As a whole crisis management is part of the wider process of peace-building. Crisis 
management is organized from outside of a war-torn society. 
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Table 4.  Crisis management, types of aid, and peace-building 
 
Crisis management has changed since the end of the Cold War. Traditional peacekeeping has 
transformed into more demanding forms of military crisis management (see Ramsbotham et 
al. 2008).12 Civilian crisis management has emerged as a new entity with which to respond 
to the need to reconstruct civilian society. The end of the Cold War has made it easier for the 
international community to react in order to take actions against these kinds of brutalities. 
In the UN, several processes have advanced to prevent the mistreatment of civilians in armed 
conflicts. 
New tools in crisis management have been motivated by human security. The human security 
perspective emphasizes the safety of civilians and the human rights of every individual. To 
provide human security, various international actors who focus on conflict prevention and 
peace-building should be able to cooperate and be aware of the needs of local inhabitants. A 
comprehensive approach to each conflict is required and should be extended to humanitarian 
and development aid although they do not belong to crisis management functions.
4.1.3  Military crisis management and peacekeeping
Peace operations are as much a source of criticism as they are both indispensable and imperfect 
responses to armed conflicts (Tardy 2004, 1). According to Salonius-Pasternak and Visuri 
(2006, 8) military crisis management is a broad concept consisting of crisis management 
actions of a military character. It has been referred to as crisis management that is conducted 
by military means and having its “primary goal to restore and maintain stability in a crisis 
area” (Government of Finland 2009a). 
12 Due to the terminological differences, Ramsbotham et al. (2008) did not use the term of military crisis management, although 
they did refer to the ability to respond to more demanding crises.
Activity form Main function Current trends/challenges 
Peace-building + large process + local involvement 
  + sustainable peace + coordination 
    + accountability 
 
Military  + ensuring security + new functions 
crisis management + peacekeeping + risky operations 
  + peace enforcement 
  + security sector reform  
 
Comprehensive + combining civilian & + flexibility & responsiveness 
crisis management military crisis management   
 
Civilian   + governance building + local involvement   
crisis management   + trust-building 
 
Humanitarian aid + enabling survival + aid employees endangered 
  + immediate basic aid + neutral position 
 
Development aid + ensuring development + strategic development 
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A crisis management operation can be divided into three phases: enforcement, maintenance, 
and withdrawal. In the enforcement phase, the volume of the military crisis management 
grows and the need for emergency aid is large. The volume of civilian crisis management 
increases gradually, while stabilization leads to a reduction in military crisis management. 
(Kurkinen 2001, 10–11.) Crisis management troops function both under international 
law and in accordance with national legislation. The mandate includes the objectives and 
restrictions for the mission. (Lundelin 2008, 1 & 119.) 
A peacekeeping operation is a third-party intervention that involves the deployment 
of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in a target state. The 
operation functions in accordance with the mandate that separates conflicting parties, 
monitors ceasefires, maintains buffer zones, and takes responsibility for the security between 
the conflict parties. The operation is neutral towards the conflicting parties, but not 
necessarily impartial towards their actions (Heldt & Wallensteen 2006, 11). A more refined 
conceptualization of peacekeeping is needed on the basis of a demand-driven and human 
security-oriented approach (Wiharta 2007, 128).
The increase in the number of the peacekeeping missions since the end of the 1980s signaled 
the commitment of the international community to preventing humanitarian disasters. The 
number of troop-contributing countries in the UN operations grew from 26 in 1988 to 103 
between in 2004 (Ramsbotham et al. 2008, 135). Although the UN’s growing commitment 
to peacekeeping has led to a decline in armed conflicts, the costs of UN peacekeeping are 
minimal compared with worldwide military expenditures (Sheehan 2011).
Peacekeeping roles have also changed, due to the higher involvement of developing 
countries in UN crisis management and the richer countries’ involvement in NATO-led 
operations. The Asian contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping is noteworthy. In 
June 2010,100,692 persons were deployed in UN operations as police, military experts, 
and peacekeepers and 30 percent of them came from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India (see 
UN 2010). Altogether, NATO troops consisted of 129,742 persons, which was almost 30 
percent higher than the number of the UN troops (NATO 2010a; 2010b). The growing 
number of UN troops coming from developing countries has been described as a division 
of labor between “the West” and “the Rest” caused by the lack of interest from the Western 
countries in deploying a large number of troops to developing countries (see Piiparinen 
2010, 133–134). A contribution to UN peacekeeping is economically beneficial for most 
developing countries because UN reimbursements generally cover more than is needed for 
these countries to train soldiers (Sheehan 2011, 145). 
Peacekeeping has been divided into three chronological phases. The first generation of 
peacekeeping, so called traditional peacekeeping, took place during the Cold War. In this 
phase, all the warring parties were involved with the peace process. The second generation 
of peacekeeping existed between 1987 and 1991 and was transitional in character. The third 
generation of peacekeeping from 1992 the present, has signified an increase in the number 
of operations. The third generation of peacekeeping enhances human security: it combines 
capable military force with international standards of humanitarianism, but it is also linked 
to risks that military force would be utilized without the permission on behalf of the UN. 
(Ramsbotham et al. 2008; Berdal 2008.) 
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Humanitarian intervention is one of the most difficult questions in international relations. 
Only after the end of the Cold War did the UN start to mandate the use of force in 
humanitarian purposes, relying on the idea that large-scale human rights violations are a threat 
against peace and international security. Even after the publication of the “Responsibility 
to protect” report, there has been reluctance within the international community to accept 
the idea of a humanitarian intervention. (Ryter 2003, 1–2.) In several instances, states have 
claimed to be making a military intervention for humanitarian purposes, but have actually 
been primarily pursuing their national security interests (Carey et al. 2010, 185). Any 
use of force for humanitarian purposes requires clear arguments supporting it over other 
means. According to Kaldor (2007, 71), a humanitarian intervention should probably be 
re-conceptualized as international presence in conflict-prone areas and this international 
presence extends from international agencies and peacekeeping troops to civil society actors. 
The dramatic nature of humanitarian interventions may become less dramatic in the future 
if operations are improved to more carefully take into account the humanitarian needs that 
exist in single conflict or post-conflict areas. 
When analyzing the generations of peacekeeping, military operations motivated by 
counter-terrorism have blurred the picture of military crisis management. United States-
led interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) were not humanitarian in nature, 
although the US has emphasized humanitarian arguments to justify them (Carey et al. 
2010, 179). The visualization in the strategic communication of ISAF maintains orientalist 
views when making an impression of the local population of Afghanistan as underdeveloped 
people (Kotilainen 2011). Visualizations of local populations in the material of some other 
operations may be criticized in a similar kind of way. When such visualizations are influential, 
they may make support to local ownership more difficult.
The current situation in Afghanistan shows that an increase in violence can occur instead 
of stabilization. There has been even a debate over whether a country like Finland sending 
troops to Afghanistan actually is one party in warfare (Salonius-Pasternak 2010). This is 
not legally the case, but incessant fighting and statements of NATO mean that another 
interpretation can be drawn (see Salonius-Pasternak 2010). Such an interpretation may also 
lead to the conclusion that countries involved in humanitarian interventions would also be 
parties of warfare.
Accountability is a key issue to the development of crisis management. Privatization of the 
security sector may be a threat to accountability, while the international community has 
handled the privatization of peacekeeping extended to the use of lethal force in a critical 
manner. The UN has refused to send troops in cases where private troops have been the only 
alternative (Lehnardt 2009, 221). At the international level, privatization, even with regard 
to the assisting duties, would have an impact on future development.
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4.1.4  Civilian crisis management, cooperation and comprehensive 
 crisis management
Civilian crisis management can be defined as crisis management carried out by civilian experts 
in a peaceful manner. It is a broad concept that refers to crisis management arranged by 
civilian actors (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006, 8).The aim of civilian crisis management 
is to prevent conflicts, to maintain peace and stability, and to strengthen local governance in 
crisis areas, when necessary. Civilian crisis management supports democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, good governance and a properly functioning civil society by different means 
(Government of Finland 2009a, 129). It may cover actions required to protect people and 
guarantee the basic functions of society in a crisis area, both before and after the conflict. 
(Jortikka-Laitinen 2006, 125.) The term has been mostly in use in the EU with similarities 
to military crisis management, which refers to the military activities of crisis management.
Civilian crisis management has been developed due to the complexity of new conflicts. 
Traditional peacekeeping does not guarantee an enduring peace process in complex post-
conflict situations. Peacekeeping that kept the former combatants from attacking after well-
resolved peace negotiations has transformed into more complex military crisis management. 
Humanitarian and development aid and work of various UN organizations and non-
governmental organizations have historically played a role that is partly the same as that of 
civilian crisis management today. The development of a more systematic concept of civilian 
crisis management has become a necessity for responding to the needs of civilian population 
in conflict. There are many civilian crisis management actors, including the UN and its sub-
organizations, other international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. It 
may function independently or it may be combined with military crisis management. Thus 
a comprehensive crisis management operation is taking place.
Peace-building and the civil-military cooperation within it must be adjusted to the 
unique conflict or post-conflict situations they are dealing with (Kristoffersen 2006, 27). 
Recently, the need to strengthen the civil-military coordination (CMCO) has become more 
salient. This coordination will become even more important in the future because crisis 
management for more complex conflicts will require diverse combinations of civilian and 
military means. (Jortikka-Laitinen 2006, 143.) Military intervention is sometimes needed 
to prevent or cease insecurity, but military action alone cannot solve problems related to 
human insecurity. However, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is challenging. (Knight 
2008, 28.) Due to a comprehensive approach, cooperation of various actors is a prerequisite 
for a progressive outcome. Civilian and military crisis management utilizes complementary 
means (Government of Finland 2009a, 100). Cooperation and coordination of civilian and 
military crisis management can take various forms, which partly depend on the organizational 
structure of a crisis management mission. Civilian and military pillars can co-exist under a 
or without a joint command, or a civilian part may exist within a military mission, such as 
the cooperation that occurs in PRT:s in Afghanistan (UNAMA exists in collaboration with 
ISAF). In principle, a military unit may also exist within a civilian mission. 
Civil-military relations are a core issue in the functions of the military in contemporary peace 
operations. Cooperation and coordination of civilian and military objectives and activities 
has been considered as a key for success in crisis management. Integration is important at 
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both the strategic and tactical levels. (Egnell 2009.) This question is discussed in detail in 
the following section.
The ongoing development of civilian and military crisis management may mean that both 
“pillars” will be mixed in different ways in the future. Separate and/or combined structures 
may be needed for civilian and military crisis management. Unfortunately, the conditions 
for various alternatives have not been widely studied despite the fact that this kind of 
knowledge might facilitate the development of crisis management organizations. Joint 
efforts are needed to improve the conditions for coordination and cooperation which are 
necessary in comprehensive crisis management.
4.2  International organizations and national development in crisis
 management and peace-building
Table 5 introduces the main functions and challenges of several organizations in regard to 
crisis management.
Table 5.  Roles of selected international institutions in crisis management and peace 
processes
Table 5 illustrates the various actors involved in humanitarian aid and civilian and military 
crisis management. The broad representation of various actors in a conflict or post-conflict 
area makes the entire peace-building process quite complicated, both for the personnel 
involved and for the local people. Communication and division of the duties may also 
be complex. Comprehensiveness has been seen as one answer to the complexity of peace-
building.
Institution  Main functions      Current development and challenges 
UN  + global peace     + increase of UN troops 
  + UN Charter 
  + governmental forum 
 
EU  + European cooperation     + comprehensiveness 
+ supra-governmental + renewal of security agenda  
 
NATO  + defence alliance     + increase in crisis management 
        + challenges in Afghanistan 
        + comprehensiveness 
 
OSCE  + European security     + observing and monitoring 
 
AU  + African cooperation 
  + African security     + AU troops  
 
Red Cross  + humanitarian law     + humanitarian aid 
 
Amnesty International + human rights     + national & thematic reports 
  + NGO 
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4.2.1  Role of the United Nations 
When the United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945 after the end of the Second World 
War, its charter was written to maintain security and global stability and prevent warfare. 
The United Nations Charter is the constituting instrument that regulating the rights and 
obligations of the member states (Kennedy 2006). The first priority of the charter was peace, 
which was motivated by the second priority – human rights. (Haas 2008, 74–75.) The 
General Assembly of the United Nations approved the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948 (ibid., 81). These two documents expressed a clear commitment to human 
rights in the post-war era.
In international relations, the UN Charter prohibits the use of force is prohibited except for 
self-defense – and for collective security under the regulation of the UN Security Council. 
The prohibition of the use of force is globally accepted in international law. (Aro & Petman 
1999, 7–12.) Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations have had more 
demanding mandates, focusing on work with local communities (Salminen 2003, 182). 
UN-led peacekeeping increased until 1995 and even doubled in comparison to its extension 
during the Cold War. However, difficulties in Somalia, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia at the 
beginning of the disintegration war proved the need for new working methods apart from 
traditional peacekeeping. For a long time, the views about how to develop peacekeeping were 
diffuse. UN member countries were only moderately interested in enhancing peacekeeping. 
As a result of this process, there was a lack of interest in commencing new UN-led operations 
at the end of the 1990s. (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006, 6.) After the reforms took 
place, UN peacekeeping was strengthened at the beginning of the new millennium. (Ibid., 
7.) Since 1992, an expansion of UN peacekeeping operations has taken place, both in the 
numbers of the operations as well as in their scope and complexity (Berdal 2008).
Despite the criticism focused of the UN, its position in conflict prevention and peace 
processes will be central in the future. The UN has a duty to coordinate international 
humanitarian aid efforts (Finskas 2010). The UN’s decision to establish a new peace-
building commission is a significant step forward on behalf of the international community 
to mitigate the influence of conflict and prevent its recurrence. Post-conflict peace-building 
has close links to structural conflict prevention, and the two areas overlap because peace-
building aims at achieving a sustainable peace and avoiding a relapse into war. (Miall 2007, 
120.) Ethically, the adoption of the principle of the responsibility to protect by the UN has 
been a step forward in international relations (see Bellamy 2009). However, the selectivity 
of the international community when responding to humanitarian catastrophes of armed 
conflicts remains a systemic problem and the selectivity in these responses should focus on 
the conflicts’ large-scale devastation (Hawkins 2008, 204). As mentioned in section 4.1.1, 
information about an effective early warning system already exists within the UN, which 
means that more efforts to utilize this information for coherent preventive actions would be 
needed (Zenko & Friedman 2011).
The goals of the UN state-building agenda are to create stability, to establish a liberal 
democratic political system, to establish the rule of law system, to protect human rights, to 
establish functional public administration, to ensure a functioning governmental capacity, 
to create a sustainable and market-based economy, and to stabilize external relations (Bull 
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2008, 33–35). The role of the UN in state- and peace-building will be relevant in the future. 
A threat to the UN’s capabilities is that, in several Muslim countries and other Third-World 
countries, the UN is considered as an organization that promotes the interests of the US 
and other Western countries: this feeling is also reflected in assessments of the UN-led 
peacekeeping operations (Brahimi 2006, 15). The veto right of the five member countries 
in the UN Security Council may paralyze the organization in the future, even in the cases 
of large-scale human rights violations. Humanitarian interventions may take place in the 
future. As long as power politics plays a major role in international relations, humanitarian 
interventions will be widely suspected and it will be difficult to achieve international 
unanimity. (Ryter 2003, 25–61.) 
In the development of the UN peacekeeping, the so-called Brahimi report (Report of the 
Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations, 2000) represented progress. Following 
a thorough assessment process, it presented guidelines for UN peacekeeping. Regarding 
the future, the idea of compact and rapid UN troops has also been proposed because the 
contemporary rapid reaction troops may not easily be taken into use for humanitarian 
purposes (Langille 2008). Although the UN’s ability to prevent crises has been criticized, 
it remains a key actor in security policy and crisis prevention, and its charter is a central 
document in international relations. However, the actions of the UN are dependent on the 
member states’ foreign policies (Weiss et al. 2010, 391).
The UN Security Council’s resolution 1325 from 2000 emphasized that women’s position 
in peace processes should be strengthened (Abugre 2009). The resolution pays attention 
to the importance of women in peace building and conflict resolution and their equal 
participation in peace processes. In 2008, resolution 1820 complemented and strengthened 
resolution 1325 in regard to rape and other forms of gender-based violence. Resolutions 
1325 and 1820 are examples of the new role of human security in international affairs. 
(Ibid.) Although UN resolution 1325 obliges member countries to promote the role of 
women in conflict areas, efforts to push this goal forward have been limited. Mainstreaming 
resolution 1325 is far from complete and the bottom-up approach which gives a stronger 
role to women in peace-building has not been implemented (Hudson 2010). In regard to 
another vulnerable group, resolution 1612 focuses on children in armed conflict (Save the 
Children 2011).
4.2.2  European Union
The European Union (EU) is a supra-governmental organization that can make binding 
laws affecting individuals and governments (Haas 2008, 281). Finland became a member 
of the EU in 1995. The EU divides crisis management into civilian and military crisis 
management. It has also emphasized a comprehensive view regarding cooperation and 
coordination of civilian and military crisis management. In 1999, the European Union 
decided to strengthen its cooperation in crisis management. In accordance with the Headline 
Goal, the construction of the military’s capability for carrying out military crisis management 
missions, including the most demanding ones and consisting of between 50,000 and 60,000 
troops at 60 days’ notice, has taken place (Koivula 2005, 11). The EU has created the 
concept of the EU Battle Groups in order to react rapidly. The creation of EU Battle Groups 
64
was motivated by the idea of protecting civilians in conflicts that rapidly become large-scale 
threats towards civilians. In the EU’s military crisis management, it has been important to 
develop interoperability, deployability, and sustainability in order to reach the Headline 
Goal 2010 (Savola 2006, 87). However, the EU Battle Groups have not yet been deployed 
in any operation, although they have been in a state of preparedness (Raitasalo 2008a, 8; 
IISS 2010, 104). In the EU, a civil-military cell was established in 2005 for coordinating 
of the activities in civilian and military crisis management in 2005 (Kokkarinen 2008, 25).
Civilian crisis management has become essential for the crisis management of the European 
Union since the beginning of the new millennium. In 2004, the EU adopted an action 
plan on civilian crisis management, including the guidelines of the Security Strategy and 
more efficient utilization of civilian crisis management resources of the member countries 
(Halonen 2005, 24–25). The EU’s capabilities to plan and execute crisis management 
operations are strengthening (Government of Finland 2009a, 97).
The EU works systematically to develop civilian crisis management, and it has set goals 
for this work. The EU’s ability to plan and execute crisis management operations are going 
to be strengthened (Government of Finland 2009a, 97). The member countries inform 
the EU about how and to which extent they can allocate resources to this work. Better 
cooperation of the civilian and military dimensions of the crisis management of the EU is 
under development. Finland is in favor of comprehensive crisis management executed by 
the EU (ibid.). A comprehensive approach to crisis management helps the development of 
cooperation both conceptually and practically. 
4.2.3  NATO
During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was clearly a defence 
alliance. In the 1990s, NATO was obliged to a central role in peacekeeping because its 
functions as a military organization suited it to such a role more than any other existing 
security organization (Tardy 2006). NATO planning processes are based on the RMA 
thinking, and countries outside the technological development are considered as having the 
will to isolate. Since the 1990’s, NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) has developed 
military cooperation between NATO and partner countries and the cooperation has focused 
on military planning, education, training, material and troops. Finland is not a member of 
NATO, but has participated in PfP.
The NATO Response Force (NRF) shows the changes that take place emphasizing 
capabilities regarding rapid mobilization and high technology (Raitasalo 2005, 259–288). 
NATO has renewed its strategic concept recently and is seeking a balance between defence 
duties and crisis management for the organization (Salminen 2009, 22). Since the 1990s, 
NATO has been expanding Eastwards in Europe. The ISAF operation in Afghanistan is 
central for NATO (Medcalf 2008) because it is the first peacekeeping operation to transform 
towards involvement in a protracted conflict in a failed state and it also represents the change 
of perceptions of people in industrialized countries regarding conflict in a remote country 
(Giustozzi 2010, 69). Civilian casualties of the military operations of ISAF have attracted 
public attention and raised public discussion in Western countries. In the foreseeable future, 
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however, it is unlikely that NATO would leave its global role and return to its former role in 
the European defence (Medcalf 2008).
Comprehensiveness has been on NATOs agenda for several years and will be a key concept 
in its new strategic concept development (Petersen et al. 2010, 75). In order to coordinate 
cooperation between civil and military actors, NATO published its “Civil-Military Co-
operation” (CIMIC) doctrine in 2000 (Kurkinen 2001, 41–69). NATO has been developing 
a civilian component based on the CIMIC –concept. Civil-military cooperation is based on 
the idea of supporting rebuilding and stabilization after the end of the conflict (Salonius-
Pasternak & Visuri 2006, 8). However, NATO has not created broad civilian capabilities 
(Salminen 2009, 21). They are seen as being more like a supportive part of the action needed 
for the military goals and have not achieved the same level as in the EU. 
4.2.4  Humanitarian agencies, regional actors, and non-governmental 
 organizations
Humanitarian agencies have traditionally been impartial, neutral, and independent, which 
has meant they have not taken sides in a conflict. In contemporary conflicts, the work of 
humanitarian agencies has been endangered by violence against aid workers (Kennedy 2009). 
Coordination of humanitarian aid has been improving since the early 1990s (Finskas 2010) 
and it is probable that humanitarian agencies want to remain as neutral and independent as 
possible in future conflicts. This means that the Red Cross will not want military protection 
for its missions. The work of the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies should not 
be regarded as civilian crisis management, but as humanitarian work. Because of changes in 
conflicts and in crisis management, the role of humanitarian agencies is problematic.
Borders between various kinds of humanitarian work, as well as crisis management are not 
always clear. Humanitarian agencies have collaborated with military actors in crisis areas 
in order to achieve efficacy (Kennedy & Kotilainen 2009). On the other hand, military 
personnel have worked in the field of humanitarian aid. Therefore, it may be difficult 
for local inhabitants to make a distinction between the roles of various actors in the area 
(ibid.). Humanitarian agencies have also criticized blurred identities of various actors in the 
humanitarian field (Niemelä 2008, 61). In contrast to this and because of the demanding 
security circumstances, the humanitarian work on behalf of soldiers has been seen as a 
necessity (ibid). From the humanitarian agencies’ perspectives, the distinction between 
diverse actors in crisis areas should be clear. In the context of a comprehensive approach 
to crisis management, the interests of humanitarian agencies differ from the interests of 
civilian and military crisis management actors because independence is more likely to ensure 
security and neutral working conditions for them. However, even as independent actors, 
personnel of humanitarian agencies are easily targeted by attacks of armed groups.
The regional agencies are not a substitute to the UN collective security system. These agencies 
have various capacities for peace operations. The challenge is how getting the regional 
agencies and the UN to work together in order to enhance peace and security in a manner 
that enables the optimal use of capacities. (McCoubrey & Morris 2000, 243–244.) In crisis 
management, the importance of the regional actors is probably increasing. The growth of 
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NATO and EU capabilities are good examples of a growing interest in crisis management 
at the regional level. In Africa, the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping troops have been in 
action in Darfur, for example. The aim of the AU has been to enhance its capabilities in 
peacekeeping in order to respond to the conflicts taking place in Africa. Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) focuses on collective security in Europe and 
has also been active in post-conflict areas such as Kosovo. In August 2009, OSCE had 18 
civilian operations in Europe and Asia (OSCE 2009). The field work of the OSCE can 
mostly be described as civilian crisis management.
Non-Governmental organizations (NGOs) work in conflict areas, both on a local and 
international basis (Palm 2008, 38). There are about 500 donor organizations and up to 
10,000 NGOs working in the field of conflict prevention, peace mediation, and peace-
building (Werther-Pietsch & Roithner 2011, 153). The peace mediation and resolution 
activities of NGOs increased in the 1990s an even greater extent than the UN peacekeeping, 
which also intensified during this period (Jacobsen 2000, 3). Many NGOs like International 
Crisis Group work in the field of conflict prevention (Bellamy 2009). The objective of 
the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is to reinforce the capacity of the international 
community in conflict resolution and crisis management (Liesinen 2008, 42). Information 
on human rights gathered by human rights NGOs like Amnesty International or the 
Human Rights Watch is necessary for conflict prevention if official information sources are 
not credible. NGOs have multidimensional roles: some NGOs work in humanitarian fields 
and others. NGOs have also promoted women’s rights in peace-building (Hudson 2010). 
However, NGOs have been criticized due to the lack of accountability in peace-building 
processes in the field (Ghani & Lockhart 2008). Consequently, the functions of the NGOs 
in peace-building and crisis management should be clearly defined and accountable.
4.2.5  Finnish model: towards comprehensive crisis management
By attending international UN-led peacekeeping, Finland has supported the UN in its main 
task, which is to maintain international peace and security. The first Finnish peacekeepers 
traveled to Suez in 1956 and returned the following year (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 
2006, 3). Attending various operations is a political decision and Finland must choose 
which operations it attends. International crisis management is one of the main tasks of 
the Finnish Defence Forces, in addition to the national defence of Finland and cooperation 
with civilian officials (Finnish Defence Forces 2010). Over 30,000 Finnish soldiers with 
over 40,000 departures have served as peacekeepers. Traditionally, professional soldiers have 
represententd 10-20 percent of the total number of peacekeepers. The number of Finnish 
casualties in the UN peacekeeping operations between 1956 and 2008 was 45 (Suomalainen 
sotilas 2009, 230–234). Finland’s annual contribution to civilian crisis management means 
that about 100–150 Finnish civilian experts travel to work in conflict, conflict-prone, 
or post-conflict areas in order to promote stability, good governance and reconstruction 
(Ministry of Interior 2008a). Comprehensiveness has been a crucial concept for Finland 
while developing crisis management and Finland has adopted a strategy for comprehensive 
crisis management (Kokkarinen 2008, 27; Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009).
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In order to promote peace, security, and development, Finland is strengthening its 
participation in international crisis management consisting of both civilian and military 
dimensions. In crisis management, Finland contributes to EU-, NATO-, UN- and OSCE-
led operations. (Government of Finland 2009, 78.) Participating in crisis management was 
also one of the guidelines in the previous national security and defence policy report (see 
Government of Finland 2004). Finland aims to participate in demanding operations in 
military crisis management and to strengthen civilian crisis management. This field requires 
respect for human rights and equality, coordination, and comprehensive approaches. 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 7.)
Finland helps develop the EU Battle Groups. Finland has also been active in developing the 
EU’s civilian crisis management. For these reasons, the EU plays a major role in Finnish 
crisis management. Cooperation with Nordic countries has traditionally been strong 
when developing peacekeeping (Anttila 2009). The Nordic Coordinated Arrangement 
for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) was established in the 1990s. Strengthening 
Nordic cooperation in crisis management and peace-building has been initiated by Thorvald 
Stoltenberg in his report for Nordic foreign ministers in 2009 (see Stoltenberg 2009). 
Finland has made a national action plan on resolution 1325, the aim of which is to increase 
the number and the proportion of women recruited into crisis management duties. 
Human rights and equality perspectives need strengthening in both civil and military crisis 
management, and gender and human rights agenda should also be extended to the training 
of the personnel. Field experiences of Finnish experts specialized in human rights should be 
utilized in educating and training crisis management personnel. It is extremely important 
that crisis management personnel do not participate in any practices that violate human 
rights. (Government of Finland 2009b, 44–45.) 
4.3  Kosovo as a crisis management environment
The crisis management personnel interviewed for this study all had work experience from 
Kosovo. The conflict in Kosovo in 1999 and the crisis management mission that followed 
is described here as an example of a new conflict and contemporary crisis management. In 
order to understand the historical context of the interviewees’ work, Kosovo’s recent history 
and some assessments of crisis management are introduced briefly in this section. Finnish 
participation in military crisis management in Kosovo started in 1999, since which time 
Finnish experts have also worked in various civilian duties in Kosovo. 
Kosovo is located in the Western Balkans and it was part of the former Yugoslavia. After the 
Second World War, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was founded. Following the 
death of President Tito in 1980, Serbian communists sought to re-establish Serbia’s hegemony 
over the federal state, although in Yugoslavian constitution adopted in 1974 devolved power 
to six republics and two autonomous regions, including Kosovo (Blitz 2006, 3). Since the 
1960s, the proportion of the Albanian minority grew and Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo 
both felt their positions threatened in the 1980s (Visuri 2000, 19–20; Korhonen et al. 2006, 
133). As the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina became internationally acknowledged in 
April 1992, the warfare started in Bosnia (Haavisto 1999, 20–21). 
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In the late 1980s, the Albanians in Kosovo started a non-violent movement to promote their 
independence policy. The Kosovo assembly was dissolved by Serbia in 1990 and the province 
of Kosovo was ruled by Belgrade. Although Slovenia and Montenegro gained international 
support for their independence claims, the independence struggle of Kosovo did not receive 
similar support. Kosovo made a declaration of independence in 1991 and Kosovar Albanians 
elected Ibrahim Rugova as president in unauthorized elections. Kosovo was left in the hands 
of Yugoslav authorities in the Dayton Peace accords and the EU statements of that time. 
In 1996 and 1997, the role of the UCK guerrilla group strengthened and the group killed 
about 20 Serbs in its attacks. In 1998, the security situation in Kosovo worsened rapidly. 
In March 1998, the United Nations Security Council of the United Nations imposed an 
arms embargo on Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. The conflict over Kosovo was a conflict of 
national ideologies, which motivated each of the ethnic groups in the conflict. (Visuri 2000; 
Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005; Korhonen et al. 2006; Pavkovic 2001.)
To prevent Serbia’s violent ethnic policy in Kosovo, NATO started its bombings in Serbia 
in 1999 (Haavisto 1999, 23–26). Kosovo is a case of a significant growth in human rights 
abuse indicating an escalation in the conflict (Miall 2007, 118). The attacks against Kosovo 
ceased after NATO’s 78-day military air campaign against Serbia. Despite its lack of Security 
Council authorization, the NATO air campaign has been generally found to be legitimate by 
international commentators (Korhonen et al. 2006, 134–135). According to Visuri (2000, 
12) the experiences from the warfare in Bosnia had an impact on the NATO decisions of 
the bombings because there was no willingness from NATO to repeat the inability to make 
decisions as had been the case regarding the conflict in Bosnia. 
On June 10, 1999, following peace negotiations led by president Ahtisaari, the UN Security 
Council adopted resolution 1244 on the establishment of the civilian administration of 
Kosovo (Visuri 2000). The presence of several institutions (UN/UNMIK, NATO/KFOR, 
OSCE/OMiK) has promoted the stability and reconstruction of Kosovo (Buerstedde 2005). 
The reconstruction process in Kosovo has been slow and time-consuming, although the 
activities of the KFOR have led to some progress (Ahtisaari 2000, 268–269). The Kosovo 
Transitional Council (KTC) was established in July 1999 to promote local decision-making: 
a 120-seat Assembly was elected in November 2001 and government was formed in March 
2002 (Bull 2008).
The status negotiations for Kosovo started in 2006 under the leadership of Martti Ahtisaari 
(International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 2006; 2007). After the elections in 
November 2007, the goal of the new government was the independence of Kosovo. Kosovo 
declared independence on February 17, 2008. The planned organizations to start to work 
in Kosovo were an EU-led mission and the ICO (the International Civilian Office). On 
the day before Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the EU made a decision regarding the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). The objective of the EULEX is to monitor, 
mentor, and advise on the issues related to the rule of law, and the mission’s objectives 
include local ownership. (Judah 2008; EULEX 2010).
The peace process in Kosovo has been criticized due to mistakes and a lack of local ownership 
(see Bull 2008; Murphy 2007). Poverty is a problem that motivates people to migrate from 
Kosovo both legally and illegally, and conditions encouraging corruption, crime, and illegal 
69
migration have increased (Häikiö 2008, 159–160). Organized crime and human trafficking 
have occurred in Kosovo as consequences of poverty, restless circumstances, weak structures 
for law and order, and mobilization of criminals (Nieminen-Mäkynen 2008, 181–182). 
The Kosovo Force (KFOR) which consists of peacekeeping troops, took over the region 
for two weeks in 1999. At the beginning of the operation the Finnish participation consisted 
of one battalion. The first Finnish unit to focus on intelligence came to Kosovo in July 1999, 
and the remainder of the battalion arrived at the area a month later (Salonius-Pasternak 
& Visuri 2006, 22–23). Since 2006, Finnish troops were part of the Multinational Task 
Force -Center (MNTF(C)), which consists of five companies with regional responsibilities. 
(Ibid. 25–26.) The number of KFOR troops decreased from about 50,000 to approximately 
15,000 by the beginning of 2008 (Raitasalo 2008a, 4). From 2009 until early 2010, the 
number of troops continued from 10,000 to 5,000, and this same trend is continuing 
(Salminen 2009, 22). The major deployment of Finnish troops in KFOR ended at the end 
of December, 2010 (Finnish Defence Forces 2011). There are still 20 Finnish peacekeepers 
serving in Kosovo (Finnish Defence Forces 2012). Finland has been involved in the civilian 
crisis management of Kosovo since the end of the war in 1999. In June 2011, 56 Finnish 
citizens worked for the EULEX and one for the EUPOL in Kosovo (Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2011).
Kosovo is an example of a new conflict because it involved non-state actors and it and 
civilians were targets of warfare as had happened in Bosnia earlier in the 1990s. Initially, 
immediately after the war in 1999, there was an urgent need for stabilizing forces, mostly 
consisting of peacekeepers. After and during the stabilization process it has been possible to 
work for the reconstruction of the society as well as for the establishment of the necessary 
administrative structures including the governance, democratic institutions and judicial 
system. Therefore, the development of Kosovo since the war may be seen as phases of 
stabilization and establishment of democracy. 
In theory, the operation in Kosovo has been carried out in a comprehensive manner (Räty 
2008, 128). As described earlier in this chapter, a number of various agencies have worked 
in Kosovo: their roles may have changed, but the need for cooperation has been clear in 
the peace- and nation-building. Today, the progress in Kosovo is a process from an armed 
conflict towards a democracy living in peace, although the stabilization has not been a linear 
process. Compared to several of today’s conflict or post-conflict areas, Kosovo has been 
recently peaceful.
Personnel working for crisis management should pay attention to the historical, cultural 
and religious background of the conflict in Kosovo. The ethnic division can also be 
regarded largely as a religious one. Understanding of the arrangements of the international 
community’s efforts to guarantee the peace facilitates the work of the personnel towards 
crisis management in Kosovo. Since 2008, Kosovo’s independence has changed the country’s 
status and the focus of the international community has been on the national capacity 
building. Stabilization has taken place although the peace-building has taken time. The risk 
of violence has declined significantly since 1999. 
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4.4  Conclusions
Derived from the changes in warfare, there is a need for a new description or paradigm for 
crisis management that strengthens human development and legitimates the use of force 
for this purpose. The advancing paradigm could facilitate a development program for crisis 
management that the international community could adopt (Pyykönen 2008, 130). The 
nature of crisis management differs from that of warfare. In a paradigmatic manner, crisis 
management should consist of “winning the peace” as warfare involves ”winning the war”. 
An essential question is how to combine different means in ways which lead to stabilization 
and durable peace. From a theoretical perspective, there may be a controversy between 
civilian and military crisis management regarding human security at the paradigmatic level. 
Civilian organizations and actors are focused on the civilian side of conflict management – 
and therefore winning the peace. For military actors this situation may be different. At least 
in militarily demanding operations, the focus may be on “winning the war”. When using 
capable military force, a crisis management operation may be found in a grey area between 
warfare and crisis management. When necessary and motivated by the responsibility to 
protect, ”winning the war” is part of “winning the peace”. The paradigm of crisis management 
should be based on the idea of durable peace13. 
The use of force requires ethical justification, which means that the international community 
usually prefers to have a UN mandate for any peace operation. The principle of the 
responsibility to protect is applied to promote human security. This means that, there may 
be dilemmas regarding the operational priorities in crisis management and the question of 
the circumstances under which the use of force is necessary or inevitable. Such dilemmas 
may need answers on behalf of single peacekeepers, and are discussed will be handled in the 
following chapter.
As mentioned in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, peace-building and crisis management activities 
may be based on a combination of different motives relying on human security and national 
security interests. If human security interests are more explicit in the involved countries’ 
policies, national security motives may remain more implicit. However, they still often 
have an impact on the decisions made about peace-building and crisis management. Other 
factors outside the security sector including the economic situation affect decisions in peace-
building and crisis management as well.
Civil-military relations need to function well in peace-building. The dilemma is how to 
acquire integrated collaboration and coordination structures, that satisfy the needs of 
both civilian and military actors. The objectives should be integrated and similar to all the 
agencies involved, as well. Comprehensive crisis management requires common objectives 
and consistent actions on behalf of all the actors involved. Comprehensive approach to crisis 
management works better in theory than it has been applied to practice (Shea 2010, 24). 
It is not an answer to the questions of crisis management in itself but it may help develop 
cooperation and better functioning crisis management organizations and practices. Only 
13 When studying crisis management, a similar kind of discrepancy may exist between civilian and military studies. For 
example, stabilization in Afghanistan has been described in terms of a battlefield (see Nurmela 2010). The agenda of an inter-
national mission like the one in Afghanistan may be controversial with regard to the responsibilities of different organizations 
involved in the mission (see Olson & Charron 2009.)
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calling civilian and military crisis management as comprehensive crisis management does 
not guarantee any difference. 
A peace process requires trust-building. The involvement of local inhabitants is an emerging 
trend in peace processes. The international society carries a responsibility for ensuring even 
“silent” groups can contribute to these processes. The trend of strengthening local ownership 
will probably continue in the future and have an impact on the development of peace-
building and crisis management organizations. Chapter 5 will examine its meaning to the 
crisis management personnel and organizations.
Dilemmas related to unresolved conflicts remain open. Should attempts be made to resolve 
them even without a peace agreement? Is there an obligation for justified and well-planned 
attempts to pacify the situation in terms of human security? These questions may be politically 
and culturally sensitive and have an impact on how different means in peace-building and 
crisis management are prioritized. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, peace-building 
and crisis management efforts are based on motives that rely both on human and national 
security interests, as well as on some other potential interests. Therefore, the diversity of 
motives behind a mission may be as complex as the conflict that the mission aims to resolve. 
The lack of conceptualizations and theory-based studies is a problem regarding research on 
peace-building and crisis management. Further research may facilitate an understanding of 
the obstacles to peace and may create more efficient forms of working in post-conflict zones.
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5.  Social reality, organizations, and personnel 
“As a peacekeeper, taking the people you deal with seriously – whether it be a 
commander, militiaman, political leader, simple peasant or shanty-town dweller 
– requires understanding how these individuals actually regard you. There are 
expectations – positive and negative – present before the mission’s arrival, and they 
change during its presence in the country.”
    – Béatrice Pouligny (2006, 96)
Peace operations take place in multi-cultural environments. In most cases, both the military 
and civilian operations are planned on an international basis. Participating countries represent 
diverse cultures which mostly differ from the culture or cultures of the region in which a 
crisis management operation takes place. In order to promote local ownership, cooperation 
between local inhabitants and the personnel of crisis management operations is needed. 
Organizational cultures of agencies and organizations participating in crisis management 
and peace-building differ from each other. All this requires adaptation and learning from 
crisis management personnel that make decisions relying on their own competences.
The aim of this chapter is to respond to the main RQ and RQs 1, 2, and 3, which are as 
follows:
  Main RQ. What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?
  RQ 1. What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management 
organizations and personnel? 
  RQ 2. How do field experiences affect the personnel’s identities and self-concepts?
  RQ 3. How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be 
developed when the human security approach is taken into account?
Chapter 6 will discuss learning in crisis management in detail. The present chapter will 
pay special attention to the question of competences required from crisis management. 
Competences are relevant for both individuals and institutions active in crisis management 
and therefore, for the analysis of both the personnel and organizations in crisis management. 
In addition, personnel in peace support operations can be fairly isolated from local inhabitants 
or have difficulty creating appropriate interaction with them (Pouligny 2006). 
Development work of crisis management should take into account the need of sensitivity 
in regard to the local cultural reality and opinions. It is necessary to develop coordination 
and cooperation of military and civilian crisis management (Pyykönen 2005). These actors 
face an insecure environment, colleagues who may have different occupational and cultural 
backgrounds, and civilians whose ability to rebuild and develop their own societies require 
support. This chapter introduces central perspectives on organizations, personnel on both 
military and civilian sides, identity questions, and competences in terms of core competences 
and action competence in crisis management.
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5.1  Organizations 
Peace-building systems consist of a large number of diverse but interdependent programs 
and organizations. The result is a complex system that the conflict in a way that would be 
impossible for a single organizational actor to achieve. A central feature of complex peace-
building systems is that the coherence and information flows are related (De Coning 2008, 
58–70). Crisis management organizations are planned to ensure the continuation of a peace 
process, interaction with local people, prevention of violent outbursts and collaboration of 
various international and local agencies in the region. Coordination and collaboration are 
key issues for a successful peace operation. Potential competition between various agencies 
reduces the effectiveness of an operation as a whole.
Cultural aspects in crisis management are central, both because of the multi-nationality 
of peace operations and because of cultural differences between foreign crisis management 
personnel and local people14. Military and civilian organizations differ from each other. 
Military organizations rely on military principles and are characterized by discipline. 
In military crisis management, troops coming from different countries are organized to 
collaborate and fulfill an operational mandate in accordance with common military 
principles. Historically, military organizations have been mostly male or male-dominated 
(Goldstein 2001). 
It is difficult to change existing organizational cultures (Schein 2009; Ylöstalo 2009). Culture 
has not been widely used as a scholar or policy concept when assessing peace operations 
(Rubinstein et al. 2008, 541). Military and civilian cultures differ to such a great extent that 
it is an impediment for coordination (Shea 2010, 24). Various agencies and organizations 
in a peace operation represent different cultures and their employees come from different 
countries. Cooperation between expatriate personnel and local population is intercultural 
and multiculturalism takes different forms in crisis management. To promote multicultural 
cooperation in and between organizations, one option could be a dialogue format leaving 
floor to each participant’s reflectivity (see Schein 2009). When applied to crisis management, 
the dialogue concept would require time for open conversation and explicit analysis of the 
cultural differences. A basic understanding of cultural differences between the organizations 
involved would facilitate the work for common objectives.
An organization can be analyzed according to Coghlan and Rashford’s (2006) typology 
of sub-systems or according to hierarchical structures. In hierarchies, the higher levels in 
leadership and management structures are more powerful for representing an organization’s 
objectives, while the lower levels may be practically crucial within its representation in a 
conflict area. An organization consists of the following sub-systems: the individual, the face-
to-face working team, the interdepartmental group of teams and the organization (ibid., 3). 
At each of these organizational levels, an individual’s tasks are: membership and participation 
(at the individual level), creating effective working relationships (at the face-to-face team 
level), coordinating joint efforts (at the interdepartmental group’s level), and adaptation 
(at the organizational level). Outcomes at the same levels are matching needs (at the 
individual level), creating a functioning team (at the face-to-face team level), coordination 
14 Countries based on individualistic cultures have traditionally developed the methods of crisis management that should 
function in collectivistic cultures. In individualistic cultures, behavior is based on attitudes and in collectivistic cultures it is 
based on norms (Triandis 1997).
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(at the interdepartmental group’s level), and adaptation (at the organizational level). (ibid., 
5–6.) This typology can be applied to the analysis of crisis management organizations. 
The organizational development of crisis management can be evaluated either within one 
organization or between two or several organizations and the employees are actors at several 
levels.
Figure 2.  Levels for analyzing organizational and inter-organizational functions
In the civilian crisis management, the personnel consist of the police, NGO employees, the 
UN employees, and the personnel of various other organizations. Work in humanitarian and 
development aid should be distinguished from civilian crisis management, although there 
may be similarities in the activities. The focus of civilian crisis management is to reconstruct 
the administration for the recovering society while humanitarian aid is required to ensure 
the primary living conditions for local inhabitants. Trust-building requiring competences 
for intercultural dialogue are also needed. As Figure 2 shows, cooperation between various 
levels of organizations occurs mostly between similar levels of organizations. 
Crisis management organizations are planned to be temporary, which may affect how 
people work in them. High-performance organizations usually have a high level of 
employee engagement because employees give their best if they really feel valued and have 
the opportunity to contribute their ideas (Holbeche 2006). Regardless of their temporary 
nature, crisis management organizations should strengthen the personnel’s motivation and 
engagement to them. In civilian crisis management, few individuals believe that they have 
a long-term post: from this perspective, the situation is similar when analyzing reservists in 
military crisis management. The professional officers may see the military crisis management 
organization more as a continuum to the national armed forces. 
In a joint operation, civilian and military actors are separate but they collaborate within the 
same structure. The ability to combine different crisis management activities in the way that 
would be optimal for enduring peace-building would be relevant for the further development 
of crisis management. In Afghanistan, for example, the PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams), including Finnish involvement have recruited civilians as experts. Disarmament 
processes may be arranged by both civic and military organizations. For example, the civilian 
crisis management operation in Aceh organized disarmament. 
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Crisis management actors and emergency agencies and organizations in a conflict area may 
compete with each other and stereotyping of representatives of other organizations may 
occur (Liesinen 2007). Stereotypical views may have an impact on mutual perception. 
Different organizational languages complicate collaboration between civilian and military 
actors (Valtonen 2010), and even cooperation between the civilian missions of the EU may 
be challenging (Mustonen 2008). These results from studies on cooperation may be applied 
to international cooperation in crisis management. Concepts and working methods in crisis 
management may be unclear, which makes crisis management duties more complicated. 
Collaboration in crisis management may be endangered by the lack of coordination between 
different actors (Nieminen-Mäkynen 2008, 174). 
In peace operations, a lack of knowledge about local realities can cause problems (Pouligny 
2006). One explanation of the operational success of a peace operation can be its ability to 
learn from the local environment (Howard 2008, 86–87). Good vertical interoperability 
signifies that cooperation between the expatriate personnel of a peace operation and local 
population works well (Rubinstein et al. 2008, 544). The outcome depends on how the 
mission is perceived, understood and accepted by local inhabitants and how well their needs 
are comprehended by the operational personnel. Cross-cultural communication sometimes 
leads to misunderstandings because the communicators cannot interpret each other properly 
due to their different cultural backgrounds (Adler 1997, 70–71). Such misunderstandings 
may take place in communication between peacekeepers who come from different countries 
as well as between local inhabitants and peacekeepers. Mutual understanding facilitates 
communication at any level.
Factors such as changes in conflicts, potential rivalry between agencies, and a lack of awareness 
about local realities can challenge crisis management organizations. An answer to this could 
be to develop education and more flexible organizational structures. Differences in military 
cultures are sometimes found to be a factor that causes inconvenience, and these differences 
strengthen the requirements for similar military norms in international operations. 
5.2  Personnel
5.2.1  Practical challenges
More profound understanding of the behavior and thinking of crisis management personnel 
would make it easier to develop their education, as well as comprehensive leadership and 
better organizational structures for crisis management. Duties in civilian and military 
crisis management differ in that civilian crisis management focuses on the rebuilding the 
governance, while the main focus of the military crisis management is to ensure security. 
Diverse objectives may make a peacekeeper’s work controversial (Johansson 2001, 61). 
Judging social processes in a conflict zone includes understanding of different power sources 
and other complexities. Instead of re-building, it may also be necessary to create something 
new based on the existing society in order to ensure durable peace. (Wennmann 2011.) Due 
to the complexities of peace processes, personnel should be able to deal with them.
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Serious stressors of peacekeepers, outcome measures related to their well-being, their 
attitudes, and cultural issues related to multinational peacekeeping environments should 
be analyzed in order to make progress in the position of the personnel (Adler and Britt 
2003, 313–314)15. These four themes are important in terms of all the dimensions of action 
competence. Serious stressors challenge both the physical and psychological dimension of 
the action competence, and the outcome measures of psychological and physical dimensions 
are related to the same dimensions of the action competence. Peacekeepers’ attitudes are part 
of the psychological, ethical and social dimensions of the action competence. 
The psychological strains in conventional warfare are acknowledged and known but this is 
not the case regarding irregular warfare (McMaster 2009, 19). Stress reactions are higher 
in peace enforcement operations than comparison to traditional peacekeeping and low-
intensity conflicts can cause even more stress among soldiers than conventional warfare 
because the enemy is clearly identifiable in conventional warfare (ibid.). Military crisis 
management tasks in the context of irregular warfare may vary from peaceful duties to 
combat (Lucas 2009, 5).
In the context of the work of Danish peacekeepers in Kosovo, military risk management in 
peacekeeping operations has been considered to be a combination of the accomplishment 
of two tasks: (a) creating security and stability in the mission area and (b) reconstructing 
the civil and political infrastructure. Security, politics and humanitarianism are profoundly 
connected and they must be managed simultaneously. There is a tendency to have more 
decentered and situational type of risk management that makes individual soldiers capable 
of exercising an increasing amount of situational and context-dependent decision-making. 
The external control is replaced by internal control. In the civil-military contacts of 
peacekeeping operations, the military ethos and its social technologies are re-contextualized 
and generalized. (Norgaard 2004.) There are two parallel and mutually connected 
tendencies in peacekeeping operations: a transition from a centralized and bureaucratic type 
of management to a decentralized risk management which allows an individual soldier to 
control himself or herself: and a transition from a territorially defined discourse of security 
to a value-oriented discourse of security that makes the construction of a civil-military 
“trust capital” and political cooperation into military security issues. These two tendencies 
mark a transition to a humanitarian security mechanism and constructing a new global 
governmentality connecting humanitarian, political, military, and local civilian actors in an 
extensive network of strategic power relations (Ibid., 217). 
International military missions usually meet as part of a specific mission, on training 
exercises and on actual missions. NATO or UN operations are not conducted by a single 
country. Military forces depend on each other because there is a lack of adequate resources, 
personnel, and logistics to conduct independent action, and international coalitions 
15 In the conclusions of “The psychology of the peacekeeper,” Adler and Britt (2003, 314–6) advised the leaders of peacekee-
ping operations that peacekeepers must understand the relevance of the operation. Placing the operation in a meaningful con-
text helps promote positive attitudes. Adequate pre-deployment training for situations that peacekeepers probably encounter 
should be arranged. Peacekeepers need accurate knowledge of the groups involved in the peace agreement. Although it is not 
possible to eliminate the stressors’, their effects can be reduced. Understanding of the common military culture and cultural 
differences should be supported. It is necessary to understand the impact of the decisions made at a political or strategic level 
on the ground. Potentially traumatic events require early intervention.  Individual coping efforts and a coherent understanding 
of the mission should be promoted. (Ibid.) The above list underlines support for coping, understanding of the mission, educa-
tion, training, and therefore adequate leadership and management in contemporary military crisis missions.
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sometimes strengthen the legitimacy of an operation. The militaries in the various countries 
show substantial international culture differences. Tensions between military staff and the 
UN civilian staff have been observed in several peace support missions. However, there is 
a certain level of military professionalism that can surmount national borders and cultural 
differences. Mutual trust and cohesion are more likely to occur when the level of activities 
is high, when the personnel are drawn from a small labor pool, and when interdependencies 
are large. These variables could be taken into account when designing training and modules 
for working in an international military context. (Soeters & Bos-Bakx 2003.) 
The problems facing military profession are current questions in various armed forces in many 
parts of the world. Current development raises the question what a military professional does 
and what the purpose of the military profession is. Soldiers have traditionally been trained 
to fight in wars, but the probability of conventional war has diminished significantly (Smith 
2004, 188–192). Officers’ and soldiers’ professions are challenging: Micewski (2005, 13) 
described the core question of being a soldier: “The aptitude and, if necessary, readiness to 
apply force and thus put one’s own and the life of the others at risk, necessitates personalities 
who are actually and in the true sense of the word able to take responsibility, not only for 
themselves but, above all, for others.” In complex crisis management environments, soldiers’ 
tasks are complicated and require the ability to make ethical assessments from them.
5.2.2  Social categorization, prejudice, and dynamics between 
 personnel groups
Due to a diverse number of actors in crisis management, prejudice between different groups 
may cause problems for collaboration. Differences that potentially lead to prejudice can be 
categorized in accordance with several dimensions. The following dimensions are substantial 
in crisis management: local people and employees of the peace operation, recruits in different 
organizations and agencies in accordance with the agencies, and different nationalities 
within an organization. People are identified in one or several social groups (Gergen 2009, 
51). The “contact hypothesis” is a set of ideas regarding how to reduce inter-group prejudice 
and discrimination. It is based on the idea that unfamiliarity and separation feed hostility 
between groups and that under the right conditions, contact among members of different 
groups reduces hostility and promotes positive inter-group attitudes. (Brewer & Gaertner 
2005, 298–299.)
Contact research, social categorization and social identity theories were combined in order 
to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the cognitive mechanisms that enable 
cooperative contact. Three alternative models are de-categorization, re-categorization, and 
mutual differentiation. De-categorization is based on the idea that inter-group interactions 
are structured to reduce the salience of category distinctions and promote opportunities to 
get to know out-group members as individuals. In re-categorization, it is crucial to structure 
a definition of group categorization at a higher level of category inclusiveness in order to 
reduce inter-group bias and conflict. The mutual differentiation model differs from the 
former two. The model favors groups working together in order to get complementary 
functions by recognizing and valuing mutual superiorities and inferiorities in the context 
of interdependence in task attainment or common super-ordinate goals. (Ibid., 304–308.)
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Mere social categorization has broad consequences. In-group members are more often 
regarded as individuals and out-group members as similar to each other. There is a tendency 
to assess in-group members as having human feelings and out-group members as being less 
prone to such emotions. The social psychology of morality cannot be understood without 
taking the influences of in-group-out-group –categorization into account. (Helkama 2009, 
142–143.) Consequences of mere categorization are essential for various group relations in a 
conflict area because it may affect relations between local people as well as between them and 
crisis management personnel or between various personnel groups in crisis management. 
Negative attitudes towards an out-group can be reduced by intensifying cooperation 
between the groups and unifying the goals set by the groups (Turner & Oakes 1997, 361). 
A negative relationship between the groups can be reduced by changing it into a positively 
interdependent one (Brown 2000, 252). 
Identification with a group has an impact on an individual’s readiness to use a given social 
category in self-definition. Self-categorization forms a substantial part of the basis of our 
orientation towards others. When inter-group conflict takes place, it is difficult to solve 
communication problems between the groups rapidly. A growing number of studies support 
the view that conflict between groups would be solved by allowing both sub-group and 
super-ordinate group identification. (Haslam 2004.) In some cases, social categorization 
may be rejected in order to prevent stereotypical representations. People may actively resist 
social categorization given to them from the outside, and acts of this tendency may be called 
identity activism (see Gergen 2009, 51–52). 
A sense of common identity is effective at reducing inter-group bias. However, it is not 
always possible to induce a common in-group identity. Developing a common in-group 
identity does not require groups or individuals to forsake their original identities. (Dovidio 
et al. 2006, 79–83.). Two categories can be united if they are considered as part of a super-
ordinate category (McGarty 2006, 30). The perception of greater inter-group similarity 
promotes re-categorization at a higher and more inclusive level of categorization (Crisp 
2006, 91). It is relevant to alter the context of group relations, for example to support 
common and more inclusive social categorization or to re-engineer group memberships 
and identities. Group representations may play a mediating role in various circumstances 
when group relations are considered. Re-categorization can take various forms. (Dovidio et 
al.2006, 83–84.) 
When applying these results to the contexts of crisis management, the cooperation between 
various actors in crisis management could be strengthened by either changing the stereotypical 
picture on members of an out-group (civilian/military crisis management organization) 
and/or reinforcing the cooperation between these organizations and trying to build bridges 
by super-ordinate group identification knitting together various sub-groups. No studies 
have examined the question of whether stereotypical views of various crisis management 
personnel groups on each other exist or cause problems. Changing stereotypical views on 
out-group members would require conscious efforts to change stereotypes. This policy 
would not exclude strengthening of cooperation or creating new sub-ordinate identification. 
Because efforts to reduce stereotypes requires the stereotypes to be revealed, which may be 
a complicated process, the easiest way to enhance cooperability might be through creating 
common identity for crisis management personnel. However, this subordinate identity 
construction should not hinder the existence of other identities.
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5.2.3  Identity and related concepts
Identity is an integrative concept which helps understand crisis management actors at the 
individual level. Self-concept and identity provide answers to the questions of “Who am I?”, 
“Where do I belong?”, and “How do I fit in?” (Oyserman 2005, 5). Our ability to remember 
is influenced by our self-concepts in a diverse range of ways (ibid. 7). A person’s sense of 
identity often includes a perception of who they were, who they are, and who they will be. 
Individuals’ assessments of their abilities, personalities, and self-worth are based on their 
memories of their past. Their memories also influence their well-being and behavior, and 
their thoughts about the future influence how they process information. (Ross & Buehler 
2005, 25–7.) A person’s identity is always related to his or her biographic continuum. 
Identity should be assessed as a process, not as a result. It functions like an intersection 
between the individual and societal dimensions. (Eteläpelto 2007, 97–141.) Identity 
connects an individual’s personal self-concept with wider social and historical contexts. The 
social aspects of identity issues are relevant for this study. Self-concept and identity comprise 
our theories about our personality (Oyserman 2005, 5). Social dimensions of identity are 
partly related to social categories people make and perceive from their social environment.
 
Identity makes it possible for individuals to understand the meaning of societal changes. 
Identity is discussed in a broad field of studies, such as sociology, social psychology, cultural 
studies, anthropology, and history. Identity has been analyzed as group identity, national, 
cultural and linguistic identity, gender identity, and professional identity. (Eteläpelto 2007, 
93–96.) However, the lack of definitional clarity regarding “identity” and “self ” makes 
research coordination difficult in psychology and sociology (Côté & Levine 2002, 87). This 
difficulty exists regarding various fields of identity studies. Identity issues related to learning 
will be handled in chapter 6.
An identity is divided into social and personal aspects (Turner & Reynolds 2005, 261). In 
addition to these two, the Eriksonian approach to identity also contains ego identity (Côté 
& Levine 2002). As one moves from defining self as an individual person to defining self 
in terms of a social identity, group behavior becomes possible and emerges. When a shared 
social identity is psychologically operative, a depersonalization of self-perception takes place 
so that collective perceptions of mutual and collective similarities are enhanced. (Turner & 
Reynolds 2005, 261.) 
Social categorization affects the social dimension of identities and it may also link prejudice 
issues to identity formation or preferences. The social identity approach emphasizes that 
categorization involves differentiation of ourselves and others into meaningfully distinctive 
categories (Abrams & Hogg 2005, 155). The use of categorization changes over time, both 
at the individual and cultural levels (Crisp & Hewstone 2006, 16). Social categorization 
locates people in various categories. The categorization process exaggerates similarities 
among individuals in the same group, as well as differences between people in other groups. 
Self-enhancement and uncertainty reduction seem to be factors that help explain social 
categorization. (Hogg 2004, 206–207.)
According to Tajfel (1978; ref. Brown & Capozza 2006) social identity is “that part of 
an individual’s self-concept that derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social 
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group”. According to social identity theory, people discriminate in favor of in-group. The 
theory relies on two basic assumptions: that people wish to evaluate themselves and to be 
evaluated positively, and that the value of self and the value of the in-group are defined 
through comparison. The in-group is positively evaluated if it is perceived as being superior 
to major out-groups on meaningful comparison dimensions. (Ibid., 3–4). A social group is 
defined in various ways in different parts of the world (see Brown & Capozza 2006). Ethnic 
identity is part of social identity and cultures have a strong influence the development of 
one’s identities and worldview (Verkuyten 2005; Laungani 2007, 81).
Self-concept and identity are gendered and the neglect of the gender has often meant the 
omission of the female gender (Wager 1994). Gender can be regarded as an on-going social 
construction that is part of social practice referring both to everyday social interactions 
and larger historical and also institutional contexts in which interactions occur. In Western 
societies, socialization takes place in the context of gender dichotomies of the male and 
female. (Martin & Jurik 2007, 31–34.)
Identity is also related to action competence which has an ethical dimension (see section 5.3). 
Identity construction is, by its very nature, ethical (Värri & Ropo 2010). Social identity may 
also play a major role when an individual thinks about existential questions. By shifting from 
a personal, finite identity to social, abstract identity, a different level of existence that is not 
threatened by biological fate may be experienced. In a study of Castano et al. (2006, 82–83) 
individuals, who were reminded of their mortality in a test situation, listed a greater number 
of social identities and perceived their group of friends as more bounded; this indicates that 
social identity may serve as an anxiety-buffer mechanism. In crisis areas, crisis management 
personnel face questions related to mortality in conflict: therefore, this could be a factor that 
would strengthen crisis management personnel’s social identities. 
In the social identity theory, individual identity is seen as a point along the continuum 
between personal identity and social identity at either end (Worchel & Coutant 2004, 
184). Individual identity operates on several levels: personal identity, group membership, 
intra-group identity, and group identity. These levels have their own continuums which 
range from high to low salience. Groups play an active role in focusing comparison process 
and in shaping individual identity (ibid., 184–198). An important process is how a group 
membership creates a reference group, which involves that an individual psychologically 
transforming his or her speech from saying “I” into saying “we” (Turner & Reynolds 2004, 
263). This difference may be important in the context of crisis management as well. Who 
are the “us” with whom an individual working in crisis management identifies himself or 
herself?
In the sociological discourse, identity issues have been linked to life politics. In the post-
modern world, life politics requires emancipation from hierarchical traditions, which 
means “a politics of self-actualization in a reflexively ordered environment” (Giddens 1991, 
214). This concept connects identity issues with the personal choices and global scope 
because these levels influence each other (ibid.). Therefore, the decision to work in crisis 
management duties is an option in one’s life politics. The identity discourse could integrate 
both the professional and social issues related to the work and learning processes of the crisis 
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management personnel. This is important, even when analyzing the personnel’s abilities to 
work in complicated situations and their capacity to learn. 
5.2.4  Being a professional in crisis management
Employees usually develop multidimensional professional identities. The instability of 
working life has changed the process of constructing identity. Work influences identity as 
well as other, more private fields of life. Professional identity is always adopted within a 
community of practice in which socialization, learning and interaction are key elements. 
Occupational traditions provide a framework that helps individuals identify with work. 
(Eteläpelto 2007; Kirpal 2004.) Due to occupational segregation regarding gender, some 
occupations are considered male and some others female (Kinnunen 2004, 74). Occupations 
in military crisis management are typically male-dominated, which has an impact on the 
representations of the work in this field.
According to Schein (2004, 20), occupations involving intensive periods of education and 
apprenticeship are connected with a shared learning of attitudes, norms, and values, which 
become taken for granted for the members of these occupations. In accordance with this 
assumption, personnel with a common background in professional officers’ education make 
a more homogenous group from a professional perspective compared to those deployed 
from the reserves to a military crisis management mission, as well as to those deployed into 
a civilian mission. The latter groups have no common occupational socialization.
An organizational identity is seen as having a collective character and it contains the major 
features of an organization (Puusa 2005). Presumably, therefore, there is a variation in both 
the work cultures in different crisis management organizations and the identities in different 
professional groups. From a global perspective, Finnish military peacekeeping is a special 
case because a large number of reservists work as peacekeepers. This phenomenon may have 
an impact on the organizational identity processes in military crisis management, although 
it has not yet faced scientific scrutiny. In civilian crisis management, the recruited employees 
are professionals who have special skills that are needed for defined tasks. Because of various 
tasks and objectives in post-conflict areas, the professional backgrounds of the personnel 
must be diverse as well. In civilian and military crisis management, there are often various 
relations between historical occupational and social psychological factors. 
Military crisis management has extensive historical and institutional roots in the armed 
forces. Civilian crisis management does not have a similar institutional background. On 
the other hand, the professional roles of the personnel in civilian crisis management and 
the reservists in military crisis management have been diverse, and the professional officers 
in military crisis management have had similar kind of professional roles in their careers. 
In military crisis management, professional officers have strong traditions because they 
mostly work within a military organization. Professional officers have been found to identify 
themselves with their professions (Limnéll 2004).16
16 According to Limnéll (2004, 27), 94 percent of the professional officers and cadets who responded to a questionnaire study 
agreed with the statement “Officers have a strong professional identity”.  Most of the respondents were also proud of their 
education and their profession compared to civilian academic professions.  
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Professional officers’ work contracts usually vary from six to 12 months in military crisis 
management when recruited by the Finnish armed forces. Reservist peacekeepers work in 
military organizations with strong military traditions when they work in a military crisis 
management operation. However, the level of adaptation to military crisis management 
is significant because the environment is quite different from that of reservists’ everyday 
life. Reservists usually have 6–12-month contracts in crisis management and come from 
widely varying professional backgrounds. For the civilian crisis management employees, 
the level of traditions within the crisis management organizations varies greatly. More 
“mature” governmental organizations may have certain traditions but individuals may find 
the organizational and cultural working contexts in many civilian organizations in post-
conflict areas to be new. Therefore, it is probable that these changes pose a challenge for the 
adaptation of civilian crisis management personnel. 
The concept of social identity is divided into subgroups of person-based, relational, and 
group-based social identities in addition to collective identities (Brewer 2001, 20). These 
dimensions have different meanings for individuals. When related to the professional groups 
interviewed for this study, this means that professions in crisis management may present an 
individual with several types of social identities. Due to the variation of social identities, 
their meaning will also vary. Group-based social identities are at least perceivable in crisis 
management. An open question is how these identities and the meanings of operation 
develop during and after an operation. Because of Castano et al.’s (2005) findings related to 
the mention of death as a factor that strengthens social identities, identity change in crisis 
management is an interesting research question. In crisis management, personnel face the 
traces of a former conflict, or at least the risks related to the potential growth of mortality 
due to a failed peace process or failed crisis management.
Few studies have focused on the professional identities and attitudes of peacekeepers 
and civilian crisis management employees. In these studies, the focus has mostly been 
on the peacekeepers. Kurashina (2005) studied the professional identities of Japanese 
peacekeepers and found institutional and historical background to be a crucial explanation 
of these individuals’ self-perception. That study found that participation in international 
peacekeeping had had a positive impact on the image of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces.
According to Franke (2003), soldiers’ warrior identity may be controversial in relation 
to peacekeeping. One way to solve this problem is to integrate warrior and peacekeeper 
identities so that they would both comprise positive parts of the soldiers’ identities (ibid.). 
A similar type of identity dilemma has also been described in a study describing CIMIC 
cooperation (ISAF) in Afghanistan where Norwegian soldiers’ tasks were connected with 
the civilian-humanitarian field (see Kristoffersen 2006). Traditionally Nordic peacekeepers 
have emphasized contact with civil society in their work. On the other hand, peacekeepers 
must have capabilities related to both civil-oriented peacekeeping and combat. Hedlund 
and Soeters (2010, 412) noted that Swedish soldiers in Kosovo and Liberia had been overly 
oriented towards peacekeeping if they actually needed to attend combat tasks. Therefore, 
the significance of civil-oriented peacekeeping and combat skills varies depending on the 
tasks required. 
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In military crisis management missions, reservists comprise a heterogeneous group from 
a professional and educational perspective. Civilian crisis management personnel consist 
of a professionally diverse group. Due to differences in their educational and professional 
background, the professional identities of these two groups are probably multiform. It is 
relevant to ask whether working in a crisis management mission influences personnel’s 
identities and thoughts in different ways in the three professional groups of this research. 
More generally, does a mission change an individual’s perception of himself or herself? 
5.2.5  Gender in crisis management
Many of victims in armed conflicts are women. Therefore, the ability of peacekeepers and 
other expatriate personnel to cooperate with local women in conflict or post-conflict areas 
is a broad task. The employees engaged with peace-building must be able to collaborate 
with local women. In their professional background, women in military crisis management 
had chosen to attend voluntary military service, while men who served in military crisis 
management had attended compulsory military service. In civilian crisis management duties, 
there was no obligation for personnel to have done military service17. The implicit idea of 
deploying women in peace operations has been to prevent the issues of sexual exploitation 
and abuse of local women, which have caused problems in several peace operations; this 
view has been criticized, however, because work against sexual exploitation and abuse require 
more explicit and clearly defined forms (Simic 2010). Based on the results of a number of 
studies on women in peacekeeping, Valenius (2007, 28) concluded that the participation of 
female peacekeepers makes operations more effective.
Occupations in crisis management are generally male-dominated. This is especially the case 
in military crisis management because a clear majority of soldiers are men. The situation 
is similar among police officers. Regarding these occupations, the recruitment of female 
employees is a special challenge. It is necessary to take the gender segregation of the 
occupations into account when developing the recruitment. A majority of Finnish women 
work in female-dominated workplaces and men in male-dominated ones (Kauppinen & 
Veikkola 1997, 21). Work abroad in crisis management missions is especially demanding, if 
an employee has family obligations including children. This may also have some implications 
on the recruitment in regard to gender, because women have traditionally taken stronger 
responsibility for children within families. 
Military service and the armed forces are often interpreted as an institution of masculinity, 
and women’s role in armed forces has been restricted (see Tallberg 2003; Mäki 2007, 106; 
Goldstein 2001, 406). The position of women in armed forces may be complicated and 
seen as “tokens”; therefore, women in military crisis management may find their situation 
challenging. Peacekeeping has been regarded as a male-bound and therefore gendered social 
construction (Tallberg 2009). According to an analysis of the armed forces in 18 NATO 
member countries, the United Sates had the largest number and proportion of female military 
personnel with 14 percent. There has been a tendency to connect a higher proportion of 
women deployed to armed forces connected with the professionalism of soldiers (Carreiras 
2006).
17 Contemporary Finnish legislation makes military service is compulsory for male citizens and voluntary for women. In Fin-
land, women gained the right to apply for military service in 1995.
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UN resolution 1325 has strengthened efforts to promote women’s position in peace 
operations. In UN peacekeeping forces between 1957 and 1989, less than 0.1 percent 
of the personnel were women and most of these were nurses. Since the increase of UN 
peacekeeping in the 1990s, the proportion of women among the personnel has risen to 
the level of almost two percent (Goldstein 2004, 11). There have been no female leaders 
in any UN peacekeeping operations. Women constitute only one percent of the military 
personnel and four percent of the police personnel in UN peacekeeping operations and 
only 30 percent of the civilian international personnel (10 percent in leading positions). 
Twenty-two percent of the nationally or locally recruited employees are women (Skjelsbaek 
2007, 27). Expectations regarding the opportunities of international actors to improve the 
position of local women are usually too high when related to the situation on the ground 
(Olonisakin 2011).
In civilian crisis management, the proportion of recruited women has been rising. In 
Finland, the proportion in civilian crisis management rose from approximately 20 percent 
in 2009 to 30 percent in 2009 (see Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 51; Tiilikainen 2007; 
Pitkänen et al 2010, 80). In Finland, only one percent of young people participating in 
military service are women (Jokinen 2010, 128). Military service is a voluntary choice for 
women in Finland; prior to service, a majority of female conscripts have been found to be 
interested in a career within the security sector, but only 40 percent retained this interest after 
their service (Määttä 2007). The proportion of women among military crisis management 
personnel has been low – in September 2009 it was only three percent (Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2009, 51). Female peacekeepers are considered “tokens” because they comprise only 
a small minority of peacekeepers. Because women working in civilian crisis management are 
mostly a minority, their position resembles that of women in military crisis management in 
respect to professional segregation. Personnel may need to work with both local men and 
women, although the approved interaction between the sexes may be restricted in traditional 
communities, and it is necessary for personnel to be aware of these traditions.
5.2.6  Finnish crisis management and military personnel 
Civilian crisis management only has a brief tradition in Finland and few studies have 
concentrated on civilian crisis management personnel (see Raatikainen 2004; Mustonen 
2008). In December 2009, 37 percent of the Finnish civilian crisis management experts sent 
abroad were police officers. It has been difficult to recruit female police officers for civilian 
crisis management duties because the number of women in these professions is limited. 
(Pitkänen et al. 2010.) Because of the short history of civilian crisis management, little 
is known about the experiences of Finnish civilian crisis management personnel. Finnish 
peacekeepers have been studied in several research projects (see, e.g., Kauppinen & Huida 
1994; Kangas 1999; Röberg 1999, Väinölä 2005; Ahtiainen et al. 2007; Kousa 2008; 
Tallberg 2009). The focuses and the themes of these studies vary considerably. Table 6 briefly 
shows the results of Finnish studies on crisis management in relation to their relevance to 
the present study. 
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Table 6.  Selected findings on Finnish crisis management personnel’s positive and nega-
tive experiences
According to Kangas (1999) and Väinölä (2005) the peacekeepers’ self-esteem strengthened 
during the time they spent in the operation. However, Lahdenperä and Harinen’s (2000) 
finding that the peacekeepers had found their duties important can be interpreted as an 
expression of their motivation for their duties. Ahtiainen et al.’s (2007) finding that the 
peacekeepers would have expected their duties to be more demanding may be interpreted 
in Norgaard and Holsting’s (2006) framework of boredom. Approximately 1.2–3.6 percent 
of Finnish peacekeepers suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder which is a low rate 
in international terms. However, it is possible that the peacekeepers who participated in 
the study had more positive experiences and that those who had bad experiences related 
to the risks of the post-traumatic disorder did not participate (Kousa 2008). However, the 
low prevalence of post-traumatic disorder is a good sign that suggests fairly high levels of 
adaptation (see Kousa 2008). Work in crisis management duties may consist of controversial 
experiences that have been reported in different ways in these reports.
Few researchers have focused on family issues of crisis management personnel. Monica 
Röberg (1999) studied the influence of peacekeeping duties on peacekeepers’ family life and 
dating and found that peacekeeping and being away from home for a relatively long time 
may have both negative and positive consequences on a peacekeeper’s marriage or dating. 
In some cases, crisis management duties had led to a divorce (Röberg 1999; Raatikainen 
2004). Maintaining good family relations was found to be more difficult at the beginning 
of the duties, when it was more difficult to deal with daily routines (Raatikainen 2004, 
Research  Positive experiences Negative experiences/  Other results 
    Challenges 
Kauppinen and   - segregation of duties 
Huida (1994) 
 
Kangas (1999 ) + self-esteem 
  + communality 
 
Röberg (1999) + effects on family - effects on family  
 
Lahdenperä & 
Harinen  + meaningful duties 
 
Raatikainen    - divorce risk 
(2004) 
 
Väinölä (2005) + self-esteem    learning organization 
                                                   + new skills 
 
Raatikainen 
 
Ahtiainen et al. (2007) + operation easy - need to concentrate cultural differences 
                                               + making friends - growth of problems 
                                                                                               - lack of privacy  
 
Kousa (2008)      low trauma level 
 
Mustonen (2008)     operational coordination 
 
Tallberg (2009) + recreation activities  - disputes (reservists/professional soldiers) 
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73). However, some peacekeepers a crisis when they returned home because they found it 
difficult to adjust to the realities at home (Suomalainen sotilas, 2009, 233). Younger women 
who were interested in attending civilian crisis management duties felt it would be difficult 
to work abroad in crisis management because of family reasons (Pitkänen et al. 2010).
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a large majority of professional officers identify 
themselves to their profession. A majority of respondents (80 percent) had a vocation for 
their profession as officers. (Limnéll 2004.) The values of the armed forces and the national 
defence have been traditionally based on patriotism and national security. In one study, 
only 51 percent of respondents who were young professional officers felt that work in 
international duties should be required from the individuals aspired to positions as officers. 
For young officers, the major reason for working abroad is to gain experience (Limnéll & 
Moberg 2008, 2–8.) Ninety-four percent of young officers felt that duties abroad should 
remain voluntary (Limnéll 2008, 41). Identity change, learning processes or the institutional 
challenges to change practices in crisis management have not been scrutinized in Finnish 
crisis management studies.
5.3  Competences
Competences can be analyzed at the individual or organizational levels although the concept 
is mostly used in reference to individuals’ abilities. Organizational competences refer to 
collective abilities, while individually, competences can be considered as attributes that an 
individual is able to apply (see also Illeris 2011, 50). Individual competences are responses to 
the requirements inherent in a specific situation but a competent person is also able to apply 
his or her professional knowledge or other abilities in practice (ibid. 50). Competences may 
also refer to qualifications (Ellström & Kock 2009), although this concept is not used with 
this meaning in the present study because it cannot be reduced to a list of qualifications; 
instead, it is part of an individual’s ability to react in appropriately in new situations. An 
essential part of an individual’s competence is his or her general ability for reflection. 
Competences also include the potential to deal with unknown challenges (Illeris 2009c).
Understanding what changes in conflicts require from crisis management personnel and 
organizations helps identify core competences in crisis management. New multinational 
operations challenge military leadership (Smedberg 2001, 274), the general principles 
of military command have not changed over time. However, changes are taking place 
for a paradigmatic shift in leadership that focuses more on shared responsibility and 
decentralization (Nissinen 2001, 97–99). Broadening the spectrum of civilian and military 
crisis management may also require reanalyzing the crisis management leadership and 
management as well. Good horizontal interoperability means that cooperation between 
various agencies and organizations functions well within a peace operation (Rubinstein et al. 
2008, 543). As concluded in the previous section, knowledge about the on-going situation 
among local inhabitants facilitates a crisis management operation.
 
The core competences of an organization are ”success factors” that are reflected from past 
achievements. They are the highest-level, longest-lasting units for strategy-making, and 
future strategic decisions should be based on analysis of the competencies. Discussion about 
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the core competencies has been part of the analysis of how organizations can build and profit 
from their capabilities (Holbeche 2006). The concept helps to find out how to develop the 
major capabilities in crisis management. Two essential questions in this research are: (1) 
What are the core competences in crisis management? and (2) What are the differences in 
core competences at the individual and organizational levels? Civilian and military crisis 
management has special skill requirements for various particular duties. In peace-building, 
interaction is relevant to local civilians, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations active 
in the region. The ability to collaborate and awareness about the local environment are 
both important. Because there are potential controversies in a conflict or post-conflict 
area, the ability to ethical assessment is also required from both civilian and military crisis 
management personnel. Due to the complexity of new conflicts, reflectivity is also needed.
The core competences in crisis management can be defined as collaboration skills, local 
awareness, ability to make ethical assessment and complexity management. These can be seen 
as the core competences for both civilian and military crisis management at the individual 
level. Local awareness improves an individual’s ability to communicate and cooperate. The 
significance of these factors can be derived from the essence of communication for providing 
human security to people living in a conflict or post-conflict zone. Complexity management 
is a core competence because new conflicts are complex and therefore require reflection. 
The ability to make ethical assessment in crisis management can be seen as a result of the 
complexity of conflict, which may lead to ethical reasoning. The objectives of military crisis 
management are restricted to ensure security; therefore, combat skills belong among the core 
competences of military personnel. In civilian crisis management, the objectives are broader. 
The core competences of crisis management at the individual level are visualized in Figure 3. 
The individual level of analysis focuses on the experiences and views of the personnel in crisis 
management. Complex missions consisting of inter-dependent projects and organizations 
are complicated and demanding working environments. Naturally, the number of challenges 
one faces at work depends on the tasks involved. The core competences introduced above 
are required from both individuals and organizations in crisis management, although 
individuals and institutions cannot be assessed in the same ways. The competences required 
from individuals in particular are analyzed below. 
Contemporary peace operations are multidimensional and complex; consequently, troops 
in military crisis management require diverse competences because they may need to 
respond to both civilian- and military-type challenges (Räty 2010). Soldiers face new, alien 
situations with risky elements creating a basis of learning. Contact and combat skills are 
needed in peace support operations. Contact skills involve a personal competency that 
specifically means context awareness, cooperation, communication, flexibility and conflict 
handling. In civil-military encounters, trust capital is needed. Trust is a tactical concept 
that enhances readiness while reducing the uncertainty of civil-military decision-making. 
Contact skills and reflexivity are less known military competencies although discipline and 
combat skills are already well-known by the military. From an organizational point of view, 
five competencies (context awareness, cooperation, communication, flexibility, conflict 
handling) included in communication skills have new meanings. Contact and combat skills 
should not be seen as exclusive, but as mutually reinforcing competencies. (Norgaard & 
Holsting 2006.) Collaboration, contact, and communication skills are part of an individual’s 
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social skills. Social skills are the ability to deal with social situations and are different from 
sociability, which is based on an individual’s preference to be in the company of other people 
(Keltikangas-Järvinen 2010, 17). Social skills can be learnt and competence development in 
general requires learning processes (ibid.; see Illeris 2011, 60). Therefore, core competences 
will be handled from the perspective of learning in the following chapter.
Figure 3.  Individual’s core competences in crisis management
When reinforcing a change within an organization, it is necessary to train people in new 
skills, recognize new behaviors and institutionalize change within the organization’s systems 
especially regarding measurement, performance management and reward (Holbeche 2006, 
312). The new challenges in crisis management should change the education and training 
of the peacekeepers and civilian crisis management personnel. New forms of education and 
training have emerged since the civilian crisis management started to evolve. Chapter 6 
discusses core competences related to learning. 
 
Action competence is part of a holistic model regarding human action and is introduced 
here as a view on competences that are relevant for crisis management. Action competence 
is divided into physical, psychological, social, and ethical dimensions (Toiskallio 2009, 49). 
The ethical dimension of action competence combines the other three dimensions (Toiskallio 
2000b, 50–60). The inclusion of the ethical component enables a holistic framework of 
analysis for circumstances underlining the meaningfulness of moral reasoning. The social 
component makes it impossible to analyze an individual in isolation from social reality. 
Social identity is at the core of action competence (Toiskallio 2009, 58). Holism represented 
in action competence has similarities with contemporary learning theories (see Jarvis 2009); 
this issue is discussed in chapter 6. 
The framework of action competence can be applied to crisis management. Mikkonen 
(2008) has studied the ethical dimension of action competence. Military personnel with 
experience in military crisis management had diverse experiences requiring ethical thinking. 
In the context of military crisis management, decision-making requiring ethical thinking 
was divided into the following sub-groups endangering one’s own troops or oneself in order 
to accomplish a particular task or to aid civilians; decisions to save local civilians’ lives or to 
distribute humanitarian aid; decisions to use armed force, exceeding one’s powers to achieve 
 
Comprehensive crisis management
Collaboration skills
Local awareness
Enhancing durable peace
Ethical assessment
Complexity management
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a goal; and a leader’s remarkable military, administrative, or disciplinary decisions regarding 
his or her own unit (ibid). Complicated security environments are ethically and practically 
challenging to crisis management personnel. According to Verweij (2007) professional use 
of force implies moral competence due to its rarity without controversies and the need to 
use force in a legitimate way. In certain risky situations lethal use of force is appropriate 
for peacekeepers. In the framework of action competence, ethical dimension gathers other 
dimensions together and ethical assessment can be seen as part of an individual’s search 
for personal virtues (see Toiskallio 2009). The question of ethics has become extremely 
important in complex peace processes (ibid). The core competences defined earlier in this 
section are based on all four dimensions of action competences.
5.4  Conclusions
In chapters 3 and 4, complexity was identified as a challenge to crisis management actors. 
Multiculturalism in crisis management extends from a multitude of cultural or religious 
groups in the region to crisis management actors representing different organizations and 
personnel with diverse backgrounds. The study of the crisis management personnel has 
mostly been limited to peacekeepers. Questions about cooperation with local inhabitants 
have been rarely studied (see Howard 2008; Pouligny 2006; Norgaard 2004); however, in 
keeping with the studies referred to in this chapter, it appears to be essential for successful 
peace-building. 
Awareness about local realities, collaboration skills, and abilities for ethical assessment and 
complexity management can be seen as core competences in crisis management in general 
(Figure 3). Besides, combat skills belong among the core competences in military crisis 
management. Norgaard and Holsting’s (2006) division between contact and combat skills is 
useful for analyzing the competences required in military crisis management. Contact skills 
require collaboration skills and local awareness. The core competences in crisis management 
and specific professional challenges may be seen as learning challenges for crisis management 
personnel and they are linked to the main RQ as well as RQs 1 and 3. Crisis management 
organizations also need capabilities related to the core competences are also required from 
crisis management organizations. 
Cooperation abilities are essential when responding to RQ3. How a group of people 
interpret another’s intentions influences the interaction and communication between these 
groups. Professional, cultural, and organizational backgrounds affect how personnel perceive 
other actors, and the stereotypes regarding “others” may prevail. Social categorization and 
stereotypical bias may impact the perception of other persons employed in crisis management 
staff. Perceptions are individual, but they may be affected by group and cultural norms. 
The perceptions that personnel have regarding other professional groups in collaboration is 
discussed in chapter 8, in the empirical part of this research. 
With regard to RQ 2, identity issues are relevant at the individual level. Personnel’s identity 
development should respect professional identities. One possible way to reduce stereotypical 
views could be a common and broader category for identification, which would affect 
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personnel’s identities. In crisis management, this would mean an emerging personnel 
category that includes both civilian and military crisis management personnel working for 
common goals. However, this way of reducing stereotypes may fail, if people in various 
duties resist it; therefore these people should have the opportunity to retain their former 
professional identities . This kind of identification links RQ2 to RQ3, because common 
identification facilitates cooperation between different actors. 
Table 7.  Crisis management experiences and their potential impact on the personnel’s 
self-concepts and identities
Table 7 shows the impact that some potential experiences can have on crisis management 
on the personnel’s self-concepts and identities. Danger may cause traumas, envisaging new 
cultures may make one think about his own place in the world, meaningful work signifies 
personal satisfaction, and new work comrades a source for identification. Ability in problem 
solving may have a positive impact on one’s identity or self-concept. Organizational cultures 
and social categorization patterns have an impact on social identity formation. These are 
examples of potential influence of crisis management duties on the personnel, as introduced 
in this chapter. 
Experience   Impact on the personnel’s identities or self-concepts 
Danger   Traumas at worst 
New cultures   One’s own place in the world 
Meaning of the work  Personal satisfaction 
Work comrades  Social identification 
Problem solving  Positive/negative impact on identity/self-concept 
Organizational culture  Formation of social identity   
& social categorization 
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6.  Learning
The aim of this chapter is to respond to the main RQ and RQs 1, 2, and 3 which are as 
follows:
  Main RQ. What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?
  RQ 1. What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management 
organizations and personnel? 
  RQ 2. How do field experiences affect the personnel’s identities and self-concepts?
  RQ 3. How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be 
developed when the human security approach is taken into account?
In many contemporary theories of learning, social and individual levels are intertwined. 
This chapter introduces perspectives on learning, as well as results from the research related 
to crisis management and learning processes. As concluded in chapters 4 and 5, complexity 
management and multicultural contexts represent learning challenges in crisis management. 
Chapter 5 introduced the core competences in crisis management, which are collaboration 
skills, local awareness, complexity management and ethical assessment and professional skills; 
combat skills are also emphasized in military crisis management. They are important objects 
of learning when educational practices in crisis management are analyzed and developed.
6.1  Contemporary perspectives on learning
At the individual level, learning can be defined as “any process that in living organisms 
leads to permanent capacity change and which is not solely due to biological maturation 
or ageing” (Illeris 2009b). Learning involves human processes including social interaction 
and psychological processing (Illeris 2011, 12). Because learning is experiental which means 
that it is based on our experiences, research on learning extends to all academic bases on 
human beings (Jarvis 2010). The concept of learning depends on how a human being and 
knowledge are interpreted (Mäkinen 2006, 53).
Regarding knowledge and learning, Etienne Wenger (1998, 4) made the four following 
assumptions: (1) the social character of our existence is relevant to learning; (2) knowledge 
is a matter of competence; (3) knowing is a matter of participating; and (4) meaning – 
including our ability to experience the world and our engagement with it as meaningful – is 
what learning is to produce. The social practices of social communities and constructing 
identities related to these communities are included in participation. Deeper forms of 
participation shape not only what we do, but also who we are and how we interpret what 
we do. Therefore a social theory of learning integrates the components that are necessary 
to characterize social participation as a process of learning and knowledge. Community, 
identity, practice and meaning are connected with learning (Ibid., 4–5). 
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Two phenomena which connected with life-long learning – meta-learning and significant 
learning experiences – are inter-twined but analytically different (Silvennoinen 2004). 
According to the meta-cognitive approach, actors can learn to manage their own learning by 
defining their learning objectives and observing their own progress towards these objectives 
(Uusikylä & Atjonen 2005, 146). Meta-cognition concerns upper level cognitive skills 
(Heiskanen & Salo 2008, 77). Meta-understanding means a person’s capacity to assess his 
or her understanding the things he or she has heard or read. Self-regulation refers to the 
ability to regulate one’s own motivation and thinking in ways that enable one to challenge 
one’s own thinking (ibid.). Meta-learning refers to unintentional learning and affects one’s 
views regarding his or her potential and conditions for action. These views are implicit. 
Significant learning experiences have an impact on one’s life and they change or strengthen 
one’s identity. A change of profession may be such an experience although some significant 
learning experiences may take longer and be progressive in nature. (Silvennoinen 2004, 62–
63.) In meaningful learning, an individual connects new information with the concepts that 
exist in his or her former cognitive structures, and as a phenomenon, knowledge creation is 
related to meaningful learning (Novak 2002, 73 & 115).
Learning can take place in formal, non-formal, and informal situations. Formal learning 
situations mostly refer to educational institutions and the non-formal ones refer to the 
educational arrangements of a non-formal character. Informal learning situations take place 
in everyday life (Jarvis 2010). Lifelong learning challenges individuals to deal with their 
identities in a continuous way (Eteläpelto 2007). At work, learning takes place in the sphere 
overlapping one’s work identity and workplace practices (see Illeris 2011). Therefore, work 
identity is also needed for dealing with issues leading to learning at work. Identity connects 
one’s personality to wider contexts within a learning process.
Individuals develop their skills at work but the nature of learning at work has not been well 
studied or conceptualized. Learning and the actual doing at work are intertwined and this 
type of learning cannot be classified in terms of formal education (Collin 2005). Learning at 
work different from learning in a class room, both contextually and distinction of learning 
and work-related learning usually occurs at places of work (Varila & Rekola 2003; Rauramo 
2008, 162). 
6.2  Levels of individual learning in relation to explicit and
 tacit knowledge
Qualitative differences between hierarchical levels of learning have been described in 
the learning literature. Knud Illeris (2009a) divides individual learning into four levels. 
Mechanical or cumulative learning means adding new information on a former knowledge 
structures. Assimilative learning is the addition new parts to former knowledge structures. 
Accommodative learning is a result of modifying former knowledge structures. Finally, 
transformative or expansive learning requires deeper changes in a person’s personality and 
how he or she categorizes knowledge. (Illeris 2009a, 12–14.) These hierarchical levels have 
similarities with several other theories of learning, such as Gregory Bateson’s categorization 
on the levels of learning, Yrjö Engeström’s (1987) theory of expansive learning and Jack 
Mezirow’s (2009) theory of transformative learning. 
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The first two of Illeris’s (2009a) categories can be described as conventional learning, and 
the two latter ones as innovative types of learning; having said that, Illeris himself only used 
the four-level categorization introduced above. Illeris’s (2009a) categorization is broad and 
learning categories in many other contemporary theories can be divided in accordance with 
his typology. However, Mezirow’s (2009) view regarding transformative learning slightly 
differs from Illeris’s. According to Mezirow (2009), transformative learning takes different 
forms in communicative and instrumental learning processes. Instrumental learning means 
controlling or manipulating an environment, while communicative learning is interactive in 
its nature. Transformative learning usually involves critical self-reflection and is an outcome 
of resolving a disorienting dilemma requiring reflection. (Ibid.) In contrast to Illeris’s more 
cognitively-based analysis, Mezirow (2009) emphasized that most transformative learning 
occurs outside of awareness.
Yrjö Engeström’s (1987) theory on expansive learning focused on collective types of 
learning. One of the basic issues in activity theory is the relationship between activeness, 
which describes animal and human forms of life, and the idea of activity, which is an 
object-oriented and cultural formation that has its own structure. Within activity theory an 
atomized view on actions is criticized. A key principle of the approach is historicity. In many 
ways, activity theory is an alternative interpretation of learning processes compared with the 
views that make a strong distinction between the individual and collective. However, this 
type of definition, makes analysis of learning challenging. Although learning is regarded as 
being socially constructed, the subject of human learning must have mental capacity. If this 
argumentation is accepted with regard to human learning, the learning unit should be seen 
as an individual; this is in contrast to Engeström’s (1987) views.
In expansive learning, an organization analyzes its working methods, builds up a new model 
for action and starts to use it. Expansive learning means the ability to learn something 
that has not been foreseen (Engeström 2004, 59). A cycle of expansive learning starts from 
questioning, involves contradictions, and new qualitative stages emerge as solutions to 
the preceding stage (Engeström & Sannino 2010; Engeström 1987, 91). In the cycle of 
expansive transition, the need state is seen as a primary contradiction, after which double-
bind and its analysis and first transformation take place. As a result of the process, object and 
motive construction and modeling of instruments occur; this is followed by the application 
and generalization and the second phase of transforming take place. Eventually, all the 
second kind of activity and consolidation and reflection take place. Learning is a necessary 
pre-condition for personal development, and development is also an ingredient of learning. 
Joint cooperative activities can cause a historically new form of activity to emerge. (Ibid.) 
Expansive learning in Engeström’s (1987) theory is similar to Illeris’s (2009a; 2011) 
description of transformative learning, although the latter is based on individuals. On 
the other hand, Engeström’s (1987) views on contradictions inspiring learning are quite 
similar to Mezirow’s (2009) interpretations about the relevance of disorienting dilemmas 
that trigger reflection processes. Unfortunately, while the expansive learning theory has 
focused on understanding the expansion, the conditions for expansive learning have not 
been studied (Ludvigsen 2007). 
94
Some distinctions between various categories of learning may be made by classifying 
the categories of information one deals with. Explicit knowledge is clearly defined. Tacit 
knowledge is not explicit and is instead based on learning and experience. It consists of 
well argued beliefs and their tacit dimension, which cannot completely be described in 
explicit terms, although it affects behavior (Virtainlahti 2009, 38). Tacit knowledge is 
learnt through socialization and may become explicit through externalization. However, 
spiral internalization of explicit knowledge and its combination with new information lead 
back to a new kind of tacit knowledge. (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 62–72.) Knowledge 
creation is a social process (Nonaka & Toyama 2007, 29). In order to assess professional 
knowledge and practices, it is essential to be aware of these different levels of knowledge and 
the interaction between them. 
In working life, knowledge based on experience means tacit knowledge. Its distribution 
is possible in similar kinds of situations as it is learnt, namely in authentic environments. 
(Paloniemi 2008.) Learning can be regarded as an experiental human process that leads 
to a completely changed person (Jarvis 2009). From this perspective, learning is holistic 
– it is embodied, social, and potentially transformative. In the present study, however, less 
transformative processes of learning are not identified as non-learning. Regarding crisis 
management, learning often signifies learning at work; therefore, the results related to it may 
also be applied to crisis management. Informal learning may take place in crisis management 
duties and take all the forms of learning processes introduced in Figure 4. 
Learning new types of knowledge or skills requires the learning processes described above. 
In order to differentiate between learning strategies, Illeris’s approach is both precise and 
practical as an analytical tool for research on individuals. Figure 4 combines Illeris’s (2009a) 
typology of learning within an individual with the learning of either tacit or explicit 
knowledge (see Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). 
Figure 4.  Levels of individual learning in relation to explicit and tacit knowledge
 
Transformative, 
expansive learning,
explicit or tacit knowledge
Accommodative learning, explicit or tacit knowledge
Assimilative learning, explicit knowledge
Mechanical or cumulative learning, explicit knowledge
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Individual competences are learnt at different levels of learning. An individual may need 
several strategies to learn different competences. It is worth analyzing what kinds of 
competences are needed in crisis management and how they are learned. In military crisis 
management, use of weapons partly requires cumulative or assimilative learning. Cultural and 
communicative strategies are learnt in a more complex way, which requires reflectivity that is 
accommodative or potentially transformative. Because transformative and accommodative 
learning modify individual ways of thinking, they probably make tacit knowledge explicit 
if the changes in cognitive structures become conscious to an individual. If transformative 
learning is regarded as taking place often ”outside of awareness” as Mezirow (2009) presumes, 
transformation may even concern the part of knowledge cycle from explicit to implicit. This 
part of the cycle is essential to Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) theory.
Assimilative and mechanical learning concerns explicit knowledge; due to their less 
challenging nature, these concepts are the two lowest in Figure 4. The typology can be 
utilized when developing education and training for crisis management personnel and the 
opportunities for the personnel to learn. In crisis management, it is essential to describe 
how well the employees could “learn the unforeseen” such as transformative learning. Like 
activity systems, crisis management organizations are multilevel systems. Personnel’s duties 
challenge the idea of life-long learning and put stress on the need to combine organizational 
and individual levels of learning.
6.3  Organizational learning and change in crisis 
 management
Organizational learning requires learning individuals, but individual learning does not 
necessarily lead to organizational learning (Senge 1994, 140). However, organizational 
learning, however, has been criticized because of category mistakes in conceptualizations. 
The critics assume that learning is only possible by individuals. (Argyris 2003, 7.) If learning 
is regarded as a human process, as Knud Illeris (2011) presumes only individual processes 
in organizational learning can be described as learning. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
however, learning is also affected by social processes. At the organizational level, learning 
actually means change and development.
Organizational learning and change perspectives can be applied to crisis management 
organizations. A learning organization must combine adaptive learning with generative 
learning, which means being able to create (Senge 1994). Transformative learning, which 
was introduced earlier in this chapter, may be regarded as part of organizational change. 
Both individual and organizational perspectives are important for developing learning 
organizations (ibid.). As Chris Argyris (2003, 157) has noted, organizations can only learn 
through individuals who act as agents for them. An organizational learning system either 
facilitates or inhibits individuals’ learning (ibid.). Organizations can promote continuous 
learning, and efforts to enhance it extend from capturing suggestions for change and 
improvement to team learning, and leadership for learning as well as broader organizational 
structures that enable learning (Watkins & Cseh 2009, 13–14). An individual’s ability 
to learn from his or her failures concerns both individual and organizational learning 
because inability to deal with failures may cause even larger problems (Argyris 1998). In 
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crisis management this view is slightly contradictory because training and education of the 
personnel aims to avoid failures in order to minimize security risks.
This conceptual critique may be enlarged to any conceptualization of learning regarding 
extending over the individual level. In this sense, the criticism is justified, but seeing 
different qualities in organizational learning and change enables conceptual progress. Within 
organizational learning, it is necessary to have an interactive spiral between tacit and explicit 
knowledge in order to enable knowledge creation in a way that is partly similar knowledge 
creation at the individual level (see Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).
Nonaka and Toyama (2007) emphasize that organizational learning is an outcome of 
personal tacit knowledge that is transformed into explicit organizational knowledge. 
Within an organizational setting knowledge creation derives from a process that transforms 
individual tacit knowledge into organizational explicit knowledge. Such a transformation 
does not take place without conscious efforts to gather tacit knowledge. Therefore, various 
methods of information gathering within an organization are important.
Organizational learning and change have been mostly overlooked with regard to 
peacekeeping operations. First-level organizational learning regarding peace operations 
means that an operation is able to learn, while second-level learning refers to the ability of 
the organizational planners and leaders to learn from the operational experiences between 
missions (Howard 2008, 14). Second-level learning is mostly individual in nature, although 
the community in a peace-building operation participates in it. The community level that 
Wenger (1998) has emphasized is central for organizational learning in crisis management, 
which Howard (2008) considered to be a tool for progress in post-conflict operations. These 
communities are essential for organizational learning, both in the field within an operation 
as well as in the institutions dealing with operational knowledge.
First-level learning directly affects the outcomes of peace operations. It consists of gathering 
field data, coordinating international efforts to integrate the post-war environment, 
exercising leadership in ways fostering the parties involved, and resolving crises arising in 
a peacekeeping mission. First-level organizational learning is a factor that partially induces 
success or failure in peacekeeping. It only takes place during operations, while second-level 
learning occurs between operations. (Howard 2008, 327–328.) First-level learning is a 
condition for second-level learning and organizational development.
Although a lot of first-level learning has taken place in peacekeeping operations, many 
failures have been made in second-level learning. At the institutional level it is crucial to work 
for reforms that enable first-level learning in single operations. (Ibid. 330–346.) Howard’s 
framework is within the UN but the two-level idea of organizational learning may also be 
applied to other organizations arranging crisis management and peacekeeping. Different 
organizations assess their own success in field operations in various ways. UN and NATO 
have permanent criteria for assessing their work, the EU and OSCE do not have such long-
standing traditions for assessing their own results and working methods. (Häikiö 2009.)
Making first-level learning into second-level learning or organizational development 
requires feedback to promote futures operations. In this process, various kinds of feedback 
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mediate the knowledge and information that is necessary for institutional learning. For 
institutional learning, it is necessary to make a distinction between explicit and tacit 
knowledge because gathering tacit knowledge may be far more challenging than collecting 
more explicit knowledge or information. Tacit knowledge management requires awareness 
of competences and people having them within an organization and acknowledgement of 
this knowledge (Virtainlahti 2009, 74). A central question is whether those people who deal 
with the operational knowledge are aware of different types of knowledge, how to gather it, 
and how to use it to enhance overall comprehension with respect to development of crisis 
management. Another essential question is whether crisis management organizations receive 
adequate information and whether they should obtain feedback from local inhabitants as 
well.
Individual learning in crisis management requires different learning strategies depending 
on the competences that should be learnt. Organizational learning in crisis management 
relies on the personnel’s individual learning capacity, as well as on the arrangements for 
gathering information, which extend the organization’s ability to promote its strategic 
objectives. Organizational learning is also an outcome of learning new competences, which 
are collective in nature. Dealing with the adoption of tacit knowledge is a challenging part 
of organizational learning. Competence, knowledge and learning management should be 
connected with the objectives of an organization (Virtainlahti 2009, 68). 
Development in information technology has not been sufficiently utilized in crisis 
management and peace-building (Ghani & Lockhart 2008). If information technology is 
more widely adopted in crisis management and peace-building processes, duties in crisis 
management will become more knowledge-intensive. It is difficult to handle a growing 
amount of information because its relevance and correctness should be checked. This is a 
challenge in many knowledge-based duties. When peace-building is regarded as a multi-
level process, as it is by Ghani and Lockhart (2008), the challenges of learning become more 
complicated for all personnel. Information processing is part of learning processes in crisis 
management. Because learning in this field extends from an individual to an institutional 
level, information technology should be developed for both of these purposes.
6.4  Crisis management operation as a learning 
 environment and challenges to education and training
A crisis management mission is a learning environment for personnel, but crisis management 
operations have not generally been evaluated as such. Work, the work community, and the 
type of production in relation to the individual are central elements of workplace learning 
(Illeris 2011). Single crisis management tasks, the core competences in crisis management, 
and the community in the duties can be described as elements for an individual working and 
learning in crisis management. Competence development in itself requires reflection (ibid. 
61). Education and training of peacekeeping troops is mostly focused on the special skills 
required during a peacekeeping mission. 
Section 5.1 described the central features of crisis management organizations. Chapter 5 
defined collaboration skills, local awareness, ability for ethical assessment and complexity 
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management were defined as core competences in civilian and military crisis management. 
Besides, soldiers obviously need combat skills in military crisis management. In a post-
conflict situation crisis management personnel must be able to cooperate with the operation’s 
multinational forces and with expatriate staff of various international organizations, as well 
as with local authorities and local people trying to orientate to live in peace. Because the 
expertise is considered as part of co-evolution (e.g., Hakkarainen et al. 2004, 150) and 
interaction also enables learning at work (Illeris 2011, 34–35), it is necessary to develop 
crisis management skills by taking into account the contextual and social factors that affect 
an individual professional’s actions. 
Control-based combat skills are mostly learnt through professional military training 
programs and drills. In the armed forces, a lot of time is traditionally devoted to this type 
of training. Smaller units are trained to receive assignments, which are carried out through 
standard procedures. The aim is to learn standardized combat skills and methods. Classic 
combat skills are repeated in training in order to maintain them. This kind of instruction 
aims to enable soldiers to respond to any conceivable situation without hesitation and 
to apply predefined methods that are appropriate from a security perspective. Combat 
skills competence is learned using the concept of discipline. (Norgaard & Holsting 2006, 
112–114.) Peacekeepers exercise situational and context-dependent decision-making 
and external control is replaced with internal control (Norgaard 2004, 214). Discipline 
alone is not sufficient for activities in complex international operations. Developing trust-
oriented competences is a long learning process that is based on social skills. Contact skills 
are not learnt through discipline. They are strengthened through deeper understanding 
of other cultures, but training can help a soldier to strengthen these competencies to a 
certain degree. (Norgaard & Holsting 2006.) Cultural competences rely on learning about 
one’s own culture, expressions of the acquired cultural skills, gaining cultural knowledge, 
understanding meaning of locations and symbols, awareness about regional history, and 
communicating with the local population on a regular basis (Ådahl 2009, 108). Only first-
hand experience of reality can make a soldier to understand the situational complexity and 
encounter his or her limitations in making development-oriented solutions. (Norgaard & 
Holsting 2006, 115–121.) 
Training and education of crisis management personnel can serve as a basis for learning cross-
cultural awareness. The personnel in international crisis management learn mostly at work 
from their colleagues by handling tacit knowledge. Communication with local inhabitants 
is also a potential learning situation. Misunderstanding of the local culture may lead to 
misinterpretations and irrational behavior and local inhabitants may also misinterpret the 
behavior of crisis management personnel.18 On the other hand, tacit knowledge of personnel 
may be accurate or incorrect, or a combination thereof. An individual interprets intercultural 
information through a framework that is affected by his or her cultural background (Talib 
2008). Tacit knowledge can be shared in cooperative learning methods including working 
in pairs and networks (Virtainlahti 2009, 118–119). In crisis management, this type of 
“peer education and learning” enables adequate mission-related information to be learned. 
Personnel’s skill may evolve during the mission through reflection, training, and guidance . 
18 As an example of culturally insensitive behavior by soldiers, US troops in Afghanistan dropped flag-figured footballs to 
Afghan children from an airplane (Linjakumpu 2009, 199). Some of the footballs had the flag of Saudi-Arabia, which contains 
the first verse of the Koran, a confession of faith. Accordingly, Americans were accused of cultural insensitivity in Afghanistan. 
(Ibid.) A friendly gesture may be interpreted negatively if the outcome does not fit in its cultural environment.
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There are two parallel and interconnected tendencies in peacekeeping operations: a transition 
from a centralized and bureaucratic type of management to risk management, which allows 
an individual soldier to control himself or herself; and a transition from a territorially defined 
discourse of security to a value-oriented discourse of security, which makes the construction 
of a civil-military ”trust capital” and political cooperation into military security issues. These 
two tendencies mark a transition to a humanitarian security mechanism and the construction 
of a new global governmentality that connects humanitarian, political, military and local 
civilian actors in an extensive network of strategic power relations. (Norgaard 2004, 217.) 
Military crisis management requires the ethical dimension of action competence because 
of the potential consequences of the crisis management personnel’s actions endangering 
their own troops and decisions to use armed force (Mikkonen 2008). Therefore, learning 
crisis management duties also requires ethical comprehension and is different from learning 
separate skills. The framework of combat and contact skills (see Norgaard & Holsting 2006), 
which are necessary for military personnel serving in peace operations can be reflected to 
the action competence framework. Although combat skills can be considered as being 
more easily learnt through training and education in comparison to the contact skills, the 
physical, psychological, social and ethical dimensions of action competence are relevant 
to the development of both combat and contact skills.19 In a way, the ethical dimension is 
especially crucial when practicing combat skills and taking into account one’s own troops 
and the civilians’ situation. Ethical questions in crisis management are an example of a 
field that requires continuous training, and they can be considered as part of life-learning 
processes. The ability to conduct intercultural communication is an outcome of different 
abilities, including an individual’s understanding of global unity: therefore, it also has an 
ethical dimension (see Heinonen 2002, 86–87). 
Education and training prior to a crisis management mission aims to develop personnel’s 
competences to work. Necessary competences in civilian and military crisis management are 
related to peace-building tasks. Combat skills are important for military crisis management 
staff. Collaboration and contact skills should be handled in the education and training 
of the personnel, and a multilevel approach to learning could serve as the basis for this 
education. Social skills can be learned and do not depend on sociability which is part of a 
human being’s personality (Keltikangas-Järvinen 2010). Learning social skills concerns a 
complex and multi-cultural environment while these skills are embedded in the context of a 
peace operation. Education can enhance the ability of peacekeepers to deal with the conflict 
and its background as well as with different aspects on the operation (Johansson 2001, 
61). Regarding social skills, the definition of their nature as a result of learning affects the 
idea of crisis management education. Communication and cultural skills required in crisis 
management can be taught20.
In the education and training of crisis management personnel, a distinction can be made 
between special skills needed in the field and abilities for transformative learning. Special skills 
19 According to Franke (2003), the relationship between warrior and peacekeeper identities may be seen as a double bind due 
to the potential controversy between them. Although there are cultural differences in the conceptualization of these identities, 
it is important that a peacekeeper is able to use arms as well as communicate with local people.
20 Peacekeepers may have prejudices that impede peace-building and even worsen the situation in a conflict area (Boniecki & 
Britt 2003). Unmotivated peacekeepers may be less likely to accept stressful conditions to help troubled factions, and may be 
unable to construe the operation in meaningful terms (Britt 2003, 76). Training and education for crisis management duties is 
important, both from motivational perspectives and in order to decrease prejudice that may emerge in the duties.
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may be both function- and operation-specific, requiring either repetitive or transformative 
forms of learning. Transformative learning styles are crucial for adopting core competences in 
crisis management, namely collaboration skills and local awareness. However, the question 
of how to develop transformative learning abilities in crisis management or in any kind of 
work place remains open. Traditional education promotes a narrow field of learning, namely 
assimilative learning (Illeris 2009c, 91). There is no evidence that education and training 
for crisis management would be an exception to this phenomenon. A greater understanding 
the variety of competences needed in crisis management as well as of their learning would 
facilitate developing education and training of this field.
Learning of central skills, such as combat skills, can be described as cumulative learning. 
Adopting cultural knowledge may require different forms of learning, which may be applied 
to reality in more complicated manners, enabling higher levels of learning. However, 
collaboration skills and local awareness can be learnt through transformative learning because 
one must modify the perceived information and be able to modify his or her behavior 
coherently with security and cultural information. In Finland, education and training are 
arranged for all personnel recruited to a mission. In military crisis management, some 
personnel are recruited from the military personnel including professional officers and part 
from the reserves. Recruitment for civilian crisis management is based on the professional 
needs of civilian operations.
In today’s education of military personnel the importance of self-education, self-
improvement, and informal learning should be emphasized (Talerud 2007, 80). Because 
cultural stress may be associated with physical stress, soldiers need to be aware of the cultural 
environment. Cultural training and education should play a major part in preparing troops 
to work in a culture that is non-familiar to them. (McMaster 2009, 21.) Besides cultural 
education, it is also necessary to arrange education and training on human rights and gender 
issues (see Valenius 2007; Schulze 2010). 
Differences in education and training of personnel for civilian and military crisis management 
can be derived from the different competences required in these tasks, although views on 
required competences may vary. Soldiers who have the option of use force must to have 
education and training before they can assume this responsibility. From an ethical point 
of view, military personnel must understand the principles of a just war, the role-specific 
obligations of military personnel, and the universal ethical virtues and values of special 
importance for military personnel (Cook 2009, 117). Within the framework of action 
competence, education and training should support critical thinking and the ethical 
assessment of one’s activities (Toiskallio 2009). There is minimal evidence regarding the 
outcome and meaning of ethics education in the military (Lucas 2009, 10). Therefore, it is 
challenging to develop ethics education for military personnel who have or are going to have 
crisis management duties.
Training and education of peacekeepers have a history dating back more than 50 years. 
In 2001, the center for education and training of Finnish peacekeepers was named as the 
International Centre of the Defence Forces (FINCENT) in 2001. Training arranged by 
the center has taken into account cooperation with civilian actors. Apart from the military 
training, the students chosen to serve as peacekeepers receive education and training regarding 
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the situation of the conflict region, the other actors of the region and their roles, as well as 
issues related to religion, culture, and gender equality. (Koskela 2007.) FINCENT and the 
Crisis Management Centre (CMC, which focuses on training civilian crisis management 
personnel) Finland cooperate in education and training21.
A study on the education and training of peacekeepers found several deficiencies22 (Lahdenperä 
& Harinen 2000). A study of police officers who had worked in a civilian mission in Kosovo 
found that they had learned professionally from their experiences. Learning had occurred 
due to difficult situations, multicultural collaboration and strengthening in self confidence 
(Raatikainen 2004). With regard to learning, there is a need to develop the didactics for the 
education and training in crisis management.
6.5  Conclusions: Skills and learning processes needed 
 in crisis management
The main focus of this chapter has been to answer to the main RQ and RQs 1, 2 and 3. 
The focus of learning in crisis management is on core competences. Different strategies 
for learning necessary competences should be promoted. As part of learning, personnel’s 
identities may change, which provides a partial answer to RQ2. Meta-cognitive skills are 
required in order to observe learning strategies. If the human security approach is a priority, 
the selected core competences are important. The learning processes introduced in this 
chapter can be categorized with respect to the former competence analysis.
Most special skills could be adopted through mechanical or assimilative learning. General 
learning abilities are important for cross-cultural communication and solving new kinds 
of problems. However, there is no knowledge about how peacekeepers and civilian crisis 
management personnel apply different learning strategies before and during missions. Levels 
of learning could be a framework for assessing learning environments as well as the ability 
to learn new skills and knowledge. Problem solving requires higher levels of learning, but 
learning combat skills mostly requires mechanical, reproductive or assimilative learning. 
Education and training for crisis management operations are generally based on learning 
specific skills and knowledge necessary for specific duties. Therefore, it is necessary to rethink 
the educational concept for crisis management. 
21 Basic education and training of Finnish peacekeepers take about 2–4 weeks. (Suomalainen sotilas 2009, 231.)  FINCENT 
and Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland deepened co-operation  by establishing a Finnish Centre of Expertise in 
Comprehensive Crisis Management in 2008. The centre develops civil-military relations and arranges training. (Koskela 2008, 
9.) The training and education of Finnish civilian crisis management personnel mostly takes place at the Crisis Management 
Centre (Crisis Management Centre 2008a).
22 A lack of education and training on landmines and unexploded ammunition was expressed by 27 percent of the respond-
ents. Over half of the respondents assessed the focus on negotiation skills insufficient. Two thirds of the reservists understood 
the orders regulating crisis management. Over 70 percent of the respondents felt that they knew enough about the cultural 
and religious differences within the region. 87 percent of the respondents expressed the ability to understand the rules of 
engagement completely. Education regarding patrolling was found sufficient by 61 percent of the respondents. (Lahdenperä 
& Harinen 2000.)
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Table 8.  Learning patterns in relation to knowledge and competences in crisis manage-
ment
Table 8 helps answer both the main RQ and RQ 1. Organizational learning is required 
to strengthen the core competences at the institutional level. As Norgaard and Holsting 
(2006) have evaluated, learning different competences in crisis management takes place in 
different ways. At the organizational level, the learning objective is to strengthen the core 
competences. Feedback from the personnel is a prerequisite for organizational learning in 
crisis management. 
At the individual level, learning objectives in strengthening the core competences may be 
divided into different categories. Adapting contact and cooperative skills can be regarded 
as a challenge for life-long learning. Learning at work is part of life-long learning. It may 
consist of learning core competences in crisis management. Problem-solving may require 
new kinds of realizations that represent transformative learning. Learning tacit knowledge 
in cooperation is part of learning in crisis management duties and it may require either 
accommodative or transformative learning. Adopting both explicit and tacit knowledge may 
occur through reflective processes. For military crisis management, learning combat skills 
related to handling weapons and the like is a process of mechanical or reproductive learning. 
Situational awareness mostly requires reproductive learning and, partially, some other types 
of learning. Taking responsibility for one’s actions related to one’s capacity to understand 
the consequences of those actions. In crisis management, realities may change rapidly which 
underscores the need to apply the ideas learned during the preceding education and training 
– as well as the ability to apply the existing knowledge to the on-going situation. Learning 
crisis management also concerns the learning processes at work in the missions, not just the 
courses that occur prior to the missions. 
Actor  Type of learning Strengthening knowledge and competences 
Organizations             Organizational learning Cooperational competence 
  and development Multiculturalism 
    Ensuring security by different means 
    Feedback systems 
 
Personnel  Life-long learning Contact skills  
    Continuous processes 
  Learning at work Different skills and competences 
    Tacit/explicit knowledge 
  Transformative learning Challenging problem solving  
                                                                                               (Complexity management) 
                                                                                               Ethical assessment 
                                                                                               Tacit knowledge 
  Accommodative learning  Cooperation   
                                                                                               Tacit knowledge 
                                                                                               Reflective skills  
                                                                                               (Complexity management)  
                                                                                               Ethical assessment 
                                                                                               Explicit knowledge  
                                                Assimilative and Situational awareness 
                                                mechanical learning Combat skills 
                                                  Explicit knowledge 
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As mentioned above, learning takes place within an individual, although it is also a social 
process. In order to enhance organizational learning and development, it is necessary 
to analyze both first- and second-level organizational learning in peace operations. This 
means that crisis management employees should be able to gather information about the 
operations in order to enable first-level learning. Between operations, this information 
and the outcomes of earlier peace operations should be critically analyzed in order to carry 
out second-level organizational learning which is necessary for the development of future 
operations and peace-building. There appears to be a need to understand tacit knowledge 
from the operations. Making tacit knowledge explicit at the organizational level facilitates 
organizational learning. 
 
The theoretical framework of the first and second levels of organizational learning has 
implications for personnel. With regard to the main RQ, personnel’s learning abilities are 
relevant for the outcome of the mission. Regarding the main RQ and RQ1, the complexity of 
contemporary armed conflicts and crisis management underlines the importance of learning 
abilities of the personnel. Howard’s view knits together individual and institutional learning 
and helps understand how both dimensions affect the development of crisis management. 
Institutional learning in crisis management requires individual learning on behalf of the 
personnel. 
RQ2, which is related to the crisis management personnel’s identities is important from the 
perspectives of learning and organizational development. Identities affect learning processes 
that include interpretation of information and work communities in crisis management. As 
mentioned at the end of chapter 5, common identity combining different dimensions of 
crisis management might reduce stereotypical views on other professional groups in crisis 
management. This, in turn, could facilitate learning processes related to comprehensive 
crisis management. 
104
7.  Futures challenges for crisis management 
 personnel in the light of the Delphi panel 
 process 
The aim of this chapter is to respond to the main RQ and RQs 1 and 3 which are as follows:
  Main RQ. What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?
  RQ 1. What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management 
organizations and personnel? 
  RQ 3. How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be 
developed when the human security approach is taken into account?
This chapter introduces the results of the Delphi panel process. The empirical part of this 
research will be interpreted primarily in order to answer to RQ 3 and partly to the main 
RQ and RQ 1. The Delphi panel process is aimed to understand futures development in 
armed conflict and crisis management and their relation to the competences required in 
crisis management.
7.1  Consistency of the Delphi Panel
The Delphi expert panel in crisis management consisted of 15 experts. However, a total 
of 42 individuals expressed their views in the first interview phase of the Delphi panel 
process. Twenty-seven crisis management personnel interviewees were asked the same 
future-related questions as the expert panelists as part of the first round of the panel process. 
Interviews were used as the method for gathering data for the first round of the futures panel 
was interviewing. The reasoning for this two-level panel was that the crisis management 
personnel could reveal some weak or emerging signals regarding the practical processes in 
crisis management23. The answers of the crisis management personnel interviewees were 
interpreted as accomplishing data providing information especially about personnel and 
educational questions. They had “practical expertise” in crisis management, which should 
not be under-estimated when assessing prospects in crisis management and peace-building. 
Their perspectives were considered to have provided further information that was valuable 
in the process of estimating respected features of the crisis management personnel in the 
future. Their role was particularly valuable in revealing the personnel’s needs for feedback 
and debriefing systems when returning home. Debriefing is used here in a more general 
context than in psychological interventions focusing on catastrophes and immediate 
psychological interventions facilitating the psychological recovery of the patients (see Saari 
2008). Arguments about debriefing were included in the second round of the panel process. 
Information from the first round was utilized when constructing the second round of the 
process. 
23 At the beginning of the planning of this study, the Delphi panel process was limited to  crisis management experts. Conse-
quently, the final practical outcome of the composition in the panel may be regarded as a compromise of combining practical 
and more theoretical and broader experience in crisis management.
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The decision to restrict the panel attendance was made after the first round of the Delphi 
panel process. Although such a solution is exceptional, it is justified by the study’s data 
gathering process. “Double interviewing” of the crisis management personnel about both 
their experiences and future assessments provided an opportunity to discuss developmental 
challenges of crisis management with people who had profound experience from field 
work. On the other hand, expertise regarding many of the details in the second round 
questionnaire was not a prerequisite for working in civilian or military crisis management 
personnel. Consequently, it was unlikely that the participation of crisis management 
personnel would reinforce the validity of the second round in the panel process. Only the 
expert panelists’ answers were counted when structured parts of the interviews were analyzed 
for the construction of the second round of the panel process. The final results of the study 
consist of the results of the second phase. 
Many of the 15 expert panelists had several types of knowledge about crisis management 
and some were selected because of their varied expertise in their career background and 
other kind of orientation. Five of the experts had worked at various educational, training, 
or research institutions. Four had spent at least part of their careers as professional officers, 
while several had practical experience in civilian or military crisis management or in similar 
kinds of duties. Two of the panelists worked in NGOs focused on conflict management. 
Many experts had served in public service and seven had worked at some ministry related 
to the research theme (namely the Ministry of Defence, Ministry for Foreign Affairs or 
Ministry of Interior). Six of the panelists were women. (See Appendix 4).
Comprehensive crisis management is a wide-ranging theme. When trying to attain a 
comprehensive view on crisis management, it was preferable that panelists would represent 
broad expertise. When choosing the panelists, gender was taken into account in order to 
obtain detailed information about the theme. Expertise related to crisis management has 
traditionally been seen more as part of a masculine sphere than a feminine one. All of the 
panelists were Finnish, which means that the interview questions focused on the Finnish 
context in crisis management policy. The panel assessed futures trends in terms of conflict 
types, requirements for crisis management personnel and their education and training. 
Assessment of future conflicts served as background information for the development of 
crisis management and the requirements for the crisis management personnel. 
7.2  First round of the Delphi panel process
The first round of the Delphi process took place between February and June 2008 and 
consisted of structured interviews. The interview questions are introduced in Appendix 6. 
The average interviews lasted for less than an hour on average. 
The themes of the interviews were:
– Future crises and conflicts
– The development of crisis management organizations
– Finnish participation in military crisis management in coming twenty years
– Finnish participation in civilian crisis management in coming twenty years
– Special capability requests for Finland regarding international crisis situations 
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– Future cooperation of civilian and military crisis management in the future
– Future cooperation with local inhabitants in conflict areas
– Ideas for better cooperation of either civilian or military actors in crisis management
– Skills required from crisis management personnel
– Challenges of educating of crisis management personnel
– Learning opportunities during crisis management missions and feedback system for the 
personnel
– Combined education and training of the military and civilian crisis management 
personnel
The interview questionnaires were sent to most of the panelists before the interview took 
place. This was a practical move in order to ensure that panelists would have time to 
familiarize themselves with the research themes and questions. The time perspective for 
futures estimations was presumed to be twenty years from the time of the interviewing. The 
time-frame was mentioned during the interviews and in the questionnaire-frame was used 
throughout the Delphi process.
The questions were mostly formulated to identify the prospects that the interviewees would 
find probable – not just the ones they hoped for. However, regarding the 20-year futures 
perspectives in crisis management, it could be challenging for any interviewee to completely 
isolate the probable alternatives from the preferable ones. The interviews were structured 
such a way that the futures crises and conflicts were assessed as background information 
for the estimations of crisis management. In the questions and arguments related to crisis 
management and personnel needed in conflict regions, the preferable alternatives were 
looked after in the research procedure. The distinction of the preferable and probable 
alternatives was made possible during the phases of the Delphi study.
7.3  Second round of the Delphi panel process
This section introduces the final results of the Delphi panel process. The first round was a 
preliminary phase which led to the arguments of the second round. After analyzing of the 
first round interviews, the theses for the second round questionnaire were constructed. The 
aim of this process was not to find a consensus but to define the relevant conditions for future 
progress in crisis management, peace-building and peace processes in the future. Critical 
questions regarding this kind of progress were required for the second round of the Delphi 
process. Therefore, the progress-seeking nature of futures studies therefore had an impact on 
the definitions of the claims in the questionnaire for the second round. Consequently the 
claims were not always “average results of the panel” although some were.
The second round of the Delphi process took place in September and October of 2008. 
This empirical phase was conducted in the form of e-mail questionnaires. (See Appendix 7.) 
Instead of questions, theses were used as the method to identify the panelists’ views. 
After each thesis, every panelist had an opportunity to propose his or her opinions. The 
questionnaires were sent to the 15 panelists one of whom was not able to answer the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire contained a total of 33 theses, and a numerical scale was 
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used for the basic assessment of the theses24. The panelists were asked their views about the 
relevance 19 of the theses25. Both scales ranged from 1 to 5 so that a positive agreement or 
an assessment of the relevance grew along those scales. 
The theses consisted of ideas that could be necessary in the strategies for developing crisis 
management. The order of the themes in the questionnaire was similar to the questionnaire 
in the first round. The procedure started from the development of crises and conflicts and 
ended with the personnel and educational theses for assessing core competences in crisis 
management. Although there was variation in the assessment of several theses, some theses 
gathered consensus from the panel. The high-level consensus thesis received average support 
of between 4.50 and 5.00, while consensus claims received average support between 4.00 
and 4.49. This section analyzes not only the numerical results, but also the arguments for 
and against the claims. The relevance of most theses was assessed as being lower than the 
respondents’ agreement with the argumentation they contained. Due to the small sample 
size and the specific nature of the data, no statistical method has been applied to the analysis 
of the data. The numerical borders limiting consensus categories were made so narrow that 
the average answers would indicate high or relatively high consensus among the respondents. 
Any potentially significant question in the futures planning may divide the experts’ opinions. 
The theses were analyzed as single items as well as in relation to each other and to their 
wider contexts. The themes of the questionnaire arose from conflicts to crisis management 
with crisis management personnel. The results are introduced and analyzed in this thematic 
order. After the quantitative results, some of the panelists’ arguments will be introduced and 
the summaries of the thematic results will be made after a few theses.
Futures crises and conflicts
The nature of the future conflicts concerns the development of crisis management and 
peace-building.
Thesis 1 
“Conflicts in the future that interfere with the means of crisis management will be most 
common in Africa and in the Middle East and one or several parties in these conflicts will 
be non-state actors.”
There was a relatively high consensus on this item (average 4.21/14 answers) and the thesis 
was considered relevant (average 4.29/14 answers). This prospect of conflicts requiring crisis 
management was quite consistent with the analysis of new conflicts introduced in the first 
chapter of this study. The former Soviet Union, the Caucasus and Middle and Southern 
Asia were mentioned as possible areas requiring crisis management. One panelist mentioned 
that it would be difficult to predict the future of South America. This means that although 
24 The alternatives to assess the theses were: 
(1.) Completely disagree with the claim, 
(2.) Somewhat disagree with the claim,
( 3.)Don’t know/Neither agree nor disagree
( 4.) Somewhat agree with the claim, and 
(5.)  Completely agree with the claim
25 The alternatives to evaluate the relevance of the theses were: 1. Highly irrelevant, 2. Somewhat irrelevant, 3. Don’t know/
Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Somewhat relevant, and 5. Highly relevant.
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Africa and the Middle East will be major areas for crisis management, the risk area could in 
fact be global.
Consensus on this item is relevant from several points of view. Conflicts in the future 
will require crisis management arrangements in order to be solved. The international 
community should be prepared for the continuation of complex conflicts. On the other 
hand, understanding this complexity may be part of facilitating peace processes for stable 
progress in areas that are currently unsettled.
Thesis 2 
“Possible changes in the relations between the major powers will not affect the principles of 
crisis management, including human rights.”
The average of the answers was 3.36 (14 answers), and there was not a consensus regarding 
the relevance of the item (average of 3.71/14 answers). The panelists expressed doubts 
that the changes in relations between the great powers would actually have an impact on 
the principles of crisis management. The consensus on this thesis was not high. Although 
there have been discussions regarding the changes in great powers in the coming decades, 
the impact of these changes on crisis management has not been the subject of widespread 
discussion. The claim was open to various dimensions of changes – both positive and 
negative. 
Theses 1–2 
The first two arguments were seen as more significant in numerical terms than the actual 
support that they received. This could indicate that the themes are relevant for the future of 
crisis management. Today’s trends may influence the experts’ views regarding the nature of 
futures conflicts. Therefore the panel’s support for the description, which was quite similar 
to today’s conflicts, may not indicate stability in the nature of the conflicts. However, the 
conflicts described in the first claim are quite challenging for crisis management and peace 
building. The relations of the major powers and their impact on crisis management will be 
relevant for the framework of crisis management. The first thesis is relatively consistent with 
the research literature on conflicts handled in chapter 3. 
Models for crisis management
Thesis 3 
“In the future, the cooperation between military and civilian crisis management will come 
closer, but the development of the division of labor will lead to phase-like tasks of various 
actors.”
The panel did not agree about this item (average 3.71/14 answers), but felt it had relatively 
high relevance (4.00/14 answers). While cooperation is getting closer, it is necessary to 
take into account the fact that the civilian and military actors in crisis management may 
need to work at the same time – not necessarily at clearly distinctive stages. Methods and 
instruments are different in civilian and military crisis management. The contribution of the 
international community in crisis management should vary in accordance with the needs 
of the people in the crisis area. In many peace processes, military contribution is needed to 
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ensure security, and civilian crisis management and local ownership should reduce the need 
for military contributions to the process. International politics may have an impact on the 
consistence of the crisis management and peace-building means in practice. The importance 
of the thesis which was expressed by the panelists may reveal that the theme of cooperation 
between various actors is relevant. However, modeling the forms of collaboration may be 
difficult.
Thesis 4 
“The development of comprehensive crisis management will require better cooperation 
relations between various actors in crisis management.”
There was a high degree of consensus on this item (4.71/14answers) and it was considered 
relevant (average 4.43/14 answers). The panelists expressed various levels at which the 
development of cooperation would be needed. Joint education was mentioned as a way of 
deepening cooperation, and attitude change was a factor that motivated the need to deepen 
cooperation in order to create comprehensive crisis management.
Theses 3–4
Theses 3 and 4 emphasized the meaning of cooperation between civilian and military actors. 
The panel avoided overly narrow interpretations of the phases of military and civilian actors 
in crisis management. Various crisis management actors will require cooperation skills in 
the future and this question will need to be comprehended profoundly when developing 
comprehensive crisis management functions, planning, education, and training. Better 
cooperation is consistent with the idea of comprehensive crisis management introduced in 
chapter 4. Thesis 3 relies on the idea of modeling crisis management; the panel was not in 
favor of this idea, although it found this theme relevant.
Thesis 5
“In civilian crisis management, the success of Finland will be based on specialization.”
There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.43/14 answers). The thesis was criticized 
because the specialization may not yet be possible and may not have sufficient resources. 
Finland is only one actor and it must collaborate with other countries. On the other hand, 
specialization was considered as a future option and the tasks so demanding that they would 
require further education and training. Leading roles in civilian crisis management may 
require specialization. Such specialization could be based on deeper development work 
of civilian crisis management which would require education, a professional recruitment 
system, and further research.
Thesis 6 
“In military crisis management, the success of Finland will be based on specialization.”
There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.71/14 answers) although the panel was 
more in favor of military specialization than in civilian crisis management specialization. 
Arguments in favor of specialization in military crisis management emphasized the scarce 
resources of a small country like Finland. Specialization could be geographical, which would 
mean focusing on military crisis management in only a limited number of regions. A leading 
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role in some tasks might require specialization. In technology, specialization in the fields 
that were not otherwise available for an operation could facilitate the work of military units 
in military crisis management. Specialization could facilitate attendance choices in various 
operations at the national level. However, specialization should not prevent attendance in 
less specialized tasks in peace operations.
Theses 5–6
Although there was no clear consensus on the specialization required in civilian or 
military crisis management, the question about specialization will probably remain open 
for discussion in the future. Potential specialization should not hinder decision making 
regarding crisis management operations that require broader skills than the specialized ones. 
However, if some “top skills” in crisis management are targeted, it will be necessary to have 
some kind of specialization strategy. The panel’s more pessimistic view on specialization in 
civilian crisis management may be connected with shorter traditions in this field. The panel 
did not in favor the modeling of crisis management, as was seen in the third thesis based on 
a phase-type approach.
Military crisis management
Thesis 7 
“In military crisis management, when the expenses per unit are rising, the number of troops 
sent abroad will remain as it is today or decrease slightly.”
The panel did not agree on this thesis (average 3.57/14 answers) and there was not much 
support for the relevance of this statement either (average 3.36/14 answers). Several comments 
saw the increase of peacekeepers as being dependent on the (political) will to distribute more 
resources in military crisis management. There is currently variation in the costs of military 
crisis management operations. Some answers revealed a degree of skepticism regarding 
whether the expenses in military crisis management increase more than other costs today 
or in the future. In more demanding crisis management tasks, more professional personnel 
from the Finnish armed forces should be recruited into the operations; therefore growing 
numbers should be taken into account in the plans concerning personnel of the armed 
forces. One answer linked this question was linked to the wider defence policy questions 
related to the priorities of the use of the Finnish armed forces.
Thesis 8
”In military crisis management, great international pressure and obligations due to it are 
prerequisites for the increased number of troops sent abroad.”
There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.71/14 answers). The thesis was criticized 
because national decisions are always necessary in order to send troops abroad for peace 
operations and Finland has long-standing interest in crisis management. On the other 
hand, international political pressure was seen as a major factor in the process and related to 
Finnish forms of cooperation, with NATO as an example. In international relations, Finnish 
participation in crisis management is related to the crises and also some other objectives 
that are considered relevant. One panelist even mentioned that international pressure has a 
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limited effect in Finland. Other factors are also related to the decisions, for example success 
in crisis management and economic resources have an impact on the decisions.
Thesis 9
“Finland must support the UN peacekeeping by arranging applied education or training for 
peacekeepers representing various countries.”
There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.79/14 answers). The idea received support 
from the panel, but it was criticized from a few points of view. Finland could collaborate 
when arranging courses. Finland could not specialize only in arranging courses for others 
because experience is necessary for arranging proper education and training. However, 
education and training for peacekeepers and police will be required. Aid in “educating 
educators” was seen as a functional solution because every country has a responsibility to 
arrange training for its own troops.
Theses 7–9
Factors affecting Finnish participation in international military crisis management will 
consist of several kinds of processes. Expenses, future conflicts, processes in international 
relations and domestic politics will probably have wide-ranging impacts on the decisions. 
If arranging more education and training to support foreign troops in UN peacekeeping 
operations Finland must also remain capable of acting in peacekeeping. Pure specialization 
in educating others would probably not be an option. 
Civilian crisis management
Thesis 10
“The increase of the Finnish civilian crisis management will depend on the results of the 
action.”
There was no consensus on this thesis (average 2.79/14 answers), and the item was not 
assessed as relevant (average 3.21/14 answers). There was variation in the answers regarding 
this statement. Although no thoughts were expressed against the principle of measuring the 
results, the measurement of the results may be fairly difficult in civilian crisis management. 
Projects in reconstruction may occur for long periods which makes the evaluation process 
even more complicated. Political pressure plays a major role in the decision process. The 
need for crisis management should be an essential factor when making decisions about 
participation. The relevance of the thesis was considered to be higher than the thesis itself. 
One panelist felt that the evaluation of crisis management projects would become significant 
in the future. Because the assessment of the outcome in various missions is challenging, 
progress in the evaluation processes may also be needed in the future.
Thesis 11
“The guidelines of the civilian crisis management arranged by Finland will depend on the 
policy of the EU.”
This thesis received relatively high support (average 4.00/14 answers), although it was not 
assessed as relevant (average 3.57/14 answers).The meaning of the EU was seen as a key 
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question due to the EU membership of Finland and the active role of the EU in civilian 
crisis management. Two panelists mentioned the meaning of the UN and OSCE in Finnish 
civilian crisis management with one emphasizing a stronger practical impact of the UN. The 
EU does not limit Finland’s choices in civilian crisis management, which allows Finland to 
focus on its own way. One panelist assessed the claim as being relatively important because 
Finland has to influence the EU policy in civilian crisis management.
Thesis 12
“The development of civilian crisis management will require growing cooperation with 
development policy actors.”
There was a consensus on this item (4.36/14 answers). The context of development policy 
and civilian crisis management is often the same. Therefore, strengthening cooperation 
would be necessary. Civilian crisis management is needed in building governance, and 
development cooperation may be an exit strategy from crisis management. 
Theses 10–12
In the near future, at least, the Finnish development of civilian crisis management seems 
to be related to the EU’s development. Futures crises will and should have an impact on 
the development of crisis management. Although it is difficult to measure the results and 
impacts of civilian crisis management, there may be an increasing tendency to develop such 
measurement. One future trend may be growing collaboration of civilian crisis management 
and development policy. For some reason, the panel found it easier to reach consensus 
on the theses regarding civilian crisis management than on those regarding military crisis 
management. When assessing these themes afterwards, the significance of the UN should 
not be underestimated although at the timing of the panel process, the EU was one of the 
major themes with regard to civilian crisis management.
Special requests for Finland regarding crisis management and peace-building and the 
possibility for specialization of Finland in this field
Thesis 13
“Special requests for Finland in peace negotiation aid will depend on the success of single 
negotiators in peace negotiations.” 
The panel did not agree on this thesis (average 3.93/14 answers). However, the statement 
did have some support because negotiations are linked to single individuals whose credibility 
is crucial in a peace process. Two panelists recommended education for peace negotiations 
26. Two panelists noted Finland’s status as a non-allied or non-colonialist country as a partial 
explanation for a favorable position for a background in peace processes. The need for good 
negotiators is broader than the number of negotiators available.
Thesis 14
“Special requests for Finland in crisis management and peace-building will require 
specialization from Finland, and this kind of specialization is indicated on various 
international occasions.”
26 Several panelists mentioned President Ahtisaari. The questionnaire was sent to the panelists before the news of President 
Ahtisaari’s receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2008.
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There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.79/14 answers) and it was not considered 
relevant (average 3.43/14 answers). Specialization was not seen as a necessary condition for 
special requests in crisis management and peace-building. However, two panelists described 
Finland’s position as a credible country as a background feature for requests. Specialization 
may be difficult because the field of crisis management is changing. However, the idea of 
specialization received support as a process in which expertise would nationally strengthen. 
One panelist mentioned that Finland had already specialized in crisis management and 
peace-building.
Thesis 15
“There will not be any special requests for Finland in crisis management and peace-building.“
There was no consensus on this thesis (average 2.5/14 answers). According to two panelists, 
Finland will probably not receive more special requests than other countries. This would not 
exclude some special requests from being made. 
Theses 13–15
In peace processes, strong individuals like president Ahtisaari are important figures. 
However, it would be challenging to develop structures that would facilitate the growth 
of “peace-makers”. Specialization in peace-building may be difficult and overly restricted 
specialization is not reasonable either. Strengthening existing resources may be a form of 
specialization. Overly narrow specialization could hinder participation, if crisis management 
contexts change. Therefore, it is preferable for the systems to be flexible in applying in 
futures changes as well. The views of the panel do not support special requests on peace 
negotiations or crisis management to Finland or that the national specialization would 
support these efforts.
Future development of cooperation of military and civilian crisis management 
Thesis 16
“Information sharing and a clear division of labor will be key issues in the development 
cooperation of military and civilian crisis management.”
There was a high consensus on this item (4.57/14 answers) and it was also considered 
relevant (average 4.43/14 answers). Cooperation is based on functional information sharing 
and division of labor, and strategic planning is a crucial part of the process. A clear division 
of labor should prevent duplicate use of resources and make it possible to carry out all the 
necessary parts of crisis management. 
Thesis 17
“Modeling cooperation in, for example, 3–7 structurally different cooperation models of 
international actors could facilitate planning and education in crisis management.”
There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.57/14 answers) and it was not seen as 
relevant (average 3.57/14 answers). Military and civilian crisis management require separate 
planning processes. It is necessary to take special characteristics of each conflict and conflict 
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environment into account. Modeling facilitates the description of features necessary in 
cooperation. However, there were doubts about how modeling would function in practice.
Thesis 18
“Local inhabitants must be taken with to participate in rebuilding projects when the projects 
are planned.”
There was a high consensus on this thesis (average 4.86/14 answers). The local people 
know the history and the culture of their area – the conflict area – which means they have 
special expertise. Reconstruction and sustainable peace require local ownership; this issue 
is especially important with regard to institution building which takes local environment 
and conditions into account. Cooperation with local inhabitants is a challenge for the 
international community learning about crisis management. The panel’s strong support 
for this thesis may be signal an emerging trend in crisis management and peace-building. 
Most peace-building processes and policies have been planned and implemented by external 
actors, although the local involvement has been emphasized in principle. A key question in 
practice is how to develop local involvement as a constitutive part of a peace process. A post-
conflict area may involve a wide range of opinions, which means that the representation of 
local communities is not a neutral question.
Thesis 19 
“Internet-based information sharing must be utilized in the civilian and military 
organizations’ cooperation with local inhabitants in crisis regions.”
There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.86/14 answers). On the other hand, the 
idea of information sharing did receive support. The Internet is efficient in those areas where 
it can be utilized. However, there were doubts about how to get an Internet-based system to 
function in conflict areas. Regarding confidential information, there may be also limits for 
information sharing. 
Theses 16–19
Getting local inhabitants involved in the planning of international operations is a significant 
challenge, not only for Finnish authorities but for the international community and agencies 
more broadly. The usefulness of the Internet may depend on the local circumstances: if the 
local inhabitants have an appropriate technological level, the Internet may be a practical tool 
in information sharing. As seen earlier regarding theses 3, 5 and 6, the panel was not in favor 
of modeling crisis management. 
Crisis management personnel
Thesis 20
“The proportion of duties requiring expertise and special professional skills will increase in 
civilian and military crisis management in the future.” 
The idea received support (average 4.29/14 answers) and the panel considered it quite 
relevant (average 4.15/14 answers). One panelist found the situation to be quite similar 
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to the current situation in such a way that special professional skills are required for the 
reconstruction of a country which is a long-term process. It is necessary to evaluate expertise 
and special skills when the target is an increase of influence in crisis management. Special 
skills of foreign personnel are motivated by the idea that local people can learn from them. 
One panelist was of the opinion that this kind of tendency would take place at least in the 
civilian side of crisis management.
On the other hand, not all personnel in crisis management will need to be specialists. The 
claim was criticized with the idea that the proportion of the specialists may not increase, 
apart from the growth in the volume of crisis management. In some situations new technical 
solution may also reduce the need for experts. One panelist emphasized the relevance of this 
claim with the planning process. The growth of expertise tasks should be taken into account 
in the planning processes of crisis management.
Thesis 21
“In civilian crisis management, interaction and negotiation skills must be taken into account 
in the recruitment phase of the personnel.”
There was high consensus on this thesis (4.86/14 answers) which was also considered highly 
relevant (average 4.57/14 answers). In a new cultural environment, interaction skills are 
especially important, and this should be taken into account in the education and recruitment 
of personnel. Failures in this field have often been linked to weak interaction skills. The 
relevance of the argument was justified by the fact that the success of crisis management 
depends on the personnel’s skills in collaborating with local people and the others attending 
the process. This should be taken into account when recruiting crisis management personnel 
as well as when educating them. However, one panelist acknowledged that these types of 
skills are generally required in working life.
Thesis 22
“In military crisis management, interaction and negotiation skills must be taken into account 
in the recruitment phase of the personnel.”
The panel agreed about this item (4.29/14 answers) and the statement was assessed as crucial 
(average 4.07/14 answers). Interaction and negotiation skills were considered necessary if a 
soldier collaborates with local people and other crisis management personnel. These skills 
are more necessary in leading positions but elevated interaction and negotiation skills are 
an advantage in every position, as described by one panelist. Although the majority of the 
panel felt this thesis was relevant, one panelist noted that the level of other skills necessary 
in military crisis management cannot be lowered because of the relevance of communicative 
abilities.
Theses 21–22
Personnel’s interaction and negotiation skills were acknowledged in both civilian and 
military crisis management. Interaction and negotiation skills were considered necessary 
for future crisis management personnel, and even more so for the personnel in the civilian 
crisis management than in the military crisis management. This distinction was motivated 
by the difference of the tasks: the military does not necessarily need to collaborate with the 
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local people, but communication with local people is evident in every aspect of civilian crisis 
management. No panelist considered that interaction and negotiation skills would be more 
necessary in military than in civilian crisis management. One panelist concluded that a 
similar kind of education in communication skills for civilian and military personnel would 
facilitate cooperation.
Although communication skills are valuable in various tasks in today’s working life, their 
particular importance in futures crisis management was clear, according to the panel. The 
communicative nature of peace processes in practice has not been subject to broad discussion, 
which means that this topic is important for the future development of crisis management. 
The personnel should have these skills as well as the professional expertise that they need in 
their duties. As mentioned in chapter 4, communicative capacity can be seen as part of core 
crisis management competence. 
Thesis 23
“In civilian crisis management, it is necessary to develop a new recruitment system that will 
ensure that multi-skilled personnel will be attracted towards various duties.” 
There was no consensus on this statement (average 3.93/14 answers). The idea of a new 
recruitment system was supported by one because international standards in recruitment 
and personnel policy would be needed. However the opportunities to develop the existing 
system were emphasized by some of the panelists. Recruitment from private sector was 
regarded too low. Young people should be recruited in a more systematic way because it 
takes time to get enough experience to work in more demanding crisis management tasks. 
Some problems may exist if people cannot get free from their tasks in Finland although the 
Finnish legislation supports these arrangements.
Thesis 24
“In military crisis management, it is necessary to develop a new recruitment system that will 
ensure that multi-skilled personnel will be attracted towards various duties.”
There was no consensus on this claim (average 3.21/14 answers). The need to reform the 
system was seen as topical because it has been difficult to recruit peacekeepers from among 
the ranks of professional soldiers. According to one panelist, the existing recruitment system 
is good but it is necessary to strengthen the will to participate in crisis management.
Theses 23–24
The support for a new recruitment system was lower in military crisis management than in 
civilian crisis management. Instead of creating new systems, there were diverse ideas about 
developing recruitment.
Thesis 25
“In order to recruit professional military personnel recruited into international duties in 
crisis management, service abroad should be a factor in promotion to the highest ranks of 
officers.”
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This thesis gained support among the panel (average 4.07/14 answers). The statement was 
supported with the idea that experience from crisis management develops an officer’s skills 
and abilities in his or her duties. As one panelist mentioned, an argument is not the same 
as a demand. Another panelist felt that this thesis already existed by another panelist. The 
panelists did not comment on the public discussion regarding the difficulties with recruiting 
professional officers in demanding crisis management duties.
Challenges in the education of crisis management personnel
Thesis 26
“In the education for civilian crisis management, it is necessary to develop common standards 
for international organizations and the states of the region in order to utilize the resources in 
an efficient manner and to avoid double education.”
The panel supported this idea (average 4.36/14 answers). The challenge of developing these 
standards is remarkable. Although the idea received support, the implementation was found 
to be demanding because of the differences of various crises. Various types of education 
are needed in courses for different missions. The standards would facilitate international 
cooperation and make the use of resources more efficient. National applications in course 
arrangements are still required. 
Thesis 27
“It is most important in the education for civilian crisis management, that the person 
attending the training learns the crisis management duties and the nature of the operation 
as well as the basics of the local cultures of the region and the history and background of 
the conflict.”
The panel supported this thesis (average 4.43/14 answers) and also regarded it as relevant 
(average 4.36/14 answers). Cultural and historical education applied to the conflict area 
facilitates the communication with local people and generates success for a mission. 
Understanding the cultural background is indispensable in civilian crisis management. One 
panelist emphasized the idea that general education could be complemented with courses 
focused on cultural issues. Before a crisis management mission, it would be reasonable to 
make an anthropological report about the conflict area.
Thesis 28
“In military crisis management education, it is most important that the person attending the 
training learns the crisis management duties, the necessary military skills and the nature of 
the operation as well as the basics about the local cultures of the region and the history and 
the background of the conflict.” 
The panel supported this idea (average 4.21/14 answers) and considered it to be crucial 
(average 4.07/14 answers). All peacekeepers must know the basic facts about the region. 
Those peacekeepers who collaborate with local inhabitants need special education in the 
culture of the area. On average peacekeepers are younger than civilian crisis management 
personnel, and should have high situational awareness in military operations; and therefore 
cultural education may be even more essential for peacekeepers. The relevance of the 
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claim was motivated by the idea that weak situational understanding may lead to failures. 
Although the claim was found relevant, the panel also emphasized the flexibility, adaptation, 
and learning skills of peacekeepers. 
Theses 27–28
Awareness of the cultural and historical background of the conflict was found to be relevant 
for the education of both civilian and military crisis management, although the topic was 
more highly valued in the former. Military crisis management may involve some routine 
tasks in which contacts to local inhabitants are not common; therefore cultural awareness 
is not as important as it is in most or all tasks in civilian crisis management. With regard 
to both military and civilian fields, the similar kinds of theses were assessed significant. On 
the other hand, the level of cultural and historical awareness should be heightened without 
narrowing the expertise and skills of the crisis management actors in the field.
Feedback arrangements
Thesis 29
“Every person who has had service abroad in civilian crisis management should be given 
an opportunity to provide and receive personal feedback and a so-called debriefing 
conversation.”
There was consensus on this item (average 4.43/14 answers) and the panel acknowledged 
the idea’s importance (average 4.48/13 answers). Debriefing opportunities were considered 
reasonable both because of the personnel’s needs and the advantage of the organization that 
arranges the mission. The “institutional memory” can develop through the process which 
also supports learning.
Without an opportunity for discussion, an individual may remain fixed with the crisis 
management operation for an unnecessarily long period of time. Even the opportunity to 
handle possibly traumatizing experiences should be arranged for personnel who have worked 
abroad in crisis management duties. The personnel’s knowledge about crisis management 
should not be wasted. There is a need to develop debriefing and “lessons learned” activities 
at the national level. Feedback information should be utilized in some form in order to 
further develop crisis management.
Thesis 30
“Every person who has had service abroad in military crisis management should be 
given an opportunity to provide and receive personal feedback and a so-called debriefing 
conversation.”
There was also consensus on this item (average 4.36/14answers), and the argument was 
considered crucial (average 4.14/14 answers). A debriefing opportunity for was considered 
particularly relevant if a traumatizing event had taken place during the operation. With 
regard to civilian crisis management, the personnel’s knowledge should not be wasted in 
military crisis management either. In larger operations it may be difficult to implement 
efficient arrangements for feedback. The relevance of the claim has probably been assessed 
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in regard to the need to avoid post-traumatic disorders and conditions similar to them. The 
idea was seen significant because today’s feedback systems have not evolved optimally.
Thesis 31
“The feedback from crisis management personnel should be gathered in a systematic way 
and to develop crisis management further.”
There was a high degree of consensus on this item (average 4.64/14answers) and the 
relevance of this claim was considered to be high (average 4.50/14 answers). Successful and 
failed methods in crisis management should both be studied in order to develop material 
for further development of crisis management. Data gathering should be systematic and 
always in use. The information may be useful when developing national capacities and even 
when collecting information for national decisions in crisis management. Without this kind 
of data analysis, useful information would be lost. The thesis is relevant because of the 
development of crisis management. Such information may also be useful in some other 
societal development tasks. Feedback gathering should be part of the feedback system.
Theses 29–31
Feedback gathering and debriefing systems for crisis management personnel received wide 
support, both for civilian and military personnel. Debriefing systems will be a future challenge 
especially, if Finland participates in riskier civilian or military operations. Institutional and 
individual learning are both challenging elements in crisis management. Institutions must 
collect data related to former or on-going operations in a manner that respects the privacy 
of the personnel. On the other hand, it is motivating for the personnel to talk about their 
experiences and provide ideas regarding how to develop the systems to function in better 
ways. Functional feedback and debriefing systems require constant development work that 
enables further evolution of learning organizations and more interactive working methods.
Joint education and training in military and civilian crisis management
Thesis 32 
“Military and civilian crisis management education should be arranged in joint modules 
that cover one functional theme or details relevant to the situation of one region.”
There was variation in the assessment of this thesis (average 3.79/14 answers) and it was not 
considered significant (average 3.64/14 answers). Although joint education and training were 
seen as a positive phenomenon, there is a need to also have separate education and training. 
According to one panelist, separate education will probably remain more important than 
joint education. Joint training should be arranged on a practical basis facilitating field work 
in a real environment. Joint education should model the cooperation methods in the crisis 
area. Mutual understanding and shared situation analysis would increase within this process. 
Modules could handle special themes as well, such as human security, resolution 1325, and 
region awareness. Joint courses should lead to functional use of resources. The distinction 
between civilian and military actors is a model for a recovering society. The functions of 
civilian and military actors’ work are different, which is also relevant in educational contexts.
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Thesis 33
“It is practical to arrange education and training for military and civilian crisis management 
nationally in different organizations that cooperate in joint education and training.”
There was no broad consensus on this idea (average 3.64/14 answers) and it was not 
considered relevant either (average 3.21/14 answers). Some of the panelists support the 
statement, but others considered this organizational question only as a practical one. The 
reason behind separate organizations was motivated by diversified needs for education and 
training in military and civilian crisis management. One panelist, who assessed this claim as 
significant, underlined the necessity of functional education in crisis management.
Theses 32–33 
Although the numerical assessment of claim 32 varied, there were similar opinions regarding 
the need for some joint education and training. In the future, although the distinction 
between civilian and military crisis management actors will be clear, functional cooperation 
will be needed in education and training in order to strengthen comprehensive crisis 
management. It is likely that many courses will be arranged separately.
Synergy in understanding the work of various institutions in a conflict area seems to be 
a condition for functional action of both the civilian actors and the military. The panel’s 
opinions on the organizational arrangements of civilian and military crisis management 
education did not reach consensus. The institutional questions related to the arrangements 
of the joint courses should be solved with respect to the specific needs of military operations 
and civilian peace-building. 
7.4  Summary and conclusions from the Delphi Panel 
 process
Plenty of theses created consensus in the Delphi Panel process. However, some of the 
theses that did not create consensus were of importance. The results are introduced in the 
categories of high consensus and consensus theses followed by the important non-consensus 
theses. The results are then introduced in thematic order. Finally, the results are assessed in 
their contextual framework. The second round of the Delphi panel did not raise questions 
that would have made the third round in the Delphi process adequate.
7.4.1  Consensus theses 
High consensus theses represent those with an average between 4.50 and 5.00, while 
consensus theses are those with an average between 4.00 and 4.49
High consensus theses (average 4.50–5.00)
Cooperation relations in crisis management (thesis 4) will be a key question in the future 
progress of crisis management. Consensus on this statement may strengthen the idea that 
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it is necessary for planning to be flexible and have the capacity for complex operations. 
Information sharing and a clear division of labor between various agencies (thesis 16) will 
be important at the operational level within a comprehensive approach. The meaning 
of this statement should not be neglected at any level of operations or projects in crisis 
management. Taking the local people’s needs and opinions into account (thesis 18) even 
when a crisis management and peace-building operation is in the planning stage, could help 
avoid errors of cultural and historical misunderstanding within a mission. The international 
community is only starting to comprehend the meaning of real cultural awareness and local 
ownership in peace operations.
In civilian crisis management, interaction and negotiation skills will be of high importance 
(thesis 21). Communicative personnel in international agencies will also be able to ensure 
local ownership and functional information sharing. Communicative skills are also essential 
for civil-military cooperation. Developing feedback gathering and debriefing systems for 
crisis management personnel will be crucial in the future (thesis 31). This kind of policy 
means that a human security perspective is extended to personnel who may risk their own 
safety for the sake of a peace process. The respect for the personnel’s needs and views may 
have a positive impact on the crisis management organizations and agencies themselves if 
they are able to learn more and if the personnel feel that their views are taken more seriously, 
for example, in the planning processes.
Consensus theses (average 4.00–4.49)
The crises requiring crisis management will probably be similar to the complicated conflicts 
seen since the 1990s. Thesis 1, which concerns the nature and the geographical range of 
futures conflicts, received broad support. The nature of the future crises is challenging to the 
development work of crisis management. The missions should be planned by taking into 
account both the local environment and the crisis management conceptual work within 
the global context. The claim regarding the impact of the EU on Finnish civilian crisis 
management also received wide support (thesis 11). The role of the EU will probably be 
important for Finnish participation in civilian crisis management in the near future. In 
accordance with thesis 12, the cooperation with development policy will probably be in 
progress in civilian crisis management. In the long run it will be more difficult to foresee 
which organizations arrange international civilian crisis management or similar kinds of 
activities.
Crisis management personnel will be probably require greater expertise in the future (thesis 
20). Specialization will probably take place at this level. In military crisis management 
interaction and negotiation skills will be necessary (thesis 22). As mentioned earlier, 
communicative skills of the personnel are important for civil-military cooperation and 
ensuring local ownership. When deciding about the promotions to the highest ranks in the 
military, the service in military crisis management should be taken into account (thesis 25). 
In civilian crisis management education, common international standards will be needed for 
reasonable use of resources (thesis 26). In education and training for civilian (thesis 27) and 
military (thesis 28) crisis management awareness about cultural and historical features of the 
crisis region as well as the background of the conflict are indispensable features. Both civilian 
(thesis 29) and military (thesis 30) personnel should have opportunities to provide feedback 
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as well as to have debriefing discussions after the completion of their crisis management 
duties. 
7.4.2  Non-consensus arguments of importance
Despite not achieving consensus among the panel, some of the theses may still be relevant. 
Non-consensus may also reveal some crucial problems. In most theses, the average assessment 
was higher on the scale of agreement than on the scale of relevance. Higher relevance than 
agreement was assessed on theses 1, 2, 3, 10, and 29. None of the arguments were strongly 
disagreed or found strongly unimportant by the panel, no average answers to any argument 
were between 1 and 2.
Theses 1-3 handled the environment and background factors of crisis management. When 
a thesis was found to have a higher level of importance than agreement , there may be some 
potential for change that would raise the importance of the thesis in relation to the amount 
of agreement with it. The nature of the future crises as well as the dynamics affecting crisis 
management may be relevant although it may be difficult for a panel member to estimate 
exactly how these changes will look in the future. With regard to thesis 10 the relevance may 
be in the potential of the future assessment of the results of the civilian crisis management.
One of the themes that emerged during the first round interviews was specialization. There 
were opinions both for and against specialization in various fields of crisis management and 
peace building. The arguments regarding the development of military crisis management 
achieved less unanimity than the theses about civilian crisis management.
For a small country like Finland questions related to specialization are not easy. On the 
other hand, scarce resources should be used in a reasonable manner. A small country 
cannot participate in everything. But too overly narrow participation may be limiting, if 
the environment and needs in crisis management change. Because of the extent of crises 
and conflicts, the need for assistance in peace processes appears to be broad in the near 
future. Because of special characteristics of various conflicts and crises, the needs may also 
be diverse.
Modeling and measuring were two other themes included in the second-round questionnaire. 
Measuring the impact of crisis management is extremely challenging. However, learning from 
the past and on-going processes may facilitate more effective and better crisis management 
in the future, even from the perspective of human security.
In the future, specialization and modeling may be essential themes in the progress of 
crisis management. In the current situation, in which new forms of crisis management are 
emerging, it may be difficult to foresee how specialization would occur because current 
crises face a constant lack of various resources. In modeling, there is always a risk of not 
taking into account special features of a crisis. Because the panel favored taking the opinions 
of local inhabitants into account, not finding consensus on modeling and specialization 
could be interpreted in a context of respect for local cultural and situational features. The 
role of the Internet and information technology in information sharing in conflict or post-
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conflict areas should not be neglected either, although the panel did not find consensus on 
the theme.
7.4.3  Results in a thematic order
Futures crises and conflicts
The panel favored of the idea that futures conflicts requiring crisis management will be 
similar to those that have taken place recently. They will mostly take place in Africa or in the 
Middle East and will involve non-state actors. The panel considered this topic to be relevant. 
The panel did not clearly assess the meaning of potential changes in the relations of great 
powers. The continuations of armed conflicts with the involved non-state actors have been 
assumed to be a futures scenario, as mentioned in chapter 3.
Models for crisis management and futures development in military and civilian crisis 
management
The panel supported the idea of comprehensive crisis management and considered it to 
be a significant idea. Because the comprehensiveness of crisis management is widely 
acknowledged by various institutions including the EU, this result is not surprising. There 
was no consensus of the phase-like progressing cooperation in civilian and military crisis 
management. On the other hand, the panel did consider the idea to be relevant by the panel. 
The potential phases of crisis management should be analyzed by experts both in civilian 
and military crisis management, in order to find out whether such kind of modeling is 
achievable for futures development work.
Specialization in military or civilian crisis management did not receive support from the 
panel. However, international development in crisis management may at least add some 
impetus to this idea. The higher expenses in crisis management will not necessarily require 
the number of Finnish troops in military crisis management to be reduced. Of course, this 
will depend on the political will of the decision makers. On the other hand, there was 
no consensus that an increase in peacekeeping troops would require strong international 
pressure. Even the idea of arranging training for those countries whose troops need it, did 
not reach consensus. These types of ideas somehow resembled weak signals not reaching 
consensus. 
Regarding civilian crisis management, the panel did not favor the idea that the increase of 
Finnish civilian crisis management would depend on the results of these activities. The panel 
acknowledged the EU’s influence on the guidelines of the civilian crisis management, as well 
as the need for growing cooperation between civilian crisis management and development 
policy actors.
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Special requests for Finland regarding crisis management and peace-building and the 
possibility for specialization of Finland in this field
The panel was not in favor of Finland receiving various special requests in crisis management, 
peace-building or negotiations on these topics. The panel did not predict specialization due 
to these requests. Although President Ahtisaari’s efforts and results in peace negotiations 
are widely known, too much attention should not be put on a single person’s results. The 
estimation of the panel does not rely on any unique position of Finland in crisis management.
Development of cooperation in military and civilian crisis management in the future
Information sharing and clear division of labor were recommended as forms of cooperation 
between civilian and military crisis management. The panel did not recommend modeling 
of the forms of cooperation. However, the panel did support cooperation with local 
inhabitants, even in the planning processes. Internet-based information sharing for local 
inhabitants was not recommended because of the limits of its usefulness in conflict or post-
conflict areas. Nevertheless, development of information technology may make these kinds 
of arrangements more utilizable in the future.
These estimations by the panel have some similarities with the discourse on development 
cooperation. Development aid has been criticized because of its potential negative 
consequences in the societies it has been brought in (Koponen 2009). Every intervention 
from outside particular society – even from a war-torn one – has unintended consequences. 
Taking local opinions into account as much as possible may facilitate the creation of local 
ownership and social structures which enable peace-building.
Crisis management personnel and feedback arrangements
According to the panel, duties requiring expertise and special professional skills in crisis 
management will increase proportionally in both military and civilian crisis management 
according to the panel. The panel also emphasized the relevance of interaction and 
communication skills. However, the panel felt that new recruitment systems for military 
or civilian crisis management were not necessary in order to ensure multi-skilled personnel. 
The panel felt that, in military crisis management, service abroad should be one argument 
to reach the highest ranks of officers. Every person who has served in military or civilian 
crisis management should have the opportunity to provide and receive feedback and have 
a debriefing. The feedback from personnel should also be gathered in a systematic manner 
and be utilized.
Education of crisis management personnel and potential for joint education and 
training in military and civilian crisis management
The panel welcomed international standards for education in civilian crisis management. 
The panel recommended that, apart from education for one’s duties, crisis management 
personnel need to learn the basics of local cultures and history in the mission areas – as 
well as basic military skills in military crisis management. The panel did not consider 
joint education of the military and civilian personnel as a necessity and it did not reach a 
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consensus about the administrative arrangements for the education and training in civilian 
and military crisis management.
7.5  Critical details from the Delphi results
Larger global trends also affect crisis management. In the coming decades, globalization 
will probably be a significant trend (Mannermaa 2008; Shapiro 2008). This century is an 
era when the global economy will expand by utilizing telecommunications and information 
processing which will have large-scale impacts on all countries and territories although 
territorial unevenness will remain as a dividing factor on progress (Castells 1998, 374). 
Information societies will be changing to ubiquitous societies in which information flows 
and networking are available through easily controllable and self-monitoring technologies. 
New technologies and complex risk societies will emerge. Working life will develop in 
less bordered directions, signifying 24/7 practices, and every individual will have several 
identities, which will change over his or her life span. Climate change will play major part 
in co-existing with globalization. (Mannermaa 2008.) Less expensive types of ubiquitous 
technology may develop and have cultural impacts. How will these trends affect conflicts 
and crisis management? It is impossible to assess exactly how technological changes will 
affect cultural development, either globally or locally. More ubiquitous technology will 
probably progress and expand its influence, which will also affect conflict development and 
crisis management as well. If armed conflicts occur, human factors will probably remain 
important in crisis management, regardless of technological changes.
Technological changes and globalization may enable easier contacts between representatives 
of various cultures. However, this type of “facilitation” does not guarantee that such 
development will occur. Due to globalization, strong local identities exist, although the 
development of “identity multiplication” may take place, as Mannermaa (2008) has assumed. 
At best, this will mean a less conflict-prone future. If new communication technologies are 
more widely available in crisis areas, interaction between local people and crisis management 
personnel may take new forms. In such circumstances, contact and communication skills 
become extremely important. New technological frameworks will not determine the 
contents of communications, but cultural misinterpretations may be even more fatal, if 
communication takes place through some form of technology. In contrast to the Delphi 
panel results, I believe that Internet-based information sharing will play an essential role 
in communication in post-conflict zones. However, as Auli Keskinen (1999, 126) has 
explained, the development of administrative information technology as a continuous 
multilevel process, and the adaptation of the Internet in information-sharing will probably 
also be a similar kind of multi-level process in crisis management.
From a consensus perspective in the Delphi panel process, the more tangible arguments 
related to crisis management personnel and their education received support more easily 
than the arguments about the structural development of crisis management. It is probably 
the case that today’s problems were more easily acknowledged, which made it easier to reach 
consensus for claims of a more concrete type. This idea is consistent with the criticism of 
potential systematic errors in Delphi results that Osmo Kuusi (2003, 223–224) has posed 
and which were introduced in section 2.4.3. Because crisis management is a broad field, 
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having experts with diverse background knowledge implied that their orientation and 
opinions could possibly vary. Due to the diversity, the credibility of the consensus results is 
higher than when a panel has similar kinds of experts.
Technological development may make the work of military crisis management personnel 
safer if they are better equipped. On the other hand, new threats may emerge if armed 
groups apply new technologies for violence. The questions related to riskier military crisis 
management operations were not profoundly handled during the second round of the panel 
process. Instead, the focus was on the cooperation processes, rather than on the details 
related to militarily demanding operations. However, the military side of crisis management 
was not excluded. In the future, the communicative nature of crisis management and peace-
building will be essential regardless of how challenging the single operations will be militarily.
The two main approaches of future research are transition and modeling (Aaltonen & 
Keskinen 2003, 79). The aim of this study was not exact modeling but finding relevant 
trends for the futures crisis management. Human dimensions in crisis management will be 
important when developing better forms of crisis management in order to provide human 
security. Emphasizing human security should be part of peace processes. Hopefully, the 
efforts of the international community will be broad and determined to develop a safer 
world for everyone. Such development would signify that the need for crisis management 
and peace building would decrease in the long run. However, the panelists in the Delphi 
process did not foresee such development taking place in the near future.
The complexity of the futures crises and conflicts has been discussed. It is reasonable for 
the international community to construct capacities to handle complicated processes. In 
addition, it is important to prevent armed conflicts. Is this idea an illusion or an option 
provided by better negotiation skills in peace processes, more skilful peace building personnel 
and both realistic and culture-aware planning in crisis management?
7.6  Summary of the Delphi panel process 
The Delphi panel process focused on futures conflict development, crisis management, 
and the competences required for it. The features of conflicts resemble the new conflicts 
introduced in chapter 3. This result has an impact on answering the main RQ and RQs 1 
and 3, because the complexity challenges both the crisis management organizations and the 
individuals working for them.
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Table 9.  Main results of the Delphi panel on crisis management
Regarding the main RQ and RQ1, it is important to bear in mind that the personnel 
should have interaction and negotiation skills. In the context of new conflicts, cooperation 
will be relevant between civilian and military actors in crisis management as well as in 
contacts with development cooperation personnel. For long-term results, cooperation with 
local residents is central: both collaboration skills and local awareness are required from 
crisis management personnel and processes enabling local residents to have active roles in 
peace-building. In the Delphi panel process, cooperation skills of the personnel as well as 
cooperation between various organizations and agencies and other actors were indicated as 
being of high importance. Apart from communication skills, the professional skills of crisis 
management personnel are emphasized. Local ownership in a post-conflict environment 
requires understanding of multiculturalism on behalf of crisis management personnel, and 
therefore cultural competences are important. Cooperation abilities in Table 9 are necessary 
when responding to all the challenges mentioned in the table. The competences described 
in Table 9 are consistent with those introduced in section 5.3 with one exception: the results 
of Delphi panel did not mention the ability to make ethical assessment.
Due to the complexity of the cooperation between various actors, learning processes in 
crisis management and peace-building should be emphasized. Armed conflicts and crisis 
management change, which means that learning abilities should be developed constantly. 
Such development requires flexibility from crisis management organizations and the needs 
of the personnel should also be acknowledged. In potentially more demanding tasks, it will 
be necessary to develop practices that take the needs of the personnel to express themselves 
into account, as well as their experience, which could help develop crisis management. 
Feedback and debriefing conversations are part of this process.
The results related to feedback are consistent with Howard’s (2008) typology of first- and 
second-level learning when developing crisis management practices. Better feedback systems 
enable higher levels of organizational learning. The challenge of feedback practices should be 
taken seriously at the institutional level of various international agencies and organizations. 
Well-structured feedback arrangements enhance learning, and also enable advances in 
leadership and management practices. Individuals taking responsibility for leadership in 
crisis management must understand the linkage between organizational and individual 
learning. The riskier the operations become, the more important it will be to enhance return 
and demobilization arrangements. It may be more complicated for an individual to return 
home than he or she could predict beforehand. 
Future phenomenon  Challenges for organizations  Competences required 
New conflicts Common goals  Reflectivity 
     Contact skills 
Multitude of actors Lack of cooperation  Cooperation abilities 
 
Various risks  Flexibility   Contact and combat skills 
                                                                                                            Professional skills 
 
Multiculturalism Local ownership  Cultural competences 
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New technological innovations could be adopted into various processes in crisis management. 
For example, learning during a mission could be reinforced by programs available on the 
Internet. Technology may facilitate the development of various feedback systems, which 
should not completely replace face-to-face communication about feedback. Modified 
technology may make it possible to reach various objectives in crisis management and peace-
building.
The panel did not recommend specialization or modeling in crisis management. It was 
easier for the panel to reach consensus on the substantial competences in crisis management. 
In the future, crisis management personnel need to be multi-skilled. In addition to the 
necessary professional skills required in one’s duties, adequate communication skills will 
also be crucial. Multi-skilled personnel should be recruited into crisis management and the 
training and education of the personnel must support the evolution of communication skills 
and cultural awareness of the personnel.
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8.  Meanings of crisis management work 
 described by the personnel
The aim of this chapter is to respond to the main RQ as well to RQs 1, 2, and 3, which are 
as follows:
  Main RQ. What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?
  RQ 1. What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management 
organizations and personnel? 
  RQ 2. How do field experiences affect personnel’s identities and self-concepts?
  RQ 3. How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be 
developed when the human security approach is taken into account?
This chapter introduces and analyzes the results of the interviews of the crisis management 
personnel. The structure of the questionnaire was almost similar in the three professional 
groups interviewed for the research (see appendix 5). In the actual interviews, the questions 
varied because there were diverse and spontaneous issues expressed by the interviewees. In 
total, 27 persons were interviewed for the study. The list of the interview numbers of both 
crisis management and the Delphi panel expert interviewees is presented in appendix 6. 
All of the interviewees had work experience in Kosovo, either in military or civilian crisis 
management. As described in chapter 2, the interviewees were comprised of :
–  Nine professional officers from the permanent staff at the Finnish Defence Forces who 
had experience in peacekeeping (all of these professional officers were men)
–  Ten peacekeepers recruited from the reserves (five women and five men from various 
professional backgrounds)
–  Eight people who have worked in one or several civilian crisis management operations 
(five women and three men). 
The details of the interview process were introduced in chapter 227. The interviews were 
focused on the experiences of the personnel as well as on their interpretations of the events 
that took place and what all of this had meant to them. These interviewees were also asked 
to participate in the futures panel process, which was introduced in chapter 728. Most of the 
interviews took place at the offices of the interviewees with a few exceptions. The focused 
interviews generally lasted less than an hour. 
Interviews of the crisis management personnel were transcribed in detail29. Results from 
the interviews are partially reported in accordance with the professional groups. Reporting 
27 Voluntary candidates for the interviews were found in co-operation with the Finnish Armed Forces, the Ministry of Inte-
rior and the Finnish Association for Peacekeepers (Rauhanturvaajaliitto). The sample is not an average of everyone who has 
worked in Kosovo. Among professional officers it would have been difficult to find female interviewees. Because the gender 
of the interviewees may have some impact on responses, it was preferable to get both men and women interviewed for the 
study. Consequently, both male and female reservists and civilian crisis management employees were asked to be interviewed. 
28 When there was limited time for the interviews, the interviewees were given the opportunity to respond to the futures panel 
questionnaire literally.
29 The interviews were transcribed by a research assistant. Because of a technical problem, one interview could not be tran-
scribed. However, exact notes of the interview were made, which enabled quite precise interpretations of this interview.
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with or without this professional group differentiation depends on the relevance of grouping 
with regard to the reported results. For example, many development ideas are reported in 
accordance with the professional groups because work practices in civilian and military crisis 
management differ from each other. Typical or particularly interesting examples of views 
expressed in the interviews can be found in the footnotes, which also contain references 
from the text to the interview numbers. Interview numbers are found in appendix 4, which 
documents the interviewees’ professional status (whether the interviewee is a civilian crisis 
management employee, professional officer or reservist) and gender. The referred parts of 
the interviews provide a more viable picture of the interviewees’ thinking than would have 
been solely by describing their views. The footnotes are directly cut from the interview 
scripts. 
8.1  Facts about the crisis management personnel 
 interviewed for the study
At the time of the interviews, 20 of the interviewees had recently completed their crisis 
management duties and seven were still working in the mission. Those interviewees who 
were still continuing their duties in Kosovo at the time of the interview represented the 
reservists and the civilian crisis management personnel. Only one interviewee had finished 
her mission more than a year before the interview was made. Professional officers in military 
crisis management had 6–12–month contracts in Kosovo. In civilian crisis management 
the contracts had been at least five months in duration. In both civilian and military 
crisis management, some interviewees had changed their duties during the mission. The 
estimated average length (or the real outcome) of the service in Kosovo was 16 months30 on 
average. The variation between the groups was salient: the average length of service among 
the professional officers was nine months, among the reservists it was 11 months and among 
the civilian crisis management personnel it was 29 months. 
Most of the interviewees (74 percent) had not had crisis management experience prior to 
Kosovo. Of those who did have previous crisis management experience, three had served 
in one mission and four in two or more missions. The service in Kosovo was the first 
crisis management mission abroad for seven professional officers, eight reservists and five 
employees civilian crisis management. Prior crisis management experience is recommended 
in several duties, especially in more challenging circumstances, and these factors impact the 
recruitment of the personnel.
On average, the civilian crisis management employees were older than the personnel in the 
military crisis management. The average age of the civilian crisis management interviewees 
was 51 years, compared to 33 years for reservists and 38 years for professional officers. The 
average age of the entire sample of interviewees was 40 years. The youngest interviewees 
were born in the 1980s and the oldest ones in the 1940s. This result is understandable 
given that civilian crisis management duties often demand more work experience than 
tasks in the military crisis management. In general, peacekeeping duties are more physically 
demanding than work in civilian crisis management, which means that the recruitment of 
30 Those having returned from the mission reported the length of their stay at the mission. Those still working in Kosovo 
provided the date at the end of their stay or estimated its length. 
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younger peacekeeping personnel is favored. There is also a maximum age limit for reservists 
in military crisis management among Finnish troops. In general, the physical challenges in 
military crisis management are more demanding than in civilian crisis management. The 
average age for female interviewees was 37 years, compared to 42 the male interviewees. 
None of the female peacekeepers had any children. Only one female interviewee, a civilian 
crisis management employee, had children under the age of 18 years. Put another way, 90 
percent of the female interviewees did not have children under the age 18 years, clearly 
higher percentage in comparison to 23 percent of the male interviewees. When grown-
up children were taken into account, eight of the female interviewees were childless (80 
percent), compared to three male interviewees (18 percent). Altogether 11 interviewees (41 
percent) were childless. Four (15 percent) of the interviewees had one or more children over 
the age of 18 years.
On average the female interviewees were younger than their male counterparts. Due to 
the age difference, the female interviewees may have children later in their lives. The age 
difference is probably not the only explanation for the larger number of childless individuals 
among female interviewees. The family situation probably has more effects on women’s 
preferences. It seems that women with children are probably less inclined to work abroad in 
crisis management duties than men in a similar kind of situation. Because of the qualitative 
nature of this data, it is impossible to prove the likelihood of this tendency.
None of the professional officers interviewed for the study were single. Half of the reservists 
and most of the civilian crisis management employees were either married or co-habiting. 
Over 60 percent of the peacekeepers studied by Monica Röberg (1999, 10) were married or 
co-habiting. It is not possible to conclude whether the family structures of the interviewees 
in this sample are exceptional compared to crisis management personnel on average.
A clear majority of the interviewees (20 interviewees, 74 percent) had a university-level 
education (M.A., etc.), and the rest had a graduated from a high school. The educational 
level of the interviewees was relatively high, given that 41 percent of Finnish employees 
have a university-level education (Lehto & Sutela 2008). The level of education was at least 
partly related to the independence of one’s duties in crisis management. The work positions 
of the personnel interviewed for the study were not standardized or of a similar level. As 
mentioned earlier, this data does not represent average numbers of crisis management 
personnel’s features. With regard to family duties, however, these statistics described above 
are consistent with the traditional role of women which is more closely linked to their 
families than men’s. 
8.2  Preference for crisis management duties in the past 
 and in the future
About a quarter of the interviewees had worked in crisis management prior to their 
mission in Kosovo. Half of the interviewees working for civilian crisis management had 
previous experience in crisis management or development aid duties. One reservist and two 
professional officers had been deployed to military crisis management before Kosovo.
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The reasons for leaving to Kosovo to work in a crisis management mission were divided into 
personal issues and more generally motivated issues. Seven professional officers mentioned 
the wish to develop professionally was a motivational factor for attending the mission. On 
the other hand, only one reservist and one civilian crisis management employee identified 
professional reasons as a motive for being deployed to crisis management. Approximately 
half of the interviewees described a more general desire for new experiences as a reason to 
leave, and around the same number highlighted international issues or security or multi-
culturalism as motives. A minority of interviewees mentioned reasons within categories 
of financial reasons, learning better language skills, and helping other people. Serving in 
crisis management duties had been a long-standing dream for some of the interviewees. The 
interviewees mentioned both personal and altruistic motivations.
Most interviewees had several reasons for working in crisis management duties, often 
combining altruistic and career-oriented motives. Some of the interviewees had past 
experiences with peacekeeping or international projects that had influenced their decisions 
to go to Kosovo. One of the interviewees in civilian crisis management described her previous 
duties in international agencies and described the work in Kosovo as part of a continuum 
in her international career. Duties in military crisis management can be assessed as a natural 
part of the career of professional officers, although this is not an obligatory part of a military 
career.
Earlier studies have found manifold motivational factors for working in military crisis 
management. Peacekeeping tasks had been a longstanding dream for many peacekeepers, 
and their motives for leaving could be complex (Röberg 1999, 5). According to Limnéll 
and Moberg (2008, 8), one of the major motives for young professional officers seeking for 
service abroad has been to gain a new type of work experience; this finding resembles the 
results of the present study.
The interviewees were asked whether they would like to serve in crisis management later in 
their lives. None of the interviewees expressed certainty that they would never go to a new 
mission. However, the interviewees did have doubts about whether a new mission would 
be ”suitable” in their life span, either for family or professional reasons. A positive attitude 
towards a potential future mission may be interpreted as an outcome of a positive experience 
during the present or a past mission. The respondents identified the following reasons why 
they would like to participate in a future crisis management mission: experience, good 
timing (professionally or for the family situation), camaraderie (mostly mentioned by the 
reservists), the meaning of the crisis management (mostly mentioned by the civilian crisis 
management employees), professional development, the work itself (one interviewee even 
mentioned this as a vocation), the nature of new tasks, and the nature of the operation (for 
example, not willing to participate in a risky operation). The most important reasons for not 
leaving were: family situation, and feeling that the existing crisis management experience 
was sufficient.
Two civilian crisis management interviewees had plans to return to Kosovo soon31 and 
two reservists admitted that they had already made applications for new service in military 
crisis management. Professionally, the question seemed complicated for professional officers 
31 At the time of the interviews, the EU was sending a large delegation of civilian crisis management personnel to Kosovo.
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because, in higher ranks, the number of duties preferable from the perspectives of Finnish 
officers in international crisis management operations is limited. Positive experiences from 
Kosovo influenced the answers in several ways. For example, camaraderie was mentioned 
as a reason for working again in crisis management duties. One civilian crisis management 
employee was interested in applying for new crisis management duties because of the 
challenges of the work, namely that they require new kinds of problem solving for which 
routine solutions are not enough. This kind of motivation is related to a will to learn new 
processes or new problem-solving methods. 
Many interviewees mentioned that their family situation affects whether they are inclined 
of applying for crisis management duties. The age of the interviewees’ children may 
influence the timing of the duties as well. Two female peacekeepers mentioned that it would 
be possible to work as a peacekeeper while they still did not have children. None of the 
male interviewees mentioned that having children would be deal-breaker. Culturally, the 
family situation seems to have different meanings for men and women thinking about the 
possibility of working in crisis management. The finding that family situation would explain 
why several interviewees would not attend future service in crisis management abroad was 
in accordance with Limnéll and Moberg’s (2008, 8) finding that family reasons would be 
the most important reason for not leaving for service abroad. Two other reasons why young 
professional officers would not leave abroad were unclear contract stipulations regarding 
service abroad, and a lack of interest (ibid. 8).
8.3  Identity and professional meaning of crisis
 management work
Professional roles and meaning of the crisis management duties
Several respondents found it difficult to identify whether their thoughts about their personal 
professional roles had changed or not. For professional officers, a crisis management mission 
is part of the occupational continuum although the situational factors abroad differ from 
those in Finland. For civilian crisis management personnel, the occupational role in crisis 
management may resemble their work in Finland. For most reservists, the peacekeeper role 
clearly differs from their civilian duties in Finland. The work in crisis management could 
also be seen as an enlargement of occupational roles. Demanding duties requiring the ability 
to communicate in English, to work in a multi-cultural team, or to react quickly were 
mostly seen as a satisfying a part of the work in Kosovo. Individuals found this process 
meaningful if it strengthened their confidence. Work abroad in crisis management consists 
of so many different factors compared to work in Finland; this helps the individuals recall 
the events and inner processes that occur because of these duties.
Many of the crisis management employees felt that crisis management experience had 
strengthened their beliefs in their own capacities. Interviewees may not find it easy to answer 
to the question of how the crisis management operation would have affected their self-concept 
or identity. The mission work typically had had a positive impact on their self-concept and 
self-esteem. Individuals had learnt to work in new, more complicated situations, which 
made them more confident. An international working environment, new situations and 
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the need to work in English consisted parts of these experiences. For professional officers, 
Kosovo could be as an example of a new working environment or a sphere of activities 
that were considered professionally crucial. In civilian crisis management, new professional 
challenges can lead to a reanalysis of the professional field because the work is reconstructed 
in a new environment that requires new kinds of solutions. A new environment provides 
the opportunity to think about how things are in Finland. Crisis management duties could 
be described rewarding. For the reservists, there was variation regarding whether the duties 
were similar to their work in Finland. 
Self-confidence, self-concept, and learning in professional groups
Twenty of the interviewees (six representing civilian crisis management personnel, nine 
reservists, and five professional officers) expressed some change in their self-concept or 
identities – mostly in terms of their self-concepts. This group comprised the majority of 
the interviewees. The other interviewees had not noticed any change or they ambivalent 
regarding this question. One of the interviewees could not assess whether such a change had 
taken place.
Several interviewees mentioned that working in crisis management provides opportunities to 
learn new things. Some felt that their self-concept had become clearer; understanding oneself 
can be seen as a necessary condition to understanding others working in the same team and 
the process led to larger cultural awareness32. In a way the process could be described as one 
of a self-realization, which is where a person identifies something that already exists as part of 
himself or herself. One reservist described how she saw more clearly her own ability to work 
in difficult circumstances and her courage in these situations. 
Work in crisis management offers individuals the opportunity to reflect of certain features 
and compare them to other individuals in new circumstances. Therefore, work may change 
a person to some extent, although he or she will interpret these reflections as clarification 
of his or her self-concepts. Although not the interviewees described how they had found 
themselves after these reflections, the reflection processes were somehow similar.
All of the interviewed professional officers had found the missions to be professionally 
positive experiences, although this is not say that they would have experienced only positive 
things. Many of them felt that their beliefs in their own capacities had been strengthened. 
One civilian crisis management employee sought further professional education after 
returning because the learning experiences from Kosovo had been motivating, while a 
reservist considering applying for further education. The changes that took place while 
working abroad in crisis management duties may help produce courage or motivation to 
study more. The positive expression was typical of both the civilian crisis management 
interviewees and reservists, although the idea was not expressed by all of them. As one 
civilian crisis management employee said: “It gives you confidence when you find out that 
you manage the situations.”
32  ”…different people are managed in different ways or they need different ways to collaborate with. And I cannot understand 
how to treat other people if I cannot understand myself.”  (Interview 20.)
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New duties could even help develop the courage to do such things as express opinions. 
This kind of process could contribute to self-realization. Strengthening of features that an 
individual had earlier found in himself may be associated with new skills or abilities in a 
positive way, which may explain why so many interviewees reported crisis management duties 
as positive experiences. New, positive experiences from crisis management could strengthen 
one’s self-confidence. Good results at work and discovering one’s abilities to learn new things 
and processes could be part of a process strengthening self-confidence. A new environment 
provides better chances to realize certain skills or to interpret their meaningfulness. Success 
in a previously unknown environment is rewarding.
One reservist interviewee mentioned that it was important to gain work experience from 
abroad but not necessarily as a peacekeeper. It was even considered possible that not staying 
home and learning more at work would have a negative impact on one’s career. On the other 
hand, one interviewee said that in his field in the Finnish public sector, the meaning of work 
experience from international tasks had increased over the preceding five years.
Identification with peacekeepers or civilian crisis management personnel
Reservists identified most strongly with peacekeepers; males mostly identified with their 
own comrades, while females were more likely to identify with peacekeepers in general. 
Professional officers had no strong identification with the peacekeeping community. If 
identification took place, it mostly involved comrades in Kosovo, not peacekeepers in general. 
The degree of identification varied among civilian crisis management personnel with half 
having civilian crisis management personnel as a clear reference group. The professional 
groups were divided into groups of ”no identification” and “some or more identification” 
with crisis management personnel. Absolutely no identification was expressed by one 
interviewee among the reservists and two interviewees among the civilian crisis management 
personnel, but, on the contrary, there was only one professional officer identifying clearly 
with his work comrades. Some interviewees were ambivalent in regard to the identification. 
Those expressing no identification with crisis management personnel tended not to express 
change in their self-concept either, although there were exceptions to this tendency as well.
Professional officers found working in Kosovo to be professionally meaningful, but the 
experience did not usually lead to strong identification with peacekeepers. However, one 
officer with clear identification and friendship bonds with his former group members in 
KFOR denied that he would have any identification with peacekeepers in general. From an 
institutional perspective, the difference between working in the armed forces in Finland and 
in KFOR is not large in comparison to most occupational changes of the reservists and the 
civilian crisis management personnel. Professionalism may be one way of dealing with the 
questions related to working abroad33. 
As mentioned in chapter 5, Limnéll (2004) and Heinänen (2008) noted that Finnish 
professional officers appear to identify themselves with their profession, which may reduce 
their need to identify with peacekeeping community. Because of their strong professional 
identity, professional officers may be less likely to identify themselves with a specific 
professional grouping in crisis management, namely with peacekeepers. In military crisis 
33 As one professional officer explained, the working community in Kosovo was one of many in which he had worked during 
his career. Interviewee: “…that work, it is one work community among the others.” (Interview 42.)
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management, officers’ titles as officers do not change either. Although reservist peacekeepers 
have their military titles, they are not soldiers in their daily life and duties in Finland.
It does not seem difficult for Finnish professional officers to integrate their peacekeeper 
identities with their soldiers’ identities because being a peacekeeper is part of their 
military career. As noted in chapter 5, Franke (2003) noted soldiers’ warrior identity may 
be controversial with peacekeeping tasks. Franke’s solution was to integrate warrior and 
peacekeeper identities in such a way they would both comprise positive parts of the soldiers’ 
identities. Even after the peacekeeping service, the role of former duties may vary according 
to the professional status: peacekeeping is a professional issue for an officer working in the 
armed forces but a reservist may see it as a “hobby”.34 Finnish peacekeepers may not assess 
soldiership as much in terms of being a warrior as Franke (2003) has presumed.
Identification with peacekeepers could be significant for an individual. As one female 
reservist explained, it could be easy to find something to talk about with anyone who 
has peacekeeping experience. Identification was noticeable when an interviewee used a 
family metaphor regarding peacekeepers: “It is such a big family.” Identification with work 
comrades and peacekeepers in general could both be meaningful and the atmosphere could 
be found pleasant. Röberg (1999) described the “strength” of the peacekeeping community 
later during a peacekeeper’s life span. . This type of phenomenon may signify that the 
peacekeeping experience is especially meaningful for some peacekeepers.
Working as a peacekeeper was even seen as a special experience that radically differed from 
everyday life in Finland: therefore, the contacts with other peacekeepers could become 
important. The difference between the reservists and professional officers in terms of their 
identification with peacekeepers may be explained by the choices they had made. For a 
reservist, applying to a military crisis management service is not seen as part of a career – it 
may be a choice in a stronger sense than leaving abroad for crisis management duties is for a 
professional officer, although it is possible to work as a professional officer without working 
in international missions. The professional background or education is not emphasized 
when reservists work as peacekeepers, which may strengthen their tendency to identify with 
the peacekeeping community. 
With regard to military crisis management interviewees’ social identities, the results suggest 
that professional officers tie their peacekeeper identity to their professional identity, while 
reservist peacekeepers have a stronger tendency to peacekeeper identification. Civilian 
crisis management personnel tend to identify themselves to their work community or crisis 
management personnel in general. Chapter 5 suggested that reservist and professional officer 
peacekeepers’ group-based and collective social identities would be on a similar basis in crisis 
management, but this does not appear to be the case. With regard to person-based identities, 
a peacekeeper’s role was closer to a professional officer’s identity than the roles of reservists 
and civilian crisis management personnel to their former or modifying person-based social 
identities. On average, the traditions in military organizations are stronger than in civilian 
ones, which may have an impact on identity issues as mentioned in section 5.3. However, 
not all the reservists identified themselves with peacekeepers. One female reservist said that 
34 One professional officer described the meaning of reservist activities in the professional context saying that he did not need 
such activities in his free time because they were part of his work. Interviewee: “ I do it daily as my job. I do not need it when 
I have some free time.” (Interview 41.)
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although peacekeeping was part of her past it was not so meaningful as in her life at the time 
of the interview. One male reservist had no identification with peacekeepers at all. 
As described earlier, one civilian crisis management interviewee mentioned that identification 
with personnel had had an impact on her identity. She had discussed the idea of establishing 
an association for civilian crisis management personnel with her colleagues as an option, 
given that there is an association for peacekeepers. The civilian crisis management personnel 
have various professional, task-related and organizational backgrounds. These differences 
may direct the identification of the civilian crisis management personnel.
Because many interviewees reported the meaning of the peacekeepers or civilian crisis 
management personnel, these groups may have some impact on individuals’ identities, 
although the interviewees did report this kind of issue when asked about the impact of 
crisis management on their own identities. An anxiety-buffer mechanism of social identity 
(see Castano et al. 2003) may partly explain why professional officers’ identification to 
peacekeepers was not as strong as reservist peacekeepers’ identification. For reservists, 
peacekeeper identity might be more utilizable in possible anxiety reduction than for 
professional officers, who probably have their professional identification on the basis.
Because of clearer professional identity related to military duties and crisis management, it 
may not be necessary for professional officers to identify themselves with a peacekeeping 
community: this is contrast to the reservists. The professional identities of civilian crisis 
management personnel and reservists were perhaps not as prone to “function” in crisis 
management surroundings. This may explain why identification with peacekeeping or 
civilian crisis management communities was stronger among the reservists and civilian crisis 
management personnel than among professional officers. 
Meaning of life
Younger interviewees with no earlier crisis management experience tended to have thought 
about the meaning of the life during the crisis management mission in Kosovo. However, 
previous crisis management or development work experience did not hinder stronger 
feelings related to the recent history of Kosovo and local inhabitants’ experiences. The recent 
war taken place in the Balkans in Europe raised some personal thoughts as well but this 
contemplation did not necessarily lead to a change, instead it tended to strengthen one’s 
basic values.
Some interviewees mentioned experiences that had made them think about the meaning 
of life. When responding to this question, two interviewees talked about seeing children go 
barefoot in Kosovo. Such an experience revealed in a tangible way how difficult the realities 
were for local people in Kosovo. One interviewee mentioned that he did not think about 
the meaning of life while he was in Kosovo, but that he would not think about it very much 
at home either. It is hard to see that thinking about the meaning of life, which is connected 
with the question of every individual’s limited life span, would have had any direct effect 
on one’s identity processing activation. The interviewees did not express that this kind of 
thinking would have led to identity changes.
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However, the question was open for further associations. One of the interviewees considered 
that work in crisis management was more meaningful than any duty she could perform in 
Finland. Another interviewee admitted that he had thought about the meaning of life in 
his duties, as well as at home. Thoughts about the meaning of life can lead to an assessment 
of the current situation and the future of the crisis area, not necessarily to thinking about 
the individual himself or herself. Côté and Levine (2002, 180-181) presumed that the 
ability to think about the meaning of one’s life is related the development of an “integrated” 
ego identity. The interviews in this study do not allow such strong interpretations of the 
personalities of the interviewees. Although thinking about the meaning of life signified 
reflective processes, no clear connections were found between these reflections and other 
parts of the interviews. 
Identity development
Working in a crisis management mission seems to affect an individual’s self-confidence if 
it provides positive learning experiences from work. Identification with crisis management 
personnel is less common among professional soldiers. There is more variation among the 
reservists and civilian crisis management personnel regarding their identification with either 
their mission comrades or peacekeepers or civilian crisis management personnel in general.
Few interviewees mentioned the work having had any impact on their identity. One 
interviewee, who had worked in civilian crisis management, mentioned the influence that 
crisis management had had on her identity due to some identification with the personnel 
she had worked with. Many interviewees denied any change in their identity or self-concept. 
Although many of the interviewees considered the experiences important for their self-
concept, they did not describe them in terms of their identity35. One professional officer 
did not believe that the duty had had any effect of his identity, but he did acknowledge that 
he had paid attention to the differences of various nationalities in crisis management and 
especially to Finnish or Nordic working habits36. 
The changes mentioned by crisis management personnel, on the other hand, did vary. One 
reservist felt that working in a European operation had made him feel more European. 
One civilian crisis management employee mentioned that her personal feeling of “world 
citizenship” had grown. As mentioned earlier, however, many interviewees expressed some 
self-realization. The identity the interviews referred to was linked to group memberships, 
which meant that the meaning of crisis management duties for the individual dimension 
(rather than the group dimension) of identity and self-concept should be emphasized. 
For many individuals, learning through new challenges has been part of self-realization. 
According to the answers to the identity-related questions, crisis management duties did not 
seem to strengthen or change social identities. 
35 In the interview, the interviewer described identity as a concept that is related to self-concept, but relevant in relation to 
various groups as a family or an occupational group etc.
36 Interviewee: ”As a Finn, it is nothing new to me. In my previous job, I’ve attended international training and similar kinds 
of things. ”
Interviewer: ”Yes.”
Interviewee: ”Nordic people in general – and Finns – do things in reasonable and logical ways. ” (Interview 30.)
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Crisis management duties implying personal change
Although not all the interviewees felt as though they would have been influenced by working 
in Kosovo, some did express stronger feelings. The differences between being at home and 
abroad had raised thoughts about the meanings of these issues. As one female civilian crisis 
management employee said, the difference was hidden in that change that took place at 
home because the things had changed in Finland while she was in Kosovo: “…it was such 
a time journey.” 
One professional officer described the peacekeeping world in somewhat similar terms 
describing peacekeeping as “a shadow world” and saying that the changes taking place at 
home may be challenging to realize37. From this perspective, work in civilian or military 
crisis management resembles some other kind of work abroad that requires adaptation. 
There are also differences compared to other types of work. Crisis management duties may 
be risky because of the history and potentially the actuality of an armed conflict. In a crisis 
area it may be more difficult to follow the situation at home or in one’s home country than 
it would be working in another country that is more similar to Finland. At the very least, 
the opportunities to travel home from a crisis management mission are more restricted, 
although special arrangements for Finnish peacekeepers do allow regular journeys home and 
vocational stays there during a mission. The Finnish policy that allows peacekeepers to travel 
home for vacations is meant to promote their social relations in Finland.
The changes in one-self while being abroad and the changes at home take place simultaneously 
although one cannot be aware of all the changes that occur at home. One cannot return to 
the same place or situation that he or she left before leaving on a mission. At the individual 
level, some personal changes take place when a person is abroad for a year, for example. This 
situation may be surprising as the two above interviewees expressed. Education and training 
of crisis management employees should include coping with this phenomenon.
Interpretation of the results from identity-related questions
In a professional sense, crisis management has diverse meanings for employees serving in it. 
For professional officers, working abroad in an international mission seems to be more like 
a part of a career than it is for reservists or civilian crisis management employees. On the 
other hand, civilian crisis management employees may aim for atypical careers which may 
be international.
Individuals may find it difficult to estimate the impact that a mission has on them. However, 
many of the interviewees said their missions strengthened their self-confidence and some 
kind of self-realization. Something within the interviewees themselves had become clearer 
and these experiences were linked to success in new and demanding work situations. Either 
37 Interviewee:  ”… that peacekeeping world is like a shadow world, so that in a way it is not  a real world...”
Interviewer: ”Yes
Interviewee: ” …like a terminal phase for a human being.”
Interviewer: ”Okay.”
Interviewee: ”And it works for a year, for a year.  There are changes taking place inside, certainly, and when you return here, in 
a way you  stop. And when you return here, in a way you’ve halted your time..
Interviewer:.”Yes.”
Interviewee: ”And it is a shock for many people. …” (Interview 38).
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during or after new situations and experiences, crisis management personnel reflect on their 
personal features. This kind of self-realization may have a stronger long-term impact on self-
confidence. Talking about one’s life may reinforce the feeling of coherence (Alasuutari 2007, 
163). Therefore, the interview situation may even strengthen interviewees’ interpretations 
of their past experiences.
Because the success in new challenges appeared to be linked to learning, crisis management 
organizations should provide learning opportunities and guarantee that individual learning 
also leads to learning at the institutional levels. However, personnel who are unwilling to 
attend interviews may have more negative experiences, which means it would be exaggerated 
to claim that crisis management duties have only positive effects on one’s self-concept.
The above-mentioned experiences have similarities with the significant experiences that 
Silvennoinen (2004) considered relevant for identity development and life-long learning. 
Work in crisis management duties may be a significant experience, promoting learning 
processes that have special importance with regard to lifelong learning. The same theme is 
discussed in section 7.4 in relation to various types of experiences. 
Many of the interviewees described their thinking processes in Kosovo. Poverty and injustice 
often raise questions that are difficult to answer even in relation to one’s own role on the 
globe. However, these interviews felt it would be impossible to conclude that individuals 
who have processed these issues would have been more prone to identity changes than other 
interviewees.
The interviewees’ interpretations of their crisis management experiences were in favor of the 
personal meanings of the experiences, but not so much in favor of the social dimension of the 
identities. Generally speaking, conscious, major changes in social identities did not occur. 
However, some of the interviewees did acknowledge what their work comrades meant to 
them, or even emphasized the meaning of the peacekeeper or the civilian crisis management 
community. Positive experiences and outcomes appeared to have a positive impact on self-
concept. Self-realization was a positive experience that several crisis management employees 
acknowledged.
Regarding RQ2 which pertains to the identities and self concepts of the crisis management 
personnel, it is obvious that many employees in crisis management who find positive 
experiences feel some kind of self-realization that connects the growth in self-confidence 
with learning. In identification, work in crisis management appears to be more substantial 
for the reservists in military crisis management and civilian crisis management personnel 
than for the professional officers in military crisis management. Because some kind of 
informal learning is typical to learning in crisis management, this phenomenon should 
be studied in detail in order to better develop crisis management practices and education 
related to learning.
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8.4  Positive and negative experiences from crisis 
 management
8.4.1  Positive experiences
The interviewees’ responses often combined answers regarding interesting and rewarding 
experiences. This section also covers answers to the question about easy experiences. Although 
an international working environment was a central theme in most of the interviews, the 
three professional groups emphasized slightly different perspectives. Professional officers 
mostly described their positive experiences in terms of ”international environment” or similar 
terms, while the reservists mostly mentioned ”work with local people”. Typical expressions 
of the civilian crisis management personnel included ”collaboration with local people” 
or expressions focusing on the “international community”. However, most interviewees 
mentioned several kinds of positive experiences.
Work with local inhabitants could be seen as the most interesting part of the work. Contacts 
with new cultural spheres, the local way of life and the problems of the Balkans were also seen 
as interesting, and some interviewees found meeting representatives of local cultural groups 
to be an interesting part of the work 38. Collaboration and challenges in an international 
environment was also found as the most interesting part of the work and it was described 
in positive terms concluding with a feeling that an individual had succeeded and learned at 
work39. One professional officer said that a “real” environment was an interesting challenge. 
Four professional officers identified the multinational sphere of activities and its special 
features to be the most interesting part of the work. The local culture was also considered 
interesting and rewarding apart from the work in international troops. As a whole, the 
work, tasks and colleagues were described the most interesting and rewarding part of the 
experience in Kosovo. The peacekeeping community was perceived in a positive way related 
to a positive atmosphere. 
The diversity of the tasks was also described as interesting. The professional challenges of 
the work in Kosovo could be considered as the most interesting and rewarding part of the 
stay in Kosovo. One female reservist found the diverse operational tasks to be the most 
interesting part of her duties in Kosovo and felt that the experiences had led to a broadening 
of her world view. Seeing the results of a project could be the most interesting part of the 
work40, as one professional officer mentioned, this is unlike the work in Finland where 
an individual mostly only sees the plans, not the tangible results. Another professional 
officer considered concrete tasks to be the most interesting part of the work. For military 
professionals, Kosovo provided real opportunities to practice various skills which are also of 
professional importance in other circumstances. 
38 Interviewee:”Most interesting... In our duties, you work, work with  different parties. Your main task is to meet, to listen… 
it’s observing them. ”
Interviewer:”Yes.”
Interviewee:”It has been absolutely most rewarding, getting to know the local culture. ”  (Interview 31.)
39 ”Perhaps it is – perhaps it is meeting foreign and different people and getting to know different ways of thinking – and 
adapting your own thoughts and working habits so that collaboration functions.  And of course managing with your duties 
so you don’t need to be ashamed of what you have done. Managing with your duties and collaboration.” (Interview 08). Similar 
kinds of thoughts were expressed in interview 38.
40 ”You saw how the project progressed. So if you were building a.sports field. or repairing a school, you could see it. And then 
it occurred quickly, and it functioned.  It took an end in time, as it was planned…” (Interview 18.)
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One civilian crisis management employee felt that influencing and not needing to work in 
routine manners were an interesting part of the work. The opportunity to work all the time 
was considered to be an interesting part of the work. One interviewee who was involved with 
the planning processes in civilian crisis management found the whole process interesting, felt 
it was rewarding to see the results of the process, and interpreted the process as a challenge 
that provided opportunities to learn new things. One civilian crisis management employee 
believed that creating new systems was the most interesting aspect of the work: this work 
was done with representatives from another culture who sometimes had different opinions 
on the processes with good arguments which also made the international work interesting. 
The development and monitoring work made one civilian crisis management employee’s 
own skills and expertise more tangible to her.
The change in working environments enables various comparisons. The interviewees varied 
in terms of what work-related issues they considered interesting. Although the duties in 
civilian and military crisis management vary, most of the employees seemed to perceive the 
challenges in a culturally new environment in a positive manner. The interviewees did not 
seem to find these challenges overly demanding.
Conversations with work comrades were often the most rewarding part of the work – and 
new friendship bonds were described as a similar kind of rewarding experience. One reservist 
found discussions with the interpreters to be the most rewarding experiences; although they 
came from the local culture, they felt to be work comrades in a deeper sense. Good team 
work was found to be the most rewarding part of the work by one reservist and a good 
work community by a professional officer. Human relations at work were found as the most 
rewarding part of the work by one professional officer. Learning about diverse work cultures 
was also rewarding41.
The duties were assessed to be the most rewarding part of the stay in Kosovo, as one 
professional officer described, while a civilian crisis management employee felt that getting 
some results at work was the most rewarding aspect. Another answer, given by a civilian 
crisis management employee, was the feedback from local people. The declaration of 
independence in Kosovo was mentioned as a rewarding experience because it signified that 
some development had occurred.
According to many interviewees in military crisis management, the daily routines at the 
camp were clear and easy because routines and every-day life at the peacekeepers’ camp 
were easy-going. The routines and the rhythm of a work day were easy although the work 
days were quite long. The work itself could be described as the easiest experience. The work 
community was considered both easy and nice – and demanding, although the practical 
arrangements for peacekeepers made life easy42. Two interviewees said that getting along 
41 ”… But first and foremost it was rewarding to get to work with people coming from other cultures. Because in a way working 
cultures differ from each other in diffrent countries and especially when there diffrences in military education and training in 
different countries… And it was especially interesting to observe how it appeared and what kind of working culture emerges 
due to it.” (Interview 35.)
42 Interviewee:”It is somehow a bipartite thing this question about your work comrades. On the other hand the easiest and 
nicest  thing has been the work community. And there are problems as well - but so great and the community where it is easy 
to go...
Interviewer:”So in a way it is controversial?”
Interviewee:”Yes, in a way it is. The work community carries easy going in some things. It has been easiest to take responsibility 
of one’s own economy because the local workers take care of the laundry. There is always food on the table, so when you go to 
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with the work comrades was the easiest part of staying in Kosovo. Apart from the hard 
work, the support of the work community made the tasks easier. Even one civilian crisis 
management employee found routines in every-day life simple in Kosovo, although her 
routines were not connected with the camp life of the peacekeepers. Different kinds of 
people along with the similarities despite having different backgrounds were found to be 
a pleasant and easy experience, as one civilian crisis management management employee 
found it easiest or nicest to communicate with local people. The tasks in Kosovo were found 
to be clear. Another “easy” factor was having enough time to work: there were not as many 
other responsibilities to handle as when living at home.
8.4.2  Negative experiences
This section discusses questions about difficult, stressful, and frustrating experiences. Many 
interviewees found their contacts with their family to be complicated. Eight interviewees 
mentioned this theme but, during the interviews, many interviewees focused only on their 
work issues and did not pay attention to their private lives. Therefore, it impossible to 
conclude how difficult a problem the distance from home actually was. The difficulty of 
being away from one’s family could be connected with a feeling of a lack of freedom in 
special and restricting circumstances. 
Obeying rules was also perceived as being somewhat difficult. One reservist said he found it 
difficult to adapt to the military leadership culture which had negative side-effects because 
negative phenomena were hidden from superiors. This comment can be interpreted as a 
difference from an organizational culture, which may divide peacekeepers into the groups of 
reservists and professional soldiers although it is difficult to assess whether this mentioned 
feature in leadership is common. One reservist mentioned that he found it difficult maintain 
his motivation if the things were arranged incorrectly or in the wrong order: he was referring 
spefically to the procedures organized by a representative of the personnel of armed forces 
not accustomed to the working methods of civilian society. Contradictions between the 
reservists and the professional military personnel may be relatively wide in military crisis 
management, although the question has not been broadly studied. One reservist said that 
he found it most difficult to learn the practical procedures of the armed forces, even though 
they were not overly difficult.
Too much work was identified as a difficult and stressful challenge. Haste was the most 
difficult part of the work, as one civilian crisis management employee assessed. On the other 
hand, one peacekeeper said that, after having learned the duties, the tasks were too simple, 
which made it difficult for her to be motivated. One professional officer described problems 
and difficulties from a perspective of adaptation and problem-solving: negative features or 
reactions of the members of the team are accepted because you realize that you cannot escape 
from the situation. The bureaucracy and some difficult colleagues were the most difficult 
parts of the work, as one civilian crisis management employee described. Another civilian 
crisis management employee mentioned that it was most stressful or frustrating when she 
the boarding house it is absolutely easier when you compare it to your life at home..” (Interview 07.)
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could not perceive any development occurring in Kosovo43. Difficulties making a colleague 
to understand your work objectives could make working complicated. 
Work by communicating in a foreign language could be energy-consuming, as one 
professional officer explained. Knowing and understanding local contact persons could be 
seen as a difficult part of the work, although communicating with local inhabitants was 
considered interesting. With regard to cultural differences, one professional officer said that 
understanding local thinking was a challenge and more demanding than understanding 
foreign colleagues44. It was difficult to learn to work in culturally appropriate manners that 
were not as efficient as one civilian crisis management employee was used to. Adapting to the 
working culture was a problematic part of the work for another civilian crisis management 
employee. For a reservist, it was stressful to combine civilian and military cultures in 
his duties. Another reservist found it stressful that the armed forces leadership was non-
professional and that the abuse of alcohol was a problem for some colleagues. A professional 
officer found it stressful that the official organization was unable to create a community 
spirit. Five interviewees found it most stressful to be away from home45. Although the 
interviewees did not describe any especially stressful situations from this perspective, the 
situation within families with children was especially demanding. Practical questions related 
to the work conditions could cause problems. One peacekeeper found his duties stressful 
when two of his colleagues fell ill at the time when the independence process induced some 
unrest in the operational area. One reservist who did not have a substitute for her duties had 
found the situation stressful.
The EU bureaucracy was the most stressful elements within civilian crisis management, 
and bureaucracy in general was considered the most stressful part of the work. Even the 
bureaucracy of the Finnish armed forces was found be stressful. The unrealistic “dead-lines” 
were a stressful part of the work, as one civilian crisis management employee explained, and 
a professional officer felt stressed by similarly occasional haste due to tasks requiring quick 
reactions.
Most of the frustration was related to the tasks and some limits regarding implementing 
them in a rational way. Although many of the interviewees focused on their duties when 
responding to the question about frustration, distance from home was also a cause of 
frustration. Some kind of frustration or difficulty was expressed in the context of the change 
of environment when returning to peacekeeping duties46. As reported earlier, the change in 
43 Interviewee:”…the progress, it does not take place there in Kosovo, it just doesn’t occur.  It, it  just goes nowhere. Would 
it be….”
Interviewer: ”Yes.”
Interviewee: ”something dependent on the UN, dependent on the local people – it is difficult to say. But it is most stressful and 
frustrating to see that today you’ve got this result and tomorrow it has not gone anywhere.” (Interview 26.)
44 Interviewee: ”So, it is most difficult to understand some others’ perspectives when the field is so heterogeneous..”
Interviewer: ”Yes.”
Interviewee.”So, when talking about some other soldiers who come from other countries, it is still easy. ”
Interviewer: ”Yes.”
Interviewee: ”But when you add the ethnic differences on that and their…”
Interviewer: ”And local ethnicities, yes. ”
Interviewee: ”So local people, and understanding their views and motives.” (Interview 30.) 
45 ”So it is the same thing to all the people with families. Although I came here once a month, so despite it…separation from 
your family was absolutely the most difficult single factor. ”  (Interview 08).  Similar kinds of thoughts were expressed in 
interviews 17, 19, 21 and 28.
46 Interviewee: ”…so when you’ve been on vacation here in Finland and when you’ve returned back,  you turn your brain into 
a Kosovo mode and it takes a few days, a few days,  before you get your wheels turning. So, sometimes it comes to your mind 
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time and place may be a demanding part of crisis management tasks that have similarities 
to working abroad in a more conventional way. However, the multiple meanings of these 
changes have not been properly studied.
Many interviewees found it frustrating that some processes took a lot of time. Frustration 
could be one part of the work when trying to implement new kinds of plans and methods, 
and lots of communication was needed in the process. The failures of the UNMIK to 
implement its mandate caused frustration for one civilian crisis management employee. 
One interviewee wondered whether the whole process would end up to having any results.47 
Peace-building processes are time-consuming and the results may be seen only after the work 
period of an employee is already over.
The bureaucracy and inefficiency at work could be frustrating and time-consuming which 
may make the work more complicated than it would necessarily be. Two peacekeepers 
mentioned that foreign aid made local people passive which frustrated them. People 
accustomed to effective work patterns were often frustrated by time-consuming activities 
and not keeping promises on behalf of the collaborative partners in the region. Potential 
frustration could be connected with the specific duties. One interviewee was frustrated 
when the information gathering had not influenced the decisions made by the superiors. 
One reservist said that her superior’s poor leadership skills had caused problems.
Potential problems related to the Finnish troops’ limited mandate to use force also caused 
frustration, as one peacekeeper mentioned. Information sharing on behalf of the Finnish 
troops should have been more effective. Impractical transitional arrangements including 
insufficient guidance can also cause frustration. 
A lack of variation in the duties could cause frustration, as one female reservist mentioned. 
One interviewee mentioned that he attended various free time-activities arranged for the 
Finnish troops, which at least prevented him from coming frustrated. However, the meaning 
of frustration should not be overestimated. As one professional officer mentioned, the work 
itself was so interesting that he could not become frustrated. Another professional officer 
said that he felt some frustration as you would at any other place because sometimes you 
just get frustrated at work but most often he did not have time to get frustrated because 
the work was so demanding and the days were so long. There was no time to get frustrated, 
as one professional officer said. There is probably variation in the amount of frustration in 
crisis management duties depending on the tasks, situational factors, and persons involved.
Two female peacekeepers mentioned difficult or frustrating gender-specific phenomena 
related to the atmosphere of the peacekeeper community. They felt that special attention 
was paid to female peacekeepers which made them feel uncomfortable.48 49 On the other 
that it could go easier , the whole thing. But….”
Interviewer: ”Yes.”
Interviewee: ”Is it frustration or not? Perhaps a mild version of that..” (Interview 31.)
47 ”…sometimes you think about how it there have been so many years fom the war and there are so many organizations work-
ing over there, so what have been the results?. We just thought about whether the whole packet functions well.” (Interview 17.)
48  Interviewee:”Mhmm, yes, we females were observed like under a loop. It was sometimes even oppressive. So we are still in 
different positions over there.”
Interviewer:”Yes.”
Interviewee:”So if we could change it, it would be better to be there.” (Interview 27.)
49 ”Or honestly said, it was like being on the lookout for especially women because we were there as a minority.” (Interview 29.)
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hand, one female reservist who felt uncomfortable with the special attention from her male 
colleagues also said that her previous peacekeeping experience was an advantage because it 
was easier for her to adapt to the peacekeeper community than it was for her female colleagues 
without former peacekeeping duties. One female reservist said that she would have liked 
to change her duties during the mission but that a less competent male peacekeeper was 
recruited instead, which she interpreted as discrimination due to her gender. Because three 
out of five female peacekeepers expressed some dissatisfaction concerning how they were 
treated due to their gender, it appears quite probable that gender issues often affect the work 
satisfaction and related issues for female peacekeepers.
8.4.3  Dangers and worries
Most of the interviewees had not felt any danger, or dangers that were only of modest 
or moderate nature. Most often the interviewees mentioned that traffic caused some risk 
and one even mentioned the local dogs. Therefore, threats faced by military and civilian 
personnel cannot mostly be described in military terms.
While out patrolling on the day of the independence declaration, one interviewee met a 
person with a weapon who arranged “happy shooting” with no intention to hurt anyone: 
however, the situation became slightly threatening when it was necessary to confiscate 
the weapon. Another peacekeeper had observed some armed unrest at the time of the 
independence declaration. One reservist felt that patrolling in a village was the most 
threatening experience.
Many of the interviewees had felt no danger in their duties in Kosovo. However, it 
was meaningful to take necessary measures to maintain security in military means as 
peacekeepers, even though the situations were not risky. One civilian crisis management 
employee mentioned that a grenade attack in a neighboring area could have occurred at the 
time that colleagues were nearby. One professional officer said that he occasionally worried 
about the potential risks of political unrest for Finnish troops in the neighboring area. The 
impression from the interviews was that nobody had felt really worried about the situation in 
Kosovo, although some of them had been in risky situations. Compared to some other crisis 
management operations, like the one in Afghanistan, the difference is clear. Therefore, the 
circumstances in riskier operations and missions are probably more demanding in general 
which may also affect other perceptions of crisis management personnel. 
One peacekeeper said that his concerns mostly occurred when he was personally at home for 
a holiday and aware of the risks of violence during the time of the independence declaration. 
After returning to Kosovo, however, he was not worried about his personal security. This 
estimation may be interpreted in at least two ways. Either the threats were regarded as more 
controllable when present, or it was impossible for one to worry about threats when it was 
necessary to concentrate on work. 
The family situation or the alcohol use of a work comrade could be reasons to worry about 
colleagues. A few interviewees also said that the mental health or well-being problems of 
colleagues could be a concern. . Several interviewees said that they had not worried about 
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their work comrades. The poverty of the local people in the neighboring areas also raised 
some concerns. For example, the future of the local people was a concern for one professional 
officer. The low risk level in Kosovo probably also affected the personnel’s perceptions related 
to the comrades. The stress factors related to one’s colleagues will be higher, if the operation 
is riskier.
8.4.4  Multiple meanings
As mentioned, the work community in peacekeeping could be found both pleasant and 
demanding. Some interviewees mentioned features of the tasks that contained both positive 
and negative aspects. Insecurity in the duties was found to be both easy and difficult and 
challenging – one interviewee described it as a drug.50 Work challenges may enable learning. 
The crisis management environment was found to be interesting although it was exhausting 
to communicate in a foreign language. Communication with local people was rewarding 
and interesting – but also difficult. 
One professional officer said that hasty and unforeseen situations requiring problem-solving 
caused both positive and negatives feelings, even stress, which facilitated the actual problem-
solving. A reservist expressed a similar kind of contradiction: she was over-worked – but the 
support she received from the work community made the work easier. Even daily routines 
were found to be both easy and stressful – and frustrating.
There seems to be learning potential in duties or situations consisting of double or multiple 
meanings. Demanding situations may become rewarding ones if an individual is able to 
handle it. Learning may be a “side-effect” of handling complicated situations – and may 
even to strengthen self-confidence, as mentioned in section 8.3. Informal learning may 
occur at work, even if the individual does not explicitly consider it to be learning. 
Multiple meanings of duties or various phenomena clearly raised thoughts among crisis 
management personnel. Double and multiple meanings may be recalled more easily than 
more ordinary situations because more complicated situations and processes may be thought 
about again later. The challenge of such situations did not become overwhelming because it 
remained controllable. 
Contradictory elements in learning situations at work have been described in nursing duties 
(Nurminen 2008). Such occasions may be controversial, insecure, and unique with factors 
that are difficult to predict. In such circumstances, intuition is crucial for understanding 
the relevant information in order to make decisions or to act. Because intuition and tacit 
knowledge are subjective, it is possible to transfer information and knowledge about such 
situations, not the experience. (Ibid.) Therefore, controversial learning situations may be 
fruitful for learning in various fields of working life and duties.
In some sense, these multiple meanings may be regarded as contradictions, which 
Engeström (1987) has described as part of an expansive learning process. When envisaging 
contradictory elements at work, some creativity is needed for problem-solving. A relevant 
50 Interviewee:”In these duties, it is tolerating uncertainty. It is a routine, it becomes a routine, but it is like a drug. It is like you 
said, both most difficult and easiest – it is both. ” (Interview 3.) 
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question is whether this type of learning in crisis management could be facilitated in some 
way – or whether training is impossible for not unforeseen phenomena. The description of 
contradictory phenomena could potentially facilitate learning and adaptation. Would these 
types of multiple meanings have importance in learning in riskier environments? While 
there are certainly contradictions serving potential for learning, even in riskier situations, 
growing security risks are a stress factor. 
8.4.5  Interpretations of crisis management experiences and learning: 
 Mostly positive but partially contradictory perceptions
Individual perceptions regarding the atmosphere of the peacekeeping community or 
team work varied considerably. Both positive and negative perceptions were found, 
although positive experiences received more attention in research interviews. Of course, 
an individual’s perceptions could contain both positive and negative elements related to 
the atmosphere. Cross-cultural contacts were mostly found rewarding. New situations and 
circumstances enabled learning that could not take place in similar kinds of ways at home. 
The experiences expressed by the interviewees were mostly positive, although many had felt 
frustration from time to time. New experiences had provided opportunities for learning. 
Experiences consisting of diverse meanings seemed to be recalled well by the personnel. 
Multiple meanings are likely to activate reflection, even afterwards. These situations may 
offer learning opportunities that should be taken into consideration when developing 
education and training of crisis management personnel.
As mentioned in section 8.3, crisis management duties may be significant experiences (see 
Silvennoinen (2004)) in the individuals’ life spans and may be relevant in their life-long 
learning processes. Several interviewees had earlier mentioned that their self-conceptions 
had strengthened during the duties and at least partly as a result of learning at work. Work 
in crisis management may be a good time for informal learning to occur. This learning 
occurs in implicit ways, often without being directly considered as learning. According to 
Collin (2005), learning at work should not be assessed in similar terms as learning through 
education. When assessing identity issues, regardless of the changes that have taken place in 
identities or identification, learning was connected with ultimately positive and potentially 
challenging learning experiences.
Learning at work also consists of informal learning which is difficult for an individual to 
assess. It is especially crucial for learning tacit knowledge, but probably not so much for 
learning explicit knowledge. It is challenging for both individuals and institutions to assess 
tacit knowledge and the results of informal learning. However, the results of these types of 
learning that may exist in the minds of the employees could be gathered in order to enable 
organizational learning although this task is not easy. 
 
Approximately 70 percent of all Finnish employees find independence to be a factor that 
strengthens their well-being at work. Interesting work also enhances well-being at work, and 
this effect is slightly higher among women than among men. Work colleagues are another 
meaningful factor for well-being at work. (Lehto & Sutela 2008, 191–193.) These themes 
can also be found in the interviews with the crisis management personnel. Compared to 
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work conditions in general, similar things also seem to be positive or negative in crisis 
management duties.
Haste may cause stress, which means that it is taken into consideration in the context of 
the well-being of the personnel. Higher demands of efficiency are linked to the personnel’s 
feelings of insufficiency (Järnefelt 2002a, 27). Overly demanding or overly easy tasks have 
a negative impact on an individual’s well-being at work (Mamia 2009, 39). There is a need 
to balance demands and stress factors of the work in peace operations; therefore, general 
research results on work and well-being should be taken into consideration when developing 
crisis management. Leaders and managers should regularly assess the amount of work and 
its coherence with resources, and they should estimate time-tables realistically, as well as 
to provide opportunities to delegate duties and allocate time for the employee’s personal 
development (Järnefelt 2002b, 101–102).
The interviewees seemed to have plenty of activities and their work days were usually not 
dull. Although the interviewees in this study may represent more positive approaches to 
crisis management duties than the personnel in general, it is interesting that boredom did 
not seem to be a wide problem among the interviewees as was found in a Danish study 
(see Norgaard & Holsting 2006). The frustration identified in another Finnish study 
(Ahtiainen et al. 2007) did not seem to be a wide or profound problem either among the 
interviewees, although they did express some frustration. The dangers envisaged by the 
interviewees were restricted and not serious. This is an essential difference between KFOR 
and riskier operations. However, even in less risky operations potential threats are taken into 
consideration and there are differences in risk perceptions and adaptation to new situations. 
Serious difficulties or mental problems were not mentioned either: this is in accordance 
with the results of Kousa (2008) who claimed that serious mental problems among Finnish 
peacekeepers were rare.
Crisis management personnel face new situations that are perceived in different ways. New 
situations require capacity for adaptation, learning, and applying one’s existing skills. A 
similar kind of situation may be perceived in various ways by different individuals. With 
regard to the main RQ and RQs 1 and 2, these results strengthen the view that crisis 
management missions are special learning environments that are likely to provide problem-
solving opportunities. 
8.5  Cooperation
8.5.1  Cooperation with local inhabitants
Best experiences with local inhabitants
Contacts with local inhabitants were part of the duties of the civilian crisis management 
personnel interviewed for this research although the types of contacts with local people 
varied in accordance with the interviewees’ duties. One interviewee’s assessment was that 
local people were friendly and their perceptions of expatriate employees seemed to be 
positive.
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Cooperation with local people was part of the tasks of one interviewee as a leader of a unit, 
and the method of the project was to get the local people involved so that they would learn 
how to deal with the administrative matters. Although this kind of method was the only 
way to get the local people to adapt the idea of project, it initially took more time than if the 
interviewee had done it herself. Although the communication was challenging, finding the 
communication channel was the easiest part of the process. The cooperation worked best 
when the interviewee was able to understand the realities of the local people’s lives and did 
not have unrealistic views about the life there: this required some experience in the region. 
Understanding the local way of thinking made the cooperation easier.
The success of cooperation could be two-fold. Locally it was culturally acceptable to answer 
“yes”, even if this was not an honest answer; this made interaction somewhat problematic. 
Because of the differences in communication styles it may be difficult to find problems 
“under the surface.” It is a matter of finding out when a positive answer really is a positive 
answer. 
Most of the interviewed peacekeepers had contacts with locals. However, some of the 
interviewed peacekeepers worked in duties that required little or no personal communication 
with local inhabitants. Generally, the communication and cooperation with local inhabitants 
went well. Local people’s perceptions of KFOR were mostly positive and friendly. It was 
easiest to discuss the projects that had proceeded well. As one interviewee said, pretty much 
everything went well at the level of conversation. Reconstruction projects largely proceeded 
smoothly, although some practical problems did occur. 
One reservist who had a lot of contacts with local civilians mentioned that work with local 
inhabitants had gone well because the local people had considered KFOR to be a cooperation 
partner. According to this reservist, communication and the support functions of KFOR 
had been the most successful parts of the cooperation with local people. Local employees 
of KFOR were seen as important contacts for peacekeepers and the local employees played 
a crucial role in the field work as interpreters. One female peacekeeper who had worked 
with local employees of KFOR mentioned that cooperation with them had been successful. 
Village leaders were often important contacts. Trust-building was the most successful part 
of the work of the peacekeepers.51 Good experiences that led to trust between the local 
inhabitants and the expatriate personnel were often considered to be a positive part of the 
work with local people. However, not all the peacekeepers do had contacts with the local 
inhabitants.
Difficulties with local inhabitants
As a superior to local employees one civilian crisis management employee had found it 
difficult to communicate about contradictory opinions. This leads the phenomenon already 
mentioned in the section on best experiences with local inhabitants. Positive expressions of 
local people may hide negative thoughts which are not openly expressed because of cultural 
codes of convenience that expatriate personnel may find difficult to interpret. 
51 Interviewee:”Our work was to gain the trust on behalf of the local people – it has worked well. It has been easiest to get 
personal contacts which has been our main duty. Personally,  like my colleagues  have said, I’ve found that it has been easy to 
get contacts [among the local people].” (Interview 31.)
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Despite succeeding in communication, one interview in a leading position found it 
challenging to communicate in the correct manner with some local employees. It was 
challenging to achieve the right balance. In such a balance local employees in the project 
carried the responsibilities required for the task, which gave them some power as well. In one 
project, the only problems emerged in contacts with governmental authorities. Corruption 
was seen as a significant problem among local authorities. The work of the international 
community should have led to wider learning processes on behalf of the local population. 
Although collaboration was almost always harmonious, difficulties did emerge, and were 
probably related to confusions about various roles and functions of different actors in 
Kosovo 52.
Not all of the civilians had positive perceptions of KFOR which had a negative impact on 
the cooperation. This was especially the case among the Serbs whose attitudes towards the 
Ahtisaari plan were negative: however, ethnic background could not be seen as a hindrance 
for cooperation. Local inhabitants sometimes wanted KFOR peacekeepers to act as judges 
in local disputes between ethnic groups. Clearly, such work would not have been part of the 
peacekeepers mandate, so they had to refuse such requests. However, it is understandable 
that the functions of various organizations or agencies were not clear from the local people’s 
perspectives. 
Problems that were often brought forward by peacekeepers were inter-ethnic in nature, 
although these problems could not usually be assessed as serious. However, the role of 
ethnicity had not disappeared. One interviewee felt that it was easier for the Albanians to 
talk about their past experiences to peacekeepers than it was for Serbs. Local people expressed 
dissatisfaction about the distribution of the aid in their region. The independence process of 
Kosovo influenced some local people among the Serbs in such ways that they doubted the 
impartiality of KFOR at that time, although the problems did not become more difficult. 
It was difficult to communicate regarding the processes that had not proceeded in an 
appropriate manner because the local people did not talk about the exact situation instead 
discussing issues related to the matter. A problem that emerged in reconstruction was that 
KFOR could not fully trust in the promises of their local counterparts in work processes. The 
inefficiency of local actors was found to be problematic in cooperation. Cultural differences 
regarding work efficiency were evident and it was necessary to supervise the reconstruction 
processes carefully.
According to one interviewee, the reputation of Finnish KFOR troops was good in Kosovo. 
Although Finnish perceptions of this issue may not be objective, it is a positive sign that 
Finnish peacekeepers feel that they are assessed in a positive way by the local inhabitants. 
Practical problems could emerge too. Sometimes the troops had communication problems 
if interpreters were not present, and all parties had to communicate in languages other 
than their mother tongues; cultural differences could further complicate interaction. Good 
communication would facilitate cooperation and the lack of it could hamper collaboration.53 
52  Interviewee:”So, I found that because there were EU-funded projects and American projects, partially one on the other, 
there were too many cooks over there.”(Interview 28.)
53 Interviewee:” And the cultural differences are, perhaps, so large, that the way to act is so different so that sometimes..”
Interviewer:”Yes.”
Interviewee:”It caused problems.”
Interviewer:”Or  it was difficult to interpret what the other person meant, or? 
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Gender and cooperation with local inhabitants
The interviews sought assessments of gender issues related to cooperation with local 
inhabitants with a few questions focusing both on the interviewees’ personal experiences 
from the impact of their own gender on their work and, more generally, their assessment of 
the meaning of gender in crisis management duties. Male interviewees had a more positive 
picture of the influence that their female counterparts had on their duties. A positive 
interpretation was generally due to the fact that their cooperation partners were mostly 
men. Women’s experiences were more divided with regard to their gender’s influence on 
their duties. Being a woman could have a positive, negative or even neutral influence, and 
one interviewee described both negative and positive aspects. The negative experiences were 
expressed by civilian crisis management employees. In military crisis management, the male 
reservists assessed the significance of their gender in more positive terms than professional 
officers who assessed the significance of their gender more typically as neutral with regard to 
their duties. Several factors could cause these differences: differences among individuals and 
duties, as well as an outcome of the phenomenon that local people would treat expatriate 
men and women differently.
Among civilian crisis management personnel who were the superiors of local employees, 
one female employee had had problems with local male employees who had difficulties to 
accept a female superior. The same individual had perceived attitudes among local women 
that favor male opinions over female ones. On the other hand, being a woman could be 
seen as an advantage in civilian crisis management. According to one interviewee, a female 
negotiator was more easily remembered on international occasions, and being a middle-
aged woman was a respectable status in the eyes of local people. In general, being a female 
employee in civilian crisis management could be an advantage because of the perception that 
women might work in a “softer” manner. Two female civilian crisis management interviewees 
assessed that gender was not meaningful in the management of their duties; it was neither an 
advantage nor a disadvantage. Another female civilian crisis management employee felt that 
being a female employee had both positive and negative impacts, although she assessed the 
negative ones as being more significant. When thinking about the gender in civilian crisis 
management, one male employee in civilian crisis management considered that being a male 
in his duties was not problematic.
Three female peacekeepers felt that their gender had a neutral impact and two female 
peacekeepers found the influence to be positive. One female peacekeeper in duties requiring 
special expertise had not found any problems in contacts with local people. Another female 
peacekeeper thought that female peacekeepers’ work and presence could support local 
women. A female peacekeeper was of the opinion that being a female in peacekeeping tasks 
had been both an advantage and disadvantage in her duties, but that local women had 
expressed more trust in her than in her male colleagues. However, some local men had 
refused to talk to her, instead talking to her male colleagues. This interviewee assumed 
that women in the field work were more trustworthy. In a family, a man might refuse to 
talk about his problems to anyone but a woman could talk about them to a woman. For 
Interviewee:”And then that if a Finn does something in this way then the other one does not understand why he does it so.”
Interviewer: ”Yes.”
Interviewee:”And such, such small things grew larger and larger. ” (Interview 36.)
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children, interaction with female peacekeepers seemed to be easier than with male ones. 
Overall, this interviewee found the influence of being a woman to be positive. 
Recruiting women to work for international projects or agencies could serve as a positive role 
model for local women, as one female interviewee said. The recruitment of female personnel 
for international civilian crisis management tasks may also be problematic, and structural 
issues hindering women from working in civilian crisis management should be eliminated. 
Unfortunately, the UN had failed to recruit women for various tasks in Kosovo, and one 
interviewee even doubted whether the UN had worked hard to recruit women. On the other 
hand, gender segregation at work can influence the local recruitment situation: it may be 
difficult to recruit male employees to some duties because of the lack of male candidates.
A reservist mentioned that 90–95 percent of the local people he collaborated with were 
men, which meant that cooperation was easy for him as a man. Another peacekeeper, a 
professional officer working in another unit, assessed that 90 percent of the local contacts 
took place with males. One male peacekeeper felt that the local male-dominant cultural 
reality made it easier to be a male peacekeeper. Because the local Muslim tradition in Kosovo 
does not rely on extremism, the gender of the employees was not considered as a major issue 
in Kosovo. One professional officer felt that gender was not relevant in his duties in relation 
to the communication with local people. Most professional officers felt that gender was not 
an irrelevant factor in their duties. When having a conversation with village leaders who 
were men it was perceived that the interaction was easier for male peacekeepers. When asked 
about the meaning of the information from local women, one male reservist considered this 
question to be significant because local women within a family most often kept “invisible”. 
Women’s invisibility in contacts with local and more traditional communities was a theme 
that was repeated in the interviews.
Although there were female peacekeepers among the Finnish troops, four interviewees said 
that they had no female colleague working in the same unit. One male reservist assumed that 
being a female peacekeeper would probably not make a difference in communication with 
local women – but that it would be difficult for him to assess this question. One peacekeeper 
assumed that it would be difficult for him to assess whether the local communities would 
accept female peacekeepers in communicative tasks with local people. He mentioned one 
situation in which his unit could not communicate with a local family because the male 
members of the family were not present. The meaning of gender varied because gender was 
significant in communication with more traditional societies but not in cooperation with 
higher levels of administration.
One professional officer assumed that, although it was easier for male soldiers to collaborate 
with their local counterparts, cooperation with local women would be easier for female 
peacekeepers. Interaction with women in a traditional society would require the presence 
of women peacekeepers, and Swedish troops had female peacekeepers in duties requiring 
communication with local women. Female peacekeepers’ communication with local women 
would also have required the presence of female interpreters.
One male peacekeeper felt that male peacekeepers would provide a stronger feeling of 
security for local people than female ones. Although his perception was positive about 
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working as a male peacekeeper, the significance of female peacekeepers’ contribution would 
be acknowledged as well so that it would be functional to have female peacekeepers involved. 
One male peacekeeper said that female employees’ contribution would be more meaningful 
in civilian tasks in Kosovo – in comparison to the tasks of KFOR. As a conclusion, the 
relevance of gender was seen in a limited number of duties or situations in military crisis 
management in Kosovo. Having both female and male peacekeepers would be good 
when creating contacts. Because contacts with civilians are more essential in civilian crisis 
management, the role of gender may be more important in that field.
8.5.2  Cooperation between civilian and military actors in crisis 
 management
Experiences from the cooperation on the civilian side
All of the interviewees reported cooperation between various civilian agencies or NGOs was 
reported. Cooperation between civilian actors usually functioned well. Good cooperation 
was an advantage for all the civilian actors and cooperation in successful projects was 
rewarding. In the cooperation between different civilian actors and agencies, there was a 
need for information sharing and exchange. Because various civilian agencies have worked 
in Kosovo, information sharing and coordination should be a natural part of the cooperation 
among various actors.
Rivalry among civilian organizations may be a problem for the cooperation of civilian actors 
in crisis management and state-building and coordination in the work of various actors 
is difficult. The lack of coordination even gave one civilian crisis management employee 
the impression that it was necessary to arrange meetings to distribute information about a 
wide range of projects going on and to avoid duplicate work in the same task. Changes in 
the arrangements and duties of various civilian agencies did not occur easily. The change 
of leadership from the UN to the EU was considered to be a difficult process, as three 
interviewees assessed
Reasonable coordination seems to be an essential factor in the collaboration of civilian 
actors. Organizational rivalry may be minimized if the projects and their collaboration are 
well coordinated. The organizational structures and duties of various actors should be clear. 
Although this idea is well established in principle, practical collaboration and coordination 
should be developed. When analyzing experiences from civilian crisis management, 
information about the personnel’s experiences should be gathered in order to get practical 
guidelines to develop collaboration. However, organizational rivalry is a difficult issue that 
cannot be answered only by education and organizational learning. Clear common goals of 
the collaboration should facilitate and hopefully even prevent rivalry.
Experiences from the cooperation on the military side
There are differences in military cultures and working manners between different countries. 
However, one interviewee especially paid attention to the idea that cultural differences 
did not cause harm to the cooperation. Cultural differences affected how individuals 
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communicated but not the outcome. There were cultural differences in daily routines and 
their timing. National interests could be a burden in the cooperation of KFOR.
The working language of KFOR is English and there is variation in terms of how well 
peacekeepers are able to communicate in that language. Several peacekeepers said that the 
lack of appropriate English language skills among military crisis management personnel was 
a substantial problem. On some occasions, the lack of sufficient language skills was found 
to be only a minor problem. Insufficient language skills could cause problems in reports and 
documents, even those written by a native English speaker. The peaceful situation in Kosovo 
meant that the lack of the language skills did not cause problems. If the situation had been 
riskier, the probability of significant misunderstandings could have been higher. 
Twelve peacekeepers (eight reservists and four professional officers) mentioned insufficient 
English language skills among other countries’ troops in KFOR. This suggests that the 
problem probably caused some kinds of problems for the operation. More specifically, the 
lack of language skills was linked to colleagues from countries other than Finland and no 
one was really concerned about the English language skills of Finnish peacekeepers. The lack 
of language skill seemed to be a larger problem, at the lower operational level of the military 
hierarchy, but occasionally professional officers faced problems when their higher-ranking 
colleagues did not have sufficient language skills for their duties. One interviewee said that 
language problems and different organizational backgrounds had made the organizational 
practices less efficient because some misunderstandings had taken place and the national 
decision-making could be time-consuming in some cases which influenced the outcome. 
Compared to the practices of many other countries, the Finnish rotation system in which 
about half the troops are changed in every six months was considered positively. KFOR’s 
military duties in Kosovo require various abilities and skills. Not all of the NATO-standards 
were fulfilled by all the countries in KFOR. Although there are standards regarding how 
NATO-documents should be written not all the countries were able to meet the standards 
although despite being members of NATO.
Within Finnish troops some problems were found between reservists and professional 
soldiers. One reservist mentioned that although some reservists were more competent 
at certain tasks, military protocol dictated that the professional soldiers should make 
decisions in these tasks. The peacekeeping work community is different because it is not 
possible to avoid meeting more unpleasant colleagues in one’s free time unlike in normal 
work communities. In pressure situations, these phenomena may be harmful to the work 
communities of the peacekeepers.
If a person is unwilling to work, it can be very difficult to get him or her away from his or 
her duties. Such cases were exceptional, however, and the peacekeepers mostly worked well. 
One interviewee mentioned that some individual colleagues who were unwilling to work 
sufficiently caused problems. However, these cases were mostly related to problems that 
could exist in any work community.
By international standards, the professional skills of the military personnel were not always 
at the level required for the specific tasks: this caused some problems, especially in leadership 
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duties. If an individual had insufficient skills, the individual’s hardworking nature could 
compensate. On the other hand, if an officer was not at the professional level required 
for certain tasks, it was often difficult to arrange the organizational settings because of the 
sensitive nature of the problem. 
Because communication is crucial in crisis management, personnel’s sufficient level of the 
English language skills should be ensured in every operation. Although employees’ language 
skills should have been assessed, several of the not all the peacekeepers had appropriate 
language skills. Insufficient language skills may be a difficult issue to overcome because all 
the countries should recruit personnel that have sufficient skills in the area. However, at 
least in riskier operations, poor language skills can lead to misunderstandings, which could 
potentially endanger some functions. Therefore, this type of problems should be handled in a 
manner that lead to sufficient competence in the communication language of the operation.
Cooperation between civilian and military actors
For some actors in civilian crisis management, it was necessary to cooperate with military 
crisis management actors. Half of the interviewees representing civilian crisis management 
personnel had regular contacts with KFOR. Half of the civilian crisis management 
interviewees did not collaborate with KFOR at work. When the state-building process 
proceeds, the role of KFOR will probably diminish in Kosovo, which means that the links 
between many civilian and military actors are not necessary. No special problems were found 
although there were differences in military cultures of various countries. One interviewee 
who had cooperated with KFOR in reconstruction said that all had functioned well. One 
interviewee mentioned that KFOR had difficulty adapting to the changing circumstances 
and the change towards the growing role of the civilian actors was somehow problematic 
partly because of the differences of organizational cultures – although no single soldier had 
caused problems as an individual54. Finnish troops seemed to work well together and have 
plenty of practical projects going on. Because the troops were organized nationally, they 
often had national agendas. This was a negative phenomenon that affected the cooperation 
and out-come. 
Most peacekeepers had some form of cooperation with civilian crisis management actors 
in Kosovo. Five peacekeepers including one professional officer did not collaborate with 
international civilian organizations or NGOs in their duties. Mostly UNMIK and OSCE were 
the collaboration partners. The EU and UNHCR or the UN in general were also mentioned 
as cooperation partners. The peacekeepers worked in various duties and the positive and 
negative sides of the cooperation varied as well. The overall-outcome of the cooperation 
was mostly positive. The cooperation regarding functions linked to KFOR and civilian 
crisis management generally proceeded well. The nature of cooperation was interactive. 
Information sharing and exchange were the most important parts of the cooperation between 
the civilian agencies and military actors. Practical information sharing was reported as having 
functioned well. With regard to the close duties of KFOR and civilian agencies, information 
was required in order to guarantee that the actors would know what they needed to do and 
54 Interviewee:”Because it is such a typical situation that first they go in tanks and…”
Interviewer:”Yes.”
Interviewee:”then there will be an institution on its own and then the civilians come a bit later, and it becomes problematic to 
find the models for collaboration.”  (Interview 20.)
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who had responsibility for the duties that could be considered as belonging to several actors. 
When meetings take place only rarely, it is difficult to get more profound information. The 
information meetings between KFOR and civilian agencies seemed to be more utilizable for 
the civilian agencies. Some cooperation related to the joint aid efforts of civilian agencies 
and KFOR. One interviewee mentioned that collaborative training for UNMIK and KFOR 
had succeeded well. KFOR and civilian actors arranged joint projects. Because the UNMIK 
was a fragmented agency, it was more difficult to collaborate with it. One professional officer 
felt that some problems had been found when the “border-line” between UNMIK and 
KFOR functions was negotiated in common meetings and some “jealousy” was expressed by 
UNMIK. The bureaucratic features of UNMIK caused some problems for the cooperation. 
There had been variation in terms of how well the cooperation between civilian agencies and 
military actors had functioned. 
Insufficient language skills among the civilian crisis management personnel were also a 
problem for the cooperation, according to one interviewee. The lack of English language 
skills is not only a problem among peacekeepers, although it was mentioned more often 
regarding military cooperation and it probably caused more harm there. The language 
question was probably more problematic on the military than on the civilian side. There 
were problems related to different working cultures. Someone who was accustomed to exact 
timing of negotiations might find it difficult to understand that some other participants 
from differing background had other perceptions of how exactly the meetings should start. 
Cultural differences could also influence how the personnel perceived local problems, such 
as violence against women. Changes of the personnel in different organizations could cause 
problems for cooperation.
Reconstruction and security: potential contradictions for KFOR
Norgaard (2004) has pointed out that current challenges for peacekeepers are: (a) creating 
security and stability in the mission area and (b) reconstructing the civil and political 
infrastructure. Therefore it is important to understand whether carrying out these two kinds 
of activities might be contradictory from peacekeepers’ perspectives. The interviewees who 
had served as peacekeepers were asked a question related to the possible contradiction of 
ensuring security and reconstruction. According to the interviews, there were no major 
contradictions between security and reconstruction goals in the activities of KFOR reported 
by the interviewed peacekeepers. A clear majority of peacekeepers did not see contradictions 
between their reconstruction and security-oriented tasks in Kosovo. From a human security 
perspective, this result is interesting. For local people, the presence of the peacekeepers is 
mostly a positive phenomenon in Kosovo – at least according to the perception of the 
interviewed Finnish peacekeepers.
KFOR functions in accordance with its mandate. According to one interviewee, the 
option to use force was one tool for security, just as reconstruction was another. The local 
population may find it difficult to understand why KFOR supports reconstruction in one 
area, but not in another. Both major ethnic groups expressed that they were dissatisfied 
about the reconstruction resources allocated by KFOR and felt that the distribution was 
not impartial: there was some dissatisfaction about who received aid and who did not. As 
a potential contradiction, one interviewee described a situation in which local Serbs were 
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interviewed for security reasons, but the local Albanians were not interviewed, which led the 
local Albanians to perceive this activity of KFOR as a partial one.
Insufficient planning may cause problems for reconstruction. Unfortunately the projects 
did not always lead to well-functioning results; for example one construction project 
was not utilized but this was not regarded as a real contradiction between security and 
reconstruction goals. One interviewee mentioned that some contradictions between security 
and reconstruction goals occurred due to the lack of respect, although this did not cause 
risks for KFOR. Reconstruction and other non-military activities had raised reflections 
about the relevance of various duties of KFOR. Peacekeepers may think about the priorities 
of the mission.
8.5.3  Findings from the cooperation activities 
The frequency of contacts with local population varies in accordance with personnel’s duties. 
In civilian crisis management, it is clearly necessary to interact with local people regularly, 
although the communication may be targeted to a limited number of people. In military 
crisis management, there are tasks in which peacekeepers do not necessarily have any contact 
with the inhabitants. Three peacekeepers did not have work contacts with local inhabitants. 
A peacekeeper’s duties may change during the service. Consequently, it would be unwise not 
to take into account an individual peacekeeper’s chances of having contacts to local people 
in the preceding education and training, although it would not be necessary to have direct 
contacts with local inhabitants according to the plans. Cultural awareness and practical 
communication skills are valuable in interaction with local inhabitants in a conflict-affected 
area. Misunderstandings may emerge and the expatriate employees on both civilian and 
military side of crisis management should be able to deal with them. The personnel need to 
understand if a misunderstanding has taken place.
Gender issues in the field work may be difficult to assess. One of the roles of female 
expatriates personnel may be to facilitate interaction with local women, especially in 
traditional societies. Because these issues are not necessarily evaluated in various contacts 
with local inhabitants, it may be difficult for the personnel to estimate the significance of 
gender in the contact they do have with them. For crisis management personnel, questions 
related to gender and cultural sensitivity may be complicated. On the other hand, local or 
regional traditions should be respected, while the international community should work for 
progress and to improve the position of local women. Reacting to a single situation may be 
a dilemma for personnel because cultural differences and all individuals’ rights to progress 
in peace-building should both be respected. From the perspective of human security, this 
should mean both the protection of people and their empowerment in reconstruction and 
peace-building (Palm 2008, 37). 
Understanding gender dimensions in conflicts is significant for those working in operations 
(From-Emmesberger 2008, 54). The gender issues may be interpreted in diverse ways by 
local inhabitants as well as by expatriate crisis management personnel. Because there are 
various interpretations of a single situation, it is necessary that personnel’s background 
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information on gender issues in a particular conflict is sufficient. Awareness and knowledge 
about gender issues in various cultural contexts is very important in crisis management.
Among the personnel, there were numerous interpretations of the meaning of the gender 
in crisis management. However, gender awareness would facilitate resolving problems and 
enhance local involvement in peace-building. Information about the experiences of crisis 
management personnel regarding gender issues makes it possible to understand how to 
strengthen women’s opportunities to participate in peace-building at various levels of peace 
processes. 
Because the interpretations of the meaning of gender vary among the personnel, it is easier to 
understand how the meanings of the same issue vary among local inhabitants in crisis areas. 
Different interpretations may make the implementation of resolution 1325 more difficult as 
would be the situation if the interpretations were more unified. Without understanding the 
variety of interpretations, the implementation may be even more demanding. Regarding RQ 
3 on crisis management practices, organizations and education, it is obvious that cultural 
and communicative education is of importance for the crisis management personnel.
Most of the interviewees considered the cooperation between and within various organizations 
to have been successful. However, some dissatisfaction in internal and inter-organizational 
cooperation was found as well. In this research, it is impossible to obtain information about 
the background of the dissatisfaction in relation to the other actors mentioned by the 
interviewees or their interpretations of the same processes with the ones of the interviewees. 
Therefore, the analysis relies on the narratives of the interviewees. Information sharing and 
exchange were often mentioned as major parts of cooperation of different actors. 
Insufficient English language skills were a broad problem that complicated all inter-
organizational cooperation and even collaboration within and between the military and 
civilian organizations and agencies. This problem was identified in both civilian and military 
organizations and by both civilian and military employees. However, the problem was 
more acute among peacekeepers according to the interviews. If the situation in Kosovo 
had been riskier, the lack of English language skills among the soldiers might have caused 
more problems for KFOR. In riskier operations, poor language skills in the communication 
language of the operation may lead to serious problems and endanger some functions: 
therefore, it would be necessary for personnel to have sufficient language skills for their duties. 
English language skills were necessary and they are part of contact and communication skills 
in crisis management.
All of the civilian crisis management employees reported having worked in collaboration 
with representatives of other civilian agencies, and half had had regular cooperation with 
KFOR. Therefore the role of communication skills is extremely important in civilian crisis 
management. The need to communicate among peacekeepers varied more widely. Although 
they all had to be able to communicate in English in their KFOR duties, it was not always 
necessary to be able to communicate with representatives of agencies other than KFOR.
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It is essential to develop proper communication in order to carry out both civilian and 
military crisis management functions, and any major lack of language skills among the 
personnel may lead to misunderstandings that impede the progress of the operation. Crisis 
management organizations on both the civilian and military sides should more seriously 
consider the extent to which cultural differences, even within organizations, affect their 
functions and efficiency.
In crisis management environments with higher security risks, the questions regarding fluent 
English language skills are more fundamental than in Kosovo where the security situation has 
recently been relatively stable. Howard’s (2008) typology of first- and second-level learning 
could be utilized when analyzing these results. The findings of organizational rivalry and 
the lack of English language skills should be taken into account when developing crisis 
management organizations, arrangements and courses for crisis management personnel. 
Organizational rivalry decreases, if the division of tasks between various organizations 
and agencies is clear. The ability to connect various duties with the broader objectives of a 
mission might also reduce organizational rivalry, if the result is broader comprehension of 
the need for various activities and the respect for them. The staff ’s overall comprehension of 
complex missions should be taken into account when developing training and education of 
the personnel. Decreasing prejudice between representatives of various organizations could 
also help reduce organizational rivalry. A common identity consisting of a common social 
category for different crisis management actors might decrease prejudice and facilitate inter-
organizational cooperation. 
The peacekeepers felt that security and reconstruction tasks coexisted positively. The recent 
developments in Kosovo had been quite peaceful, which probably made it easier for the 
interviewees to assess security and reconstruction as complementary phenomena. In a more 
hostile environment, the complementary roles of these phenomena might not have been as 
likely to exist. This question should be evaluated in a broader manner because the various 
tasks of the military crisis management troops may be confusing to the local inhabitants. For 
example, the roles of the military and the humanitarian agencies should not be confused.
The ability to communicate about these issues with local inhabitants and with representatives 
of different organizations is clearly necessary. Communication and contact skills are relevant 
in all dimensions of interaction, both between various organizations as well as with local 
people. In complicated missions, understanding of the mission’s common goals is important. 
This comprehension may make collaboration easier if it is linked to the understanding of 
the roles of the various actors.
Regarding RQ3 on crisis management practices, organizations, and education, the results 
of this part of the interviews do not reveal any particular problems in the cooperation of 
various agencies, although some dissatisfaction was found in terms of the cooperation 
between and within different organizations. However, the reported lack of English language 
skills of many employees representing other countries may be a severe problem in practice.
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8.6  Education and training for crisis management duties
After gaining some field experience, the personnel may be better able to assess the education 
and training arranged before the mission. The interviewees had numerous ideas about 
how to develop the education and training. The results are reported consistently with the 
professional groups of the interviewees. There was a clear difference between the civilian 
and military crisis management interviewees in regard to participation in pre-education 
and training. All of the personnel serving in military crisis management attended at least 
one training or orientation course before travelling to their duties in Kosovo. However, a 
majority of the civilian crisis management interviewees (five interviewees) had not attended 
any mission-specific course in regard to Kosovo although one of them had attended education 
prior to the previous mission. 
The interviewees were asked about the education and training connected with their duties 
in Kosovo. Training during the mission was not included in the number of courses asked 
here. The interviewees described their experiences from the courses and evaluated the 
meaning of the courses, but these evaluations were not meant to be feedback related to 
particular courses. In this context, training means both practical training of the specific skills 
needed in the duties in Kosovo as well as more educational parts of the training courses. 
This section reports the results in professional groups. Most of the training courses for the 
military personnel were arranged by the Finnish National Defence Forces. Civilian crisis 
management personnel had mostly attended the courses arranged by the agency in which 
they began to work. Many of these employees started to work in Kosovo before CMC 
Finland had started its civilian crisis management courses. 
Most of the military personnel had attended courses arranged for peacekeepers starting work 
in Kosovo. 
Those courses are usually named in Finnish “rotation training” (“rotaatiokoulutus” in 
Finnish). Most peacekeepers who had attended these courses were satisfied with them, 
although some had ideas to develop course practices. The reservists mostly attended the 
rotation education courses and some professional officers had experience from a wider range 
of courses before starting the duties in Kosovo.
The ideas of life-long learning and personal studies during and before the missions were 
mentioned by some of the interviewees. All the interviewees, not only those who had 
experience with training courses, were asked about development ideas for future education 
and training both before and during crisis management operations, although the exact 
questions varied slightly depending on the issues that the interviewees recalled or emphasized.
Civilian crisis management personnel
Two civilian crisis management interviewees had attended one course and one interviewee 
had attended two courses before the duties in Kosovo. As mentioned above, most of the 
civilian crisis management interviewees had not attended any courses prior to starting work 
in Kosovo. The numbers did not include courses prior to some other peace-building or 
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similar kinds of missions abroad. One interviewee who worked for a large international 
organization was satisfied with a course arranged prior to travelling to Kosovo. Another 
interviewee had participated in a course arranged by the CMC Finland and found it utilizable 
at work in Kosovo. An interviewee considered that it would be important to clearly inform 
the course participants about the objectives of the mission.
Life-long learning or mission-specific learning opportunities were not handled in the 
courses. A mission abroad could be regarded as challenge that required a lot of studying 
prior to traveling to start the work, although another kind of learning began after the duties 
had started with many new contacts55. One interviewee who had not had any opportunity 
to participate in a training course before the mission mentioned that it would be crucial 
to at least arrange orientation courses that would inform new personnel about the culture, 
history, and current situation of the region. Another interviewee also emphasized learning 
about these subjects. One interviewee felt that the education and training for civilian crisis 
management duties should be based on the current situation data because the situations in 
crisis or post-conflict areas may evolve rapidly. 
Mission-related objectives should be emphasized during the courses. This finding is 
consistent with Adler and Britt’s (2003) idea that peacekeepers should understand the 
meaning of the mission. Training courses should be constructed in a standardized manner 
for employees from different countries. All the EU member countries should arrange courses 
for civilian crisis management employees or representatives of these countries should have 
opportunities to participate in international courses organized by some other EU member 
country and mission-related courses could be at least partly arranged in the places covered 
by the mission. One interviewee suggested that courses prior to the missions could function 
as a forum to select the participants. Because course arrangements are expensive, this kind of 
selection cannot be directly applied but the idea of checking personnel’s appropriateness for 
the duties may be possible in some phase of pre-education.
During missions, civilian crisis management employees may need opportunities to meetings 
in to gain further education or training related to the current situation of the region: however, 
it may be difficult for people to find time for this kind of training. 
Professional officers
Two of the professional officers had attended one course prior to starting to work in Kosovo 
and two had attended two courses before starting to work in Kosovo, one had attended three 
courses and three officers had participated in four training courses. These numbers do not 
include training courses before some other missions. 
The officers were generally satisfied with all the courses. Generally, there did not seem to 
be any dissatisfaction of having attended too many courses. Instead, some more education 
and training would have been useful. One interviewee had learned about his future duties 
in Kosovo only few months before they started. This meant he was not able to attend all the 
55 ”So that every time you go to a new country, you need to create, of course, to read through the history of that country, read 
the statistics describing the country, understand what the local administration has been like,  understand where we come  from 
and who are the actors and how the map functions. And most study to get through is to know those 100  people in your sector 
who you should get to know and have contacts with so that you can talk like this…” (Interview  3.)
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appropriate courses that would have supported his work. For example, a course arranged 
within Nordic cooperation arrangements would have been useful. Changes in the recruitment 
of personnel can have negative consequences that affect individual opportunities to attend 
various courses which would be necessary for the crisis management duties. 
Some professional officers had not attended courses appropriate to their staff tasks. For the 
demanding and most internationally oriented staff tasks, it would be relevant to arrange 
enough courses that would be suitable for the particular tasks. In general, rotation courses 
were found to be good. Practical questions were well handled during the rotation course. 
Because of the more detailed military education, rotation courses were not so utilizable for 
professional officers especially if they do not serve in the national troops. On the other hand, 
the rotation course arrangements created community and team spirit. The life-long learning 
or other mission-specific learning opportunities were generally not emphasized during the 
courses. The use of manuals and informative material related to them was handled in the 
training.
Three interviewees mentioned that they had found to working and collaborating with 
their immediate predecessors for a week in Kosovo to be extremely fruitful. This kind of 
arrangement was practical for gaining in-depth knowledge of the new duties. An interviewee 
who had had guidance some time before the duties began, found this arrangement to be 
helpful for learning. Two interviewees mentioned that prior to starting their duties, that they 
had studied issues related to the history and culture of Kosovo on their own. This kind of 
study should be facilitated in the education and training of crisis management personnel.
One interviewee said that he had prepared material for his successor but that he did not 
know anyone else who would have done the same. This kind of social innovation appears 
to be a good idea. Because this innovation was meant for enable learning, because there was 
general satisfaction with guidance and dissatisfaction with insufficient guidance, the idea of 
informal learning in crisis management duties gains support.
Given that professional officers have expressed that work in an international mission is a 
learning opportunity while they are busy during the mission, some structures to promote 
their learning opportunities could be developed. National and international training of 
KFOR sometimes occurred simultaneously which limited participation in either kind of 
training. One interviewee mentioned that he had sent informative material in an electronic 
form to his successor well before the new recruit was to arrive in Kosovo. Specified courses 
should be arranged for the troops serving in special duties that require particular professional 
skills. However, one officer admitted that it would be difficult to arrange diversified courses 
for all the tasks because the background skills vary.
Culturally and historically specific aspects cannot be exaggerated in the education and 
training of the peacekeepers. More material (such as books, DVDs, web-sites) on cultural 
issues could be produced and some web-sites and the like could be recommended to the 
personnel starting to work in crisis management. Guidance practices of the peacekeepers 
should be developed further and management of exceptional or emergency situations could 
be the subject of further trained both before and during the missions. Guidance is needed 
some time before the work in a mission starts because such an arrangement facilitates 
individual reflection and learning.
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Reservists
There were six reservists who had attended one training course before the KFOR mission 
and four reservists had attended two such courses. Training courses before some other 
peacekeeping missions abroad were not included in these numbers. Most of the peacekeepers 
were satisfied with the training prior to the mission and during it, if applicable. However, 
there were some parts of the training which could be developed further. One interviewee 
had had an obligation to cut short the rotation course before it ended due to the change of 
forthcoming duties in Kosovo and had found this situation unsatisfactory.
During the rotation education, it was necessary to collaborate with future colleagues, which 
was good for the management of future duties. Peacekeepers said that education provided 
practical information that was useful for their duties. In a “task-related training course” it 
was obligatory to work in English, which was good practice for the duties that required 
communication in English. The presentation about Islam during the task-related course 
was overly focused on extremism or other forms of Islam that do not exist in Kosovo, which 
meant it was inadequate for the on-going situation there.
The basic tasks and skills required of a peacekeeper soldier were handled well during the 
rotation course. In the rotation course, the training of handling weapons was clear and 
easy to keep in mind. The rotation education contained good practical training for soldiers’ 
duties but could have included more specialization for the exact duties in Kosovo. 
According to one interviewee, the rotation training course did not include a presentation 
describing the war in Kosovo in 1999, although this would have been very helpful for 
understanding the on-going situation in the region. There was an expressed desire for more 
culturally-based information. Some criticism was expressed: stereotypical views related to 
Kosovar inhabitants were presented in culturally-oriented education and issues related to 
the work in a foreign culture and different culture should have been handled, taking into 
account individual perceptions and feelings related to these kinds of phenomena.
Some parts of the courses were too tense, which meant it was difficult to really learn all the 
details of the presentations. Course feedback regarding these kinds of problems could help 
the development of courses that are as clear as possible from participants’ points of view. 
According to one interviewee, it was possible to understand certain realities only after having 
come to work in Kosovo. It was possible to attend various courses or activities in Kosovo 
although the lack of time sometimes hindered participation. For example, local languages 
could be studied in Kosovo. A wide range of courses were arranged including languages, 
first-aid courses and courses encouraging personnel to work as support persons. Some of the 
lessons arranged in Kosovo overlapped with the rotation education course.
 
The life-long learning or mission-specific learning opportunities were mostly not 
emphasized during the courses. Insufficient guidance when starting work was considered 
problematic. On the other hand, good guidance was found to be a key function for learning 
new professional tasks. During the training courses, more information about the cultural 
realities of contemporary Kosovo would have been beneficial for peacekeepers. Training 
for emergency situations before and during the mission could have been more in-depth. 
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Because reservists may have learned professional skills that would give them an advantage in 
peacekeeping duties, it would be useful to identify these skills during the training courses. 
Exchange of the duties could be practical, especially for the personnel who were not serving 
in operative tasks, in order to understand the overall operation.
The rotation course could have been longer in duration, although this is also a matter of 
resources. Apart from developing courses before the missions, training and life-long learning 
opportunities during the missions could be developed as well. Occasions or meetings 
encouraging self-reflection of the personnel should be arranged in order to strengthen the 
mental health of peacekeepers and facilitate learning processes. Although there are plenty 
of training and educational activities for Finns working in KFOR, a more systematic and 
supportive approach to the personnel’s learning potential could provide an advantage from 
a pedagogic point of view.
Findings from crisis management education and training
In this sample, only a minority of the civilian crisis management personnel had attended 
any of the training courses prior to their missions. From an educational perspective, the 
fact that over half of the personnel had not received any training immediately before the 
mission could have been problematic. On average, professional officers had participated in 
the largest number of courses, and the reservist peacekeepers had taken at least one training 
course before starting work.
One of the positive aspects was the learning opportunities arranged by KFOR or the Finnish 
troops in Kosovo. These activities could even help prevent boredom during the mission. 
According to the interviewees a lack of time limited the actual opportunities for studying 
rather than a lack of courses or other activities. However, a more systematic approach to 
facilitate learning processes during the duties in crisis management could help life-long 
learning come true in crisis management missions. Individual learning in crisis management 
work is part of an individual’s life span. 
In education and training courses before the missions, guidance for studies on one’s own 
during the mission had not taken place. Independent learning practices during the missions 
were not prompted. Consequently, promotion of informal learning was not enhanced in the 
education and training of crisis management personnel. 
Particularly with regard to interactive and communication skills in a multi-cultural 
environment, new educational methods could be applied. In the context of deep leadership 
and interaction, coaching is evolving as a method to enhance an individual’s interactive 
skills (Nissinen et al. 2008). This kind of idea could also be applied to crisis management 
circumstances. Some kind of coaching or counseling during the missions could take place. 
If the need to advance the interactive and communication skills of crisis management 
personnel is acknowledged, it will be important to enhance appropriate educational and 
training methods before and during the missions to develop these kinds of skills. Some of 
the education could consist of counseling or coaching at work.
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However, some of the interviewees spoke of their own studies related to the mission in Kosovo. 
Without any special prompting to study on their own, they had studied various issues that 
would enhance their understanding of the reality of Kosovo. More systematic prompting for 
this type of activity might also facilitate understanding the complexity of learning because, 
at least in its informal forms, learning is not measurable. Self-educational potential has been 
described as one’s ability to reflect critically, learn, study, and influence (Hämäläinen and 
Nivala 2008, 205). Advancing self-educational potential of crisis management personnel 
could be one objective of their education and training.
Up to 80 percent of the activities in the National Defence Forces, are based on common 
knowledge and tacit knowledge. However, the educational practices of the NDF have 
been based on immediate teaching. (Halonen 2008, 102–103.) This is not optimal to 
the learning of tacit knowledge and probably the situation regarding crisis management 
is probably similar. Therefore, educational arrangements that strengthen life-long learning 
opportunities in crisis management are needed.
For professional officers, the situations in which they have to start to work in demanding 
duties without the opportunity to attend adequate courses may cause stress and frustration. 
Especially in demanding duties, the opportunities to study prior to the mission are important 
for the management of the duties. Those professional officers who have had thorough course 
and guidance arrangements were satisfied, while those without such opportunities appeared 
dissatisfied. The same kind of tendency was seen among the reservists working in special 
tasks that required guidance. 
Regarding RQ3 on crisis management practices, organizations, and education, it is clear 
that cultural issues should be handled more profoundly during the courses, as should issues 
related to the adaptation in new cultural environment. Because of the relevance of cultural 
awareness in crisis management, the pedagogic challenge of teaching cultural differences 
and background of a conflict should be taken seriously. In relation to RQ1 on the learning 
challenges that new conflicts pose to crisis management personnel, the interviews revealed 
that individual learning processes during the missions were mostly neglected in the education 
and training of the personnel. The education and training are more or less based on the idea 
of “school-type” of learning taking place during the courses and partly at work.
The challenges mentioned by the interviewees could be taken into consideration when 
planning study programs of crisis management personnel. Adaptation to various changes 
during and after the mission may be difficult for an individual. Because only three civilian 
crisis management employees had attended any training courses before travelling to Kosovo, 
my conclusion is that at the time of their recruitment there was a lack of adequate training 
in civilian crisis management.
8.7  Feedback and support to the return to Finland
Because many of the interviewees had not yet returned from the mission but continued to 
work in their duties in Kosovo, the procedure of the interviews varied slightly because of this 
difference. This section covers both the interviewees’ personal experiences from their return 
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and their ideas about how to improve return arrangements for the further development of 
crisis management are reported in this section. In part of the interviews, the conversation 
proceeded to the crisis management personnel’s return and demobilization arrangements 
in general and/or –to the questions related to mental health and support for mental health. 
This part of the interviewing process became more detailed as it went on. 
Feedback to personnel and ideas to develop feedback
The work certificate systems in various civilian agencies functioning in the field of civilian 
crisis management vary in accordance with organizational practices in these questions. Two 
of the civilian crisis management interviewees had some opportunity for feedback, one 
should have had the opportunity in principle but had not had it in practice and the rest did 
not report the opportunity for personal feedback. In international agencies, the recruitment 
often depends on factors other than an individual’s personal skills. This very nature of 
international agencies may impede the development of efficient feedback systems. If a 
project is arranged by a private enterprise, there is probably no regular system for arranging 
feedback to the personnel. According to these results, inadequate feedback arrangements in 
civilian crisis management may cause problems. Inadequate or insufficient feedback may 
inhibit both individual and organizational learning. The large number of actors in this field 
may make it difficult to tackle this problem.
Although CMC Finland has taken responsibility for feedback arrangements of the Finnish 
crisis management personnel, national arrangements cannot completely compensate for 
arrangements modified to individual organizations. Therefore, at least the international 
organizations and enterprises working for them, as well as single states, should have 
opportunities to receive feedback arrangements that are somehow standardized. It may be 
difficult to get the enterprises involved, if they do not have a model how to develop these 
arrangements.
There is a need to arrange feedback in ways that enable subordinate employees to provide 
honest feedback to their superiors. Developing feedback systems is important because to the 
recruitment of personnel whose personal characteristics make them unsuitable for civilian 
crisis management. Language and social skills are required in civilian crisis management 
focusing on various cultures, especially in higher positions of an agency. In some organizational 
settings when the project is not arranged by a large agency it may be difficult or impossible 
to develop a feedback-system that ensures feedback to an employee. Therefore, national 
feedback arrangements can complement the institutional feedback systems. Feedback 
information should be reliable in order for it to be valuable: unfortunately, this is not the 
case if all the employees receive positive feedback regardless of the actual outcome of their 
work. Due to the variety of the agencies and their practices, it is impossible to make clear 
conclusions about their feedback systems. Some kind of standardization of the feedback 
would improve the position of the employees: the need to establish a standardized feedback 
system was more acute in civilian crisis management, according to the interviews.
Peacekeepers working for Finnish troops in KFOR can receive work certificates after their 
service. Most of them received evaluations from their superiors. Development discussions 
carried out by one interviewee were interactive in nature, which meant that the personnel 
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in the subordinate positions could comment on the assessment. When working in the 
international staff, the personnel typically received feedback from the national side and 
from KFOR. One interviewee had received feedback three times although no development 
discussions were arranged. The feedback from KFOR or NATO was assessed as being 
over-positive. Communication with the Finnish superior in Kosovo aided assessment of 
the various cultures. The Finnish feedback system was found to be more credible than the 
NATO-based evaluation system.
Employee feedback should be provided in a positive manner, such as prompting learning 
processes, but some of the interviewees felt that the feedback was given too much like a 
“judgment”. Swedish feedback arrangements were assessed positively because of the positive 
atmosphere in which the feedback was given: and even negative feedback was given in a 
constructive way. Compared to the national system with its annual development discussions, 
the similar systems in the international service duties are not as well developed, according to 
one professional officer. Personal goals for the work period in peacekeeping could be set and 
the feedback system could be linked to these goals.
In general, the reservists working in crisis management receive evaluations from their 
superiors. Three of the interviewees were uncertain about feedback arrangements that would 
take place at the end of their duties in Kosovo. Self-evaluation and evaluation by superiors 
were compared in a fruitful manner. According to one reservist, the Swedish feedback 
system was more rewarding than the Finnish. Feedback was dependent on the superior’s 
ability to communicate: both giving and receiving feedback. On the other hand, feedback 
conversations also succeeded well. A normal kind of work certificate that potentially express 
the positive features of the employee was preferable as a form of feedback on the military 
side.
Personnel’s feedback to the crisis management organizations or regarding the missions 
and ideas for its development
One civilian crisis management interviewee had personally been active in providing feedback 
to the civilian crisis management organization she had worked for. Three interviewees 
mentioned that they had not had a chance to provide feedback about their duties. One 
civilian crisis management employee mentioned that she had not been asked to write any 
feedback regarding the mission, although this kind of information could be useful for 
the development of crisis management practices, while negative feedback may reduce the 
opportunities to get recruited into a new mission. Nationally and at the EU level, a system to 
gather feedback about the crisis management would be useful because information from the 
personnel would help develop better crisis management practices. Mission-related feedback 
could help the development of international agencies. The development ideas of civilian 
crisis management personnel were consistent with Howard’s (2008) ideas of gathering field 
information in order to develop institutional practices in crisis management.
Four professional officers mentioned the opportunity to provide feedback. One interviewee 
was unsure how well feedback from the Finnish KFOR troops in Kosovo would be analyzed 
and utilized later. Riskier operations might receive more attention from the defence 
administration. One interviewee mentioned that he had even provided feedback regarding the 
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position of the peacekeepers working out of the rotation schedules. Two officers mentioned 
that they had written a report about their duties and this kind of reporting functioned as 
feedback to the Finnish National Defence Forces. This kind of reporting was voluntary and 
was not gathered by KFOR. The Finnish National Defence Forces have existing feedback 
systems and a crucial development question is how this material is analyzed and utilized in 
order to develop the organization and its practices.
Three reservist peacekeepers felt that they had had opportunities to provide feedback, while 
two other interviewees that they had not had any such opportunity. Some kind of feedback 
could be provided informally because the atmosphere of the unit was good. One interviewee 
wondered whether peacekeepers were unwilling to give feedback – especially negative 
feedback – to the organization because they were afraid of not having further opportunities 
to serve as peacekeepers. Feedback could be made in a form of a report. 
Support to the return to Finland and other dimensions of mental support and ideas 
for their development
Several interviewees emphasized return arrangements even though it was not originally 
a theme of the interviews. However, given that many interviewees wanted to offer their 
opinions about return issues, the theme was included in most of the interviews. One civilian 
crisis management employee suggested that an obligatory conversation after an employee’s 
return would be a good practice and it would facilitate adaptation to the circumstances 
back at home. Regarding civilian crisis management duties in Kosovo, special psychological 
support practices did not seem to be necessary. At least, the need for psychological support 
after the mission was not mentioned, although the idea of feedback conversations might be 
considered as a good one.
Regarding professional officers, returning home could be perceived as an easy process. A 
service period of half a year might make return and adaptation at home easier. On the other 
hand, one officer spoke of the difficulties related to his return home.56 His difficulties were 
related to the contrast between unlimited, long workdays in Kosovo and everyday life with 
the family and limited work days, as well as the distance to his former work environment 
in Kosovo. In some regards, the return had not been difficult, but, an opportunity for a 
discussion might have been fruitful and facilitated the return.57 In the first peacekeeping 
duty, some stronger emotions rose during the transition period and previous peacekeeping 
experiences could facilitate learning about how to handle transitions and one’s emotions. 
Several interviews discussed feedback and debriefings arrangements. There was support for 
developing more advanced return arrangements in order to guarantee the peacekeepers’ well-
56 Interviewee:”So I must say that it is a real shock to return in that way. It is like talking to an empty room , you talk today 
like...  It is like you said earlier that you still have one foot in Kosovo, so I would say… that my body is here completely but 
I’m obliged to think what is happening there…sometimes, not all the time. Therefore I personally believe that we ought to 
take some model from Sweden.”
Interviewer: ”Yes.”
Interviewee: ” They have a system in which when they return from an international operation, the operation continues one 
week in their homeland.” (Interview 21.)
57 Interviewee:”Although I do not feel that I would have had any problems to set myself to live at home and so forth, but somehow 
it has emerged that it would be good to get to talk about these things to someone.”
Interviewer: ”Yes, yes.”’
Interviewee: ”...as well.. Although it has just been living over there,  it would be nice to talk with someone who knows what it’s 
all about.” (Interview 25.)
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being. It is recommended that every peacekeeper could have an opportunity for a personal 
conversation with an expert of this field 
after their return.
 
According to one male reservist who did not mention personal problems, there it would 
be reasonable to arrange possibilities to attend some return conversation or meeting. 
Furthermore, because it was easier to go to Kosovo than to return home, return meetings 
or conversations could help in adaptation back home. Another reservist mentioned that 
the system of Sweden, which signifies that peacekeepers’ work continues in Sweden after 
the return and includes personal discussion opportunities, enables personal processing of 
the mission and would have aided her adaptation at home. Each individual’s perception of 
the return might include an understanding of a difference between that individual and the 
others because the one coming from a mission continued like in the situation a year before 
and the ones having lived in Finland had “really” lived in Finland. Several interviewees said 
that some odd or sad feelings might arise after the return or transition. 
Two individuals (a priest and one deployed support person) worked for issues related to mental 
health of approximately 400 Finnish peacekeepers in Kosovo and there was also a network of 
voluntary support persons. One reservist interviewee wondered whether these arrangements 
were sufficient for mental support of the Finnish troops. An appointment to check the 
peacekeeper’s situation after returning to Finland could be beneficial to the individual 
and could also help develop the feedback systems. There was support for developing more 
advanced return arrangements to guarantee the peacekeepers’ well-being. One interviewee 
mentioned that he would personally not like to have any feedback or return conversation, 
but that such a conversation could be necessary for peacekeepers who had been in dangerous 
situations in their duties. Return conversations could be voluntary. Questionnaires related to 
the return and personal well-being could be sent to the peacekeepers twice after their home 
return, which would be a sign of caring about the well-being of peacekeepers.
Findings from feedback and return arrangements
The theme of adaptation when returning home arose spontaneously in some of the 
interviews. Some interviewees said that the return had been difficult, although not all who 
mentioned this as a relevant topic had experienced difficulties. Especially in riskier missions, 
the personnel may require permanent and clearer arrangements regarding receiving mental 
support. The role of priests has been to support peacekeepers mentally and spiritually (Helin 
2008). Some enlargement of mental support is needed in military crisis management, and 
the agencies that take responsibility for civilian crisis management also develop this type of 
service and support. 
However, it should be acknowledged that even “well-being” individuals may also require 
the opportunity to have a conversation to better adapt to everyday realities in Finland. This 
type of opportunity should be provided regardless, how stressful the service abroad has been 
to an individual. A need for a return conversation should not be regarded as a negative or 
stigmatizing sign. Three interviewees mentioned either during or after the interview that the 
interview had functioned as a form of return discussion or a debriefing. In riskier operations, 
the need for debriefing and feedback conversations will probably be substantially higher 
171
than for Kosovo. Higher risks cause more stressful events at work. These occasions should 
be handled in some form during the mission and as a whole when the individual returns 
back home.
Return conversations are currently being developed, both on the military and civilian sides 
(latter/CMC Finland). It is challenging to try and connect procedures that strengthen mental 
health and adaptation with learning processes, both at the individual and institutional levels. 
In the training and in the material distributed to the personnel, potential problems arising 
after the return should be handled seriously. Many of the potential problems after the return 
are social in nature and are related to different experiences of the person returning and those 
staying home.
Feedback arrangements are carried out by the Finnish National Defence Forces regarding 
military crisis management and by CMC-Finland regarding civilian crisis management 
although the CMC-arrangements had not yet started when the civilian crisis management 
personnel interviewed for this research returned home. However, these new arrangements 
can have a more positive impact for an individual and his or her learning than they have had 
until today. There t is a question mark over how well the gathered information is utilized at 
the institutional level in order to develop the operational practices. The interviewees in the 
civilian crisis management had faced various feedback practices. General guidelines especially 
for feedback practices in the institutions of civilian crisis management are important.
From a fruitful theoretical perspective, applying Howard (2008), a linkage between first- and 
second-level learning is important for the development of peace operations: well-functioning 
feedback arrangements would be important. Feedback standards and development processes 
could aid organizational learning in peace operations and crisis management. On the other 
hand, well-modified personal feedback and some kind of learning-goal- setting could 
strengthen personnel’s opportunities to learn and develop themselves. However, learning 
and giving feedback should not be simplified. It may be difficult to assess which practices 
would be the best ones because the assessment takes a long time and the practices may need 
to be modified quickly.
For institutions, insufficient utilization of personnel’s feedback is waste of resources. For 
individuals, feedback facilitates learning and personal development. Feedback to both 
individuals and institutions should be used in a comparable manner. As mentioned at the 
end of sections 8.3 and 8.4, informal learning takes place at work in various missions. 
Part of informal learning involves handling tacit knowledge. Individuals may even better 
understand their learning processes if they have opportunities to provide feedback and 
simultaneously think about their learning processes. Informal learning might even lead to 
the formation of explicit knowledge through reflective processes facilitated by appropriate 
feedback arrangements. 
When managing knowledge, it is relevant to establish working methods that enable 
knowledge and skills transfer from one individual to another, and its modification as part of 
the common knowledge and know-how of the organization (Moisio & Salimäki 2005). The 
temporary nature of crisis management tasks means that information transfers are extremely 
important. Feedback gathering can comprise a major part of knowledge and information 
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transfers in crisis management missions. Feedback arrangements should be taken into 
account when developing leadership and management practices as well.
It is also necessary to develop feedback arrangement during civilian and military crisis 
management missions. An environment that supports the autonomy of its personnel 
enhances its learning opportunities, and positive feedback usually improves an employee’s 
work motivation (Salmela-Aro & Nurmi 2005). Because crisis management missions are 
temporary in nature, too little attention has been paid to establishing the circumstances that 
support motivation and well-being in ways that are common in ordinary working places. 
Feedback is part of good leadership and it supports developing competences and working 
methods (see Nissinen et al. 2008; Virtainlahti 2009, 154). The ability of superiors to 
provide positive feedback and to provide any feedback in a positive manner should receive 
attention when planning the education and training processes of the superiors in crisis 
management. Coaching and evaluation of the results should support learning processes 
especially regarding interactive skills within an organization. Because of the temporary 
nature of the crisis management organizations, feedback processes should be well planned 
and evaluated in accordance with other efforts to develop well-functioning leadership and 
learning processes.
The criteria for a successful outcome in a certain task are often unclear, which means that 
feedback from others may be crucial (Salmela-Aro & Nurmi 2005, 137). Such situations 
may take place often in crisis management duties, in which the actor may find it difficult 
to make quick decisions or assess activities that require certain skills. The need for feedback 
may sometimes be even higher in crisis management than in more ordinary-kind of work.
Courses for crisis management personnel should be planned so that they seriously consider 
the personnel’s challenges to adapt to the changes required for crisis management duties. 
The return home seems to be a more challenging change than going to work abroad in crisis 
management. Support for the reflection of the changes may facilitate the personnel’s actual 
abilities to work “with” these issues.
Previous studies have also recognized difficulties connected to returning home (see Röberg 
1999, 45). Many spouses of peacekeepers were surprised that the peacekeeping did not end 
when the peacekeeper returned home (ibid., 46). Peacekeeping is such a strong experience 
that former peacekeepers keep talking about it when meeting each other (ibid.). Police 
officers who served in Kosovo found it was frustrating to come home from more challenging 
duties because their work communities were usually not interested in their experiences and 
personal development during the duties in Kosovo (Raatikainen 2004, 76). Therefore, an 
individual can experience difficulties both at home and at work after the return.
Regarding RQ1 on learning in crisis management and RQ3 on crisis management practices, 
organizations, and education, it is clear that the learning cycle between individual and 
institutional learning has not been the framework for developing feedback practices in crisis 
management. Gathering information from crisis management personnel should lead to 
institutional learning. Practices to develop institutional learning should be developed in 
both civilian and military crisis management. This kind of information gathering could also 
lead to the development of collaboration among various actors. 
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8.8  Summary of the qualitative interviews 
The results of the qualitative interviews provide information about the personnel’s experiences 
and the requirements for crisis management personnel. Interviewees mostly perceived the 
challenges in crisis management in a balanced manner. In addition, the interviews were 
affected by the interviewer and the selective nature of the memory of any interviewee. 
The results of this chapter can be interpreted in terms of learning. Table 10 categorizes 
learning processes and challenges as well as potential institutional deficiencies in terms of 
learning in crisis management. The table helps answer the main RQ and RQs 1, 2, and 3. 
Some of the interviewees expressed both positive and negative perceptions. Learning processes 
in crisis management can be derived from the interview material. They are divided into 
several categories in Table 10 consistently with Illeris (2009a) and Senge (1994). Adaptation 
to changes is classified as a learning process, because several interviewees identified return 
difficulties as a challenge. Adaptation requires several kinds of learning processes in terms 
of Illeris’s (2009a) categories: mechanical, assimilative, accommodative, and transformative 
learning. Of these, accommodative and transformative learning describe individual learning 
as having an impact on cognitive structures (Illeris 2009a). Transformative learning was 
combined with a positive experience of self-realization which strengthened confidence.
Table 10.  Learning processes, challenges for individuals, and institutional deficiencies
To respond to the main RQ and RQ1, it is important to realize that learning processes in crisis 
management take different forms. As Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) explained, making tacit 
knowledge explicit is part of a spiral process between tacit and explicit knowledge. Handling 
tacit knowledge is a prerequisite for organizational learning. Informal learning signifies 
learning outside school-like environments: it is a form of adapting both tacit and explicit 
knowledge and it can also make a major part of learning at work. Training and education 
are often necessary for supporting informal learning processes and are required in order to 
adapt easily definable skills in crisis management. According to the results, the interviewees 
had not received support for informal learning or learning at work when they had attended 
education and training for their crisis management duties. Didactical applications regarding 
different competences and levels of learning are needed when developing education and 
training of the personnel.
Learning processes  Learning challenges   Institutional deficiencies 
Transformative learning Self-realization  Insufficient learning strategies 
Accommodative learning Self-realization 
                                           Learning unexpected combinations Lack of acknowledgement 
Assimilative learning Receiving functional feedback Insufficient feedback systems 
Mechanical learning Instructions 
  Teaching  
Adaptation into changes Returning home  Lack of debriefing strategies 
Organizational learning Functional feedback  Insufficient feedback systems 
  Learning at work  Lack of life-long learning vision 
  Tacit knowledge  Arrangements for orientation 
                                           Informal learning 
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I believe that self-realization is an outcome of positive and creative problem-solving that 
often occurs in transformative and accommodative learning processes. The interviewees 
expressed this type of learning when describing their experiences of applying their 
knowledge in new situations. To answer RQ 3, the results of the interviews reflect several 
institutional deficiencies: namely, lack of life-long learning vision, lack of acknowledgement 
of tacit knowledge, insufficient feedback systems, and lack of debriefing strategies. These 
deficiencies should be improved by developing crisis management organizations in terms of 
learning. Without comprehension of tacit knowledge, educational practices may also suffer 
from inadequate learning vision, which could lead to neglecting informal learning at work. 
Training for crisis management duties is based on mainstream ideas of required competences, 
but not as much on the idea of how the personnel would best learn these competences. 
These questions should be reconsidered when developing educational practices for crisis 
management.
Positive experiences of crisis management personnel are often connected to some kind of 
self-realization. To answer the main RQ and RQ1 which focused on learning, it is necessary 
to understand that positive learning outcomes can be promoted in crisis management, 
even though it may be difficult. Positive experiences were often combined with success in 
new situations that could be described as learning, even though the interviewees did not 
always describe these experiences in this way. These kinds of situations are also emotionally 
rewarding and they can be described as informal learning. This kind of learning partly means 
adopting tacit knowledge. It is difficult to assess learning and its utilization at work because 
learning is combined with other work activities (see Collin 2005). Therefore, it is difficult 
for individuals to perceive whether they have achieved “a new level” in their understanding 
of a phenomenon at work. Being aware of one’s own learning processes may be impossible. 
Because informal learning consists of constructing and learning tacit knowledge, further 
research on this theme is important. Crisis management organizations need to understand 
the role of tacit knowledge and informal learning in order to develop learning organizations 
and knowledge management in them.
The challenge for the evolution of crisis management organizations is to enable individual 
learning that would lead to institutional learning or change. As concluded in chapter 6, 
learning as a human phenomenon occurs within an individual, although it is affected 
by social processes (see also Illeris 2011). Institutional learning may occur at the level of 
working teams which represent communities of practice in Wenger’s (1998) terms. The 
development of feedback systems is essential for both individual and institutional learning. It 
is a way of making tacit knowledge explicit at the organizational level and part of knowledge 
creation (see Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Understanding the interdependence of tacit and 
explicit knowledge at the organizational level may facilitate developing crisis management 
organizations and practices. 
Instead of separate agencies, a crisis management organization can be seen as consisting 
of all the institutions and actors relevant for the operation. Today, the feedback systems 
of the various agencies differ from each other and employees of private enterprises do not 
necessarily receive any feedback at all. The interviewees had plenty of ideas about how 
to develop practices both in civilian and military crisis management: these ideas covered 
training, feedback and return arrangements. Gathering ideas about how to develop crisis 
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management in the future appeared to be fruitful. As mentioned in section 8.6, one 
professional officer had gathered material for his successor in order to facilitate learning for 
the duties. Guidance also facilitated learning. These results offer us some understanding of 
the important role that tacit knowledge has in crisis management.
Crisis management duties require a lot of time, and they are temporary and demanding. 
Many challenges are caused by the distance to the families and friends. Regarding military 
crisis management in Kosovo it was a necessity for the personnel to leave their families at 
home. Some other duties that require work abroad also require to living separately from 
one’s family. Paradoxically when the family stays home, there may be more time for staying 
at work and working even longer days. 
Regarding RQ3, the experiences of the personnel described in chapter 8 underline the 
personnel’s professional abilities and their communication skills. Cross-cultural issues are 
significant both in interaction within an international mission as well as in contacts with 
local employees, representatives of regional governance, and other local inhabitants. A 
certain kind of flexibility is required from the personnel working in such circumstances. 
To promote the human security, the expatriate personnel need to communicate with local 
people as well as to learn new issues – and to enable institutional learning. Interaction with 
the local population often occurs with the help of interpreters. Cultural differences and the 
complexity of the operation may make communication more difficult, which means that 
personal abilities that can be learnt through education and training are essential.
The interviewees interpreted gender issues in diverse ways. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand the range of views the personnel had regarding their cooperation with local 
inhabitants in a crisis area. Cultural and gender education may somehow standardize 
personnel’s knowledge of these particular issues. However, the local inhabitants’ opinions 
on these issues in a conflict area may be controversial. It would be recommendable to have 
guidelines about how to act in a situation that is a dilemma if local opinions are divided. 
Cultural realities and recommendations for empowering all the population are compared. 
Guidance in gender issues during the operation may facilitate dealing with them (see Anttila 
2011). Strategic planning in the recruitment may help get both women and men to work in 
crisis management duties for which the influence of the gender is essential. 
Personnel’s feedback opportunities facilitate individual and institutional learning as well 
as guarantee the personnel’s well-being. Changes when starting work in an international 
mission, as well as when returning home, may be surprising for an individual. Returning 
home requires adaptation that may be more complicated than people presume beforehand. 
The theme of the difficulties when returning home was tangible in several interviews because 
of the interviewees’ own experience or because of observing some others’ challenging return 
processes. Several interviewees emphasized the meaning of the return which suggests it is 
an important theme. Acknowledgement of this difficulty should lead to practical policies 
that facilitate the return of personnel. Opportunities for return conversations could be part 
of this process. After more complex and riskier missions than in Kosovo, the return may be 
even more demanding for an individual. 
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Regarding RQ2 on the crisis management personnel’s experiences and their influence on 
the identities and self-concepts, the positive sphere of the experiences is a major finding 
in the results. Also, it is noticeable that most of the interviewees mostly did not report any 
identity changes. Successful experiences were often linked to a positive self-concept and 
some kind of self-realization. Although those individuals who had negative experiences may 
have refused to be interviewed, the relatively stable crisis management environment could 
mainly explain this result. Although no major identity changes took place, the interviews 
suggest it is worth reporting that identification with the work community was most modest 
among the professional officers, while the reservists identified with their work communities, 
including the peacekeeping community, most strongly when the professional groups were 
compared. Identification with the crisis management communities could have an impact 
on the personnel’s identities although they did not mention this aspect when asked about 
identity changes. Multidimensional experiences seem to enable learning and work in crisis 
management may be a good time for learning within an individual’s life span and life-long 
learning processes. 
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9.  Learning in crisis management: 
 conclusions from the results 
9.1  Evaluation of the methods and the significance 
 of the research
 
Validity is based on the idea that empirical research actually measures what is expected 
to measure. In qualitative data, criteria of validity rely on honesty, the depth, richness 
and scope the obtained data, the participants, objectivity and the extent of triangulation. 
Validity is regarded in degree rather than as an absolute state. (Cohen et al.2007, 133.) The 
validity and reliability of the empirical parts of this research rely on the criteria in use in 
qualitative research. There is also some supplementary criteria regarding the Delphi panel 
process. Some theorists believe that reliability does not cover qualitative research and that 
terms like credibility, neutrality, consistency, and trustworthiness should be used instead 
(ibid. 148). Triangulation is a means to increase the validity and reliability of a research and 
therefore, methodological triangulation has been applied to this research. Validity responds 
to the question of whether a method explains or describes the phenomena it was meant to 
explain or describe. The question of the validity of the results is more complicated than 
the question of credibility. In the interviews, the interviewees were able to check whether 
they had understood the questions correctly. Consequently I presume that the interviews 
interpreted for this research actually measure the things they were meant to measure. In the 
Delphi panel process, the interpretation of the first-round results affects on the arguments 
or questions in use during the second round. In the Argument Delphi panel process, the 
researcher was allowed to provoke the experts to obtain information that potentially reveals 
weak or strengthening signals: therefore, the validity of the whole process is more difficult 
to assess.
There are two systematic errors in futures thinking; namely overestimating change 
and underestimating inertia. On the other hand, reports provoke reactions which affect 
development. In fact, a good prediction is one that leads to action and change – not the one 
coming true. (Godet 2001, 22–24.) Therefore, it is difficult to assess the validity of futures 
studies and this dilemma also extends to my research. A study may itself impact the future 
and lead changes which otherwise would not have occurred. Therefore, revealing weak or 
emerging signals can be part of the reliability of any research process in futures studies, 
although it is difficult to indicate the truth-value of these signals. The relevance of the 
arguments concerning futures development which Kuusi (1999, 77) has defined as criteria for 
significance of a Delphi study may be seen only afterwards. There are some systematic errors 
in Delphi panel processes. The more distant the envisioned future, the greater the variation 
among expert assessment. Experts tend to be more pessimistic in a longer perspective in 
compared to short-term estimations. Research questionnaires and posed questions may have 
an impact on the results. The more desirable the idea being assessed, the closer its emergence 
is estimated. A closer crisis is seen as being more meaningful than a longer-term crisis. 
Simplicity and certainty are overestimated in compared to complexity and uncertainty. 
(Kuusi 2003, 223–224.) When analyzing the results of any Delphi research, these aspects 
should be taken into account.
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In interviews, the best way to achieve greater validity is to minimize bias as much as possible: 
one way to control the reliability is to make the interview questions crystal clear (Cohen et 
al. 2007, 150–151). The ontological and epistemological assumptions affect how focused 
interviews are estimated as a research method and how the validity of results is measured 
(Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2006, 19). Interviews are always results of social interaction which 
influences the outcome (Alasuutari 2001, 142–143). Understanding the interactive nature 
of an interview process helps to make the analysis as objective as possible.
The methodological concept of reliability is used to describe how well methods measure 
or represent the phenomena they are meant to measure. As in qualitative interviews in 
general, the interviews in this research were unique narratives. The interviewees gave their 
interpretations of the events and it is impossible to know how other individuals present at 
the same events would have interpreted them. Personal perspectives on crisis management 
were expressed. When assessing the reliability of the results, it is essential to remember that 
the consistencies of the group of interviewees as well as the Delphi panel have an impact on 
the results. As mentioned at the end of chapter 8, the interviewees may be more optimistic 
than those who would not like to be interviewed about their crisis management experiences. 
Regarding the Delphi panel process, a panel consistency either solely based on the civilian 
or the military side might have provided results other than those presented in this research.
The interviewer’s personality and status as a civilian doctoral student at the National 
Defence University might have had an impact on the interviews. Issues related to feedback 
and debriefing systems may have been more easily expressed to a civilian than to an officer, 
for example. On the other hand, some more militarily-oriented problems might have been 
more easily told to an officer. The information from the crisis management personnel’s 
interviews as well as from the Delphi panel process was interpreted with respect to the actual 
answers. Therefore, I believe that the credibility of both materials was high. 
The unique nature of the interview process means it would be impossible to repeat exactly 
as it occurred in this research. The same kind of uniqueness also applied to the Delphi panel 
process. Despite the uniqueness of the interview and the panel processes, I believe that the 
results from this material have provided new knowledge, although it is mostly consistent 
with some of the studies introduced in earlier chapters.
The futures panel process revealed current questions for the near future of crisis management 
and peace-building. Results regarding feedback systems and return arrangements were 
consistent when utilizing two methods. Applying two methods made it possible to find 
processes that are relevant and close to individuals working in crisis areas. The results were 
complementary and consistent with the essential role of communication and contact skills. 
These findings are not contradictory with the challenges that have been traditionally linked 
to peace-building and peacekeeping activities; instead, they should be taken seriously 
account when developing crisis management. Core competences in military and civilian 
crisis management will remain highly significant. It is relevant that working conditions and 
training of crisis management personnel are developed in accordance with new challenges. 
This kind of development may enhance human security, both of the personnel and of local 
inhabitants. A comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach has enabled the analysis of 
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the core competences required for crisis management. On the other hand, it has made the 
theoretical framework of the research fairly broad.
9.2  Results of two empirical parts concisely
The main RQ of this research focuses on what kind of learning should be promoted in 
crisis management. Four of this report’s research questions were introduced in chapter 2 and 
handled in the conclusions of the theoretical and empirical chapters. At the beginning of 
this chapter, the results of the two empirical chapters of this research will be compared with 
each other and with the theories introduced in chapters from 3–6. At the end of the chapter, 
a summary of the results will be introduced by answering the four RQs. The research focus 
of two kinds of empirical entities was partially different, which means that the comparison 
of these results cannot be regarded as a broad methodological triangulation but as a partial 
one. Two empirical parts can be interpreted separately. It is hoped that the results may 
be applied to “futures making”. However, any future assessment of primarily intellectual 
activity or endeavor is inherently difficult. 
The futures panel on crisis management presumed that conflicts that would be interfered 
with by means of crisis management would resemble the new conflicts defined in chapter 
3. Future crisis management will be demanding due to the complexity of conflicts. When 
conflicts and crisis management become more complex, learning becomes complicated 
as well. For challenges related to complicated information flows, methods to promote 
transformative learning and comprehension of large amounts of information should be 
emphasized. 
The futures panel emphasized collaboration of various crisis management organizations 
and agencies. The panel supported the idea of cooperation between local people and 
crisis management actors, as well as between civilian crisis management and development 
cooperation. Cooperation and coordination are necessary between organizations that 
potentially consist of a multitude of actors. The teams in which the personnel are deployed 
require collaborative competences. Compared with official reports on crisis management 
(for example, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009), the emphasis on cooperation is not 
surprising. However, an essential question is how to enhance cooperability in practice. Is this 
a challenge for developing networks and network-based working methods in and between 
organizations?
The crisis management personnel interviewed for this study mentioned some unofficial 
aspects not favoring cooperation. Rivalry between the organizations may cause problems, 
while different organizational traditions may impact what kinds of practices are considered 
good. Many interviewees found communication difficult because some personnel from 
other countries could not communicate in English. Crisis management organizations must 
be aware of potential communication problems within organizations and between them 
as well as between crisis management personnel and local inhabitants. When enhancing 
organizational learning, it is also important to understand communication questions related 
to work of all the personnel. These themes are also undoubtedly worthy of further research.
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An individual may work in complicated and culturally diverse environments where skilful 
communication is a necessity. Local awareness and comprehension of cultural differences 
facilitate communication. Multi-level requirements of peace-building must be taken into 
consideration when developing crisis management. Both now and in the future, it will not 
be sufficient to construct administration only for the requirements of central governance. 
Peace-building occurs at various levels that have specific challenges. Crisis management 
personnel are obliged to interpret diverse demands coming from local population and 
various actors involved in peace-building.
Question marks remain regarding specialization in crisis management and the potential 
need to model various types of conflicts. These ideas did not receive support from the futures 
panel. However, they may be worth further investigation in some advanced forms. Modeling 
should not be regarded as a “technical” tool because there are and will be differences between 
conflicts. 
Comprehensiveness in crisis management could advance in terms of organizational learning 
and unifying common tasks and objectives at the operational level. At best, cooperability 
provides a foundation for common identities and facilitates division of labor. Organizational 
learning is essential for the future of crisis management. Sufficient feedback arrangements 
that enable organizational learning are required. Coordination between organizations in 
crisis management is necessary and even organizational learning could be coordinated. 
These aspects should have an impact on leadership and management of these organizations 
and agencies. Organizational learning is collaborative learning among various civilian and 
military agencies and organizations participating in crisis management. 
In regard to Figure 2 in section 5.1, various levels of organizational life should be taken 
into consideration as well. In terms of cooperation between various organizations, crisis 
management personnel interviewees mostly described collaboration between teams or 
departments. Within their own organization, they mostly described cooperation within their 
own teams. The organizational level was more distant. In the futures panel, various levels 
were handled in different theses of the questionnaire. In order to develop crisis management 
organizations, distinctions must be made between various organizational levels. 
Local ownership is a prerequisite for durable human security. According to the futures panel, 
local inhabitants should influence the planning of crisis management and peace-building. 
As much as possible, they should have an impact on peace-building in order to strengthen 
local ownership. According to the interview results, contacts with local people can be 
both challenging and interesting. Interaction may be especially challenging if hostilities 
continuously take place, as in the current situation in Afghanistan. In such circumstances, 
it is especially demanding to strengthen trust within society. Enhancing human security 
requires crisis management personnel to have communication and contact skills because they 
enable strengthening local involvement which is a condition for successful peace-building.
Training before the missions may facilitate contacts with local people. Expatriate crisis 
management personnel need encouragement to identify local inhabitants’ views and even 
opinion differences among them. The gender issues may be dilemmas for expatriates working 
in crisis management duties. The interviews revealed a multitude of opinions on gender 
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issues. In addition, there may also be various interpretations of this theme among local 
inhabitants. The empowerment of the whole population may challenge working methods. 
Leadership, guidelines for gender issues, and education of the personnel need to support 
both cultural and gender awareness. 
Generally speaking, crisis management personnel did not recognize identity changes taking 
place as a result of their work. The work community in military crisis management appeared 
to be more important for the reservists than for the professional officers in military crisis 
management. Most of the interviewees had been busy in the operation. The experiences of 
the crisis management personnel can be compared to some extent with the futures panelists’ 
views on the qualifications of the personnel. The experiences of the crisis management 
personnel were mostly positive, and positive learning experiences appeared to take place 
because of the self-realization at work. Some of the controversies they recalled could be seen 
as part of learning processes. There had been various obstacles for the cooperation, including 
different interpretations on behalf of actors working for different organizations. To improve 
the cooperation, it is essential to emphasize the common goals of different organizations and 
agencies in a joint operation. As concluded in chapter 5, strengthening a common identity 
could facilitate collaboration as well. It can take place by respecting the existing roles and 
identities of various actors.
Debriefing and return arrangements after the mission were emphasized by many interviewees 
who had worked in Kosovo. The futures panel found the feedback arrangements to be essential 
for developing crisis management. Return arrangements should also be taken seriously into 
the consideration during the training. In addition, special information booklets on this 
issue might be useful. The significance of potential debriefing arrangements meant that 
challenges relating to the return home as well as the need to develop feedback systems 
were emphasized in the interviews and panel process: these messages may be interpreted 
as “strengthening signals”. There is no reason to neglect these messages in regard to the 
evolution of crisis management systems in the future. In more complicated operations, these 
types of challenges may even be more demanding than in Kosovo. 
The qualifications of the personnel described by the Delphi panelists focused on 
communicative and professional skills. These skills may also be promoted in education 
and training as well. Cooperation at various levels and towards different directions will 
be a challenge in crisis management and also has an impact on the personnel and the 
skills required in crisis management. Illeris (2011) assessed reflectivity as a key element to 
competence development and it belongs among the core competences in crisis management. 
Communicative skills are especially important in civilian crisis management. In military 
crisis management, the individual’s duties have a stronger impact on the level of the 
communicative skills required of that individual. However, the potential need for 
communication skills should be taken into consideration in all duties as this is a crucial 
issue for developing education and training for crisis management duties. Professional 
skills in crisis management appear to include creativity, which means the capacity to learn 
new things and new ways to react in unexpected situations. Therefore, applying acquired 
knowledge or skills in new circumstances comprises a significant part of learning. The ability 
to make ethical assessments is needed, although the panel did not emphasize this point. 
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Crisis management personnel envisage moral dilemmas, which creates the need for the 
personnel to have abilities related to ethical assessment.
In Kosovo, individual learning often took the forms of informal learning. Learning in crisis 
management tasks does not usually resemble learning in educational institutions. It is often 
informal and signifies learning at work. The crisis management personnel’ experiences 
introduced in this research may open the doors for new kinds of learning processes, education 
and training. At least partly, the informal nature of individual learning of tacit knowledge 
in crisis management should become more explicit and conscious in order to facilitate 
organizational or institutional learning. Understanding processes in the evolvement of tacit 
knowledge in this field is also important. Learning about the core competences may require 
different learning strategies. Therefore, in the education and training of the personnel, 
different types of learning processes need to be understood and encouraged. It is necessary 
to apply long-term educational strategies involving learning at work and understanding of 
multi-type learning of the core competences.
The futures panelists’ views were in favor of standards in education and training for civilian 
crisis management. According to the panel, crisis management duties, information about 
the operation, local cultures, and the historical background of the conflict should play 
an essential role in the education for crisis management duties. Regarding military crisis 
management, the education and training of basic military skills are also important. According 
to several interviewees who had experience in crisis management, lifelong learning ideas 
were not promoted during their education and training before the mission. Because such 
personnel apply their skills and knowledge through the operation, education and training 
should encourage individual efforts to learn in a persevering way.
The following introduces some brief answers to the research questions. Conclusions will 
be made from the results of the two empirical chapters of this research as well as from the 
literature reviewed previously. 
The main RQ:
  What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?
Crisis management organizations require learning individuals in order to change. Core 
competences include skills and abilities that crisis management personnel should learn 
before and during the mission. Core competences in civilian crisis management differ from 
those in military crisis management. Apart from core competences, personnel also require 
competences for their specific duties.
There has been a lack of capacity to transform individual learning processes into institutional 
and organizational learning and change in crisis management (see Howard 2008). 
Organizational learning require adequate organizational arrangements and support from 
the leadership of crisis management operations. 
Regarding human security, the abilities of the crisis management personnel in communication 
and cooperation are crucial and will remain as such in the future. Increased complexity in 
conflicts and peace-building may take place and make the work in crisis management even 
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more challenging. Cultural awareness and communication competences will help take local 
populations into peace processes and provide human security. Reflectivity can be seen as 
part of adopting the ability to make ethical assessment and personal competences. Besides, 
in military crisis management, combat skills are important.
For individuals, learning is often informal in its nature, which means that more detailed 
knowledge is required about both individual and institutional learning in crisis management. 
The idea of prompting individuals’ learning at work should be included in the training and 
education of the crisis management personnel. Different competences required for crisis 
management are learned in many ways, which means that several kinds of learning strategies 
should be enabled to promote core competences. Crisis management organizations should 
improve feedback mechanisms that strengthen both institutional and individual learning 
because both of them are significant for the evolvement of crisis management. From an 
institutional point of view, organizational learning processes are emphasized and their 
promotion should be a key target when developing crisis management and peace-building 
processes. 
RQ1: What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management 
organizations and personnel? 
New conflicts are complex: therefore, it is necessary for crisis management personnel to 
understand their background. Personnel should understand the cultural environment in 
which they work, as well as the local population’s empowerment as part of providing human 
security. Crisis management is multicultural and the comprehension of the shared objectives 
of the mission also facilitates working. The individual level learning of the personnel and 
information sharing within the operation enable organizational learning. This core idea 
needs to be made explicit for all parties. In order to develop education and training for crisis 
management personnel, the didactical applications will be needed as well.
For the personnel, crisis management work provides many opportunities for learning, 
although the duties may be demanding. At best, self-realization of the personnel takes 
place and positive experiences strengthen self-confidence. The experience seemed to have 
more personal than social meanings for the interviewees. Changes of time and space can be 
difficult to deal with. Return home may be difficult and arrangements for facilitating the 
adaptation after the return require improvement.
2. (RQ): How do field experiences affect the personnel’s identities and self-concepts?
Positive experiences of managing new situations were often linked to self-realization and 
positive self-concepts although the interviewees did not express as many changes in their 
identities. At the personal level, positive experiences appear to be combined with informal 
learning. Identification with the peacekeeping community was common among the reservists, 
but not among the professional officers. Several civilian crisis management interviewees also 
identified themselves with civilian crisis management personnel. However, it is impossible 
to conclude how long-lasting this type of identification is and the degree to which it affects 
one’s identity in the long run. 
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3 (RQ): How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be developed 
when the human security approach is taken into account?
According to the results, practices strengthening local ownership need improvement. 
Cooperation between various agencies and between local residents and expatriate actors 
in peace-building is a priority for well-functioning peace-building and crisis management. 
Cooperation skills are needed in order to guarantee human security prerequisites for which 
are respect for local views and participation. Various aspects of collaboration should also 
be taken into account in the education and training of the personnel. A clear division of 
labor and definition of tasks given to single agencies facilitate cooperation. The need for 
cooperation skills does not make other professional skills less important than before. In 
the education and training of the personnel, there is a need to pay attention to general 
learning abilities and personnel’s further learning at crisis management work. Educators 
and instructors need to understand the competences required in crisis management and 
how they are learned during the courses and after them. Individuals need support for their 
identity work as well.
Feedback arrangements are central for the progress of crisis management. Personnel’s 
activities potentially enable organizational learning in crisis management. Crisis management 
organizations should be more aware of the core competences in crisis management and 
how they can be learnt both individually and institutionally. Results from learning studies, 
and especially studies focusing on learning at work and organizational learning, could 
be applied to this context. Because common identity for crisis management and peace-
building personnel might facilitate cooperation, common education, training, and guidance 
might reinforce common identity construction. Likewise, emphasizing common goals of 
civilian and military actors strengthens both cooperability and potentially common identity 
construction. 
Futures conflicts will probably remain complex. Stronger local involvement facilitates 
peace processes. Contact skills and cultural awareness will be crucial for crisis management 
personnel in the future. Personnel should be able to cooperate with a range of partners. Life-
long learning at work should be taken into account more seriously during the training and 
missions so that different learning processes would be facilitated. Informal learning should 
be acknowledged when training and education for crisis management duties are developed. 
Cooperation in training of civilian and military employees is needed although the roles of 
civilian and military personnel in crisis management should remain clear.
9.3  How to improve learning, feedback systems, 
 and training
Understanding the growing importance of the communicative tasks in crisis management 
and peacebuilding is a key issue in developing these practices. It is necessary to strengthen 
learning of communication skills before and during crisis management operations. 
Competence development overall also requires reflectivity. In order to enable the institutional 
(second-level) learning it is important that the first-level learning results are well handled 
and reported and that the conclusions from them implemented. Learning individuals are 
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important for evolving crisis management, because they may gather operational knowledge 
and provide feedback. This enables organizational or institutional learning and change. 
On the other hand, it is essential that the institutions enable individual learning by giving 
feedback. A crisis management operation needs to advance as a learning organization 
although it may consist of several actors. 
Figure 5.  Learning and change in crisis management
Different institutions collaborate for the joint objectives. Individuals working in crisis 
management often cooperate within an organization and between agencies, as well as with 
local inhabitants. As concluded in chapter 6, learning takes place within an individual 
although it is affected by social processes. Therefore, organizational learning means change 
enabled by the learning of individuals leading to reassessment and potentially new activities 
within an organization. For organizational learning and change, communication about the 
results or outcomes is crucial. Gathering diverse data about the results is important for 
organizational learning in crisis management and peace-building. The outcome should be 
assessed by taking into account local people’s estimations as well as the mission’s personnel’s 
views. Different learning strategies for different situations, knowledge and skills could be 
promoted. 
Well-functioning feedback systems are also a condition for learning organizations. 
Organizations and agencies in crisis management should develop their feedback systems 
in order to enable organizational change. A peace-building or crisis management operation 
generally consists of a range of agencies or organizations. In order to create a “learning 
and changing operation” in crisis management, these organizations should be able to share 
information and even critical findings about the results of an operation.
Gathering feedback during the missions is not sufficient to develop crisis management and 
peace-building. Information should also be analyzed and utilized. Both the futures panel 
and the interviews of crisis management personnel were in favor of developing feedback 
systems. Howard’s (2008) framework of operational (first-level learning; mostly individual) 
and institutional (second-level learning) learning levels makes it easier to understand that 
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(individual) 
learning
Second level
(institutional) learning
in crisis management
186
adequate feedback systems are important in developing crisis management and peace-
building. Learning within different organizations in a crisis management operation should 
be gathered and shared in such a way that the whole operation would utilize it. Regarding 
feedback systems and learning options, it is important to acknowledge the need to develop 
leadership strategies in crisis management as well. A multitude of actors are present in a 
crisis management and peace-building process. A multi-cultural environment always 
complicates leadership processes (see Nissinen et al. 2008, 41). Because of the multi-cultural 
and temporary nature of crisis management, reforms within international agencies and 
organizations should take place with goal-oriented efforts to achieve progress in feedback 
practices. There is a challenge to get a peace operation as a whole to function as a learning 
organization.
Information technology may be utilized more intensively in the future: to strengthen the 
learning in crisis management both at individual and institutional levels. If this type of 
progress includes growing and up-dated knowledge about crisis management missions, it 
will facilitate learning how to develop on-going and forth-coming operations. Information 
that is processed more quickly may reduce uncertainty. Institutional learning that relies on 
information technological development requires individual learning.
The more complex the conflicts and both crisis management and peace-building 
become, the more demanding the communication will be. Communication skills are a 
prerequisite for situation awareness. Contacts between different actors will be an essential 
part of crisis management work in the future. Therefore, communication skills should 
not be underestimated even in situations with riskier military crisis management tasks. 
Communication skills may be regarded as a condition for fulfilling first-level learning because 
they are a necessity for developing second-level learning when applying Howard’s (2008) 
typology. On the other hand, second-level learning enables first-level learning options in 
later peace-building missions. At best, different forms of learning are taken into account at 
a systemic level and when developing leadership practices.
Learning in riskier operations is more demanding. It can be more difficult to find rewarding 
experiences, if existing threats make trust-building between local people and crisis 
management personnel more challenging. Consequently, at the individual level, positive 
experiences from successful events may be rarer in riskier operations. On the other hand, 
success in peace-building in such circumstances may be even more rewarding than in less 
risky ones.
Challenges for organizational learning and change are broad in today’s crisis management, 
both in civilian and military terms. However, the need for learning in military studies and 
strategic thinking is not new. The ideas described above have similarities with John Boyd’s 
(1927-1997) strategic thinking based on flexibility and learning (see Osinga 2007). The 
principle of human security makes the ideas related to learning in crisis management even 
more topical and complex than they used to be in operational planning. 
When developing training practices, responses to the challenges of crisis management 
in the future should evolve. Naturally, professional skills required for single tasks are 
naturally important. In addition, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, cultural awareness, 
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communication and cooperation skills, reflective skills, and the ability to adaptation to a 
new culture and to the return home should all be taken seriously. Reflective skills should 
enable learning new skills during the duties and facilitate the various learning and adaptation 
processes required during and after the mission.
Training before the missions should enhance the adoption of new learning strategies applied 
to the mission. Opportunities for learning during missions should be emphasized in the 
education, training and work practices of both civilian and military crisis management 
personnel. Crisis management missions are learning environments and learning at work is 
an essential part of the learning of crisis management personnel. Promoting learning at work 
requires engagement, goal direction and resources, which means that its development takes 
time (Illeris 2011, 161). 
Tacit knowledge sharing and informal learning processes need to be fully understood when 
developing training and learning practices, and crisis management in general. Education 
and training should favor practices that facilitate a learning cycle from individual to 
organizational learning and back to individual learning. In particular, small actors in crisis 
management have difficulties arranging organizational and individual learning practices. 
Course practices should be developed to promote special and general skills necessary for crisis 
management. Partially courses for military and civilian personnel can be united although 
the differing duties of civilian and military officials should not be confused. Joint courses 
could handle specific themes (like gender) or mission-related issues (such as geography, 
culture, and objectives of the mission). Human security could be a theme that requires 
comprehensive efforts from both civilian and military personnel: education and training 
related to this theme should also be connected with the cultural, historical and social issues 
of a conflict area. 
9.4  Combining individual and institutional levels
This research combines the individual and institutional levels in crisis management. 
Cooperation in the missions makes it possible achieve the goal of human security. It is 
essential that the international community understands how people working for different 
organizations promote peace-building and sustainable peace. The individual, institutional 
and international levels are intertwined. 
At the individual level, crisis management duties seem to be a meaningful period for the 
personnel. At best, employees self-concepts become clearer, their self-realization increases 
and their positive evaluations about themselves strengthen after success in demanding work 
experiences. It is recommended that work in crisis management consists of meaningful 
experiences as often as possible even in the future. The personnel envisage complex situations 
when working to improve conditions in a crisis area. 
The personnel interviewed for this study did not usually acknowledge identity changes 
during the mission, although they had experienced some change in their self-concept. 
Compared to other groups, professional officers were less prone to any identification with 
their mission communities, which appeared to be due to their strong professional identity. 
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With regard to identity construction, a common crisis management personnel identity 
might benefit cooperation in crisis management and decrease stereotypical barriers between 
different personnel groups. However, the processing of common identity cannot be forced, 
although it may be supported by arranging common training and favoring the common 
mission instead of separate organizations or agencies involved in it.
Because crisis management duties may be more challenging in the future, it is necessary 
to facilitate the personnel’s adaptation to the demanding circumstances. This is not only 
a question of professional skills but abilities for reflection which could be strengthened in 
education. Leaders of the missions should understand the needs of the personnel in their 
duties. Working abroad in a culturally different environment and in special circumstances is 
a challenge, and the difference is especially tangible when personnel are isolated from their 
families. Personnel in both civilian and military crisis management should be prepared for 
this difference. Prior to a mission, it may be difficult to understand changes in time and 
space as well as their meaning in personal human relations. Because coming back home may 
be much more demanding than going to work abroad in crisis management duties, special 
arrangements for the employees’ return should be developed. Training courses and services 
provided for the personnel should be equipped with information about these issues. The 
challenge of the return back home should be handled as well. Many interviewees expressed 
that the return home was challenging although not all the interviewees having returned 
home shared this view. Broader opportunities for return conversations or even obligatory 
conversations should be arranged. In the Finnish Defence Forces and CMC Finland, the 
processes of developing return arrangements are advancing.
The framework of competences makes it possible to understand the realities of crisis 
management personnel and to take the individual needs into account. More knowledge 
about the well-being of crisis management personnel is needed. Adler and Britt’s (2003) 
views which emphasize coping with stressors, understanding the meaning of the mission, and 
adequate education and training seem to be relevant in developing good working conditions 
for the personnel who are considering working in complicated crisis areas in the future.
The substance of peace-building should not be forgotten. Civilian means are the grounds 
for reconstructing and rebuilding civil societies. Military means of peace operations are 
required to ensure peaceful development. Comprehensive crisis management requires both 
parts to be united in one mission in a functional manner. Although I have concluded from 
the results that contact and cooperation skills will be important in future crisis management 
and peace-building, the functions of military and civilian crisis management should not be 
confused. Peacekeepers will work in military duties and civilian crisis will work management 
personnel in the civilian duties. On the other hand, competences required for these tasks 
vary in accordance with an individual’s duties. In civilian crisis management, interactive and 
communicative skills will be particularly important, as well as besides specific professional 
skills. 
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9.5  Prospects for further research
Crisis management is based on the efforts of several countries. The combination of countries 
involved varies from one operation to another. Although the interviewees in this research were 
Finnish, some of the results reported earlier are significant for the international community 
as a whole. The analysis of conflict development and progress in crisis management and 
peace-building is the basis for understanding the core competences required in crisis 
management. A comprehensive approach to crisis management is worthy of further 
research. It should facilitate the development of crisis management practices to ensure 
human security. Howard’s (2008) typology is a good theoretical tool at the institutional 
level for understanding and developing learning processes in crisis management. Forms of 
informal learning in crisis management require further research and it could be fruitful to 
compare these results with studies on learning at work. Conceptually and methodologically, 
it could be interesting to compare the tacit knowledge emphasized in the learning literature 
and weak signals described in futures. 
Multi-level analysis of peace-building is required. Diverse organizational levels and their 
relations to potential communication problems should be analyzed in a more detailed manner. 
Because organizations generally provide a positive picture of themselves it may be difficult to 
handle these questions openly. However, it is necessary to understand communication and 
other cooperation problems in order to solve them. One of the main challenges is to enable 
early local involvement strengthening peaceful development. Stronger local involvement 
may change the overall picture of international peace operations. Development work and 
research in the field peace-building and local ownership should also evolve. 
In military theory, effectiveness has been traditionally regarded as an outcome of military 
force: in contemporary complex peace operations, however, this evaluation is not sufficient 
(Egnell 2009). The complexity of conflict resolution and crisis management challenge both 
military studies and peace and conflict studies. For military studies, a major question is the 
integration of the civilian components to collaborative context with the military. Joint efforts 
of both conceptual research and applied studies are needed in order to better understand 
conditions for peace-building and crisis management.
Crisis management will also play an essential role in achieving peaceful development of 
societies in the future. Success in peace-building is a key question for peaceful development. 
In military studies, more research in crisis management is required to better understand 
its essence and how to develop it. While it is sufficient to limit the scope of research to 
military studies only, multidisciplinary perspectives and studies in crisis management will be 
particularly essential in the future. Different perspectives may provide us a broader picture of 
the phenomena that must be understood in peace-building. In addition, efforts for sustainable 
peace processes need to be supported by strong political commitment and research activities. 
Acceptance of this may reveal that achieving peace is challenging and complicated on several 
levels. With humble and communicative orientation, the international community can 
contribute to a more peaceful world than that of today.
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Abstract
Enhancing human security through crisis management 
–  opportunities and challenges for learning
Since the Cold war, armed conflicts have usually started in so-called fragile states and 
poor countries, they have occurred inside states, mostly not between them and non-state 
armed groups have been involved in them. They often lead to conflict cycles, in which 
warfare and more stable circumstances vary. Because conflict mortality often remains under 
the international definition (under 1,000 annual deaths), I call these kinds of conflicts as 
“new conflicts”. The international community has tried to develop the models for crisis 
management and peacekeeping in order to obtain sustainable peace. Human security is 
based on a vision according to which every individual’s human rights should be respected. 
This vision affects how crisis management and peace-building are carried out. 
The present research consists of two empirical parts: a Delphi panel process and interviews 
of crisis management personnel. Fifteen experts on different fields in crisis management 
attended the panel that was carried out in 2008. According to the panel, the futures 
conflicts will often resemble “new conflicts”. In addition, interaction and communication 
abilities are required from crisis management personnel. The panel emphasized interaction 
and communication abilities particularly with regard to the competences of civilian crisis 
management personnel, although these abilities are also important for the military crisis 
management personnel. A clear division of labor between various actors is required in crisis 
management.
The second empirical part of the research consisted of 27 thematic interviews with civilian 
and military crisis management personnel who had served in Kosovo. The interviewees were 
nine professional officers, ten peacekeepers who had been recruited from the reserves, and 
eight individuals who had worked in civilian crisis management. The interviews occurred 
between February and June 2008. 
The results emphasized the significance of interaction and communication abilities because 
many interviewees had solved problems with crisis management personnel and local 
inhabitants. 
Learning processes that occurred in crisis management and that were often positive and 
informal in nature were also highlighted through the interviews. These successful events 
had a positive impact on an individual’s self-confidence and this process can be described 
in terms of self-realization. Learning in crisis management is especially significant if the 
activities are developed in order to enhance human security.
Informal learning should be better taken into account when developing crisis management 
education and opportunities for learning in crisis management. Feedback systems also 
require development. The entire crisis management operation should also receive critical 
feedback if it is necessary in regard to its positive and negative outcomes.
230
Several individuals who have worked in crisis management require adequate feedback in 
regard to their work. Spontaneously many interviewees considered that crisis management 
personnel should have a right to have a debriefing-like return conversation. Even the 
knowledge that such an opportunity exists could be good news for the personnel, even though 
the opportunity might not always be utilized. Compared to starting to work, returning to 
Finland from crisis management duties is more challenging for many individuals
The results of the present study prompt to study crisis management from the perspective 
of learning. It is also essential to develop feedback systems in crisis management to enhance 
individual and organizational learning. A crisis management operation is a learning 
environment. The development of crisis management personnel’s communication and 
interaction skills is essential in order to attain a sustainable peace process, in which the 
inhabitants of a conflict region are also involved.
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Tiivistelmä
Inhimilliseen turvallisuuteen kriisinhallinnan kautta 
–  oppimisen mahdollisuuksia ja haasteita
Kylmän sodan jälkeen aseelliset konfliktit ovat yleensä alkaneet niin sanotuissa hauraissa val-
tioissa ja köyhissä maissa, ne ovat olleet valtioiden sisäisiä ja niihin on osallistunut ei-valtiol-
lisia aseellisia ryhmittymiä. Usein ne johtavat konfliktikierteeseen, jossa sota ja vakaammat 
olot vaihtelevat. Koska kuolleisuus konflikteissa voi jäädä alle kansainvälisen määritelmän 
(1000 kuollutta vuodessa), kutsun tällaisia konflikteja ”uusiksi konflikteiksi”. Kansainväli-
nen yhteisö on pyrkinyt kehittämään kriisinhallinnan ja rauhanrakentamisen malleja, jotta 
pysyvä rauhantila saataisiin aikaiseksi. Inhimillinen turvallisuus perustuu näkemykseen, jos-
sa kunnioitetaan jokaisen yksilön ihmisoikeuksia ja jolla on vaikutusta myös kriisinhallin-
nan ja rauhanrakentamisen toteuttamiseen.
Tutkimukseen kuuluu kaksi empiiristä osaa: Delfoi-tulevaisuuspaneeliprosessin sekä kriisin-
hallintahenkilöstön haastattelut. Viisitoista eri alojen kriisinhallinta-asiantuntijaa osallistui 
paneeliin, joka toteutettiin vuonna 2008. Paneelin tulosten mukaan tulevat konfliktit usein 
ovat uusien konfliktien kaltaisia. Lisäksi kriisinhallintahenkilöstöltä edellytetään vuorovai-
kutus- ja kommunikaatiokykyä ja luonnollisesti myös varsinaisia ammatillisia valmiuksia. 
Tulevaisuuspaneeli korosti vuorovaikutus- ja kommunikaatiotaitoja erityisesti siviilikriisin-
hallintahenkilöstön kompetensseissa, mutta samat taidot painottuivat sotilaallisen kriisin-
hallinnan henkilöstön kompetensseissakin. Kriisinhallinnassa tarvitaan myös selvää työnja-
koa eri toimijoiden kesken.
Kosovossa työskennelleen henkilöstön haastatteluaineisto koostui yhteensä 27 teemahaas-
tattelusta. Haastateltavista 9 oli ammattiupseeria, 10 reservistä rekrytoitua rauhanturvaa-
jaa ja 8 siviilikriisinhallinnassa työskennellyttä henkilöä. Haastattelut toteutettiin helmi- ja 
kesäkuun välisenä aikana vuonna 2008. Haastattelutuloksissa korostui vuorovaikutus- ja 
kommunikaatiotaitojen merkitys, sillä monissa käytännön tilanteissa haastateltavat olivat 
ratkoneet ongelmia yhteistyössä muun kriisinhallintahenkilöstön tai paikallisten asukkaiden 
kanssa. 
Kriisinhallinnassa toteutui oppimisprosesseja, jotka usein olivat luonteeltaan myönteisiä 
ja informaalisia. Tällaisten onnistumisten vaikutus yksilön minäkuvaan oli myönteinen. 
Tällaisia prosesseja voidaan kuvata ”itseä koskeviksi oivalluksiksi”. Kriisinhallintatehtävissä 
oppimisella on erityinen merkitys, jos halutaan kehittää toimintoja inhimillisen turvalli-
suuden edistämiseksi. Siksi on tärkeää, että kriisinhallintakoulutusta ja kriisinhallintatyössä 
oppimista kehitetään ottamaan huomioon oppimisen eri tasot ja ulottuvuudet sekä niiden 
merkitys.
Informaaliset oppimisen muodot olisi otettava paremmin huomioon kriisinhallintakoulu-
tusta ja kriisinhallintatehtävissä oppimista kehitettäessä. Palautejärjestelmää olisi kehitettävä 
eri tavoin. Koko kriisinhallintaoperaation on saatava tarvittaessa myös kriittistä palautetta 
onnistumisista ja epäonnistumisista. 
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Monet kriisinhallinnassa työskennelleet kaipaavat kunnollista palautetta työrupeamastaan. 
Liian rutiininomaiseksi koettu palaute ei edistä yksilön oppimista. Spontaanisti monet 
haastatellut pitivät tärkeänä, että kriisinhallinnassa työskennelleillä olisi mahdollisuus de-
briefing-tyyppiseen kotiinpaluukeskusteluun. Pelkkä tällainen mahdollisuus ilmeisesti voisi 
olla monelle myönteinen uutinen, vaikka tilaisuutta ei hyödynnettäisikään. Paluu kriisin-
hallintatehtävistä Suomeen on monelle haasteellisempaa kuin näissä tehtävissä työskentelyn 
aloittaminen ulkomailla.
Tutkimuksen tulokset kannustavat tutkimaan kriisinhallintaa oppimisen näkökulmasta. On 
myös olennaista, että kriisinhallinnan palautejärjestelmiä kehitetään mahdollisimman hyvin 
edistämään sekä yksilöllistä että organisatorista oppimista kriisinhallinnassa. Kriisinhallin-
taoperaatio on oppimisympäristö. Kriisinhallintahenkilöstön kommunikaatio- ja vuorovai-
kutustaitojen kehittäminen on olennaista tavoiteltaessa kestävää rauhanprosessia, jossa kon-
fliktialueen asukkaatkin ovat mukana.
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Appendix 4.
Interviewees by number and status
Interview number  Status
 01.   DELPHI interviewee, male, military education
 02.   DELPHI interviewee, male, civilian education
  03.  Civilian crisis management interviewee, female 
  04.  DELPHI interviewee, male, civilian education
 05.   DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education
 06.   Reservist interviewee, male 
 07.   Reservist interviewee, male
  08.  Civilian crisis management interviewee, male  
  09.  DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education 
  10.  DELPHI interviewee, male, military education 
  11.  DELPHI interviewee, male, military education 
  12.  DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education 
  13.  Reservist interviewee, male 
   14.  DELPHI interviewee, male, civilian education 
  15.  DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education
  16.  Professional officer interviewee, male  
   17.  Reservist interviewee, male 
  18.  Professional officer interviewee, male 
   19.  Professional officer interviewee, male  
  20.  Civilian crisis management interviewee, female 
   21.  Professional officer interviewee, male 
  22.  DELPHI interviewee, male, civilian education 
  23.  DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education
  24.  Civilian crisis management interviewee, female 
  25.  Professional officer interviewee, male 
   26.  Civilian crisis management interviewee, female  
  27.  Reservist interviewee, female 
   28.  Civilian crisis management interviewee, female    
   29.  Reservist interviewee, female  
   30.  Professional officer interviewee, male    
   31.  Reservist interviewee, male 
  32.  Civilian crisis management interviewee, male 
  33.  DELPHI interviewee, male, civilian education     
  34.  DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education  
  35.  Reservist interviewee, female 
   36.  Reservist interviewee, female  
   37.  Civilian crisis management interviewee, male  
   38.  Professional officer interviewee, male  
  39.  Reservist interviewee, female 
   40.  DELPHI interviewee, male, military education 
   41.  Professional officer interviewee, male 
   42.  Professional officer interviewee, male 
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Appendix 5. 
Interview questions for the crisis management personnel interviews
Ulla Anttila
Helmikuu 2008
Kriisinhallintahenkilöstön haastattelu
1. Osaryhmä
 (A) rauhanturvaajat, puolustusvoimien palkattu henkilöstö
 (B) rauhanturvaajat, reserviläinen
 (C) siviilikriisinhallintahenkilöstö
2. Syntymävuosi  19___
3. Sukupuoli   (a) nainen
   (b) mies
4. Perhesuhteet  Puoliso    a. on
     b. ei ole
   ____ alle 18-vuotiasta lasta
   ____ yli 18-vuotiasta lasta
5. Koulutus  peruskoulu
   opistotaso/ammattikorkeakoulu
   ylempi korkeakoulututkinto/tätä ylempi
  
   nykyiset työtehtävät/tehtävät kotimaassa:
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
6. Työskentely operaatioalueella
Milloin työskentely alkoi?  ___________________
… ja päättyi?   ___________________
Työtehtävät Kosovossa:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
7. Mahdollinen aiempi osallistuminen kriisinhallintatehtäviin
Oletteko ollut mukana useassa operaatiossa?
Paikka ___________________
238
Aika ___________________
Operaatio ja tehtävä ___________________
Paikka ___________________
Aika ___________________
Operaatio ja tehtävä ___________________
8. Miksi hakeuduitte kriisinhallintatehtäviin?
______________________________________________________________________
9. Rauhanturvaamisen/kriisinhallinnan merkitys (A,B,C)
Mikä merkitys kriisinhallintatehtävissä työskentelyllä on ollut ammatilliselle 
kehityksellenne? 
______________________________________________________________________
Onko kriisinhallintatehtävillä ollut vaikutusta siihen, mitä ajattelette omasta 
ammatillisesta roolistanne nykyisin?
______________________________________________________________________
Mikä merkitys kriisinhallintatehtävissä työskentelyllä on ollut minäkuvanne ja 
identiteettinne kehitykselle?
______________________________________________________________________
Ovatko rauhanturvaajat/siviilikriisinhallintahenkilöstö edelleen tärkeä viiteryhmä 
minäkuvanne kannalta?
______________________________________________________________________
Mietittekö kriisinhallintatehtävissä elämän tarkoitukseen liittyviä kysymyksiä?
______________________________________________________________________
10. Tulevaisuus (A, B, C)
Aiotteko lähteä uudelleen kriisinhallintatehtäviin? 
______________________________________________________________________
Miksi haluatte lähteä/ette halua lähteä kriisinhallintatehtäviin uudelleen?
______________________________________________________________________
11.  Kriisinhallintatehtävät, vastaukset pyydetään lyhyesti
Mikä oli kriisinhallintatyössä mielenkiintoisinta? ___________________
- ” -       antoisinta? ___________________
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- ” - vaikeinta? ___________________
- ” -  stressaavinta? ___________________
- ” -  helpointa? ___________________
Koitteko kriisinhallintatehtävissä vaaraa?
______________________________________________________________________
Jos koitte, voitko kuvata tilannetta tai tilanteita?
______________________________________________________________________
Koitteko tehtävissänne muuta vaaran tunnetta – esimerkiksi huolta työtovereista tai 
jonkin lähialueen tilanteesta?
______________________________________________________________________
Oliko teillä turhautumisen hetkiä?
______________________________________________________________________
Jos oli, kuvaisitteko tilannetta tai tilanteita?
______________________________________________________________________
12. Yhteistyö paikallisten siviilien kanssa (A, B, C)
Olitteko tekemisissä paikallisten siviilien kanssa?
______________________________________________________________________
Kuvaisitteko, kuinka yhteistyö heidän kanssaan sujui?
______________________________________________________________________
Mitkä asiat sujuivat parhaiten?
______________________________________________________________________
Jos ongelmia oli, millaisia ne olivat?
______________________________________________________________________
13. Alueella työskentely ja sukupuoli
Olitteko tilanteissa, joissa sukupuolestanne oli hyötyä tai haittaa tehtävien 
suorittamisen kannalta?
______________________________________________________________________
Jos olitte, voitteko kuvailla tilanteita? 
______________________________________________________________________
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Miten suuri merkitys paikallisväestön kanssa työskennellessä oli työntekijän 
sukupuolella?
______________________________________________________________________
14. Yhteistyö siviilikriisinhallinnan toimijoiden kanssa (A, B)
Teittekö yhteistyötä paikalla toimineen siviiliorganisaation  työntekijöiden kanssa – 
esimerkiksi YK, EU, ETYJ tai kansalaisjärjestöt?
______________________________________________________________________
Voitteko kuvailla, kuinka yhteistyö heidän kanssaan sujui?
______________________________________________________________________
Mitkä asiat sujuivat parhaiten?
______________________________________________________________________
Vaihteliko yhteistyön toimivuus organisaatioittain?
______________________________________________________________________
Jos ongelmia oli, millaisia ne olivat?
______________________________________________________________________
Jälleenrakennus edellyttää luottamuksellisia välejä siviileihin, mutta turvallisuuden 
takaamiseksi rauhanturvaajilla on äärimmäisissä tilanteissa oikeus aseellisen voiman 
käyttöön. 
______________________________________________________________________
Koitteko ristiriitaa operaatiossa jälleenrakennustehtävien ja turvallisuuden takaamisen 
välillä?
______________________________________________________________________
15. Yhteistyö rauhanturvaoperaation sotilaiden kanssa / muiden siviilikriisinhallinnan 
toimijoiden kanssa © 
Teitkö yhteistyötä paikalla toimineen rauhanturvaoperaation eli KFOR:in sotilaiden 
kanssa?
______________________________________________________________________
Voitteko kuvailla, kuinka yhteistyö heidän kanssaan sujui?
______________________________________________________________________
Mitkä asiat sujuivat parhaiten?
______________________________________________________________________
Oliko yhteistyössä eroa sotilaiden kansallisuuksista riippuen?
______________________________________________________________________
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Jos eroja oli, kuvaisitteko niitä? 
______________________________________________________________________
Ilmenikö ongelmia yhteistyössä muiden siviilikriisinhallinnan toimijoiden kanssa?
______________________________________________________________________
Jos ongelmia ilmeni, kuvaisitteko millaisia?
______________________________________________________________________
16. Yhteistyö sotilaiden kesken (A, B)
Oliko yhteistyössä sotilaiden kesken ongelmia?
______________________________________________________________________
Jos oli, kuvaisitteko ongelmia?
______________________________________________________________________
17.  Rauhanturvaajien koulutus (A; B)
Vastasiko ennen rauhanturvaoperaatiota saamanne koulutus odotuksianne?
______________________________________________________________________
Saitteko riittäviä yleisiä valmiuksia toimia rauhanturvatehtävissä - esimerkiksi liittyen 
rauhanturvaamiseen yleensä ja sotilaan tehtäviin rauhanturvaoperaatioissa? 
______________________________________________________________________
Saitteko riittäviä erityisiä valmiuksia toimia kyseisissä rauhanturvatehtävissä – 
esimerkiksi liittyen alueen kulttuuriin, maantieteeseen ja erityiskysymyksiin?
______________________________________________________________________
Entä millaista opastusta saitte, miten voisitte oppia uutta itse komennuksen aikana?
______________________________________________________________________
18. Koulutuksen kehittäminen (A, B, C)
Millä tavoin kehittäisit rauhanturvaajien/siviilikriisinhallintahenkilöstön koulutusta 
ja harjoituksia:
▪ ennen operaatiota/työskentelyä?
______________________________________________________________________
▪ operaation/työskentelyn aikana?
______________________________________________________________________
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Mikä saamastanne koulutuksesta oli erityisen hyvää 
a. ennen operaatiota/työskentelyä?
______________________________________________________________________
b. operaation/työskentelyn aikana?
______________________________________________________________________
Oliko jonkin tyyppinen koulutus tarpeetonta
a. ennen operaatiota?
______________________________________________________________________
b. operaation aikana?
______________________________________________________________________
Miten kriisinhallintatyöskentelyn jälkeinen palautejärjestelmä toimi? Oliko sellaista 
lainkaan (henkilöstön oman tai instituution kehityksen mittaamiseksi)? Ts. saitteko 
antaa palautetta tai annettiinko teille palautetta?
______________________________________________________________________
Minkä tyyppistä palautetta olisitte henkilökohtaisesti toivonut mm. oppimisen 
kehittämiseksi?
______________________________________________________________________
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Appendix 6. 
Interview Questionnaire for the Delphi Panel process (1. round)
Ulla Anttila
Helmikuu 2008
Kriisinhallinnan tulevaisuus
Pohjakysymykset Delfoi-menetelmän 1. kierrokselle
Tulevat kriisit ja konfliktit
1. Millaisiksi arvioitte ne konfliktit ja kriisit, joita kansainvälinen yhteisö pyrkii 
estämään ja lopettamaan kriisinhallinnan avulla tulevaisuudessa? Arviointijakso on 
noin 20 vuotta.
______________________________________________________________________
Kriisinhallinnan mallit
2. Mihin suuntaan oletatte kriisinhallintaorganisaatioiden kehittyvän seuraavan 20 
vuoden aikana? Valitkaa vaihtoehdoista yksi, joka parhaiten kuvaa näkemystäsi.
a. Pysyvät nykyisellään
b. Sotilaallisten ja siviiliorganisaatioiden yhteistyö tiivistyy
c. Sotilaallisten ja siviiliorganisaatioiden työ eriytyy ja yhteistyö vähenee
d. Tapahtuu sekä tiivistymistä että eriytymistä, mutta eri kysymyksissä
Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?
______________________________________________________________________
Sotilaallisella kriisinhallinnalla tarkoitetaan sotilaiden organisoimaa rauhanturvaamista ja 
kriisinhallintaa, jonka tarkoituksena on konfliktialueen vakauttaminen. Operaatiot ovat 
yleensä kansainvälisiä ja johtovastuu operaatiosta voi olla esim. YK:lla, Natolla, EU:lla tai 
jollakin maaryhmittymällä. Sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan rinnalla tai siihen liittyen voidaan 
kriisialueella toteuttaa humanitaarista apua, jälleenrakentamista sekä ohjelmia, jotka liitty-
vät hyvän hallinnon kehittämiseen.
3. Oletatteko Suomen osallistumisen kansainväliseen sotilaalliseen kriisinhallintaan 
seuraavan kahdenkymmenen vuoden aikana:
a.  Pysyvän nykyisellään
b.  Kasvavan
c.  Vähenevän
Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?
______________________________________________________________________
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Siviilikriisinhallinnalla tarkoitetaan siviilien organisoimaa kriisinhallintaa. Sitä saatetaan 
toteuttaa itsenäisesti tai sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan rinnalla. Siviilioperaatiossa pyritään 
vakauttamaan oloja mm. avustustoiminnan, jälleenrakentamisen ja hyvän hallinnon kehit-
tämisen kautta. Siviilioperaatiossa saatetaan toteuttaa myös aseistariisuntaa.
4. Oletatteko Suomen osallistumisen kansainväliseen siviilikriisinhallintaan seuraavan 
kahdenkymmenen vuoden aikana:
a.  Pysyvän nykyisellään
b.  Kasvavan
c.  Vähenevän
Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?
______________________________________________________________________
5. Suomelta tullaan tulevaisuudessa pyytämään erityisesti seuraavanlaista kansainvälistä 
tukea edellyttäviin kriisitilanteisiin seuraavanlaista kapasiteettia tai osaamista (voitte 
valita tarpeelliseksi katsomasi määrän vaihtoehtoja):
a.  rauhanneuvotteluapu
b.  demokratiakoulutus
c.  hyvän hallinnon kehittäminen
d.  sotilasjoukkoja, millaisia ________________________________________________
e.  humanitaarinen apu
f.  en pidä Suomelle kohdistuvia erityispyyntöjä todennäköisinä 
g.  muu vaihtoehto ______________________________________________________
Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?
______________________________________________________________________
6. Millä tavoin sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan yhteistyötä pitää tulevaisuudessa 
kehittää?
a.  parantamalla tiedonkulkua 
b.  yhdistämällä siviili- ja sotilasoperaatioita
c. l isäämällä yhdessä toteutettavia tehtäviä
d.  huolehtimalla selkeästä työnjaosta
e.  yhteistyön mallit pitää ratkaista tapauskohtaisesti, ilman mitään tavoitemallia
g.  vaikuttamalla toimijoiden asenteisiin 
Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?
______________________________________________________________________
7. Miten parantaisitte yhteistyötä paikallisten asukkaiden kanssa konfliktialueella? 
______________________________________________________________________
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8. Miten parantaisitte yhteistyötä (vastaajasta riippuen näkemys)
–  siviilikriisinhallinnan sisällä  - ja/tai -
–  sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan sisällä?
Kriisinhallintahenkilöstö
9. Kriisinhallintahenkilöstöltä edellytetään tulevaisuudessa seuraavia ominaisuuksia 
(voitte valita tarpeelliseksi katsomasi määrän vaihtoehtoja):
a.  erityisosaaminen ja -taidot
b.  kielitaito
c.  kulttuurien tuntemus
d.  kyky oppia uusia asioita
e.  vuorovaikutus- ja neuvottelutaidot
f.  paineensieto
g. sosiaalisuus
h.  muu, mikä _________________________________________________________
Mitä pidätte edellä mainituista tekijöistä tärkeimpänä?
a. sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa ___________________________________________
b. siviilikriisinhallinnassa _________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
Kriisinhallintahenkilöstön koulutus
10. Tulevaisuuden kriisinhallintakoulutuksen suurimpina haasteina pidän (valitkaa 
enintään kolme vaihtoehtoa):
a.  erityisosaamisen ja erityistaitojen opettamisen
b.  kielitaidon opetuksen
c.  kulttuurien tuntemuksen opettamisen
d.  varautumisen oppimaan uusia työskentelymenetelmiä
e.   kansainvälisen operaation toimintojen hallinnan opettamisen
f.  muu, mikä ____________________________________________
Mikä haasteista on tulevaisuudessa merkittävin?
sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa  ____________________________________________
siviilikriisinhallinnassa  ____________________________________________
Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?
______________________________________________________________________
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Millä tavoin oppimismahdollisuuksia ja koulutusta kriisinhallintatyöskentelyn aikana 
tulisi kehittää?
______________________________________________________________________
Millä tavoin kehittäisitte kriisinhallintatyöskentelyn jälkeistä palautejärjestelmää? 
Palautteella tarkoitetaan sekä henkilöstön antamaa palautetta organisaatiosta että 
henkilöstön saamaa palautetta omasta toiminnastaan.
______________________________________________________________________
11. Pitääkö sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutusta toteuttaa tulevaisuudessa 
yhdistetysti?
a.  Kyllä
b.  Ei
c.  Vaihtelee tilanteen mukaan.
Jos vastasitte joiltain osin tai kokonaisuudessaan myönteisesti, missä asioissa pidätte 
yhdistettyä koulutusta perusteltuna?
______________________________________________________________________
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Appendix 7.  
Questionnaire for the second round of the Delphi panel process
Ulla Anttila 
MPKK:n tohtoriopiskelija
Kriisinhallinnan tulevaisuus
Väittämät Delfoi-menetelmän 2. kierrokselle, syyskuu 2008
Arvoisa vastaanottaja,
Delfoi-tutkimukseni toisen kerroksen lomake perustuu ensimmäisen kierroksen haas-
tattelujen ja niihin liittyneiden lomakkeiden analyysiin. Tälle lomakkeelle nostetut 
väittämät eivät ole keskiarvotuloksia vaan osa niistä on tullut esiin haastateltavien 
kertomissa perusteluissa.
Arvioitavia väittämiä on lomakkeella yhteensä 33. Toivon, että sinulla on aikaa arvioi-
da ne kaikki ja mahdollisuuksien mukaan myös perustella arviosi. Tutkittavien väittä-
mien avulla pyritään kartoittamaan ajanjaksoa n. 20 vuotta eteenpäin nykyhetkestä. 
Oheinen lomake on tallennettu Word-muotoon siten, että se olisi mahdollista täyttää 
mahdollisimman helposti tekstinkäsittelyä hyödyntäen. Toivon sinun voivan vastata 
3.10.2008 mennessä.  Lomake on mahdollista palauttaa minulle myös paperiversiona 
kotisoitteeseeni. Tässä tapauksessa toivon sinun kirjoittavan nimesi lomakkeeseen ja 
toimitan sinulle mielelläni palautuskuoren, kunhan ilmoitat asiasta.
Toivon, sinun ilmoittavan minulle myös puhelinnumerosi, jotta voisin kysyä puheli-
mitse mahdollisia täydentäviä kommentteja.  Jos sinusta tuntuu mielekkäältä, pelkän 
kirjallisen vastaamisen sijasta voimme käydä lomakkeen läpi myös haastatteluna esim. 
puhelimitse. Pyydän sinun ilmoittavan toiveesi haastattelutyyppisestä lomakkeen läpi-
käymisestä sähköpostitse.
Kuten Delfoi-paneelin ensimmäisellä kierroksella painotin, vastaukset käsitellään tut-
kimuksessa niin, ettei paneeliin osallistuvien henkilöiden henkilöllisyys käy ilmi.
Lomakkeeseen vastaaminen vie aikaa noin tunnin. Suuret kiitokset vaivannäöstäsi lo-
makkeeseen vastatessasi!
 
VASTAUSOHJEET
Väittämiä pyydetään arvioimaan joko yhdellä tai kahdella mittarilla, joiden suurin 
arvo 5 tarkoittaa myönteisintä suhtautumista. 
A. Väittämiin pyydetään vastaamaan käyttäen seuraavaa skaalaa:
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
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3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä 
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
B. Väittämien olennaisuutta koskevaan arvioon pyydetään vastaamaan käyttäen seu-
raavaa skaalaa:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1-5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut-osuudessa toivon sinun voivan painottaa, millä edellytyksin kyseinen näke-
myksesi tulevaisuuden kehityksestä toteutuu.
VÄITTÄMÄT
Tulevat kriisit ja konfliktit
1. Tulevat konfliktit, joihin puututaan kriisinhallinnan keinoin, ovat yleisimpiä Af-
rikassa ja laajassa Lähi-idässä ja konfliktin yhtenä tai useampana osapuolena on ei-
valtiollisia ryhmittymiä.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5): 
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
2. Mahdollinen suurvaltasuhteiden muutos ei vaikuta kriisinhallinnassa noudatetta-
viin periaatteisiin esimerkiksi ihmisoikeuksiin liittyen.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
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5. Täysin samaa mieltä   
Perustelut:
Kriisinhallinnan mallit
3. Tulevaisuudessa sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan yhteistyö tiivistyy, mutta työn-
jaon kehittyminen johtaa vaiheittaisuuteen eri toimijoiden työskentelyssä.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
4. Kokonaisvaltaisen kriisinhallinnan kehittäminen edellyttää kriisinhallinnan eri toi-
mijoiden yhteistyösuhteiden parantamista.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
5. Siviilikriisinhallinnassa Suomen onnistuminen perustuu erikoistumiseen.
Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
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3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
6.  Sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa Suomen onnistuminen perustuu erikoistumiseen.
Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä   
Perustelut:
Sotilaallinen kriisinhallinta 
7. Sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan yksikkökustannusten kasvaessa ulkomaille lähetettä-
vien joukkojen määrä joko pysyy nykyisellään tai vähenee hieman.
B Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
8. Sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa ulkomaille lähetettävien joukkojen määrän kasvu 
edellyttää suurta kansainvälistä painetta ja siitä johtuvia sitoumuksia.
Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
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9. Suomen pitää tukea YK:n rauhanturvaamista järjestämällä soveltuvia koulutuksia 
eri maiden YK-joukoille.
Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
Siviilikriisinhallinta
10. Suomen siviilikriisinhallinnan kasvu on riippuvaista toiminnan tuloksellisuudesta.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
11. Suomen harjoittaman siviilikriisinhallinnan suuntaviivat ovat riippuvaisia EU:n 
linjauksista.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
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4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
12. Siviilikriisinhallinnan kehittyminen edellyttää kasvavaa yhteistyötä myös kehitys-
politiikan toimijoiden kanssa.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
Suomeen kohdistuvat erityispyynnöt kriisinhallinnassa ja rauhanrakentamisessa sekä 
maamme mahdollinen erikoistuminen näillä aloilla
13. Suomeen kohdistuvat erityispyynnöt rauhanneuvotteluavusta ovat riippuvaisia yk-
sittäisten neuvottelijoiden menestyksestä rauhanneuvotteluissa.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
14. Suomeen kohdistuvat erityispyynnöt kriisinhallinnassa ja rauhanrakentamisessa 
edellyttävät Suomelta erikoistumista, joka osoitetaan kansainvälisissä yhteyksissä.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
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15. Suomeen ei kohdistu erityispyyntöjä kriisinhallinnassa ja rauhanrakentamisessa.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
Sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan yhteistyön kehittäminen tulevaisuudessa
16. Tiedonkulku ja selkeä työnjako ovat avainasiat sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallin-
nan yhteistyön kehittämisessä.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
17. Yhteistyön mallintaminen esimerkiksi 3–7 rakenteellisesti erilaiseen yhteistyömal-
liin kansainvälisten toimijoiden kesken helpottaisi kriisinhallinnan suunnittelua ja 
koulutusta.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
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4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
Yhteistyö paikallisten asukkaiden kanssa konfliktialueella
18. Paikalliset asukkaat on saatava mukaan jälleenrakennushankkeisiin jo suunnitte-
luvaiheessa. 
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
19. Internet-pohjaista tiedonjakoa on hyödynnettävä kansainvälisten siviili- ja sotilas-
organisaatioiden yhteistyössä paikallisten asukkaiden kanssa kriisialueella.
Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
Kriisinhallintahenkilöstö
20. Asiantuntijuutta tai erityisammattitaitoa vaativien tehtävien osuus kasvaa tulevai-
suudessa sekä siviili- että sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
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21. Siviilikriisinhallinnassa vuorovaikutus- ja neuvottelutaidot on otettava huomioon 
jo kriisinhallintahenkilöstön rekrytointivaiheessa.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
22. Sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa vuorovaikutus- ja neuvottelutaidot on otettava 
huomioon jo kriisinhallintahenkilöstön rekrytointivaiheessa.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
erustelut:
23. Siviilikriisinhallintaan on kehitettävä uudenlainen rekrytointijärjestelmä, joka ta-
kaa monipuolisen henkilöstön saatavuuden eri tehtäviin.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
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24. Sotilaalliseen kriisinhallintaan on kehitettävä uudenlainen rekrytointijärjestelmä, 
joka takaa monipuolisen henkilöstön saatavuuden eri tehtäviin.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
25. Jotta sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan kansainvälisiin tehtäviin saadaan tulevaisuudes-
sa rekrytoiduksi sotilaallista ammattihenkilöstöä, pitää ylennyksissä ylimpiin upseeri-
arvoihin olla yhtenä perusteluna ulkomaanpalvelus.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
Kriisinhallintahenkilöstön koulutuksen haasteet
26. Siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutukseen on kehitettävä yhteiset standardit kansainvä-
listen organisaatioiden ja alueen valtioiden kesken, jotta voimavarat saadaan käytettyä 
tehokkaasti ja päällekkäiseltä koulutukselta vältytään.
Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
27. Siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutuksessa tärkeintä koulutettavan henkilön kriisinhal-
lintehtävien ja operaation luonteeseen tutustumisen lisäksi on alueen paikalliskulttuu-
rien, historian sekä konfliktin taustan perustietojen opetus.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
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B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
28. Sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan koulutuksessa on tärkeintä koulutettavan henkilön 
kriisinhallintehtävien ja sotilaallisten valmiuksien sekä operaation luonteeseen tutus-
tumisen lisäksi on alueen paikalliskulttuurien, historian sekä konfliktin taustan perus-
tietojen opetus.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
29. Jokaiselle siviilikriisinhallinnan tehtävissä ulkomailla työskennelleelle on tarjot-
tava mahdollisuus henkilökohtaisen palautteen antamiseen ja saamiseen sekä ns. de-
briefing-keskusteluun.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä 
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
 3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä 
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä 
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
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30. Jokaiselle sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan tehtävissä ulkomailla työskennelleelle on 
tarjottava mahdollisuus henkilökohtaisen palautteen antamiseen ja saamiseen sekä ns. 
debriefing-keskusteluun.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
31. Kriisinhallintahenkilökunnalta saatu palaute on kerättävä talteen systemaattisesti 
ja hyödynnettävä kriisinhallinnan jatkokehittämisessä.
A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
Sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutuksen toteuttaminen yhdistetysti
32. Tulevaisuudessa sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutus kannattaa toteuttaa 
yhdistetysti moduuleina, jotka esimerkiksi kattavat tietyn asiakokonaisuuden tai jon-
kin alueen tilanteeseen liittyvät asiat. 
A Arvio väittämästä (1–5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
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2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen 
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
33. Sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutus on tarkoituksenmukaista järjestää 
kansallisesti eri organisaatioissa, jotka tekevät yhteistyötä yhteiskoulutuksessa. 
A. Arvio väittämästä (1-5):
1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä
Perustelut:
B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):
1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen
Perustelut:
SUURET KIITOKSET VAIVANNÄÖSTÄSI!  
Mahdolliset lisäkommentit lomakkeesta tai aihepiiristä: 
______________________________________________________________________
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